Health sector reform in Thailand: Policy implementation in three provinces. by Songkramchai, Leethongdee
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
Health sector reform in Thailand: Policy implementation in three
provinces.
   
Leethongdee, Songkramchai
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Leethongdee, Songkramchai (2007)  Health sector reform in Thailand: Policy implementation in three provinces..
thesis, Swansea University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42881
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 Health Sector Reform in Thailand: 
Policy Implementation in Three Provinces
Songkramchai Leethongdee
A thesis submitted to the University of Wales Swansea in fulfilment of 
the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Health Science)
May 2007
ProQuest Number: 10821271
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10821271
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
DECLARATION AND STATEMENTS
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where 
correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly 
marked in a footnote(s).
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is 
appended.
Signed...........................................................................  (candidate)
STATEMENT 2
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for 
inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed (candidate)
Date
Date
Signed...........................................................................  (candidate)
Date........................ ......................................................
SUMMARY
This thesis examines the implementation of the universal coverage (UC) health care 
reforms in Thailand, introduced from 2001 onwards. It aims to investigate the interaction 
between top-down and bottom-up influences on policy implementation in the local health 
system, based on comparative case studies of three provinces. The study was conceived as 
a ‘policy ethnography’, an approach which uses mixed methods to investigate the 
perspectives of local policy actors.
The Thai Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) did not specify all aspects of the UC policy 
‘blueprint’ in detail, and allowed provinces to make important decisions in certain areas, 
such as the choice of financing model. The research found that it was generally actors at 
the higher levels of the provincial health administrations who had actual potential to 
influence the way the reforms were implemented. However, there were interesting 
examples where middle-level provincial actors gained influence at particular junctures of 
the implementation process, usually either when they were in a strategic position with 
regard to the roll-out of a particular policy, or if they could get support from powerful 
allies higher up the MoPH hierarchy. The degree of engagement and knowledge of lower- 
level actors were more limited, and many at this level saw the reforms as overly top-down. 
Over the period covered by the study, the relative influence of top-down and bottom-up 
influences ebbed and flowed. There was a cycle whereby local adaptations usually led to a 
reaction at the centre, and further policy statements and top-down directions.
Many problems arose in implementing the UC reforms, including difficulties in achieving 
progress on the original objectives of reducing geographical inequalities of funding and 
workforce distribution, problems in allocating resources fairly within the local health 
system, lack of progress in developing primary care, and tension between curative and 
preventative approaches.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The research idea
This thesis examines the implementation of Thailand’s universal coverage (UC) health 
care reforms, introduced from 2001 onwards, using case studies from three north-eastern 
provinces. The thesis considers both the significance of these reforms in their own right, 
and what they show us about the importance of the ‘implementation’ phase in the health 
policy making process.
With respect to the latter, the thesis supports earlier work that highlights the complexity of 
real world health policy implementation, and the possibility that actors at lower as well as 
higher levels can influence the shape of policy as it is put into effect (Walt and Gilson 
1994). The Thai case study sheds further light on the debate between ‘top down’ theorists 
who see the policy template and implementation strategy devised by higher level actors as 
the keys to successful roll-out of policy, and ‘bottom-up’ theorists who attach more 
importance to the influence of lower level actors, and portray implementation as a ‘process 
of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy 
into effect and those upon whom action depends’ (Barrett and Fudge 1981:4). As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, various arguments have been advanced to support these two 
positions, and there has been further theoretical development in terms of mixed 
approaches. Probably the relative influence of top-down and bottom-up influences on 
policy implementation differs according to context and time. Empirical studies such as this 
one can help establish the extent of variation and the factors involved.
The specific interest of the Thai case lies in its significance as a rare example of UC 
reform in a lower middle-income country, which aims for equity and comprehensiveness at 
a time when many health care reforms seek to harness markets and the price mechanism. 
Since the 1980s major health sector reforms have been introduced in many countries 
throughout the world with the aims of improving overall health and client satisfaction, 
increasing technical and allocative efficiency, and sometimes with providing more 
equitable access (Berman 1995; Mills et al. 2001; Roberts et al. 2004). Economic pressures 
and the influence of donor agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) meant that many reform efforts were concerned with developing 
mixed public and private systems, and promoting competition and economic efficiency
through the involvement of independent providers in secondary care (Cassels 1995; 
Gwatkin 1994; Xing-Yuan and Sheng-Lan 1995). To a large extent this displaced an 
earlier drive by bodies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) towards ‘health for 
all’ and more inclusive coverage. The Thai case may be set alongside a small number of 
other middle-income countries which have ‘bucked’ this trend and introduced reforms in 
which Governments seek to engineer a planned expansion of coverage to the whole 
population. Arguably, this represents a second wave of health sector reforms whose 
objectives and methods are different from the earlier health sector reforms of the 1980s 
and 90s.
The rest of the chapter will: set out the research questions addressed in the study; examine 
the trends in policy development alluded to above in more detail; discuss the background 
to reform in Thailand, and describe the structure of the Thai health system and the 
specifics of the UC reforms.
1.2 Research questions and objectives
The general concerns outlined above lead into the research questions and objectives set out 
in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Research questions and objectives
Research Idea Research questions Research objectives
What is the nature 
o f interaction 
between top-down 
and bottom-up 
influences on the 
implementation of 
UC policy in the 
local health 
system?
1. Who were the main actors involved in the 
processes o f the UC policy implementation 
in local health system?
1. To map out the networks of  
actors and power relationships in the 
three provinces
2. What were the channels of 
communication between lower level and 
higher level actors?
2. To examine how high level 
commands were communicated 
from the central departments to 
local actors, and whether feedback 
in the reverse direction occurred.
3. What changes occurred in the 
organisation o f local health services as the 
UC reforms were implemented?
3. To examine the changing of 
organisation o f health services in the 
three case study provinces
4. How much scope did local actors have to 
influence the content o f the reforms or the 
approach to implementation taken?
4. To determine whether there are 
differences o f approach between 
provinces and how far local actors 
influenced the content o f health care 
reform in each area.
5. Given the importance o f the financing 
mechanism in the UC reforms, how was 
that mechanism adapted to local conditions?
5. To explore the financing 
frameworks applied in the three 
provinces.
Table 1.1 Research questions and objectives (continued)
Research Idea Research questions Research objectives
6. What were the perspectives of local 
actors on the UC reforms, their feasibility 
and the implementation approaches adopted 
nationally and locally?
6. To examine the perspectives of  
local actors on aspects o f the 
reforms, their feasibility and 
implementation.
7. What were the problems encountered in 
implementing UC policies and how far did 
they differ in the three provinces?
7. To identify problems encountered 
and assess the extent of  
commonality and difference in the 
three provinces
8. What are the areas of autonomy and the 
constraints affecting local actors?
8. To offer a perspective on 
implementation theory that assesses 
the relative importance o f top-down 
and bottom-up influences, and the 
areas they affect.
9. To contribute to scholarly 
understanding o f the relative 
significance of ‘policy formation’ 
and ‘policy implementation’ in 
health care reform.
Rather than treating these questions as separate issues that should be answered in serial 
order, the thesis will address them via a narrative account of the chronology of reform in 
the three case study provinces. Thus the networks of local actors, their relations with 
higher level actors, the changing organisation of local services, the space for local decision 
making and variation in financing regimes, perspectives on the reforms, problems 
encountered, and the balance between constraint and influence, will be described and 
analysed with reference to events in the three Thai provinces of Mahasarakham, Kalasin 
and Roi Et.
1.3 From primary health care to health sector reform and UC
The period preceding the formulation of the UC reforms in Thailand fits the general 
pattern described in the wider health policy literature of a shift in focus from developing 
primary health care (PHC) to systematic health sector, reform (HSR), with the additional 
qualification mentioned above that the Thai reforms may be part of a second wave of 
reform which puts more emphasis on equity as opposed to markets and economic 
efficiency.
By the mid-1970s international health agencies and experts were beginning to reassess the 
usefulness of traditional disease-focused programmes and examine alternative approaches
to health system development in developing countries. New community-based health 
projects were seen to be achieving more promising outcomes than many conventional 
programmes. This led some analysts to propose a bottom-up approach, emphasising 
prevention and managing health problems in their social contexts, which they contrasted 
with the top-down, high-tech approach associated with the traditional medical science 
perspective.
A key event at this juncture was the international Conference on Primary Health Care, held 
in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan in 1978, and sponsored by the WHO and UNICEF. This 
resulted in the famous Alma-Ata Declaration which endorsed the goal of ‘Health for All 
by the Year 2000’, to be attained mainly by improvements in primary care (WHO 1995), 
and set the direction of WHO strategy for more than 20 years. This approach quickly 
became known as the PHC approach.
The Conference declared that health is fundamental human right and that attainment of the 
highest possible level of health was an important worldwide social goal. This was 
incorporated into the WHO’s Constitution, which defined the objective of the organisation 
as ‘the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of health’ (WHO 1981: p. 31). 
Much of the debate in the following years was concerned with what that level might be, 
and how it could best be achieved in developing countries. One important notion which 
arises from the definition of PHC is that it provides ‘essential health care’. In its broadest 
sense essential health care may refer to all concerns, issues or factors that are necessary for 
ensuring people’s well being and development. But for some analysts PHC could also refer 
to the basic or fundamental level of care offered in a particular system, which in the real 
world differed from country to country, depending in resources and national priorities. 
Analysts differed in their views of whether the goal should be a global effort to introduce 
comprehensive services as widely as possible or the more modest approach of first 
building primary care services to a basic standard. There were also questions about how 
far a selective approach should be taken to combating particular disease threats which 
might shape a country’s health profile.
The more ambitious conceptions of primary care development were expensive and 
required extensive health care system development, so that results across the world were 
mixed and often disappointing. Some health analysts argue that comprehensive primary
-5 -
health care was an experiment that failed, whilst others contend that it was never truly 
tested. Green (1999) has argued that there are many obstacles to implementation of a PHC 
approach, including resources but also a failure to translate the philosophy into concrete 
plans and strategies. Problems include the misinterpretation of the PHC concept, selective 
PHC strategies, resistance to change and centralised management and planning 
infrastructures which do not support community-based initiatives. While the PHC strategy 
did bring benefits in many areas, many long standing health problems continued to exist, 
including major inequities in access and health care delivery. The design of existing health 
programs and activities were often blamed for inefficiency and ineffectiveness, putting 
them under pressure to be re-oriented and re-organised (WHO 2004).
In the 1980s the emphasis began to swing away from gradual development of PHC 
towards more comprehensive health sector reform, largely under the influence of donor 
agencies. In 1980 the World Bank began direct support for health projects, and playing a 
more proactive role in deciding health policy (Walt 2001). Financing strategies and ‘cost- 
effectiveness’ moved to the centre of the policy agenda (Musgrove 1995; Hearst and Bias 
2001; Bias and Hearst 2002). As the World Bank and IMF emerged as the largest funders 
for developing countries these organisations began to set conditions on health loans, and 
increasingly to link funding to compliance with ‘structural adjustment’ policies, which 
among other things required better control of public expenditure and more use of markets 
and competition in the health care system.
Generally, the health reforms of the 1980s and 1990s required greater use of markets and 
the overhaul of financing systems to improve efficiency and cost containment. The US 
‘managed care’ model has exerted considerable influence on many health reform 
initiatives in developing countries, both at terms of the general private health insurance 
approach and specific micro-level reimbursement techniques, such as diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs). Places as diverse as Brazil, Chile and Argentina, the Philippines and Hong 
Kong have used American-style market strategies and encouraged the involvement of 
international managed care companies like Aetna, EXXEL and Cigna (Stocker et al. 1999; 
Brudevold et al. 1999). Even the People’s Republic of China, once an advocate of free 
treatment for all, has turned its back on this seemingly unattainable goal and moved 
towards a largely privatised system where access depends on ability to pay (Blumenthal 
and Hsiao 2005).
-6 -
However, against this trend towards managed care, a number of middle-income countries, 
such as Taiwan (Lu and Hsiao 2003), South Korea (Anderson 1989), Turkey (Saltman and 
Figueras 1998) and Mexico (Knaul and Frenk 2005), introduced reforms that were more 
concerned with equity than economic efficiency, and explicitly aimed to achieve UC for 
their populations. Although this may be seen as in line with the long-standing WHO policy 
of ‘health for all’, this is a relatively untried policy in developing countries, which many 
critics have suggested may be unaffordable. The situation by the late 1990s was that most 
countries with established UC systems were developed nations, which had had those 
systems for some time. Rather than being associated with the recent wave of health sector 
reforms, these systems mainly dated back to an earlier era of more comprehensive welfare 
state reform after World War II. Tax-funded, publicly provided systems were introduced 
in the United Kingdom, most of the Scandinavian countries and some Mediterranean 
countries. In the two decades after the war many continental European countries that 
favoured a ‘Bismarckiarf social insurance model, progressively extended coverage to the 
point where UC was achieved.
Thus the move by a number of middle-income countries to develop their health care 
systems in this direction was an interesting development without recent precedent, and 
involved considerable risk. Indeed, the UC reforms in the Philippines, due to be phased in 
over a number of years, have already proved to be unsustainable (Obermann et al. 2006). 
These reforms captured the attention of the policy community in several developing 
countries including Thailand (Nitayarumphong 1997; Nitayarumphong and Mills 1998). 
Thailand’s decision to follow the same route is significant because, even if one discounts 
the failed reform attempt in the Philippines, the Thai case shows that the income threshold 
at which countries are achieving universal coverage is getting lower (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: The income per capita GDP of middle-income countries with recent UC 
reforms
Country $ (WB Atlas Method) World Rank this indicator
Mexico 6,790 70
Turkey 3,750 89
Thailand 2,490 104
Philippines 1,170 136
Adapted from: 2006 World Development Indicators, Table 1.1. Size of Economy. World Bank. 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section 1 .htm (Accessed 3 October 2006)
Admittedly the categorisation of diverse systems into the ‘UC’ box is not without 
problems. Sri Lanka, which has often been characterised as a UC system since moving in 
that direction under British influence, has been excluded from the list here because the 
services on offer did not extend far beyond basic primary care. Argentina, also often 
classed as a UC system, since the populist reforms introduced under Peron, appears to 
have been shifting in the opposite direction and its most recent reforms are about 
reinvigorating markets (Bertranou 1999, Lloyd-Sherlock 2005).
1.4 Thailand’s movement from PHC to UC Reforms
As in many other countries, the concept of PHC was adopted and implemented nationwide 
after the Alma-Ata conference in 1978. In Thailand PHC policies were taken forward 
through a network of health volunteers, whose skills and supporting infrastructure were 
upgraded over time. Other initiatives included establishing a village drug fund, a multi­
purpose village fund, and setting up Community Primary Health Care Centres (CPHCC). 
These schemes were implemented actively at the beginning but faced problems of 
sustainability. Despite the limited success of PHC in many areas, implementation of the 
PHC strategy started changing ways of thinking on the role of the public in health 
promotion and raising the importance of first-line health services.
The ‘health for all* aspect of the PHC policies was reflected in a series of limited financing 
reforms to improve access to care for certain specific populations. In 1975, the Medical 
Welfare Scheme (MWS) was established to serve the poor. Then in 1980 the Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) was launched to provide care for public employees, 
and from 1990 formal sector employees were covered by the Social Security Scheme 
(SSS). The MWS and CSMBS were financed from general tax revenues while the SSS 
relied on tripartite contributions. The Government advanced different rationales for the 
schemes depending on the different groups whom it tried to protect. The poor were 
protected because of their inability to pay for their health expenses and the need for 
redistributive policies to counter unequal access to care. Health benefits were provided to 
civil servants as a fringe benefit to compensate their relatively low salaries. The SSS, 
including its health benefits was seen as a necessary development to support the growth of 
an industrialized sector that was reckoned to be crucial to the national economy. Although 
all these schemes had different benefit packages, provider payments and government
budget subsidies, which would affect equity among the schemes, they developed to cover 
about 70% of the total population by 2000.
Thailand’s period of incremental health system development lasted through most of the 
1980s and 1990s without significant external pressure to change course, and no apparent 
appetite for radical financing or market reforms from the indigenous policy community. 
One theme from reform initiatives elsewhere that did attract domestic interest was 
decentralisation. This had a resonance with the PHC policies since these were often linked 
to ideas of community empowerment and a turn away from the top-down organisation of 
services. But it also appealed to analysts who favoured a more pluralistic system of 
providers, and the transfer of some MoPH hospitals to autonomous status. There was 
much debate in health policy circles about the pros and cons of decentralisation policies, 
with some expressing concern about issues such as:
• the possible fragmentation of local health providers networks and the effect on the 
referral system;
• governance, capacity and transparency in local politics and administration;
• the capabilities and efficiency of local administrations;
• the future employment status and security of the workforce.
With the economic crisis of 1997, it seemed that Thailand would at last be propelled into a 
cycle of health system reforms of the kind seen in many donor-assisted nations affected by 
the ‘conditionality’ of loans. Following the financial crash, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) offered a social sector reform loan (SSRL) to the Thai government covering 
education, labour and health. The loan conditions required the MoPH to allow MoPH 
hospitals to become autonomous starting in 1999, and to introduce other changes to scale 
down the central bureaucracy (such as forcing the public universities to become 
autonomous organisations). A bureaucracy reform policy was passed by cabinet in 1997 
and soon began to impact on public sector organisations. The Civil Service Early 
Retirements Project launched in 1998 aimed to lose 90,000 posts in the public sector 
(CSCO 2000). The Decentralisation Act 1999 forced the MoPH to implement policies in 
line with the National Decentralisation Plan, mainly concerned with the transfer of 
functions to local government. Then in 2000 a national Health Sector Reform Office
(HSRO) was established in 2000 to prepare a draft of the National Health Bill and assist 
the Government in taking forward health sector reforms.
However, the events that followed gave the reforms a new direction more in line with the 
aspirations of local experts and Thai civil society groups than any reform agenda imposed 
by international bodies. A group of reformist civil servants and professionals who had 
long harboured plans for an extension of coverage to the whole population saw the 
Government’s avowed commitment to health sector reform as the opportunity to bring this 
about. At the same time the HSRO began a campaign to engage with civil society groups 
in debate about the shape of the nation health system, which went well beyond the issue of 
decentralisation and again raised the issue of universal coverage. Another important piece 
in the jigsaw was the emergence of a new political party, the Thai Rak Thai (‘Thai’s Love 
Thai’s’- TRT) Party, which promised to redraw the landscape of national politics and 
introduce policies for the benefit of the whole Thai population. Under its charismatic 
leader, Taksin Shinawatra, the TRT party went into the 2001 general election with a series 
of radical policies, including one that past governments had said was unaffordable -  the 
introduction of UC health care.
1.5 Organisational structure of the Thai health care system
By 2001 the Thai health care system took the form of a tiered administrative structure, 
headed by a Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), with the administrative tiers extending 
down to the regional, provincial and district levels. This section will briefly describe that 
structure, which was under challenge from both the 2001 UC reforms and the earlier set of 
decentralisation reforms.
The MoPH is the principal agency responsible for promoting, supporting, controlling and 
coordinating health care for Thai citizens. Several other agencies have significant roles in 
medical and health development programmes, including the Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Defence, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, certain State enterprises 
and the private sector. The facilities managed by these agencies include hospitals that 
provide primary, secondary and tertiary care. However, the mainstream health care system 
and the management of public sector facilities are under the general control of the MoPH.
The administration structure of the MoPH is divided into two levels: the central and 
provincial administrations. The central administration is comprised of 10 agencies: (1) the 
Office of the Minister; (2) the Office of the Permanent Secretary; (3) Department of 
Medical services; (4) Department for Development of Thai Traditional and Alternative 
Medicine; (5) Department of Mental Health; (6) Department of Disease Control; (7) 
Department of Health; (8) Department of Health service Support; (9) Department of 
Medical Science; and (10) Food and Drug Administration. In addition, the MoPH 
supervises certain other agencies which are not in the bureaucratic line of command such 
as the Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI), the National Health Security Office 
(NHSO) and the Government Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO) (MoPH 2002b). These 
agencies are independent organisations, with duties specified under separate legislation. It 
should be noted that according to the Public Organisation Act, 1999, four categories of 
health units - regional, general, community hospitals and health centres - are expected to 
be transformed into autonomous public organisations when the necessary preparations are 
complete. To date, only one community hospital has achieved autonomous public 
organization status: Banphaew hospital in Samut Sakhom province.
The provincial administration comprised the provincial health offices (PHOs) in 
Thailand’s 75 provinces (excluding Bangkok); regional, provincial and community 
hospitals; district health offices (DHO) and the health centres. These are the public sector 
health agencies that oversee the health system at the local level. They are the main 
organisations responsible for the front-line implementation of health policy, including the 
UC reforms examined in this study. The relationship between the central and provincial 
administrations are shown in Figure 1.1
Figure 1.1: Organisational structure and the relationship between the central and 
provincial administrations in the health care system
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1.6 The Universal Coverage Reforms: Health Sector Reform in Thailand
The UC policies were implemented in a series of stages starting in April 2001. 
Nevertheless, the policy marks a sharp break with the incremental approach of gradual 
increases in the health care coverage provided for the Thai population that had 
characterised the preceding two decades. As suggested earlier, the immediate factor 
precipitating the change of policy was the 2001 election victory of the TRT Party, which 
came to power on a populist manifesto in which health reform was an important element. 
In its electoral campaign the party had presented its new health policy to the people using 
the slogan: ‘30 baht treats all diseases’. This referred to the proposal that Thai citizens 
requiring health care would be able to obtain it in return for a co-payment of just over 40 
new pence in British currency. The scheme quickly became known as the “30 baht treats 
all diseases project’ or the ‘30 baht scheme’. The policy built on plans that had long 
existed among a reformist group in the MoPH for UC health care, and incorporated many 
of their specific technical proposals. However, the political origins of the policy had 
significant consequences in areas such as the speed of implementation, and the slow 
follow-up of the initial health care financing reforms with linked changes advocated by the 
MoPH reformists.
The MoPH experts had been examining the feasibility of an extension of coverage for 
many years. Thus certain specific features of the 2001 reforms, such as capitation funding 
and the contracting mechanism used, had emerged out of a lengthy policy formation 
process which paid careful attention to international experiences (Nitayarumphong et al. 
1993; Nitayarumphong 1997; Nitayarumphong and Mills 1998; Pannarunothai et al. 2000; 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004), as well as the patterns of economic incentives and costs 
associated with different funding models (Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999; Pramualratana 
and Wibulpolprasert 2002).
The central plank of the reforms was a new public health insurance scheme which provides 
treatments within a defined ‘core’ benefits package to registered members for a co­
payment of 30 baht per chargeable episode (Towse et al. 2004). Eligibility is established 
by presenting a gold registration card, issued by the local Contracted Unit for Primary Care 
(CUP) and entitling the holder to care in their home area. Older people, children and the
poor receive a special ‘Taw Tahaarf (‘T’) version of the registration card and pay no fee.1 
Drugs prescribed are limited to those on a national drugs list, certain high-cost or chronic 
disease treatments are subject to cost ceilings, and there was initially no entitlement to 
anti-retroviral therapy or haemodialysis (though these were later brought within the 
scheme). Treatment outside the area of registration is limited to accident and emergency 
care. Finance for the scheme comes mainly from public revenue paid to local contracted 
units on the basis of population. The reforms raised public health expenditure from about 
66.25 billion baht in 2000/01 to 72.78 billion baht in 2001/02 (MoPH 2004), putting the 
first year cost of reform at a modest 90 million pounds sterling including inflation.
The 30 baht scheme filled the coverage gap left by the existing public health insurance 
schemes (NaRanong et al. 2002). By the 1990s Thailand was providing comprehensive 
health care to public servants and workers in larger enterprises though the Civil Servant 
Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS), the Social Security Scheme (SSS) and the 
Workmen’s Compensation Scheme (WCS). About a fifth of the population were covered 
by a subsidized voluntary health card scheme (HCS), which offered care to families for an 
annual fee of 500 baht (£7.20 pounds sterling). There was also a more restricted Medical 
Welfare Scheme (MWS) for the poor, and the ‘Type B Exemption Scheme’ which waived 
payments for the uninsured poor at the discretion of public health staff (Suraratdecha et al. 
2005). The 30 baht scheme superseded the HCS, MWS and ‘Type B Exemption’, and 
extended coverage to the whole registered population. Thus the Thai population was 
covered by the three main public financing schemes- the SSS, CSMBS and the UCS - with 
about three quarters covered by latter. Prior to the universal coverage reforms, the public 
schemes left about 30% of the Thai people without coverage, and a further 32% with only 
means-tested assistance under the MWS (Wibulpolprasert 2005).
1.6.1 The ‘big bang9 reform phase
Most commentators regard the Thai case as an example of ‘big bang’, rather than 
incremental reform. Although aspects of the reforms were phased, the ‘big bang reform’ is 
an appropriate description of the initial rapid effort to extend coverage within a short-time 
scale. Although several generations of reform-minded MoPH policy makers had sought to
1 Taw Tahaan (VI) is the 23rd letter o f the Thai alphabet, and in this context signifies ‘tong’ or gold
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widen coverage and made modest progress in that direction, no Government had been 
willing to foot the bill for major reform. The January 2001 election victory of the Thai 
Rak Thai (TRT) Party opened the way for change, and brought in a government who 
wished to push for an early move to UC. Despite advice from senior economists in favour 
of pilots and gradual implementation over 3 years (Siamwalla 2001; HSRI 2001), a 
powerful coalition formed which supported rapid nation-wide implementation. The MoPH 
reformers who perceived a limited window of opportunity, lined up alongside TRT 
politicians keen to make good on election promises, and civil society groups. A pilot 
study already underway in 6 provinces in April 2001 was quickly re-labelled as the first 
stage of implementation of the UC reforms; 15 additional provinces were brought on board 
in June 2001 and the scheme was extended to cover all provinces (except some Bangkok 
districts) by October 2001. Finally, complete coverage of the country was achieved in 
April 2002.
The UC scheme is financed mainly by general tax revenues and the budget is allocated on 
a per capita basis to Contracted Units for Primary Care (CUPs). The payment per insured 
member was 1,202 baht (just over £17 sterling) in the FY 2001-02 and 2002-03, 1,308 
baht in 2003-04 and 1,396 baht in 2004-05. The people are required to register with the 
CUP, which provides primary care services and arranges referrals to secondary care. 
Access to hospital care requires referral from the CUP, except in the case of accidents and 
emergencies. Providers are paid by the CUP on a capitation basis for the Out-patient Care 
(OP) and per case - based on Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs) - for in-patient care (IP). 
Unlike the North American DRGs system, the payments for in-patient care are subject to a 
global budget. Personal preventive and health promotion (P&P) services are also part of 
the benefits package and are paid to providers on a capitation basis plus a performance- 
related element. Providers also keep the 30 baht co-payments, though it has been 
calculated that less than 2% of total receipts comes from this source (Tangcharoensathien 
et al. 2005).
The policy slogan of the reformers might have been: ‘first achieve coverage’. The 30 baht 
scheme extended the insured population from about 25 million (40% of the population) in 
2001 (Wibulpolprasert 2005) to above 59 million (95.5%) in 2004 (Jongudomsuk 2004). 
Although the original policy design called for a single fund, it was decided to delay 
merging the public insurance schemes so that universal coverage initially depended on a
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patchwork of the new and old schemes (HSRI2001). The initial plan was to pool resources 
from the existing four health insurance schemes into on UC scheme but this met resistance 
from quarters such as the civil service and the labour unions (Tangcharoensathien and 
Jongudomsuk 2004). The government therefore decided to fund the 30 baht scheme by 
pooling the MoPH budgets for public hospitals, others health facilities, and MWS and 
voluntary health card scheme and providing some additional money. This could be done 
without legislation, enabling progress to be made while legislation was prepared and 
debated. Some early problems attracted media criticism, such as the absence of provision 
to treat gold card holders away from their home area, and claims that the 30 baht scheme 
provided lower quality care than the traditional schemes (Suraratdecha et al. 2005). 
However, the rapid expansion of coverage was widely perceived to be a major success 
story.
The initial nationwide roll-out represented the first steps necessary to get the gold card 
scheme working. However, as explained above, it was only part of a wider reform 
movement that developed momentum after the 1997 crisis had made radical change 
inevitable. In 1999 the Leekphai Government had established a national Health System 
Reform Office (HSRO) charged with preparing reform legislation within three years. By 
the following year, a coalition of grassroots activists, academics and policy actors worked 
with the HSRO to draft a comprehensive National Health Bill, which incorporated 
proposals for greater emphasis on health promotion and disease prevention, increased 
public involvement, and prohibition of for-profit private health care providers (HSRO 
2002). Under a provision of the 1997 Thai Constitution which allowed for a draft law 
supported by 50,000 signatories to be submitted to the legislature, the Bill was laid before 
Parliament in March 2001. However, instead of supporting this Bill, the TRT Party 
enacted a narrower the National Health Security Act, that introduced the financing 
machinery required for the 30 baht scheme. The National Health Bill remains stranded 
without sufficient Parliamentary support to become law.
2
A recent study found that around 15% of gold card holders seeking ambulatory care said that they used 
private rather than UC facilities as their first option during a recent illness. The reasons given included staff 
attitude, inconvenient clinic hours and long waits.
3 The Draft on National Health Bill in section 71 the Public Health service ( ...)  shall not be for profit 
business
1.6.2 The longer-term implementation task
Although basic coverage was achieved remarkably quickly, the 30 baht project required a 
transformation of the resource allocation system that the reformers knew would take some 
years to complete. It is the beginning of this period that the thesis considers. The 
developments required by the reform plan included the creation of a purchaser-provider 
split, and a new system of capitation-based funding intended to strengthen primary care. 
Policy makers also needed to co-ordinate the health care reforms with cross-cutting 
legislative changes associated with the decentralisation and pubic organisation reforms.
In the period covered by the study, at least three major pieces of legislation affected health 
care units. Firstly, the Decentralization Act, 1999 mandated a larger role for local 
government in the decentralised administration of the health care system, and required that 
35% of public finances be channelled to local government by 2006. Secondly, the Public 
Organization Act 1999 resulted in a push to transform government organisations into 
autonomous bodies, so that public hospitals under the control of the MoPH could gain 
autonomous status. Associated reforms led to a re-designation of many health staff as 
public service officers (Pa-nak-ngan -  in Thai) rather than civil servants (Kha-Rat-Cha- 
Kan in Thai). Thirdly, the National Health Security Act, 2002 took account of these Acts, 
and made provision for local purchasing agencies which contained representatives from 
both health and local government. However, the details of local purchasing remained 
unclear, and policy makers recognised that further capacity building in local government 
would be necessary before this aspect of the reforms could be implemented.
The decentralisation reforms continued going forward even as a new UC reform agenda 
emerged. In 2000 a National Plan for decentralisation to local government was drafted, 
and the following year an operative plan came into effect. The plan stipulated that the 
functions, facilities and public workforces of departments such as the MoPH tasks must be 
devolved to local government by 2010. Oversight responsibilities would then be assumed 
by local government bodies such the sub-district administrative organisations (SAOs) and 
the municipalities. The 1999 legislation provided for the proportion of public revenues 
channelled to local government to rise from about 12% in 1999 to 20% in 2001 and 35% in 
2006. One important element of the plan was a proposal to create Area Health Broads 
(AHBs) which would be responsible for health care in local administration units, and this
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was one of the options discussed by the MoPH for applying the UC system at provincial 
level. Although many commentators assumed that the decentralisation reforms and the UC 
reforms would proceed in tandem, the implementation of the former after 2000 appears to 
have been slow. By 2006, only around 27% of the national revenue was being allocated to 
local government. The roles of the different local government administrative organisations, 
at municipality, district and sub-district levels, and how they would interface with other 
bodies in the new purchaser/provider split structure, remained unresolved issues. At the 
time of writing (2007) the transfer of funds to local government required by the 
Decentralisation Act has still not occurred. Currently there appears to be a high chance that 
the Decentralisation Act will be amended to allow much more time to implementation and 
to put limits on the increase in local government revenue. Nevertheless, the parallel 
existence of the decentralisation reforms has an important influence on the story of UC 
policy implementation, and will feature from time to time in later chapters.
1.6.3 Thailand’s purchaser/provider split
The new Thai funding system was based on the idea of capitation-based payments 
channelled through a purchaser/provider split, but initially the split was not fully in place. 
The period covered by the study saw an initial phase when the MoPH oversaw both the 
purchasing and provision functions on the understanding that the purchasing role would 
soon be handed over to the National Health Security Office (NHSO) in line with the 2002 
Act. There was then a time of uncertainty in government circles when the feasibility of an 
early transfer to the NHSO was debated. The outcome was that the transitional phase was 
extended, so that the powers of the new NHSO were limited and influence remained with 
the MoPH. Then towards the end of the research period health care staff began looking 
ahead to the time when the NHSO would exercise its full duties and the purchaser/provider 
split would take clearer shape.
Although based loosely on Western models, the Thai purchaser/provider system appears to 
be unique. Two features that departed markedly from UK and Scandinavian models were 
the creation of the NHSO as an autonomous purchasing agency separate from the MoPH, 
and the channelling of monies through the CUPs. The first signalled that the Thai 
purchaser/provider ‘split’ was intended to be more radical than, for example, the system in 
the British National Health Service where both purchasers and providers are overseen by
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the central Ministry. The second was innovative because the system did not rely on a local 
purchasing body to determine patterns of district services but gave this responsibility to a 
co-ordinating organisation on the provider side -  the CUP.
The original policy intention had been that the money used by the MoPH to support public 
hospitals, the MWS and the HCS would be transferred to the NHSO to fund the 30 baht 
scheme. At the same time the NHSO would assume responsibility for purchasing care for 
the CSMBS. The NHSO would channel monies to local purchasing offices, either new 
entities or bodies associated with local government, which would enter contracts with the 
CUPs on the provider side. Policy makers in the MoPH believed that a major weakness of 
the pre-existing SSS had been that the choice of large hospitals as the main contractors had 
led to an excessive focus on secondary care. They decided that the new scheme would 
take a different direction and channel the bulk of UC funds through contracting units 
closer to primary care -  the CUPs.
One of the principal architects of the reforms, Sanguan Nitayarumphong (currently the 
General Secretary of the NSHO), has described the CUP as a ‘fund holder’ on the provider 
side: a ‘primary care provider is entrusted for (sic) the main provision of comprehensive 
care for their registered population’ (Nitayarumphong 2005:198). Each CUP serves the 
population of a local health district4 , for which it receives capitation-based funding. The 
CUPs use their funds to support local service units and pay for referrals. Nitayarunphong 
argued that the main advantages of the approach are greater responsiveness due to the 
closeness of the decision makers to the local population, and cost containment via CUP 
gate keeping of referrals to larger hospitals. Referrals are reimbursed through DRG-based 
payments to provincial and tertiary hospitals, reflecting volumes and case mix, and 
adjusted according to the relative weights (RWs) pertaining to particular hospitals. The 
CUPs are required to employ specified numbers of professional staff, and provide 
comprehensive care, within 30 minutes travel time of the registered population, which 
includes both hospital and community services. Most CUPs were expected to be in the 
public sector, but accredited private providers could gain CUPs status if they were able to 
offer the full range of required services, including health promotion and disease prevention
4 The original plan was that CUPs would cater for a maximum population o f 10,000 people. However, there 
were practical advantages o f aligning them with the existing districts, which include urban districts with 
populations in excess o f 100,000
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(P&P). The concept was inspired in part by the British general practitioner fundholder 
scheme. However, the CUPs are significantly larger provider organisations which 
typically oversee a district community hospital, primary care units, and district staff 
engaged in promotion and prevention projects.
Many aspects of this plan proved to be highly controversial. Conservative elements in the 
MoPH fought a successful rearguard action to slow implementation and to delay passing 
control of the reforms to the NHSO. The 30 baht project was more than just another 
insurance scheme because it changed fundamentally the way funds were channelled to 
public hospitals. The system of block grants from the MoPH to hospitals ceased, and was 
replaced by a new capitation-based funding stream that went to CUPs. The MoPH won the 
key concessions that it would oversee the implementation of the reforms through an initial 
transitional period ending in May 20065, and that in the interim it would disburse the UC
! budget via the Provincial Health Offices (PHOs), bypassing the NHSO. This meant that
right from the start the system lacked a strong local purchaser. The PHOs continued as 
supervisory bodies in the line of command from the MoPH to the provider units, and 
simultaneously acted as local health insurance offices. The de facto responsibility for 
providing comprehensive district health services lay with the CUPs, creating the unusual 
situation in a purchaser/provider system that co-ordination depended on a body on the 
provider side.
1.6.4 Implementing the new financing system at provincial level
t
The NHSO began operations in late 2002, but initially its responsibilities under the 30 baht 
scheme were limited to purchasing high-cost care and accident and emergency services,
I and funding treatments away from the home area via the Emergency Medical Service. The
NHSO quickly designated the PHOs as its local branches, but much of the steering of the 
emergent system continued to come from the MoPH, which was controlling the main UC 
budget. However, there were disagreements within the MoPH, which still had a direct line 
of command control over the PHOs, about how much control these should have over the 
spending of the budget at local level. Faced with a log jam, policy makers decided to
5 The transitional period was formally 3 years from the date of enactment o f the Act. However, the Thai 
financial year runs until the end of September, and this effectively meant that the NHSO took over 
responsibility for the UC budget on October 1st 2006.
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allow PHOs themselves to determine which funding ‘model’ to use at local level. As will 
be shown in later chapters, this was a highly significant development because it opened the 
way for local actors to influence provincial implementation strategies. Some provinces 
passed on the bulk of the UC budget to CUPs under the so-called ‘inclusive model’, 
whereby substantial decision making authority over how money was spent lay with the 
CUPs. Others used an ‘exclusive model’ whereby the PHO itself held a fund for inpatient 
activity, and let the CUPs disburse only the monies for out-patient and P&P activity. 
Under both models PHOs created a ‘clearing house’ to channel the inpatient fund, or the 
in-patient component of the CUP budget, to hospitals in line with the referrals coming 
from the CUPs. The PHOs were also allowed to decide whether to include the salaries 
component of the UC budget in the allocation to the CUP or themselves manage a top- 
sliced salaries budget.
Capitation funding was a radical departure intended to reduce the historic geographical 
inequalities in spending patterns that had bedevilled the Thai health system. Much of the 
medical workforce and hospital facilities were concentrated in the Central Region and a 
few large urban centres, while the rural South, North and North Eastern Regions were 
underserved in relation to their populations. The reforms used finance to try to engineer a 
reallocation of resources. A system in which money followed patients empowered rural 
hospitals and primary care units to recruit extra professional staff in line with local 
populations, while forcing ‘capitation-losing’ urban hospitals to reduce staff. The initial 
payment was set at 1,202 baht per insured member in FY 2001/02, in line with a proposal 
put forward by MoPH experts, and despite a competing proposal from Pannarunothai and 
associates who estimated the required per capita payment at between 1,482 and 2,397 
(Pannarunothai et al. 2000, 2004). Despite some criticism from independent 
commentators, the 1,202 baht figure was regarded by insiders as adequate if the new 
policy was implemented ‘ruthlessly’, in the sense of imposing reduced budgets on 
previously ‘over-funded’ public hospitals.
1.7 Emergent problems
This purchaser/provider system quickly led to both a micro-allocation problem and a 
macro-allocation problem, which taken together resulted in a highly significant change in
the financing method in 2002 that largely undermined the re-distributive impact of the 
reforms, and re-imposed greater central control. The micro allocation problem concerned 
the way the CUPs distributed money within the local health care system; the macro 
allocation problem concerned the impact of the reforms on capitation-losing regions and 
centres.
The problem with CUPs in rural areas was that they rapidly came under the control of the 
doctor directors of community hospitals, who then used their power to allocate resources 
according to their own priorities. In the reformed system each CUP had to include both 
hospital and community services. Because health centres had no medical staff, and relied 
on community hospital doctors to provide clinics, these hospitals quickly emerged as the 
dominant players and almost all CUP Board chairs were hospital directors. Secondary and 
tertiary care hospitals depended on referrals from local service units for their share of UC 
funding, channelled to them via DRG-based payments from the CUPs. Unfortunately in 
Year 1 many community hospitals held on to patients so as to retain capitation-based 
income that would have been reduced by the cost of referrals, or were also late with 
referral payments. Consequently provincial and tertiary hospitals received less money 
than expected. The power of the community hospitals also affected primary care services. 
In many areas, health centres, PCUs and district health offices found that monies they had 
expected to receive were retained for community hospital projects.
As expected, capitation funding left many of the larger hospitals, particularly teaching and 
super-tertiary hospitals in the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority area, in a deficit situation. 
Many were unable to cover salary costs, yet unwilling to allow the workforce movements 
that architects of the reforms had envisaged. By November 2001, 29 provinces had made 
requests for help from the MoPH Contingency Fund and received support totalling 3.2 
billion baht (Nitayarumphong 2005). What the architects of the reforms may not have 
anticipated was the power of professional groups affected by this change to mobilise 
support and influence Ministry decision makers.
The combination of the redistributive effect of capitation funding at national level and the 
referral and allocation problems at CUP level, provoked a backlash in the upper ranks of 
the medical profession and policy adjustments in the MoPH. In FY 2001/02 the problems 
were addressed by creating a central contingency fund, over and above the UC budget.
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Additionally PHOs were given the option of choosing to hold both the in-patient budget 
and the salaries budget for the province centrally, thus helping to safeguard the position of 
larger provincial hospitals by guaranteeing their funding. In FY 2002/03, under a new, 
more conservative permanent secretary, the MoPH decided that the salary budget would be 
held and disbursed at national level, and provinces were also instructed to separate out the 
in-patient budget from the UC funds paid to CUPs. These changes reduced the impact of 
capitation-based funding. At national level, much of the funding lost by larger hospitals in 
Central Region was restored by re-directing the salaries budget. At provincial level, 
‘exclusive’ funding strengthened the position of the larger provincial hospitals, whose 
funding now bypassed the CUPs. Rural community hospitals that had initially been cash 
rich found in Year 2 that their allocations were dramatically cut. The idea of a significant 
movement of doctors and nurses from over-served to under-served areas, as staff followed 
money, disappeared from the policy discourse.
The data presented in this thesis document the reaction of provincial level actors to this 
change, and also their behaviour in relation to further policy developments in the MoPH 
and the NHSO. During the transitional period with the MoPH as purchaser, the pattern of 
greater central control of finances continued. Larger hospitals were protected from the full 
impact of capitation funding through top-slicing of the budgets for salaries and in-patient 
activity, though they still suffered because of general under-funding of the new scheme. In 
each of the fiscal years from 2001 to 2006 the capitation payment agreed by government 
fell short of the figure requested by MoPH or NHSO experts (e.g. 1,308 baht against 1,447 
in FY 2004; 1,396 against 1,510 in FY 2005 and 1,396 against 1,800 in FY 2006) 
(Leesmidt et al. 2005). The problem was accentuated because promised funds were often 
not allocated in full, especially at the CUP level. Community hospitals, Primary Care 
Units (PCUs) and health centres mostly received very limited funding, which affected their 
ability to develop promotion and prevention projects. The aim of building the capacity of 
rural PCUs to offer ‘close to the home’ care remains largely unrealised. Because most 
qualified staff still work in hospitals, many PCUs are based there and differ little from 
outpatient clinics. Some Thai commentators have argued that what has emerged is a 
safety-net scheme for poor people rather than a comprehensive service acceptable to the 
nation as a whole (NaRanong and NaRanong 2001).
On September 19th 2006, The Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, was ousted from power 
in a military coup. Although the stated reason was the corruption of the ruling group, many 
commentators suggested that the coup might put an end to the Thai Rak Thai Party’s 
populist policies, including the UC reforms. At the time of writing it is still too early to 
predict the longer-term impact on Thai health policy. The new ruling military council 
moved quickly to say that universal coverage was not under threat, though aspects of the 
policy might be amended. The council appointed the former MoPH Permanent Secretary 
from the early ‘radical’ phase of the UC reforms as the new Minister of Public Health, and 
set up a review panel headed by a prominent pro-reform academic to suggest a way 
forward. The findings of the body are not yet available, but current debate in the Thai 
presses suggests that the 30 baht co-payment and aspects of the financing mechanism may 
be revised. The major unresolved issue is whether the principles of universality and 
comprehensiveness will be challenged by any proposal to link contributions and access to 
ability to pay.
1.8 Summary of chapter
This chapter has described the basic concerns addressed by the study and the research 
questions and objectives that follow from that ‘research idea’. It has discussed the shift 
from PHC policies to health sector reforms, and how UC reforms represent a distinctive 
and interesting subset of such reforms. Finally it has described the background of health 
policy development in Thailand and the content of the Thai UC reforms.
Chapter 2 
The literature on the policy process 
and implementation
C hapter 2: The literature on the policy process and implementation
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers areas of the policy literature relevant to the thesis. It contains a 
brief review of one of the main approaches to studying the policy process, a more detailed 
review of the large body of work on policy implementation, and a discussion of the more 
limited implementation literature on developing countries.
2.2 The health policy process
This thesis is concerned primarily with the implementation of health system reforms at local 
level, but before turning to that topic it is essential to understand the concept of health policy 
and the policy process. In the literature the term ‘policy’ has been used to refer to a range of 
related matters including expressions of purpose or intent, decisions, courses of action, laws, 
regulations, official guidance and administrative guidelines (Barker 1996; Hogwood and 
Gunn 1984; Walt 1994). Although there is no single definition of ‘policy’, one shared 
element in many definitions is that policy is not simply about intent but involves arriving at a 
working consensus that will allow planned changes to impact on the health care system, or 
other social systems that affect health (Barker 1996; Walt 1994). The point here is that policy 
or health reform is not just about an initial ‘idea’ or ‘blueprint’, but also about the steps that 
are taken to put the initial idea into effect and the changes in the idea that may occur as this 
process unfolds.
Walt and Gilson (1994) argued that health policy analysis traditionally concentrated on the 
formal content of policies and neglected other factors which influence policy development. 
This limited analysis of policy development resulted in ineffective implementation, with 
expected outcomes not being achieved. Walt and Gilson (1994) proposed a model for health 
policy analysis which includes four dimensions of policy that affect development and 
implementation.
• content what the policy states
• context the environment in which the statements were made
• process the steps involved in developing the policy
• actors individuals and groups involved in developing the policy.
The relationship between these four areas is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Four dimensions of the policy process
CONTEXT
ACTORS 
- as individuals 
as members of groups
CONTENT PROCESS
Source: Walt and Gilson (1994)
Walt and Gilson (1994) argue that all these factors become involved at different phases of the 
policy process. Actors generally drive events but must take account of context and the 
dynamics of the policy process, as well as content (what one might term the policy blueprint). 
The importance of these factors and the relations between them may change at different 
stages of the policy process. There are times when the influence of different factors overlaps, 
as they are interrelated parts of the same process. Parsons (1995) has suggested that in order 
to obtain relevant information, we need to ask four questions at each stage of policy 
development: who, what, when and how? Parsons’ questions map conveniently onto the 
categories for analysis suggested by Walt and Gilson (1994).
• Content - refers to the question what?
• Context - refers to the question when?
• Process - refers to the question how?
• Actors - refers to the question who?
If we take the broad conception of policy suggested above, we need to consider the 
significance of content, context, process and actors at each stage of policy development.
Various authors have outlined a number of stages in the development of policies. (Laswell 
1956; Jenkins 1978; Lindbolm 1980; Anderson et al. 1984; Hogwood and Gunn 1984; 
Walt 1994; and Baker 1996) In an attempt to clarify the policy process the stages of policy 
development are summarised in the following table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Stages of policy development
AUTHORS STAGES OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Lasswell
(1956)
1. Intelligence, 2. Recommendations, 3. Prescription, 4. Invocation, 5. Application, 
6. Appraisal, 7. Termination
Jenkins
(1978)
1. Initiation, 2. Information, 3. Consideration, 4. Decision, 5. Implementation, 
6. Evaluation, 7. Termination
Lindblom
(1980)
1. Policy formation, 2. Policy preparation, 3. Policy formulation, 4. Policy 
implementation, 5. Policy evaluation
Anderson 
etal. (1984)
1. Problem or policy formation or policy agenda, 2. Policy formulation, 3. Policy 
adoption, 4. Policy implementation, 5. Policy evaluation
Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984)
1. Deciding to decide, 2. Deciding how to decide, 3. Issue definition, 4. Forecasting,
5. Setting objectives and priorities, 6.0ption analysis, 7. Policy implementation, 
monitoring and control, 8. Evaluation and review, 9. Policy maintenance, succession and 
termination
Walt (1994) 1. Problem identification/ issue recognition, 2. Formulation, 3. Implementation, 
4. Evaluation
Baker (1996) 1. Issue definition, 2. Setting objectives, 3. Priority setting, 4. Defining options, 5 Option 
appraisal, 6. Implementation, 7. Evaluation
In general, the stages of health policy development describe similar processes. Barker 
(1996) and Hogwood and Gunn (1984) identify a number of steps within the activities of 
problem identification and policy formulation. All seven authors also identify other 
activities within policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. It is evident however 
that there are no conflicts between the identified stages of policy development. Therefore, 
the stages of policy development could be easily summarised to include agenda setting, 
formulation, implementation and evaluation.
There has been a good deal of discussion in the policy literature about just how useful the 
'stages' approach is, and whether it oversimplifies what happens in the real world. In the 
eyes of some it is too closely wedded to the rational systems approach, and risks reifying 
what they see as a fluid interplay between different aspects of the policy process 
(Nakamura 1987). Parsons (1995) is more sympathetic to the approach mainly because she 
argues that it provides a way of analysing the multiplicity of contextual factors that affect 
decisions doing the policy process. For her the idea of stages provides a useful way of 
conceptualising what influences enter the picture at different steps along the road from 
policy idea to rollout and evaluation. Other commentators such as Hill and Hupe (2002)
see the stages framework as a heuristic that can be useful as long as it is not applied too 
rigidly to what are likely to be complex and messy real world events.
The approach applied in this thesis holds that the content of policy is usually not fixed at 
the time when an initial policy blueprint is devised, and allows the possibility of further 
significant policy development. Hill and Hupe (2002) have proposed a useful distinction 
between ‘policy formation’ and ‘policy making’ which points to the way in which policy 
revision can continue over a period of time.
‘What is needed is a way of combining the analytical benefits offered by the 
“stages” model with a recognition of the interaction between the stages. We 
consider that this is best achieved by talking of policy formation (rather than 
making). This is then distinguishable in most cases, from an implementation 
process within which policy will continue to be shaped. If the term “policy 
making” stands for the policy process as a whole, then both implementation and 
policy formation refer to respectively “late” and “early” sub-processes to that 
process’ (Hill and Hupe 2002:8).
In this view policy implementation can shape the content of policy as the policy process 
proceeds.
2.3 Theoretical perspectives on implementation
2.3.1 Policy implementation
This section of the thesis will look at the implementation literature that has emerged since 
the early 1970s by highlighting the contributions of some key scholars. It will provide a 
brief review of the main contending perspectives in implementation studies. In particular it 
will discuss the debate between ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ approaches, and also 
examine the contributions of scholars who have sought to synthesis the two perspectives.
2.3.2 The ‘discovery’ of implementation
Many scholars have suggested that ‘implementation’ remained neglected, when compared 
to policy formation, until it was ‘discovered’ in the early 1970s (see: Gogging et al. 1990; 
Parson 1995; Ryan 1995). According to this account, implementation was seen as a
relatively unproblematic administrative or managerial process. Policy formation was 
regarded as the key phase in determining successful outcomes. There was an assumption 
that policy makers formulated policy and that implementation would follow almost 
automatically. The seminal work that is said to have transformed the field is Pressman and 
Wildavsky’s (1984)6 book, ‘Implementation \ This study described the failure of a large 
federal job creation scheme (the EDA) to meet its objective of providing employment for 
black people in Oakland, California. The authors found that the main obstacle to success 
was not poor policy, or local opposition, but lack of co-ordination between agencies 
charged with implementing policy. Pressman and Wildavsky’s approach was quickly 
supported by Erwin Hargrove (1975), who wrote of implementation as the ‘missing link’ in 
the study of public policy.
However, many later writers, such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Hill (1997) and 
Hill and Hupe (2002) have contended that this image of ‘discovery’ ignores a good deal of 
pre-existing scholarship in sociology and socio-legal studies that had examined the 
translation of policy into action. Among the earlier works identified are Philip Selznick’s 
(1949) study of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s efforts to engage with grassroots 
organisations, Peter M. Blau’s (1955) study of goal setting in two government agencies, 
Lipsky’s (1971) early paper on ‘street-level bureaucracy \  and the debate about discretion 
in the interpretation of legal rules (Davis 1969; Jowell 1973). Although the critics are 
right to say that Pressman and Wildavsky’s message was not an entirely new one, it might 
be argued that much of this previous work had low visibility in mainstream policy studies, 
and that the Oakland study led to a significant shift in the focus of policy research.
2.3.3 The top-down model
At one level, Pressman and Wildavsky’s study is concerned with barriers to 
implementation, and especially the possibility that local actors and agencies can stop 
policies from being applied as intended. Part of the subtitle of their book -  ‘How Great 
Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland’ - points to potential conflict between 
high-level policy makers and front-line policy implementers. One theme of the study is 
that successful implementation depends on co-operation and communication between
6 The first edition o f Implementation was published in 1973.
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different organisations and departments at the local level. The authors argue that, if action 
depends upon a number of links in an implementation chain, then a very high degree of co­
ordination between agencies is required if a series of small deficits are not cumulatively to 
create a large shortfall in the way policy is applied. They introduce the idea of 
‘implementation deficit’ and suggest that this can be measured and analysed using 
quantitative techniques.
However, a second important theme of the study is concerned with how far high-level 
actors can influence or even control policy implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1984: xxi) state that: ‘policies normally contain both goals and the means for achieving 
them’. They go on to say that ‘implementation is a process of interaction between the 
setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them’. High-level actors need not only to 
set policy goals but to analyses what then makes the achievement of these goals difficult. 
They need to formulate a series of hypotheses specifying the predicted consequences of 
proposed policies, and the conditions necessary for policy to work. A governmental 
program needs to ensure that these conditions are met and the desired consequences 
follow. In order to achieve this, there must be a chain of command which is able to 
assemble and control resources, facilitate communication and ensure co-ordination.
• •  7Although Pressman and Wildawsky later changed their position , their book prompted a 
series of studies which focused on the steps needed to control policy implementation so 
that original policy objectives were achieved The book thus came to be seen as an 
exemplar of the ‘top down’ approach to implementation: a prescriptive approach that tries 
to set out the practical steps needed to ensure that the policy blueprint is operationalised 
successfully.
There are already several excellent reviews of implementation research, including the early 
top-down approach, that would make a study by study account here redundant (Van Meter 
and Van Horn 1975; Van Horn 1979; Barrett and Fudge 1981; Sabatier 1986; McLaughlin 
1987; Goggin et al. 1990; Ingram 1990; Fitz et al 1994; Maitland 1995; O’Toole 2000; 
Schofield 2001; Hill and Hupe 2002; Barrett 2004; Saetren 2005). One important 
development was that a number of largely descriptive case studies, including Pressman and
7
The third edition of Implementation (1984) contained a new final chapter called ‘Implementation as 
Evaluation’, which portrayed the relationship between policy formation and implementation as an interactive 
process.
Wildawsky’s book, were followed by studies with a more conscious theoretical focus. 
These so-called ‘second generation’ studies (Goggin et al 1990) set out to construct 
analytical frameworks that would help high level actors develop systematic approaches to 
implementation. One early example was Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) attempt to 
construct a model incorporating six interacting variables affecting implementation: 
standards for assessing performance; the resources and incentives made available; the 
quality of inter-organisational relationships; the characteristics of the implementation 
agencies, the economic, social and political environment; and the ‘response’ of 
implementers. Another influential study, Eugene Bardach’s (1977) ‘The Implementation 
Game’, also sought to develop an analytical perspective for policy makers and is 
noteworthy for its advocacy of careful ‘follow-through’ at the implementation stage. For 
Bardach, implementation is a political process which will often require higher-level actors 
to anticipate the ‘games' that must be played with lower-level implementers and 
themselves to work actively to remove obstacles encountered during the implementation 
phase.
Many other important top-down studies followed (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, 1981; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; Sabatier 1986). A book worthy of special mention because 
of its subsequent influence on the field is Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn’s (1984:199- 
206) 'Policy Analysis for the Real World'. Although Hogwood and Gunn were well aware 
that ‘perfect implementation’ could never be attained, they considered it useful to construct 
a heuristic framework for policy actors defining the ideal pre-conditions that would 
facilitate that goal. Their oft-quoted ten preconditions for ‘perfect implementation’ are as 
follows:
1. The circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints;
2. that adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the program;
3. that not only are there no constraints in terms of overall resources but also, at each 
stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources is 
available;
4. that the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and affect;
5. that the relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, if 
any, intervening links;
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6. that condition of ‘perfect implementation ’ requires that there is a single 
implementing agency that need not depend upon other agencies for success, or, if 
other agencies must be involved, that dependency relationships are minimal in 
number and importance;
7. that there is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be 
achieved, and that these conditions persist throughout the implantation process;
8. that in moving towards agreed objectives it is possible to specify, in complete 
detail and perfect sequence, the tasks to be performed by each participant;
9. that there is perfect communication among, and co-ordination of, the various 
elements involved in the program;
10. that those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance.
As with many other top-down studies, the aim was to provide high-level actors with a 
guide for action which would enable them to minimise the implementation deficit. The 
model of ‘perfect implementation’ was seen as a heuristic device that could to help 
identify the preconditions for effective implementation and to provide tools for thinking 
more systemically about the reasons for implementation failures.
Overall, the ‘top-down’ approach has characteristically focused on the implementation of 
policies developed at the centre in local environments. Parsons (1995:463) suggests that 
these studies were based on a ‘black box model’ of the policy process inspired by systems 
analysis. Top-down theorists, in many cases, assume a direct causal link between policies 
and observed out-comes and tend to underplay the influence of implementers on policy 
delivery. Most follow a prescriptive approach that conceived of policy as input and 
implementation as output factors. Top-down research was concerned mainly with 
identifying the conditions which would maximise the translation of policy objectives into 
practice. The approach tended to erect an over-sharp distinction between policy 
formulation and policy implementation, and portray the two things as distinct phases that 
needed to be analysed separately as two distinct phases within the policy process.
2.3.4 The bottom-up model
The top-down model focused on the strategies that higher-level policy actors could use to 
ensure that the basic policy template was translated into a working operational reality.
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Lower participants entered the picture mainly as subordinates whose compliance with 
policies needed to be controlled, or sometimes as sources of information feedback who 
might enable higher- level actors to make necessary policy adjustments. However, it was 
not long before a competing approach to implementation studies emerged which argued 
that lower-level actors might themselves operate as ‘policy makers’, at least in the sense 
that they shaped the detailed operationalisation of policy in local contexts.
Arguably the initial inspiration for the bottom-up approach came from outside mainstream 
policy analysis, and especially from the fields of socio-legal studies and organisational 
sociology. Two strands of research which were particularly influential were legally- 
oriented studies of discretion in rule use, and sociological research on ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’.
By the late 1980s, the theoretical debate about the possibility of reducing administrative 
discretion by more careful framing of legal rules (Davis 1972) had generated enough 
interest to prompt a number of empirical studies of rule use and administrative discretion 
in various organisational settings (Kagan 1978, Bardach and Kagan 1982; Mashaw 1983; 
Hawkins 1984; Bryner 1987; Hutter 1988). The thrust of much of this work is summed up 
in the following quotation from a review of Mashaw’s ‘Bureaucratic Justice ’, a study 
which examined decision making by social security agency staff assessing disability 
benefit claims.
The great mass of official decisions in the legal system of the modem welfare- 
regulatory state are not made by judges, after considering the arguments of legal 
counsel, but by ‘eligibility workers ’ processing files in welfare and unemployment 
insurance offices, or by low-paid regulatory inspectors, tax auditors, licensing 
officials and assorted other bureaucrats. In theory, of course their decisions are 
subject to review by the courts, but in practice appeal often is unfeasible. The law, 
as applied, thus is a product of “the bureaucracy”. (Kagan 1984, p.816)
Kagan’s work in particular had an influence in the public policy field, including his 1982 
study with the former ‘top-down’ theorist Eugene Bardach. Other later legally-oriented 
work contributed to both the legal and policy literatures (Baldwin, 1990; Baldwin 1995). 
This interest in the way bureaucrats interpret mles (and one might add, policies) comes 
close to the concerns of the second strand of writing on street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky 
1971, 1980; Prottas 1979).
An earlier generation of scholars, such as Michel Crozier (1964) and Crozier and 
Friedberg (1980) had described how bureaucrats resist or slow change. Lipsky (1980) went 
a step further by arguing that street-level bureaucrats do not merely resist the 
implementation of policy but become involved in policy making. Chapter 2 of his classic 
study is entitled ‘Street-level Bureaucrats as Policy Makers ’. Lipsky suggested that such 
workers make policy in two ways: ‘They exercise wide discretion in decisions about 
citizens with whom they interact. Then, when taken in concert, their individual actions 
add up to agency behaviour’ (p. 13). The need for discretion in interpreting administrative 
rules arises both from the difficulty of writing exhaustive rules that will cover all 
circumstances (the same point that the socio-legal writers had made), and also the ‘human 
dimensions o f  situations’ (p. 15) -  the need to respond sensitively and flexibly to the 
special circumstances and problems of clients. In terms of shaping agency behaviour, 
street-level bureaucrats develop routines and coping mechanisms that allow them to 
process large amounts of work with limited resources, and which will affect the benefits or 
services available to clients.
Lipsky argues that there are features of work in bureaucratic organisations that make it 
very difficult to prevent the ‘bottom-up’ policy making that he describes.
‘Most street-level work is not open to meaningful revision by limiting discretion, 
removing public employees from interaction with clients, or modestly altering 
bureaucratic structure. In street-level bureaucracies there is an irreducible 
requirement that public employees interact with citizens to determine the nature 
and extent of public services they should receive and provide those services 
through interactions with them’ (Lipsky 1980, p 201).
Lipsky argues that ‘the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, 
and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively 
become the public policies they carry out’ (p. x). However, these practices are not 
necessarily a reflection of ideals of public service, but more usually are bound up with the 
coping strategies that front-line staff use to manage work pressures against a background 
of limited resources. Many of the routine practices that street-level bureaucrats use, such 
as client stereotyping, limited search strategies and de facto rationing, reflect the practical 
need to keep the system working in adverse circumstances -  what Lipsky (1980:xiii) terms 
a ‘corrupted world o f service’. It is not so much the case that the lower level actors 
frustrate the plans of higher level policy makers, but that they often make adjustments to
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allow imperfect policies to work, or devise coping strategies to compensate for the 
inadequate resources provided.
The early street level bureaucracy work inspired many studies of discretion in government 
agencies and other organisations, including several with an explicit policy implementation 
dimension (Maynard-Moody et al. 1990; Scholz et al. 1991; Weissert 1994; Scott 1997; 
Ellis et al. 1999; Keiser 1999; Baldwin 1990; Evans and Harris 2004). Although some of 
the work took the form of micro case studies, the ‘street-level’ perspective quickly 
influenced implementation theory. Berman (1978) suggested that policy implementation 
occurs at two levels: the macro-implementation level, where higher level policy actors 
devise an implementation strategy, and the micro-implementation level, where local 
organisations react to these plans, develop local strategies and implement them. He argued 
that most implementation problems arise from the interaction of the policy with micro­
level settings. Because high-level policy makers have very limited influence over local 
actors, this results in considerable variation in how a given national policy is implemented 
in different places. The bottom-up theorists contend that in this situation top down control 
attempts will be relatively ineffective in pushing local actors towards greater compliance; 
instead local implementers need to be given freedom to adapt the policy to local 
conditions.
Some theorists attempted to deal with this problem by trying to model this micro-level 
policy implementation in detail so that these insights could be incorporated into a more 
sophisticated analysis of the policy formation process. Elmore (1980) proposed a re­
focusing of implementation studies. In his view ‘the important issue is not whether the 
framework of analysis is “right” or “wrong” , but whether it is sufficiently clear to be 
controvertible’ (p.602). Elmore (1980) devised an approach termed ‘backward mapping’ to 
analyse the concrete steps and choices between alternatives facing local actors:
... ‘backward reasoning’ from the individual and organisational choices that are the 
hub of the problem to which policy is addressed, to the rules, procedures and 
structures that the closest proximity to those choices, to the policy instruments 
available to affect those things, and hence to feasible policy objectives. (Elmore, 
1981, quoted by Hill and Hupe, 2002, p. 58)
The concept of ‘backward mapping’ involves concentrating on a specified problem, 
identifying the actions and choices that will arise in solving the problem, and then working 
backwards to specify the detailed policy provisions needed to support those steps.
One important consequence of the bottom-up approach was to change the unit of analysis 
for research studies. Where ‘top-down studies had been concerned mainly with the 
apparatus of government, state departments and the legal system, the bottom-up studies 
examined a wider array of organisations and actors. Hjem and associates argued that 
research needed to extend beyond the formal authority structures of the central state to take 
account of a wider policy system. They contend that policy is applied through 
‘implementation structures’ located ‘within pools of organisations’ and ‘formed through 
processes of consensual self-selection’ (Hjem and Porter 1981). They set out or identify 
these implementation networks empirically, and investigated how field-level policy actors 
carried out their activities without prior assumptions about the constraints that would 
apply. Hjem and Hull (1982:107) argued that research should be ‘organisation-theory 
inclined’, so that it does not privilege any specific actor or set of actors, but builds up a 
picture of patterns of influence from empirical data. Hjem’s team found that top-down 
initiatives were often poorly adapted to local conditions, so that their successful 
implementation depended crucially on the ability of local actors to adjust policy to fit local 
conditions.
The ‘implementation structure’ or network analysis approach was supported by Barrett and 
Fudge’s (1981) book '‘Policy and Action \ This contains ten case studies which examine 
the empirical variability of implementation processes at different levels and in different 
contexts. Two important issues that they identify are the ‘multiplicity of linkages between 
actors and agencies’ and there persistence of conflict rather than consensus in many real 
world implementation attempts (1981:253). They argue that the networks of linkages, and 
patterns of social relations and interest were inadequately theorised in previous work, and 
propose a framework of analysis based on Strauss’s (sociological) ‘negotiated order’ 
perspective. Barrett and Fudge portray implementation as a negotiation process in which 
the relevance of control and compliance needs to be worked out in different contexts 
(1981:257-58). Negotiation, bargaining and compromise are seen as central elements in a 
process in which ‘policy makers and implementers are more equal and the interaction 
between them becomes the focus for study’ (1981:258). However, although they
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emphasise the importance of the micro order, Barrett and Fudge also stress the importance 
of the interest-power structure and the constraints that this imposes on negotiations. While 
these writers can be seen as ‘bottom up’ because of their attention to micro-level 
processes, the emphasis on interest and power means that they recognise certain top-down 
influences, and bring their approach closer to the mixed approaches considered in the next 
section.
Several other bottom-up studies showed that political outcomes did not always relate in a 
one-to-one way with original policy objectives, and that the assumed causal link between 
policy and outcome was questionable. Beyond this, some pointed to the positive 
advantages of street-level discretion. Allowing flexibility to local actors nearer to the real 
problems than central policy makers was seen as a beneficial approach. There was also 
interest in exploring the limits of top-down power: a number of scholars such as Berman 
and McLaughlin (1978); Sarason (1982); and Fullan (1982) argued that top-down policies 
constrain but do not construct outcomes, and that local agencies should adapt policies 
rather than adopting them.
2.3.5 The main points of controversy
While the first wave of implementation researchers modified their models in response to 
internal critique and empirical testing (Sabatier 1986), real points of difference remained 
between the two approaches. Pulzl and Trieb (2006) suggest that they are characterised by 
different research strategies, contrasting goals of analysis, opposing models of the policy 
process, and conflicting models of democracy (see: Table 2.2)
Table 2.2: Comparison of top-down and bottom-up theories
Accounts of comparison Top-down theories Bottom-up theories
Research strategy Top-down from political decisions 
to administrative execution
Bottom-up from individual 
bureaucrats to administrative 
networks
Goal o f analysis Prediction/policy recommendation Description/explanation
Model o f policy process Stagist Fusionist
Character o f implementation 
process
Hierarchical guidance Decentralised problem solving
Underlying model of 
democracy
Elitist Participatory
Source: Pulzl and Treib, 2006
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Top-down researchers typically started from a high-level policy decision and worked their 
way down-wards to implementers. Bottom-up scholars, in contrast, started by identifying 
the actors involved in front-line roll-out of policy at agency level, and then developed their 
analysis to move upwards and sideways to study the networks of implementing actors and 
their problem-solving strategies.
The goal of analysis of top-down scholars is to reach a general theory of implementation. 
This theory should be carefully enough to allow for predictions as to whether an individual 
piece of legislation is likely to be implemented effectively. Moreover, the theory should 
enable scholars to derive recommendations for policy makers with a view to improving 
implementation. The aim of bottom-up studies, in contrast, is to give an accurate empirical 
description and explanation of the interactions and problem-solving strategies of actors 
involved in policy delivery. Some like Hjem and Porter (1981) tried to move beyond 
description, in their case to develop a complex heuristic model of the actor network or 
‘implementation structure’ (Hjem and Porter 1981) within which implementation takes 
place.
The two schools of thought put forward contrasting models of the policy process. As 
mentioned earlier, top-down theorists have been influenced by what has been called the 
‘textbook conception of policy process’ (Nakamura 1987: 142), and the ‘stagist’ model. In 
the eyes of some, this means they do not examine the whole policy process, but merely 
‘what happens after a bill becomes a law’ (Bardach 1977). By contrast, bottom-up writers 
argue that policy making continues throughout the whole policy process (what some call 
the ‘fusionist’ model).
The schools have differing views on the character of implementation process. Top-down 
theorists view implementation as an apolitical, administrative process. The real power rests 
with the high-level policy actors, who define policy objectives and use hierarchical 
command and control mechanisms to ensure that objectives are translated into practice. 
Bottom-up scholars argue that policy objectives are never completely definitive or closed 
to revision, and that the way policies are implemented can never be fully controlled from 
above. For them, there is a legitimate space for local policy adaptation rather than 
following a blueprint according to hierarchical command.
Finally, the two approaches are based on different models of democracy. The top-down 
models rest on a traditional, conception of representative democracy at the state level. In 
this view, elected representatives have a special status as the actors with legitimate 
authority to make binding decisions for the whole citizenry. The bottom-up argues that it is 
legitimate for lower level actors and agencies to have a voice about changes that will affect 
them, and that these perspectives must be taken into account alongside the intentions of the 
elite actors.
2.3.6 The synthesisers of implementation theory
Some bottom-up theorists came close to building top-down elements into their models. As 
mentioned above, Barrett and Fudge (1981) took account of differential power and the 
possibility that higher level actors would be involved in negotiations as policies were 
applied. Richard Elmore (1978), initially thought of by many as a ‘bottom-up’ theorist, 
was another writer who laid the ground work for a synthesis between the two positions. 
Elmore suggests that in the study of complicated events, there is value in using mixed 
research methods and different theoretical models, to produce an analysis that works at a 
number of different levels. He argues that one can distinguish various facets of the process, 
including ‘implementation as systems management’, ‘implementation as bureaucratic 
process’, ‘implementation as organisation development’ and ‘implementation as conflict 
and bargaining’. The previous section discussed the innovative approach of ‘backward 
mapping’ that Elmore developed. In a later (1985) article he proposed a complementary 
approach of ‘forward mapping’, whereby policy makers would identify the incentives 
affecting implementer behaviour The emphasis on the simultaneous use of analysis at 
different levels opens the way to take account of both the needs of policy makers and the 
perspectives of lower-level implementers. Elmore suggested that there were many 
situations where policy makers should leave some areas of policy open for local actors to 
determine the details in the light of the experience of implementation, so overall this is a 
mixed approach which still puts a good deal of weight on bottom-up influences.
Sabatier (1986), already well-known as a top-down theorist, shifted his position in his later 
work, where he tried to develop a more sophisticated account of relationship between 
policy formation and implementation and the networks involved. He proposes an 
‘advocacy coalition’ approach, which examines how actors at different levels become
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involved in implementation. He argues that there is a policy subsystem, comprising a range 
of public and private organisations and actors who are involved in concerted action but are 
often in conflict, and that policy implementation depends on strategies devised by ‘power 
brokers’. A kind of feedback loop operates whereby accumulated knowledge feeds into 
the revision of policy objectives. The sub-system is also affected by external events which 
impose constraints on action and limit the available resources. This takes him closer to the 
bottom-up perspective because the advocacy coalition can be seen as comprising actors 
from all levels. Apart from this Sabatier’s contribution is noteworthy because of his clear 
statement of something not usually acknowledged in the bottom-up models, the continuing 
significance of higher level actors and their interventions as a factor which has an impact 
on lower-level actors, and over which they have little direct influence.
Several writers who attempted to synthesize the top-down and bottom-up positions, tried at 
the same time to re-theorise aspects of the policy process. For example, Lane (1987) 
argued that implementation involved both the idea of ‘policy achievement’ and ‘a process 
of policy execution, which coincided respectively with responsibility for outcomes and 
trust in putting policy into effect. In his view top-down models are concerned mainly with 
the responsibility side and bottom-up models the trust side. Stoker (1991), writing 
explicitly about the United States federal system, introduces the interesting concept of 
‘implementation regimes’, which looks at the shifting balance between use of state 
authority, market exchange and ‘governance’ (other more indirect regulatory mechanisms 
such as contract). This leads into an analysis of different patterns of ‘centralised’, ‘shared’ 
and diffuse’ distributions of public authority in different contexts and the associated 
implementation approaches. Other studies ranged across such approaches as network 
analysis, institutional theory and governance theory.
Goggin and associates’ (1990) book was noteworthy because it combined an attempt to 
synthesize the top-down and bottom-up approaches with a call for a more comprehensive, 
but parsimonious theory of the implementation process. Their self-proclaimed progression 
into ‘third generation’ implementation theory, represented an attempt to move beyond 
description, and what they saw as the fragmented analytical efforts of previous writers, to 
develop explanatory and predictive implementation theories. For these writers, 
implementation research had relied too much of case studies rather than systematic data on 
variables affecting implementation that would allow hypothesis testing. Third-generation
work involved a marked turn towards quantitative, multi-variate analysis techniques. 
Goggin et al’s major study involved a complex design involving investigation of 27 
variables, and a large number of other multivariate studies followed (see: O’Toole 2000). 
However, it is questionable about whether the quest for a ‘parsimonious’, middle-level 
theory of implementation was ever realistic given the range of policy domains and contexts 
involved. O’Toole (2000:283), himself one of the main advocates of this goal, concludes 
that ‘the top-down and bottom-up debates are ended, superseded by a general recognition 
of the strengths of each.’ Although still sympathetic to the Targer-n studies’, he notes 
approvingly that ‘a range of complementary research initiatives is now underway’.
The period after the appearance of the ‘third generation’ studies saw a dip in the popularity 
of implementation research in the English language literature. In the 1990s and 2000s a 
number of commentators (for example, Hill 1997; Lester and Goggin 1998; Hill and Hupe 
2002; Barrett 2004) commented on the decline of the sub-field. The reality of the decline 
across all the disciplines involved in implementation studies has been questioned, although 
it does appear to accurately characterise what has happened in the core social policy field 
(for a review see; Saetren 2005). There have been recent calls for a revival (for example, 
Schofield, 2001), and signs of a response in the form of a special issue of the Journal 
Public Administration (Schofield and Sausman 2004).
In the British context, recent empirical studies include some innovative work concerned 
with the implementation of policies designed to reduce health inequalities (Hunter 2002; 
Exworthy et al. 2002). Exworthy and Powell’s (2004) study draws on Kingdon’s (1984) 
work to propose a modified ‘policy streams’ approach, which is linked to the idea of multi­
level governance. Exworthy and Powell suggest that it is necessary to move away from the 
traditional focus on the relationship between a single central department and a local agency 
(the centre/local relationship), to also consider centre/centre and local/local relationships. 
Paraphrasing Kingdon's language, they argue that implementation analysis needs to 
incorporate the ’little windows’ at local level as well as the ’big' windows at national level. 
In their view implementation efforts are more likely to be successful when Kingdon’s three
policy streams8 come into alignment across the three dimensions of centre/local, 
centre/centre and local/local.
One conclusion emerging from this literature is that the nature of the implementation 
process associated with a particular policy remains an empirical question. The current 
debate recognises the need to construct implementation models in different ways to reflect 
the different contexts. In many ways Berman (1980) anticipated the current position when 
he argued that there is considerable variation in real world implementation strategies, and 
that the relative importance of top-down and bottom-up drivers must be investigated in 
specific policy contexts. Although case studies are not the only method, they remain an 
important source of data. This is the approach that will be taken in this thesis.
2.4. Studying policy implementation in developing countries
Saetren (2005:564) puts the number of published implementation articles (‘core’, ‘near­
core’ and ‘non-core) at over 3,500, but relatively few of these relate to developing 
countries. This seems to be a serious omission in the light of suggestions that the Western 
studies of implementation processes may have only limited utility elsewhere (O’Toole 
1994; 1997). Among a small number of studies that examine implementation processes in 
developing countries, most look at areas such as environmental policy, agrarian reform, 
community or rural development programmes, and housing or infrastructure projects, 
rather than health care (e.g. Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Ross 1984; Chan et al. 1995; 
Brinkerhoff 1999) Grindle’s (1980) edited collection includes a single chapter on 
implementation problems in a combined health/nutrition programme in India, while 
Grindle and Thomas’s (1991) book which uses case study data to examine reform, 
contains only one health example relating to Mali.
Implementation studies in the health field in developing countries have been quite diverse. 
Some have used questionnaire methods to examine the implementation of policies such as 
a national pharmaceutical prescribing policy in Lao PDR (Tomson et al. 2005) and 
hospital accreditation (HA) standards in Thailand (Pongpirul et al. 2006). Another
8 Kingdon (1984) suggests that policy is made through three separate streams o f processes - the problem 
stream, the politic stream and the policies stream. Policies come to the top o f the agenda when a ‘window of  
opportunity’ opens up in each o f the three streams at the same time.
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approach has involved retrospective assessment of implementation of a health reform 
programme, either at the system or sub-system level, using secondary analysis of research 
findings and press reportage, perhaps with the addition of a small number of primary 
interviews (e.g. Hecht et al. 1993; Shakya et al. 2004; Ugalde and Homedes 2005; Lloyd- 
Sherlock 2005). Other studies use a case study approach more similar to that of the 
present study. For example, Mubyazi et al. (2004) used interviews, group discussions and 
analysis of policy documents to study the implementation of health decentralisation 
policies in four districts in Tanzania. Gilson and associates have employed a similar 
qualitative approach to look at a range of implementation cases in Africa. Some of this 
work takes the form of cross-national comparative studies of implementing financing 
reforms (Gilson et al. 2001; Gilson et al. 2003). Other research (Gilson and Erasmus 2004; 
Gilson et al. 2006) makes the case for applying findings from the literature on street-level 
bureaucracy and bottom-up implementation to health systems development and tackling 
health equity implementation gaps in South Africa.
Walt and Gilson (1994:354) remark on the high rates of failure of health programs in 
developing countries, which they attribute to a lack of consideration of factors that affect 
implementation. They argue that development experts have long been over preoccupied 
with the technical content of good policies, the ‘what’ of policy reform rather than ‘how’ 
they should be implemented, and ‘why’ in practice policies are not applied as intended. 
While there are many studies of health care reform in the developing world that focus on 
issues such as financing strategies and organisational transformation, there has been little 
systemic analysis of the problem of implementation (Walt 1994; Blaauw et al. 2003). Walt 
and Gilson (1994) suggest that bottom-up implementation theory in particular could be a 
useful corrective to over-reliance on the dominant rational planning approaches. The 
bottom-up approach highlights the complexity and messiness of real world policy-making, 
and the role of culture, power, politics and social networks. These authors emphasis the 
‘interactive’ nature of implementation processes in which the front-line response may itself 
influence and change policy in the course of implementation, especially where negotiation 
and bargaining are necessary to make progress. In their view there is an important place 
for implementation studies that examine the relevant networks of actors and agencies and 
the forces that influence them.
Studies of the health sector in Thailand fit the pattern of relative neglect of implementation 
processes that Walt and Gilson (1994) describe. Generally the focus of research has been 
on policy formation or policy evaluation with little attention being paid to the intervening 
process.
Two recent studies by doctoral students working with Gill Walt have made a start in 
correcting this bias. Pitayarangsarit (2004) examined the questions of how Thailand’s 
universal coverage health care reforms came about, and how likely the policy was to 
achieve its intended goals. The study uses a ‘policy process’ approach to examine the four 
elements of context, actors, process, and content. The research concentrates mainly on the 
policy formation phase, which is explored via interviews with high-level actors, and 
documentary and media analysis. The implementation phase is investigated by a single 
case study of ‘Salaburi’ province reported in Chapter 6. Data collection at provincial level 
included observations of five meetings involving public health staff, 24 semi-structured 
interviews and 4 focus group discussions with villagers (the lay perspective on the 
reforms). Pitayarangsarit suggests that Thailand has a tightly-knit, medically-dominated 
policy community, which includes bureaucrats, professionals and academics, and which 
continued to influence policy during both policy formulation and implementation. She 
suggests that implementation ‘was a top-down process; however, there were some spaces 
for street level bureaucrats to adapt decisions to fit their context’ (Pitayarangsarit 2004, p. 
2). Provincial level authorities had some degree of autonomy in implementation decisions, 
but policy transfer from centre to local area was top-down. Pitayarangsarit (2004:164) 
reports that ‘There was little consultation but allowance was made for flexibility, and it 
was given to the province to manage the process. At provincial level, the decision-making 
process was more interactive and it seemed to manage conflict partly due to the Thai 
culture, which resulted in compromises’. One conclusion of the study is that the nature of 
policy implementation reflected both managerial and political problems.
Tantivess’s (2006) study investigated how anti-retroviral therapy (ART) came onto the 
Thai Government’s policy agenda in the 1990s, how policies about widening access to 
ART fitted in with the universal coverage health reforms introduced in 2001, and the 
process via which ART policy then developed during the course of implementation. The 
study is concerned with policy making across both the policy formation and 
implementation phases, and benefits from the author’s high-level contacts, which opened 
the way for interviews with senior policy makers in the Ministry of Public Health and the
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Government Although much of the study concentrates on the networks of actors involved 
in policy formation, Chapters 6 and 7 investigate policy implementation through case 
studies in two provinces. The case study component involved just under 60 semi­
structured interviews with staff in provincial Health Offices, hospitals, NGOs, civil society 
organisations and people with HIV and AIDS, and about ten ‘other informants’ provided 
additional information.
Both studies examine the policy process as a whole, and arguable the weight of analysis 
inclines towards policy formation rather more than implementation. Given the scale of the 
effort involved in following policies through both the formation and implementation stage 
in a  single study, it is hardly surprising that the case studies of implementation are of 
limited scale. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the present study has a different emphasis 
since it focuses primarily on implementation, and uses a larger data set than the earlier 
studies to concentrate on three case study settings.
2.5 Summary of chapter
This chapter has reviewed certain key areas of the literature relevant to the thesis. It has 
introduced the ‘policy process’ approach that guides the analysis, and foreshadowed the 
importance of the implementation phase and the role of lower level actors. The chapter has 
highlighted a number of past works that have argued for the value of case studies, and 
suggested that actors, networks and agencies and the local context may all influence the 
content of polices. It has summarised the debate between top-down and bottom up 
theorists, and highlighted the conclusion of some writers that the relative influence of top- 
down and bottom-up influences in relation to particular policies in particular local contexts 
is an empirical question. This will be one of the key issues that is explored in Chapters 5- 
8, which deal with how the three case study provinces implemented the 30 baht reform 
policy.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
Chapter 3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This is a qualitative study based on a comparative case study methodology in which the 
‘cases’ are represented by three case provinces and their approach to implementing the UC 
reforms. The case study data was collected using mixed methods, which include 
interviews, focus groups and documentary analysis; overall the approach can be called 
‘policy ethnography’. This chapter provide an account of research methodology: it 
describes the policy ethnography approach and discusses case studies as one strategy for 
policy ethnography; it explains the three main phases of the study and the main data 
collection methods; it explains certain steps taken to maximise the validity of the findings; 
it discusses the ethical issues raised; and finally considers some limitations of the study
3.2 The ‘policy ethnography’ approach
This study is a ‘policy ethnography’; an approach that uses qualitative methods to 
investigate the perspectives of actors within a health care system that has been used in 
policy-oriented research on the British NHS and elsewhere since the 1990s. The term 
‘policy ethnography’ was coined by Philip Strong and Jane Robinson (1990) in their study 
of the Griffiths management reforms - ‘The NHS: Under New Management’. A similar 
approach was adopted by other researchers, such as David Hunter and associates (Pollitt 
1988; Harrison et al. 1992) at Leeds University, David Cox (1991) at Birmingham 
University, Chris Bennett and Ewan Ferlie (1994) at Warwick, and Rob Flynn and 
associates (Flynn et al. 1996; Flynn and Williams 1997) at Salford University, all of whom 
carried out major studies supported by mainstream funding agencies. It is also the 
approach used by David Hughes, Lesley Griffiths and associates in a series of Swansea 
studies (Hughes, Griffiths, and McHale 1997; Hughes, McClelland and Griffiths 1997; 
Hughes, McHale, and Griffiths 1997; Griffiths and Hughes 1998; Hughes and Griffiths 
1999a; Hughes and Griffiths 1999b; Griffiths and Hughes 2002). Policy ethnography has 
been attractive to researchers because it uses flexible research designs, which are not de­
railed by rapid and unpredictable organisational change. Although randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) are still seen as the ‘gold standard’ by many British funding bodies, they do
not work well when organisational structures and boundaries are subject to constant re­
jigging.
Although there is no single agreed definition of policy ethnography, Strong and Robinson 
(1990) point to four characteristics which distinguish this approach from conventional 
ethnography.
• It is multi-disciplinary: understanding policy involves drawing not only on 
sociology but also economics, organisation studies and health service research
• It is not written for an academic audience alone but needs to address the agendas of 
policy makers and practitioners
• It employs a sense-making framework shared with subjects, rather than being 
discovered by the ethnographer. Thus concepts used by the researcher will usually 
be ones that subjects recognise, as opposed to being made up by the ethnographer
• It relies mainly on ethnographic interviews which recognise the expert status of 
informants and take the form of a dialogue in which the subjects assist in the task 
of analysing ongoing events.
Hughes (2002) has argued that policy ethnography should include a significant 
observational component to complement interviews and documentary analysis. He 
suggests that the approach is especially suited to the study of policy implementation as it is 
‘worked out’ in a range of health care settings, such as health authorities, hospitals and 
community units. The focus is on policy in action -  the implementation of policy in real 
world situations at different levels within organisations. Beach (1999) suggests that policy 
ethnography involves research about the struggles over values and the material influences 
that underlie policy discourses and which relate policy texts to practice. In his view, 
research of this kind can highlight the processes by which lower-level actors mediate or re- 
contextual national policies, and the differences between intended policy and policy in use.
Policy ethnography differs both from traditional ethnographies that emphasise the 
authentic representation of subjective experience, and recent post-modernist work 
preoccupied with multiple realities and the problem of privileging one account over 
another. Policy ethnography rests on a realist epistemology and is more about obtaining 
information that is difficult to get by other means. It aims to look inside the ‘black box’ of
the organisation and ‘reach the parts others methods cannot reach’ (Hughes 2002). Table
3.1 summarises some distinguishing features of ethnography and policy ethnography.
Table 3.1: Distinguishing features of ethnography and policy ethnography
Research method Definition Distinguishing features
Ethnography These studies focus on people’s own 
descriptions o f their routine, daily lives, 
enabling the researchers to explore a 
number o f views at the same tim e(1)
- the ethnographer is seen as 
expert observer or ‘loiterer’ (2)
- goal is understanding subjective 
perspectives and cultural 
meanings
Policy ethnography These studies examine policy 
implementation as it is ‘worked out’, and 
focused on policy in action in real world 
situations at different levels within 
organisations.(3)
- the policy ethnographer is seen 
as multi-disciplinary narrator who 
puts together a story from 
available evidence.
- Goal is understanding policy 
implementation and its enactment 
in organisational settings
Adapted from: (1) Hammmersley and Atkinson (1983)
(2) Spradley (1979)
(3) Hughes (2002)
One possible criticism of the idea that policy ethnography looks inside the ‘black box’, is 
that it risks falling into the trap of naive realism and treats field data as straightforward 
reproductions of the world ‘out there’. Martyn Hammersley (1992) has argued for a third 
position beyond crude realism and idealism, which he calls ‘subtle realism’ (see also: Pope 
and Mays 1995; Murphy et al. 1998; Mays and Pope 2000). This position accepts that 
knowledge claims are uncertain and that researchers inevitably see events through the filter 
of their own culture and values, but argues that research can say useful things about a real 
world. However in Hammersley’s view, researchers should be cautious and should limit 
themselves to the goal of searching for knowledge about which they can be ‘reasonably 
confident’. Such confidence is based on the credibility and plausibility of knowledge 
claims. For subtle realists, there is a reality that exists independently of the researcher’s 
knowledge claims, and such claims can be more or less accurate. Subtle realism is 
different from the naive version because it holds that research reports represent reality 
rather than reproducing it. Reality can be represented from a range of different 
perspectives, and more than one of the different (but logically compatible) accounts 
produced may be true. But it is also the case that some accounts can be shown to be false, 
and research can help to indicate which have most plausibility and credibility. Subtle 
realism points to the imperfect attempts of researchers to reach practical understandings of
social phenomena, and adopting this approach is the best way the researcher knows of 
responding to the charge o f ‘naive realism’.
The research question and objectives were described in Chapter 1. The study aims to 
elucidate a policy implementation process at local level and this seems highly compatible 
with a policy ethnography approach. Strong and Robinson studied the implementation of 
the NHS Griffiths reforms mainly by using interviews. Rather than using case studies, 
they aimed to build up a synoptic picture of the roll-out of the reforms by interviewing a 
large number of actors spread over many settings. This had the advantage of 
generalisability, but the disadvantage that data on particular sites was often limited to a 
partial snapshot of events provided by a single interview. Later policy ethnographies have 
tended to include a bigger observational component, and use case studies which either 
stand alone or are supplemented by interviews in a larger sample of settings. This study 
takes a midway position where a large number of actors are interviewed but within the 
context of three case studies. It was decided not to include observations as one of the main 
research methods (a) because of the large scale of the data collection task in the three 
provinces and (b) because interviews were considered more manageable for a researcher 
attempting his first policy ethnography study. Thus the design is closer to that of the 
original Strong and Robinson (1990) version of policy ethnography, which relies mainly 
on interviews.
3.3 The case study approach
Because not all policy ethnographies use case studies, the case study approach will be 
discussed in more detail. Case studies are appropriate when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are 
being considered, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real- 
life context (Yin 1994). This resonated of the aim of this study to explore local actors’ 
perspectives on the implementation of policy and their actions in real-life contexts.
Yin (1994) discusses how in examining ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, case studies need to 
explore sets of related propositions which can describe patterns of social action or events 
in the area covered by the case, such as an organisation or locality. Case studies aim at an 
in-depth investigation of the interaction between significant factors affecting some 
phenomenon. This approach seems to have clear applicability to a topic like the
implementation of UC policies, where factors such as local power networks, the influence 
of different groups and the nature of organisational cultures all play a part in the story.
However, it should be noted that there is no method that is free of problems, and case 
studies are no exception. Table 3.2 describes strengths and weakness of case studies 
method.
Table 3.2: Strengths and weaknesses of case studies
Strengths weaknesses
- allows in-depth interviews,
- produces first-hand information,
- employs methods that encourage familiarity 
and close contact with the informants,
- allows the employment o f a variety o f  
interrelated methods and sources,
- permits long-term contacts and personal 
experiences in the field,
- focuses on verifiable life experiences,
- produces information that covers the whole 
unit and not only small aspects o f it.
- Results relate to the unit o f analysis only and 
allow no inductive generalisations,
- findings entail personal impressions and biases; 
no assurance o f objectivity, validity and reliability,
- Research cannot be replicated,
- It is difficult to convey in research reports the 
complexity o f the field and to the personal and 
subjective information that constitutes the basis of 
case studies,
- the interviewer effect may cause distortions; even 
the presence o f the researcher in the field can result 
in problems o f reactivity..
Adapted from: Sarantakos, S 2005
This study, which examines three cases, resembles what Yin (1994) has called a ‘multiple- 
case design’. This is a common study design which is often used when independent 
innovations occur at different sites. Thus each site might be subject of individual case 
study, and the case study as a whole would have use a multi-case design (Yin 1994).
The cases were purposively selected for the study. They were chosen because they had 
particular features or characteristics which would enable detailed exploration and 
understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the research aimed to study (Mason 
2002; Patton 2002). Although selection did not rest on a formal statistical sampling 
process, the choice of sites was made to capture one of the main sources of variation in 
local implementation approaches: the administrative divisions.
The north-east (Esam) region was chosen as the location for the study partly because it is 
the area near the author’s university, but also because it is the poorest region of Thailand, 
and the one where the UC reforms were predicted to make the most difference to the 
health of previously under-served populations. The researcher wished to select three 
‘heartland’ provinces typical of Esam, but also to try to capture any variation of approach
that existed in the region. For MoPH purposes Esam is divided into three administrative 
departments or health regions9 (Khet- in Thai), whereby PHOs reported to different 
Regional Offices, which (it was hypothesised) might enforce directions from the MoPH in 
rather different ways. Thus one central Earn province was selected from each health 
region: Mahasarakham in Health Region 5, Kalasin in Health Region 6 and Roi Et in 
Health Region 7. Each of the three provinces contained a provincial city, as well as small 
town and rural areas, as indeed can be found in almost all Esam provinces. More detail on 
the characteristics and comparative information on the three cases study provinces is 
provided in chapter four.
3.4 The doctoral project and its companion study
This doctoral study was linked to a wider study carried out by the supervisor of the policy 
formation and implementation process via which Thailand’s universal coverage health care 
reforms came into existence. The supervisor was in Thailand in 2002-03 and arranged for 
the student to be accepted for doctoral studies at the beginning of this period, with the aim 
of putting in place a linked study and studentship. The supervisor’s research included 
interviews with policy makers in Bangkok and additional data collection in the north-east 
which have informed sections of this thesis (especially Chapter 1), but are not described 
here. The supervisor accompanied the student to many interviews, which were carried out 
by the student, but which it is hoped will eventually be used to produce publications for 
both studies.
3.5 The research process
The research plan for the doctoral study was conceived in 2002, and has been adapted in 
the light of subsequent events. The research questions arose from the dramatic 
transformation of the Thai health care system that began in 2001. The research process 
comprised three broad phases: (1) Formulating the research questions and planning the 
research design; (2) completing necessary preparations, collecting the data and undertaking 
preliminary analysis; and (3) supplemental data collection, further analyses and reaching 
conclusions. This is adapted from Yin’s (1994) framework but makes some amendments 
to the last phase. One complication in the present study is that there were two stages of 
data collection because the initial interview study was followed up with a focus group
9 During the year when the study was started, Thailand was divided into 12 regions under the supervision of  
Health Regional Offices headed by Inspector Generals.
-53-
stage carried out about a year later. This latter stage was intended to corroborate and 
further elucidate findings from the interviews. Thus it has been included in Phase 3.
3.5.1. First Phase: define and design
This phase was concerned with four activities (1) formulating the research questions and 
refining the theoretical approach, (2) designing the data collection protocol, (3) selecting 
case studies and (4) preparing for field-work and piloting the interview guide.
Initially, the research questions considered focused on the extent of organisational change 
in the district health system after the UC reforms But, following a review of the literature 
and discussion with the supervisor, the author became more interested in examining the 
implementation of the reforms as a complex process worthy of study in its own right (see: 
Chapter 1).
The data collection strategy and general approach for both the in-depth interview and the 
focus group discussions, were developed by reviewing the literature and discussing the 
issues with acquaintances working in the health care system (The books by Yin (1994) and 
Arthur and Nazroo (2003) were particularly helpful). Although the interview guide was 
prepared at this stage, the corresponding guide for the focus groups was left undefined, to 
be determined by the interview findings.
The selection of the case studies was described in section 3.3. Three provinces were 
selected to provide a multiple-case study design.
The preparations for the study included arranging access, considering ethical issues and 
appropriate safeguards, and piloting the interview guide.
Most of the interviews for the study involved personnel who worked in the public health 
care system overseen by the Ministry of Health. It was considered necessary to get 
permission for the study at a high level in the Ministry, and then later to seek consent from 
individual respondents at lower levels in the system. Verbal permission for the study had 
been obtained by the supervisor in a face-to-face meeting with the deputy Minister of 
Health, some months before the doctoral research began. However, it was decided that 
formal written permission would be required to show to actors in the system who might
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want this information. Thus a letter requesting access was sent in March 2003 to the 
Permanent Secretary of the MoPH, the highest civil servant in this department. This 
covered both the doctoral project and the related study being undertaken by the supervisor. 
The Permanent Secretary responded positively and sent a formal letter giving permission 
for the research to proceed. Subsequently individual respondents were approached 
individually to see if they were willing to take part. Although random sampling was not 
used, respondents were selected purposely to include staff at all levels in the local health 
systems of the three provinces. The approach used to recruit these respondents is discussed 
in the next section. With regard to respondents outside the MoPH, such as the 
municipalities and private hospitals, the author sent letters requesting co-operation and a 
project information sheet to the relevant Mayor or Doctor Director.
The ethical issues raised by the study were considered and necessary safeguards were put 
in place (because of its importance, this is discussed in section 3.9).
Finally the interview guide was piloted. This was done with four public health officers 
who were studying at Mahasarakham University in the part-time program for bachelor 
degree of Public Health. These were not working in three study provinces and not eligible 
for the main study. The pilot exercise resulted in a few small changes to the questions to 
make them more ‘user friendly’, and one change in question order.
3.5.2. Second phase: prepare, collect and start preliminary analysis
The author’s position as a lecturer in Faculty of Public Health at Mahasarakham University 
(MSU) helped him gain access to policy actors within the three study provinces. The 
Faculty provides Batchelor and Masters Degree programmes to health professionals 
throughout the north-east, and also has a good network of research contacts. In April 2003, 
the author began approaching key personnel in the three provinces to see whether they 
would take part in the research. A twin-track approach was used that involved (a) 
approaching key personnel in the MoPH and local government administrative hierarchies 
of the three provinces, and (b) approaching lower-level actors in the system who were 
studying at the university and would thus be accessible for interviews there. Informal, 
verbal requests, often by telephone, were formalised with letters to the Chief Medical 
Officers (CMO) of the PHOs requesting permission to conduct the study. The author then
approached persons lower down the hierarchy. Some senior staff, such as PHO 
administrators and the Heads of District Offices, helped to set up interviews with 
colleagues in other offices. A number of local health administrators who were past or 
present students were particularly helpful in making approaches to others for the 
researcher. From then on it was fairly easy to access the key informants in the local health 
areas. A similar approach was taken to certain non-MoPH personnel, mainly in local 
government, who were interviewed.
The group under the command of the MoPH comprised the Chief Medical Officers 
(CMOs) who headed the PHOs, the deputy CMOs in Medical Care, Public Health and 
Administration in each PHO, the heads of Group or Department in the PHOs, doctor 
direc tors of provincial hospitals or their deputy, doctor directors of community hospitals 
(including large, middle and small hospitals), and heads of District Health Offices (in 
large, middle and small districts). At a lower level the study also covered heads of health 
centres (including both those already upgraded to primary care units (PCUs) and 
traditional health centres), and Health Officers who worked in the PHOs, hospitals, 
district health offices and health centres. The non-MoPH respondents consisted of the 
Mayors of Muang (city centre) municipalities, Directors of the Public Health and 
Environment Divisions, and health officers in municipalities, as well as the Doctor 
Director of a private hospital in the UC scheme.
The respondents who were current students posed some special ethical problems which are 
discussed later (see 3.9). The objective was to recruit informants from this source so as to 
provide a snapshot of views from lower staff in the PHOs, district offices and health 
centres. This would supplement the accounts of higher-level post holders who were 
approached because of their place in the hierarchy. A list was made of all students on 
current courses who held such positions. A selection was then made according to 
geographical locations and bands of grades. In a few instances where a selected person 
declined to take part, a reserve was picked from the same group.
Overall, the group of respondents selected must be considered to be a convenience sample. 
However, purposive considerations were taken into account in getting a roughly even split 
between the three provinces, and representation of different grades and districts within
each province. As it turned out the numbers included from Kalasin province were slightly 
lower than intended because of difficulties in recruiting some categories of staff.
Although the response to the study was generally good, a few intended respondents in key 
positions declined to take part. These included the Doctor Director of one of the three 
provincial hospitals, a Doctor Director of a community hospital, a Doctor Director of one 
Private hospital and a Mayor of a Muang municipality.
In total 147 respondents participated in the study. 124 took part in in-depth interviews. 
The focus groups involved 31 respondents, of whom 23 had not been previously 
interviewed. Overall 55 respondents were from Mahasarakham, 44 from Kalasin and 55 
from Roi Et. The breakdown of respondents at different levels is presented in table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The study respondents
Respondents Mahasarakham Kalasin Roi Et
In-depth
interviews
Focus
groups
In-depth
interviews
Focus
groups
In-depth
interviews
Focus
groups
Health officers in MoPH
- Chief Medical Officers (CMO) of 
PHO*
1 - 1 - 1 -
- Deputy CMO or Assistant CMO* 3 1(1)** 2 - 3 1(1)**
- Head of PHO groups/departments* 8 1(1)** 5 2(1)** 5 1
- Doctor Director of Provincial 
Hospitals or representatives
1 1 1 - 1 1
- Doctor Director of Community 
Hospitals
6 1(1)** 7 - 7 1
- District health Office Heads 6 3(1)** 7 2 7 1
- Head of Health Centres 4 3 4 3(1)** 6 2
- District Health Officers
- hospitals 3 - - - 1 -
- district health offices 4 - 3 - 2 2
- Health Centres/PCU 4 - 4 - 8 1
Out-side the MoPH
- Senior municipal 
representativesities* * *
2 - 1 1 2 1(1)**
- Health officers in municipalities 2 1 - - 1 1
- Doctor Director Private Hospital - - 1 - - -
Total each methods 44 11(4)** 36 8(2)** 44 12(2)**
Total each provinces 44+7=51 36+6=42 44+10=54
Total this study 147
Note: * In later data extracts all these respondents have been identified as ‘senior administrative
officer, provincial health office’ (SAO-PHO) to hide identities.
** The numbers of focus group participants in brackets indicate those who also took part 
in in-depth interviews. Thus the total of 147 indicates the number of persons 
participating in the study.
*** ‘Senior municipal representatives’ included two mayors and three Directors of Public 
Health and Environmental Division. These are not distinguished to anonymise 
respondents.
The interviews with respondents in the three provinces were conducted within six months 
during April to September 2003. Though there was a small degree of overlap as the 
research moved from one province to another, the general sequence was to do field 
interviews in Mahasarakham, then Roi Et and lastly Kalasin. As mentioned above co­
operation was generally good, but a few respondents declined to participate because of 
heavy workloads or personal reasons. Several interviews had to be postponed because 
participants had to prioritise other duties, and some were rescheduled several times. A 
more detailed account of the interviews is given in 3.6.1
All but one interview was in the Thai language. The bulk of the interviews were 
transcribed fully, although questions were entered in shortened form. The exceptions were 
some routine responses that were summarised. Provisional analysis was undertaken using 
Thai language transcripts. This required reading the transcripts several times and 
documenting key ideas and details of the policy stories of the three provinces. Often it was 
necessary to cross-refer to other interview transcripts for corroborating information. The 
analysis was done manually, using a paper list of categories and codes, rather than through 
a qualitative software package. The main reason for this was the problem of working in the 
Thai language. Problems of translation and exploring meaning in cultural context could 
not have been easily handled with available English language software applications
A selection was made of passages that might be used verbatim in the thesis and these were 
translated into English. This translation was verified with a native language speaker, the 
supervisor.
3.5.3. Third phase: supplemental data-collection, additional analysis and conclusions
The last phase of the research process involved supplemental data collection, further 
analysis and the drawing of conclusions.
Although they involved additional data collection, the focus group discussions have been 
included in this phase because they were concerned mainly with checking and updating the 
picture emerging from the preliminary analysis of the interviews.
Focus groups are more than a collection of individual interviews, because they generate 
data from interaction between key actors (Finch and Lewis 2003). Focus groups can have 
various purposes. Apart from being used as the primary method, they can be applied both 
as a pre-research and post-research tool in a mixed methods study (Saratakos 2005; Khan 
et al. 1991). In this study, the focus groups were a post-research method, aimed to further 
explore and confirm findings gained from the interview phase, and also to update some 
points that had been unclear a year earlier.
The content of the focus groups had been left deliberately open in the initial research 
design, so that it could take account of the provisional findings from the first stage of 
analysis of the interview transcripts. A list of topics to be covered was prepared, 
resembling an interview guide. This included a number of points from the interviews that 
it was determined required clarification. A separate focus group meetings was convened in 
each of the study provinces. As with the interviews, a range of persons at different levels 
in the system were invited to attend. This included 8 persons who had already been 
interviewed, but -  partly because of changes in some post holders - an additional 23 new 
participants.
The final phase of analysis involved finalising the details of the policy stories of the three 
provinces, looking at key similarities and differences and trying to set this within some 
broader context. A guiding ‘theme’ for events in each of the three provinces was 
identified, and these are reflected in the titles of chapters 5, 6, and 7. As the author wrote 
up the accounts of each province he tried to develop cross-case conclusions, and to find 
supporting or negative evidence across the three provinces. Chapter drafts were discussed 
with the supervisor and comments were incorporated into the final version of the thesis.
A schematic of the research processes and activities is provided in figure 3.1. To sum up, 
this is a mixed-methods study which includes data from semi-structure interviews, 
documentary analysis and focus group discussions. Case studies were conducted in three 
provinces. Their policy stories and the cross-case conclusions have been put together from 
these three kinds of data.
Figures 3.1: Summary of the research processes and activities
1. Define & Design
2. Preparation, 
Data Collection, 
& Preliminary 
Analysis Write individual case report
Write individual case 
report
Write individual 
case report
3. Supplementary 
Data Collection, 
Additional 
Analysis & 
Conclusions
(9) Draft cross-case 
conclusion
Study phases
(5) Conduct first case: 
Mahasarakham
(10) Develop policy 
implications conclusion
(6) Conduct second case: 
Roi Et
(3) Selecting 3 
provinces as cases
(8) Focus group 
discussions
(7) Conduct Third case: 
Kalasin
(2) Design interview 
schedule
(11) Write up the 
thesis
Research activities
(4) Preparing field-work, 
ethical issues, and 
Pilot test
(1) Develop research questions and theory
Adapted from: Yin 1994:49
3.6 The three data collection methods
The three main data collection methods described above will now be discussed in more 
detail.
3.6.1 Semi-structured interviews
This study included in-depth interviews that used a loosely structured sequence of open- 
ended questions. Such an interview aims to cover a number of predetermined questions 
and/or special topics, but do so in a flexible way. The questions are typically asked in a 
consistent order, following a prepared ‘interview guide’, but the respondents are given 
freedom to response and digress. The researcher as interviewer can probe beyond the 
prepared questions if answers develop in interesting ways (Berg 2001; Bryman 2004).
Some questions that were not included in the guide may be added as the interviewer picks 
up on things said by respondents. The semi-structured questions of this study were mainly 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions concerned with how local actors interacted with the 
implementation of the UC policy.
As mentioned above all but one interview was conducted in Thai. All 124 interviews were 
tape recorded (see in table 3.3) with the subjects’ permission (see Section 3.5.1 The author 
confirmed that all discussions held with them would be guaranteed the greatest degree of 
confidentially. The advantage of tape-recording is that a verbatim transcription of recorded 
interviews provides a good basis for analysis. Most interviews lasted between one and two 
hours, although a few were shorter.
3.6.2 Documentary analysis
Documentary sources can be useful for reconstructing events and as a check on interview 
accounts. Indeed Yin (1994, p: 81) states that ‘for case studies, the most important use of 
documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources’. Documentary 
analysis can also provide evidence on why and how particular policies were made and 
carried out (Buse, Mays and Walt 2005).
In this study, many documents both Thai and English were examined. Most documents 
were obtained from the government and academic sectors: the PHO reports, the MoPH 
report, the NSHO documents and other papers from government organisations and 
research institutes. A number of statistical tables used to illustrate particular points have 
been adapted from those sources. Details of financial allocations and the split of budgets 
were also obtained in this way. The PHO reports in particular were an important source of 
information on the organisational designs and departmental structure of the PHOs in the 
three provinces. Overall the documents provided important contextual information which 
allowed a better understanding of data from the interviews and focus groups.
3.6.3 Focus group discussions
Focus group discussion is one of several qualitative methods that researchers can use to 
generate valid information. It is a form of group interview usually used with around 8 to 12 
subjects from the target population; there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular 
fairly tightly defined topic; and the accent is upon interaction within the group. Because of
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this the data are more than a collection of individual interviews: data are generated by 
interaction between group participants, so that there is an exchange of ideas and responses 
and the group is synergistic in the sense that it works together (Finch and Lewis 2003). It 
has been said that the focus group contains elements of two methods: the group interview 
and focused interview. Focus groups are generally conducted under the guidance of a 
facilitator (moderator) who steers the group towards discussion of the desired topics (Khan 
et al. 1991; Berg 2001; Bryman 2001, 2004). Some experts recommend that a second 
observer is present to take notes and manage things such as tape recording.
Focus groups are often considered to be an economical method because they offer some of 
the advantages of in-depth qualitative studies without requiring full scale anthropological 
investigations (Asbury 1995). However, they also have many of the limitations such as that 
the samples are small and purposively selected and therefore do not allow generalisation to 
larger populations. Focus groups are not natural but organised events. However they are 
useful in situation such as where there are power differences between the participants, 
when the everyday language and culture of a group is of interest, and when the researcher 
wants to explore the degree of consensus on a given topic (Morgan and Kreuger 1993).
In this study, focus groups, like the interviews, were concerned with participants’ views 
about how the UC policy had been implemented at local level. The discussions further 
explored some of the issues thrown up by the interviews, especially certain areas where 
evidence seemed unclear. It also invited respondents to reflect back on events after 
another year of the reforms had passed.
As stated above, focus groups were held with a range of respondents in each of the study 
provinces. A focus group was conducted on 20 January 2005 in Mahasarakham PHO with 
11 participants; while a second took place at the Kalasin PHO on 27 January 2005 with 8 
participants, and a third at Roi Et PHO on 28 January 2005 with 12 participants. The 
CMOs hosted the events and gave considerable support. Each discussion took about three 
hours, and all were recorded with permission. The author acted as moderator and steered 
the discussion, while a research assistant made simultaneous video and audio recordings of 
the meetings.
3.7 Data analysis
Qualitative interviews and focus groups typically produce large amounts of textual data in 
the form of transcripts and field notes, and this large amount of unstructured textual 
material is not straightforward to analyse (Bryman 2004). Researchers have used a number 
of procedures to order and analyse such data, Alan Bryman (2001, 2004) describes two 
general approaches to qualitative data analysis: analytic induction and grounded theory. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe the activities of data reduction, data display and 
conclusions (drawing/verifying). Sotirios Sarantakos (2005) suggests that the main types 
of qualitative analysis are iterative analysis, fixed analysis and subjective analysis. 
Approaches to analysis vary in terms of basic epistemological assumptions about the 
nature of qualitative enquiry and the status of researchers’ accounts. They also differ 
between different traditions in terms of the main focus and aims of the analytical process 
(Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor 2003). It could be said that several writers have 
distinguished rather different analytical approaches depending on their aims and focus. 
However, the common elements of these analytic methods are their relationship with 
interpretive or hermeneutic paradigms, their understanding of the world as being socially 
constructed through language, and the notion that analysis deals with the presentation of 
cultural representations (Benini and Farber Quoted from Sarantakos 2005).
In this study, the interpretive perspective was adopted in analysing of data. In this 
approach human action is seen as a collection of symbols expressing layers of meaning. 
The researcher set out to examine social action in terms of patterns and meanings 
expressed in interviews, which could be investigated by analysing interview texts. The 
interviews and focus group discussions data were transcribed for analysis. The analysis 
then involved trying to organise and reduce these data to reconstruct the policy stories of 
the three provinces and to uncover patterns of the key actors’ activities, actions and 
meanings (Berg 2001). The process of data analysis consists of three activities, as Miles 
and Huberman (1984, 1994) suggest: data reduction, data display and conclusion. Details 
of this process are described as following;
• Data reduction. This is the process of transcribing the interviews and focus group 
discussions, and then selecting relevant sections on which the analysis can focus. 
After the transcription is completed, the textual data can be coded (in this case 
manually). The author wanted to identify all the key issues, concepts and themes by
which the data can be examined and referenced. This starts with the questions 
derived from the original research aims, but also brings in emergent issues raised 
by informants themselves or by other kinds of data such as documents (Pope, 
Ziebland and Mays 2000).
• Data display. The next stage of analysis involves an organised assembly of 
information to permit the formulation of generalisations and conclusion drawing. 
This happened as preliminary accounts of events and perspectives in each case 
study province were written up as draft chapter sections. As the second and third 
cases were also written up and similar issues addressed comparisons and contrasts 
were explored. It was then necessary to re-visit the earlier drafts and to add 
missing comparative information, and think about possible explanations for 
differences of approach.
• Conclusion-drawing and verification. This is the process of drawing conclusions 
from the case analysis used a cross-case analysis to determine commonalities and 
differences across boundaries (Patton 2002). This is what happened as the initial 
drafts were revised to take account of differences and similarities in findings and 
the ideas for the different key themes in each province were refined. Attempts were 
then made to verify or test these conclusions by checking that sufficient evidence 
has been produced verified, and in some cases looking for corroborating 
information in documents or in a few instances by follow-up telephone calls to a 
small number of key informants to check specific points. (Miles and Huberman 
1984,1994).
The three streams of data analysis are not necessarily sequential; these activities can occur 
early in the process, may take place simultaneously, and are likely to be revised throughout 
the course of the study.
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this research was to produce an understanding of the 
context of the UC policy implementation and the factors that influenced the 
implementation of the reform policy in local level. The study aimed to build a general 
account of the reforms and their implementation that fitted each of the individual three 
provincial cases based on the descriptive approach of the policy ethnography method.
3.8 Quality controls of the study
There are various strategies available to protect against bias and enhance the reliability of 
findings. Most authorities agree that the approaches taken in qualitative studies are rather 
different from those used in quantitative studies, so that conventional considerations such 
as reliability, validity and generalisability cannot be approached in the same way (Mays 
and Pope 2000). Seale (1999:266) uses the term ‘trustworthiness’ as an alternative to 
cover some of the issues usually discussed as validity and reliability. In the author’s view, 
‘trustworthiness’ depends mainly on the depth and quality of the data presented, and 
evidence that steps have been taken to corroborate the main findings on which the analysis 
is based.
One way to gather corroborating information is through ‘triangulation’, and indeed that is 
the main approach used in this study. Triangulation is broadly defined by Denzin 
(1978:291) as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”. 
The idea is based on the traditional practice in navigation of taking multiple compass 
bearings, beyond the minimum two necessary to establish a position. The extra data 
(additional compass bearings) then increase confidence that the calculated position is 
correct. Translated into the research domain, the extra sources of data, and cross-checking 
between them, are considered to minimise the chances of incorrect findings and increase 
study validity.
Denzin discusses several types of triangulation, including data triangulation (the use of 
multiple sources to help understand a phenomenon), methods triangulation (the use of 
multiple methods to study a phenomenon), investigator triangulation (the use of multiple 
investigators in collecting, analysing and interpreting the data), and theory triangulation 
(the use of multiple theories and perspectives to help interpret and explain the data) 
(Denzin 1978:295). In practice, most studies tend to focus on either data or methods 
triangulation, which is the approach taken in this study. Triangulation is not an absolute 
guarantee of validity, and some see it more as a way of ensuring comprehensiveness and 
encouraging a more reflexive analysis of the data than as a pure test of validity (Mays and 
Pope 2000). However at the practical level it did assist the cross checking of the details of 
the policy stories of the three provinces that was important in this study.
A second approach to building ‘trustworthiness’ advocated by some writers is ‘respondent 
validation’ or ‘member checking’ (Bloor 1983; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Murphy et al. 
1998). This involves feeding back the study findings to respondents for their comment and 
possible correction as a final stage of data collection. This may be done by circulating 
summary findings to a group of respondents or by a final round of interviews. It has been 
pointed out that accounts offered at a later time may be more than simple corrections of 
accounts made earlier, and that this exercise may be more complex than at first sight 
appears to be the case (Bloor 1997). However, it would be likely to minimise the kinds of 
gross errors that can sometimes occur. In the present study, the focus groups carried out 
about a year after the main data collection included an element of member checking. 
Although findings were not fed back to respondents in detailed form, several of the 
questions discussed were designed to test whether preliminary analysis was on the right 
lines and to fill in possible gaps or get corroborating information where existing data were 
thin. This final stage also helps to increase confidence on the findings reported.
3.9 Ethical issues
Almost all research raises significant ethical issues that need to be addressed at the design 
stage. A number of safeguards were incorporated into the present study.
Although Thailand has a system of formal ethical committees overseeing biomedical 
research, this does not cover the type of health policy research conducted in this study. In 
fact in 2003 there was no formal framework with which the present study needed to 
comply. The School of Health Science at Swansea University has recently created an 
ethics committee to oversee projects that are outside the remit of NHS or overseas ethics 
committees, but this did not exist in 2003. Similarly, the institution that facilitated aspects 
of this study, Mahasarakham University (MSU) did not have such a committee, though it 
has established one since. However, it was known that the study would pose some ethical 
issues, such as those raised by the wish to recruit some respondents from the ranks of 
current MSU students, and it was therefore decided to set up a small informal committee to 
advise on what safeguards would be required. This comprised the Dean of the Faculty of 
Pharmacy and Health Sciences, the UK supervisor (at that time in Thailand), and an 
assistant professor experienced in health research.
The advisory committee suggested that the research needed to pay particular attention to 
confidentiality and informed consent, and should take special steps to advise respondents 
who were students that if they decided not to participate this would have no adverse 
consequences for them in terms of their studies at the University. It was suggested that an 
information sheet should be prepared for all potential respondents, and that this should 
include an explicit statement that non-participation would not be penalised, and also 
consent forms for all participants. Regarding confidentiality, it was suggested that a 
statement giving assurances on this point should be included in the information sheet, and 
that arrangements were made to keep data in a secure place to which only the researcher 
and supervisor would have access. It was also suggested that the researcher should seek 
explicit permission for tape recording before or at the start of interview sessions, and if 
necessary would proceed without taping the interview.
In summary, the informed consent of respondents was sought in writing, and this 
supplemented an initial verbal request to take part in interviews and later a specific request 
to allow taping before the machine was switched on. Taping was always done openly. 
More than half the respondents were interviewed in their place of work, so that the 
researcher was there at their invitation and it was open to them to cancel that invitation 
without needing to go through any difficult face-to-face contact. The group (less than half) 
who were current students were in a more difficult situation, because interviews mostly 
took part after classes at the University. Efforts were made to assure student candidates for 
inclusion that saying ‘no’ would have no adverse consequences. This was done verbally in 
initial meetings and was also mentioned in the Information Sheet. Actually a number of 
student respondents did decline to take part.
3.10 Limitations of this study
There are many sources of possible quality problems in qualitative research, including 
researcher bias, selective reporting, lack of rigor and inadequate analysis of data. As 
explained previously, a number of strategies were used to try to safeguard quality control 
in this research. The author is confident that a substantial study has been completed, but 
accepts that it inevitably has some limitations.
On unavoidable limitation is that this study of the UC policy only examines three 
provinces of the 76 in Thailand. It is clear that the three cases will not capture all the 
nuances of the policy implementation process as it unfolded throughout the country. No 
claim is made that the specific findings from the three provinces can be generalised and 
transferred to other localities. However, in the author’s view some of the general 
propositions about the nature of the implementation process in the three provinces may 
well be generalisable, albeit with caution. Case studies can be used in policy-oriented 
research, and are a legitimate part of the evidence that policy makers can look towards for 
lessons, but cumulative evidence is needed to improve confidence in the findings 
emerging. The findings of this study need to be set alongside other studies conducted in 
this period, and its conclusions assessed in that light.
Another limitation of this thesis concerns the way data have been reduced and represented. 
The data gathering process was complicated because the interview needed to be translated. 
Translation, however, is not simply finding word for word correlations. Translation 
includes communicating concepts and ideas between cultures (Simon 1996). Words that 
seem equivalent can take on different meanings in different cultures (Patton 1990; Bassnet 
1994). Translators add a new dimension to research. They must “constantly make 
decisions about the cultural meanings which language carries, and evaluate the degree to 
which the two different worlds they inhibit are ‘the same’” (Simon 1996: 138). Where, the 
researcher relies on a third person to provide precise translation of interviews this adds an 
extra element of difficulty (Temple and Edwards 2002). However in this study, the author 
and supervisor were able to use personal (though unequal) knowledge of both languages 
and cultures to discuss difficult passages and to reduce - if not eliminate - these problems. 
The reason why the problem may not have been entirely eliminated is that researchers as 
translators still bring a personal cultural perspective to the translation process (Avruch and 
Black 1993; Overing 1987). The literature suggests that there may be not a single correct 
translation or interpretation of data (Bassnet 1994), and that translation choices often rest 
on unacknowledged biases.
Data reduction was complicated by the extra step of translating interview data. All of 124 
cases interviews and 3 focus group discussions in this study were conducted in Thai, and 
this increased the burden of work and the possibility of errors. The phases of translation
and provisional analysis in Thai, followed by translation into English and then final 
analysis and writing-up in English added an additional level of complexity.
The complications in data display concerned on the extent to which supporting data in the 
thesis should be presented in the original language. In any study where more than one 
language is used, the researcher must carefully consider how to display data extracts. 
Many ideas and concepts are not easily translated using a word-by-word format. Ideally 
the data would be displayed in the original language together with the translation, in order 
to preserve the original meaning and make the translation available for scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, the researcher must also consider issues of accessibility and word count, 
and the interests of the target readership. This study has taken a pragmatic approach and 
presented almost all interview extracts in English. Only in a few instances where 
translation has been highlighted as particularly problematic has explicit reference been 
made to the original Thai words.
The final limitation in conducting this study was the difficulty in finding comprehensive, 
systematic data. Some of the MoPH, provincial and district statistics were incomplete, or 
not up to date. Additionally, some explanations about important policy processes such as 
financial arrangements and management of resources were only described in outline detail 
by key informants and needed to be fleshed out from other sources. In a few cases it was 
not possible to fill in all the gaps. This was made more difficult because the key 
informants tended to conceal their failures, poor practices, and past mismanagement. For 
example, the administrators groups who had the major responsibility for policy 
implementation in the three provinces sometimes gave rather guarded accounts of past 
events. These gaps were not always filled in by lower officers who might hesitate to 
criticise the role of the higher level officers.
3.11 Summary of chapter
This qualitative study was designed to explore and understand the implementation of the 
Thai UC reforms in the three case study provinces. It is a ‘policy ethnography’, which uses 
a multiple case study strategy. The study gathered data through the mixed methods of in- 
depth interviews, documentary analysis and focus groups. It employed naturalistic inquiry 
to build a picture of the policy stories of the three provinces and the perspectives of 
participants on the UC reforms.
Chapter 4 
The three cases study provinces: 
characteristics and comparisons
Chapter 4. The three cases study provinces: characteristics and 
comparisons
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the three case study provinces where data on the implementation of 
the UC reforms were collected. It gives a brief account of the north-eastern Region as well 
as the individual provinces, and then presents some background data on patterns of health 
care provision and levels of financing under the UC reforms.
4.2 Thailand’s Esarn region
The three provinces selected as case studies are clustered together in the geographical 
heartland of Thailand’s North-eastern, Esarn Region.10 For the MoPH purposes, Esarn is 
further sub-divided into three Health Regions (Khet - in Thai), covering the 19 provinces 
(Jangwat - in Thai) of the region (Paak - in Thai). The three study provinces are at the 
boundaries where the three Health Regions intersect. Mahasarakham is in Health Region 
5, Kalasin 6 and Roi Et 711.
For long periods the history of Esarn was different from that of the rest of Thailand. At 
various times it has been part of the Lao, Khmer, and Siamese empires, and its people are 
descended from Thai, Lao, Mon, Khmer, Indian, Chinese, and Euro-American fore bearers 
(Wyatt 1982:1). Most Esarn natives acknowledge a strong affinity with the people across 
the border in the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos, and are almost as likely to 
describe themselves as ‘khon Lao’ (Lao people) as ‘khon Esarn" (Esarn people). The 
present five administrative regions of Thailand, and the name of ‘Esarn’ for the north-east,
th  •go back to the end of the 19 century and the reign of King ‘ Chulalongkorn" (Rama V), 
who was concerned to unite and draw together the nation of Siam in the face of European 
colonial incursions into South-east Asia.
10 (fitU m  in Thai; also Isan, h a m  and Isaan)
11 In 2003, the MoPH comprised 12 health regions and then re-organised into 19 health regions in 2004
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However, Esarn has continued to suffer from a sense of separation from the rest of the 
nation, and an unequal share of its resources. There is a history of political dissent in the 
1930s, wartime resistance to the Japanese occupation and the collaborator Bangkok 
government, and communist insurgency from the 1950s to the 70s (Cohen 1991). The 
region was one of the centres of support for the Thai Rak Thai party, which won 126 of 
136 Esarn seats in the 2005 general election. This reflects widespread support for its 
populist reform programme, of which the 30 baht scheme was the centre piece. A number 
of former communist insurgents, now active in local politics and civil society groups, were 
among the organisers of the ‘caravan of the poor’ which staged counter demonstrations at 
the time of the anti-Thaksin protests in Bangkok in early 2006, and which among other 
things were a statement of support for the UC reforms. After the military coup of 
September 19th 2006 which ousted the Thaksin government, Esarn was seen as one of the 
main sites of potential opposition (Tunyasiri and Nanuam 2006).
From around the 1970s Government investment in Esarn increased, partly in an attempt to 
limit support for the communist insurgency. In the Vietnam War era the United States 
established four air force bases in the north east, and channelled substantial aid to the 
region. This included infrastructure projects such as the Freedom Highway from Bangkok 
to Udon Thani, which passes just to the west of the study provinces. However despite 
further government development projects after the US withdrew from the region, the 
economic gap between Esarn and the affluent Central Region remained. This contributed 
to a situation where large numbers of Esarn people migrated to find work in Bangkok, the 
industrialised Eastern seaboard and the tourist resorts, typically in low paid work in 
construction, factories and service industries, and also as sex workers. Although some 
migrated permanently, many Esarn people alternate between periods spent away as waged 
labour and periods working in the rural subsistence economy. This pattern of episodic or 
seasonal migration has opened a route for cultural influences from central region, changed 
patterns of consumption, and also an increase in social problems and the spread of diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS. It also contributes to the well-documented problem of getting 
treatment away from the home area that arose with the UC reforms.
Mahasarakham, Kalasin and Roi Et are agricultural provinces located on the southern 
Korat plain. This is mostly an area of flat paddy fields, but rises as one moves north into 
Kalasin and comes closer to the Phu Phan mountains. Much of the land is divided into
smallholdings clustered around rural villages. The farmers depend on cultivation as well as 
animal husbandry, including water buffalo, cattle, pigs, chickens, ducks and fish. The 
main crop is glutinous rice, with some production of jasmine rice, cassava root (tapioca), 
maize, sugar cane, peanuts, cotton, sweet potatoes, jute, and water melons. The soil 
quality is generally poor, but in recent years attempts have been made to extend the areas 
given over to higher value crops such as vegetables and soya. Many areas suffer from both 
drought and flooding, and can cultivate only one crop per year, which limits the income 
potential of subsistence farmers.
Esarn remains culturally distinct from other parts of Thailand. The three provinces in the 
study lie within the Lao-influenced area, as opposed to the Khmer-influenced area near the 
Cambodian border, and most residents speak both Thai and the Lao-Esam dialect. There 
is a strong cultural identity based on a distinctive Esarn cuisine, folk music and dance 
forms, literature and an oral story-telling tradition. As in the rest of Thailand, Esarn 
people follow the Theravada Buddhist tradition, typically combined with elements of 
Brahmanism (phram), spirit beliefs and magic. Traditionally Lao people, including those 
in Esarn, have suffered from negative stereotyping and low evaluation from the central 
Thais (Chiengthong 2003). Thus for many Esarn people feelings of pride in their cultural 
heritage are mixed with an awareness of social disadvantage and low status.
In 2003, Esarn had a population of 21,659,698 against Thailand’s population of 
63,079,765, but although about a third of the Thai population lived there, they received 
only about one tenth of the nation’s income (Intarachai 2003). It remains the poorest 
region of Thailand. Esarn contains fourteen of the fifteen poorest provinces in the nation. 
Amnat Chareon province had the lowest Gross Provincial Product-GPP per capita, with 
17,530 baht in 2005, compared with the nationwide average of 109,696 baht. In 2005, the 
10 poorest provinces of Thailand were all provinces in Esarn (NESDB 2005).
There is a problem of income inequality within the region as well as income distribution in 
relation to the rest of the country (Isara 1998). Economic development and inward 
investment in factories or larger commercial enterprises is concentrated mainly in the 
major cities of Khon Kaen, Korat, Udon Thani and Ubon Ratchathani. By contrast, there is 
far less development in the small cities and rural areas, including the three case study
provinces, and that has led to a wide gap in the standard of living between rural and urban 
people.
This social disadvantage is reflected in the distribution of health care facilities. Esarn has 
eight of the ten provinces in Thailand with the fewest physicians per capita (Srisaket had 
fewest, with one per 13,474 in 2002; the Esarn average was 21,047 and the national 
average was 3,568). It also has eight of the ten provinces with the fewest hospital beds per 
unit of population (Srisaket has fewest, with one per 1,972 in 2002; the Esarn average was 
2,180 and the national average was 4,650) (NESDB 2005). However, as elsewhere in 
Thailand, all districts (amphur) have a hospital, and all sub-districts (tambon) have a health 
centre.
4.3 Mahasarakham
Mahasarakham province was separated from Roi Et in 1865 in the reign of King 
Prajomkao (Rama IV). The provincial city was upgraded from a ‘Baan kudyangyai" (large 
village) to become the capital of the new province and given the name ‘Mahasarakham’, 
which means ‘the residence for wealth and merit’. (Mahasarakham Cultural Office 2006)
Mahasarakham lies to the west of Kalasin and Roi Et, and is the nearest of these provinces 
to the capital, being about 470 kilometres from Bangkok. With an area of about 5,289 
square kilometers, it is one of Thailand’s smaller provinces. It is located at the middle 
point of Esarn region and is sometimes called ‘Sadue Esarn’ (the navel of Esarn) 
(Mahasarakham Cultural Office, 2006). It is composed of 13 districts with a total 
population of 936,883 in 228,656 households in 2003. Mahasarakham is a poor province, 
ranking 69th of the 76 Thai provinces in terms of average per capita income. Although its 
position has improved slightly in recent years, income is still lower than the other two 
provinces in the study. For many years, Mahasarakham competed with Srisaket (in lower 
Esarn) for the title of Esarn’s poorest province. As will be shown in section 4.6, other 
characteristics of Mahasarakham are similar to the other provinces in this study.
The provincial capital, the city of Mahasarakham, is relatively under-developed compared 
with larger Esarn cities like Khon Kaen, Udon Thani, Ubon and Korat. By 2003 it had a
single medium-sized department store, and a virtual absence of Westem-style facilities. It 
was a traditional Esarn town with a picturesque but unhygienic fresh food market, a night 
market for general goods, several central streets of small shops and businesses, and two 
cinemas. There is no railway connection or airport, and the main transport links are via 
express bus, or by connections to the airports at Khon Kaen and Roi Et. The road links 
south that were previously rather poor benefited from a recent major upgrading of the 
connecting road to the Freedom Highway (Route 2 from Bangkok to Udon Thani) to the 
west, which by 2004 was mainly dual carriageway. There has been a spurt of development 
in the past few years mainly as a result of the expansion of Mahasarakham University.
Mahasarakham has long been a regional educational centre. An ancient city located in the 
Punjab province of Pakistan known as Taxila was a major centre of learning, and this is 
reflected in Mahasarakham’s other nickname of ‘the Takkasila of Esarn’, or what 
westerners sometimes term ‘the education province’ (DaGrossa 2003).. The institutions of 
higher and further education within the city include: Mahasarakham University (MSU), 
Mahasarakham Rajaphat University (in 2003 still the Rajaphat Institute), Ratchamongkhon 
College (an agricultural college), Mahasarakham College of Nursing, the Physical 
Education College, Mahasarakham Vocational College and Mahasarakham Technical 
College. Mahasarakham is a ‘college town’, and to the extent that its prosperity has 
increased a little in recent years this is largely due to the impact of the growing educational 
sector (Intarachai 2003). MSU had received major investment from the Ministry of 
Education and with a student body of over 20,000 in 2003, it was the second largest 
University in the North East. It has been the centre for a number of research studies on 
political and social topics including a major British Academy funded-study on civil society 
in Esarn (McCargo 2006), a study of student culture and sexuality (DaGrossa 2003), and 
cooperative projects on development and cultural exchange with other countries from 
Indo-China.13 Additionally, there are a number of research centres for the study and 
development of local wisdom in Esarn, such as the Research Institute for North Eastern 
Art and Culture, the Silk Innovation Centre, the Research Centre for Palaeontological 
Study, and the Centre for the Study of Eastern Archaic Manuscripts (MSU 2006).
12 The city of Taxila, or Takkasila in Pali, was an important Buddhist centre o f learning from the 5th 
century BCE to the 2nd century CE. UNESCO has listed 18 locations at Taxila as world heritage sites.
13 For example, the Confucius Institute, MSU, has a joint project with Guangxi University o f the People’s 
Republic of China, and there is also a project between the Faculty o f Public Health MSU and Laos PDR 
Government to strengthen the health workforce in Laos PDR.
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The research and scholarship of the University has had a significant influence on local 
organisations and people, including civil society organisations, like farmers groups, local 
government administrators and also local health care bodies, such as the PHO and health 
administrators. The Local Politics Information Centre at Mahasarakham University has 
been a major centre for critical analysis of the good governance and civil society 
movement. Thus some of the University-supported projects, notably the collaborative 
project with Leeds University, sought to strengthen citizen participation in local 
communities. Additionally, other government organisations such as the Health System 
Research Institute (HSRI) and the Training and Development Centre for Primary Health 
Care in the North-east (in line of the command of the MoPH) have launched cooperative 
research projects aimed at raising the quality of scholarship and debate about health care 
services in the province. These projects have also promoted ideas about good governance 
and civil society, and have paid special attention to the needs of the poorest social groups 
during the period of economic crisis and recovery from 1997 to 2002.
4.4 Kalasin
Kalasin city was founded in 1833 in the reign of the King Rama I. At times it has been 
classified as a district or sub-district under different names, and in the past has come under 
the control of Roi Et, Korat and most recently Mahasarakham. Kalasin province was 
divided from Mahasarakham in 1947, taking its name from the city of the same name 
(Thai Heritage Treasury 2006). Kalasin means "black water", which is probably a 
reference to the dark colour of the Pao river that runs close to the city. The province is 
composed of 18 districts with a total population of 994,600 in 225,717 households in 2003.
The Lam Pao dam, built across the Pao and Huai Yang rivers, was intended to alleviate 
floods, provide a site for fish breeding and help agriculture. Many irrigation projects have 
been introduced in the surrounding areas which have improved the quality of the land. 
Kalasin is noticeable greener than its neighbors. Production of sugar cane and cassava are 
particularly strong in this province
The scenic Lam Pao dam and reservoir, the Phu Phan mountains and the research centre 
and museum for the dinosaur fossils at Phu Kum Khao are a stopping-off point for the 
many Esarn tours, which are a growing segment of Thailand’s tourism industry. The 
province contains part of the Phu Phan National park, fourteen conserved forests, three 
parks and three reserves with protected wild animals (Kalasin Provincial Hall, 2003). The 
city of Kalasin is an unexceptional Esarn town, with similarities to Mahasarakham. Again 
it has few westem-style facilities. By the end of the research period it had two shopping 
plazas with large department stores to Mahasarakham’s one. It is also the location of the 
largest fresh food and general goods market in the heartland area. The town centre 
features the usual mix of shop houses and a more modem retail premise found in Esarn 
towns, and is known in the central North East for its textile shops, including many selling 
the local silks and cotton fabrics that are produced in Kalasin province. At the time of the 
research, Kalasin had no University or large higher education institution. Recent statistics 
on the urban poor in Thailand show that Kalasin city possesses a higher proportion of 
people under the poverty line than either Roi Et or Mahasarakham cities (Chutimaskul, 
2006).
Kalasin city has no railway station or airport. It is connected to Khon Kaen, and thence the 
south, by a recently-upgraded four-lane highway. As with the neighboring cities, the main 
means of long-distance transport for ordinary people is express bus.
4.5 Roi Et
The history of Roi Et goes back at least to the reign of King Thaksin in the 17th century 
when it was a fortified city and a strongpoint of the Thonburi empire and early 
Ratanakosin empire in the Northeast. (Thai Heritage Treasury 2006) The name Roi Et, 
signifying ‘101’ in Thai, is believed to be an exaggerated reference to the 11 gates of the 
walled city or its rule over 11 surrounding colony settlements (Sirindhom Isan Information 
Centre 2006) The city of Mahasarakham probably originated as an outpost of this older 
and more important regional centre. Roi Et has an area of about 8,299 square kilometres. 
It is composed of 20 districts with a total population of 1,322,389 in 298,146 households in 
2003.
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In the past, the agricultural land of Roi Et province was at least as poor as that of the 
adjoining provinces, being subject to flooding, drought and saline soil. Major Government 
and NGO investment programmes over several decades have improved this situation. 
Jasmine rice is the best-known product from this area. Roi Et province is also home to a 
large Thai army base, which provides further support to the local economy. Although not 
a major tourist destination, the province contains a number of Khmer temples, pagodas and 
ruins which attract some visitors.
Today Roi Et city is an important commercial and administrative centre. It is an attractive 
town that justifies its nickname of ‘diamond of Esarn’. Roi Et city has a more developed, 
more affluent appearance than Kalasin or Mahasarakham cities. There are three superior- 
class hotels. Shopping is better that in the two other provincial cities. There are large 
branches of the British-owned superstores Tesco-Lotus and Makro.
Roi Et is not an educational centre in the mode of Mahasarakham, but it has a small 
student population. In 1998, one of the four public universities in Esarn, Ubon Ratchathani 
University, opened a satellite campus in Roi Et. Recently a new branch of the Rajaphat 
University was established in the province. However, these institutions were still 
developing at the time of the study. For this reason, there is no tradition of health research 
in Roi Et, and the university has not had the same influence on local organisations as 
Mahasarakham University. While road links are reasonably good, the journey across to the 
main Freedom Highway south is longer than from Mahasarakham. However Roi Et 
possesses a small regional airport, which offers daily flights to Bangkok.
4.6 Comparing the provinces
The following sections are intended to provide some comparative information about the 
provinces. No attempt is made to investigate associations between these factors and 
differences in the implementation of the UC policies in the 3 provinces. It must be 
remembered that this is a qualitative study based on three cases, and not a cross-sectional 
quantitative study. The information provided here is for background purposes and also to 
allow external comparisons with data from other studies, which might perhaps be 
illuminated by the detailed case study material in this thesis.
4.6.1 General information
To summarise some of the information for 2003 already presented, Roi Et is the biggest 
province (with an area of 8299.4 Sq.km and population of 1,322,389), Kalasin comes next 
(wdth an area is 6946.7 Sq.km and 994,600 people) and Mahasarakham is the smallest of 
the three cases (with 5228.0 Sq.km2 and 944,385 people). Roi Et is divided into 20 
districts (amphur), 192 sub-districts (tambori) and 2,292 villages (moo baan); Kalasin 
contains 18 districts, 134 sub-districts and 1,509 villages; and Mahasarakham is made up 
of 13 districts, 133 sub-districts and 1,874 villages.
The local government administration in Roi Et consists of one City Municipality ‘tesabaan 
muang\ 16 Municipal Districts ‘tesabaan amphur*) and 186 sub-district administrative 
organisations (SAOs or ‘ABT’ in Thai). Kalasin was divided into one City Municipality, 
23 Municipal Districts, and 129 SAOs. Mahasarakham comprised one City Municipality, 
10 Municipal Districts and 132 SAOs.
4.6.2 Economic characteristics
In 2003, the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) of Roi Et was the highest of the three cases at 
32,897 millions baht, compared with Kalasin as 25,812 million baht and Mahasarakham at 
about 23,727 million baht. The population’s income per capita per year in Roi Et was the 
highest at 22,785 baht, with Kalasin at 21,302 baht and Mahasarakham as around 21,030 
baht. In terms of the overall ranking of population income across the whole 76 provinces 
of Thailand, Roi Et was 65th, Kalasin was 69th and Mahasarakham was 70th. Table 4.1 
shows comparative information about the three provinces.
Table 4.1: Comparative general information for the three case study provinces
Characteristics Maha Kalasin Roi et Note
Whole kingdom
-Area (Sq.km2) *-b’c 5,228.0 6,946.7 8,299.4 514,000
- Distance from Bangkoka,b,c 470 kms 519 kms 512 kms
- Districts 87 b’c 13 18 20
- Sub-districts81 b’c 133 134 192
- Villages 87b,c 1,874 1,509 2,292
- City (Muang) Municipality a’b’c 1 1 1
- District Municipalities87 b’c 10 23 16
- SAOs (Sub-district LGO) 87 b’c 132 129 186
- PAO (Provincial LGO) 87 b’c 1 1 1
- Population (2003)d 944,385 994,600 1,322,389 63,079,765
- Households (2003 )d 217,994 225,717 298,146 17,853,423
- Move-in rate (per 1000)d 42.19 42.67 41.32 59.36
- Move-out rate (per 1000) d 38.11 39.29 39.40 53.44
- Population densityd 
(persons/Sq.km2)
180.5 133.0 151.0 127.0
- Gross Provincial Product GPP at 
Current Market Prices (Million of 
Baht)e
27,799 30,534 39,216 Gross Domestic product 
(GDP) = 7,104,228 
Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) = 742,534
- GPP Per capita (Baht)e 31,524 30,947 28,461 Whole country, GPP 
average = 64,763 
NE Region, GPP average 
= 21,902
- Population income (in 2 0 0 2 )1 
(Per capita/year)
21,030 21,302 22,785
- Rank order of population income 
within Thailand’s 76 provincesf
70 69 65 76
Sources: a. Mahasarakham Provincial Hall, 2003 “Provincial Annual Report"
b. Kalasin Provincial Hall, 2003 “ Provincial Annual Report”
c. Roi Et Provincial Hall, 2003 “ Provincial Annual Report”
d. Department of Local Administration, Ministry o f Interior, 2003 “Population Report”
e. NESDB, 2006 “Gross Domestic Product and Gross Regional Product”
f. Bank o f Thailand (the North-eastern Branch Office), 2005 “Provincial Economic Report”
4.6.3 Epidemiology and health facilities
The health profiles of the three provinces are broadly similar, though recent 
epidemiological data do show some small differences. Traditionally the main killers in the 
north-east have been cancer and heart disease followed by diseases associated with the 
liver. Table 4.2 shows that the rate of deaths from cancer is similar to the national average 
(with Kalasin a little higher), and deaths from heart disease a little higher than the national 
average (but with Mahasarakham being lower). Deaths from liver disease are less 
common than in the past and do not feature in this table.
For many years respiratory illness, digestive disorders and infectious diseases have been 
the common diseases in Esarn, and this continues to be the case, especially as far as
outpatient treatments are concerned. This is a different pattern than that at national level, 
where endocrinal, nutritional and metabolic conditions as well as mental disorders feature 
more prominently. Regarding inpatient statistics, the categories of ‘intestinal infectious 
disease’ and ‘other infectious and parasite’ are common, just as at national level. 
Admissions for normal single births feature higher in the list in the case study provinces 
than nationally, while disorders of the blood do not feature in the top three as they do 
nationally.
Table 4.2: Main categories of diseases affecting the three provinces
Mahasarakham Kalasin Roi Et whole country
Illness with 
surveillance diseases
Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of 
diseases/Per 100,000 
pop
First Diarrhoeas
1,413
Diarrhoeas
1,649
Diarrhoeas
1,586
Diarrhoeas
1,745
second Fever causes 
356
Fever causes 
306
Fever causes 
342
Fever causes 
364
third Pneumonia
220
Food poisoning 
278
Food poisoning 
216
Food poisoning 
254
Cause of deaths Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of diseases/Per 
100,000 pop
Group of 
diseases/Per 100,000 
pop
First Heart disease 
85
Malignant neoplasm, all 
form 
116
Malignant neoplasm, all
form
80
Malignant neoplasm, 
all forms 
78
second Malignant neoplasm, all
forms
73
Infectious and parasites 
55
Heart disease 
65
Accident and
poisoning
57
third Accident and poisoning 
31
Accident and poisoning 
52
Infectious and parasites 
47
Hypertension and
cerebrovacular
35
Out-patients report Group of diseases/ 
Per 1,000 pop
Group of diseases / 
Per 1,000 pop
Group of diseases / 
Per 1,000 pop
Group of 
diseases/Per 100,000 
pop
First Respiratory tract
infections
265
Respiratory tract
infections
297
Respiratory tract
infections
301
Endocrine, nutrition,
metabolism
9487
second Digestive and intestines 
178
Digestive and intestines 
230
Digestive and intestines 
258
Other infectious and
parasites
8974
third Other infections and 
parasites 
110
Muscle, skeleton and
ligaments
138
Other infectious and
parasites
164
Mental, behaviour
disorder
3295
Inpatients
report
Group of disease 
Per 100,000 pop
Group of disease 
Per 100,000 pop
Group of disease 
Per 100,000 pop
Group of 
diseases/Per 100,000 
pop
First Other intestinal 
infectious disease 
463
Other intestinal 
infectious disease 
379
Other intestinal 
infectious disease 
475
Other intestinal 
infectious disease 
517
second Other infectious and
parasite
296
Single spontaneous
delivery
357
Single spontaneous
delivery
348
Other infectious and
parasite
334
third Symptom, signs 
abnormal clinical and 
laboratory finding 
280
Symptom, signs 
abnormal clinical and 
laboratory finding 
349
Other infectious and
parasite
297
Blood, blood forming
organs and related
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Adapted from: 1. Mahasarakham PTO, 2003
2. Kalasin PHO, 2003
3. Roi Et PHO, 2003
These three provinces have a lower reported incidence of HIV/AIDS than the national 
average. The accumulated numbers of AIDS patients reported in Thailand from 1984 to 
2003 were 244,383 cases nationally, with 2,187 in Mahasarakham, 1,758 in Kalasin and 
3,215 in Roi Et. In 2003, the numbers of new cases of AIDS reported were 285 in 
Mahasarakham, 222 in Kalasin and 306 in Roi Et, against a total in Thailand of 24,579. In 
2003, the number of AIDS patients per 100,000 population is 30.2 in Mahasarakham, 
22.37 in Kalasin and 23.14 in Roi Et, against the average figure for the whole country of 
39.29. In 2003, 6,659 people were recorded as dying from AIDS in the whole country, 
with 31 in Mahasarakham, 24 in Kalasin and 108 in Roi Et. (Department of 
Communicable Diseases Control 2006) Although most of these figures are likely to 
underestimate the real epidemiology of AIDS, they indicate that these provinces are not 
‘hot spots’ of this disease.
One surprising point emerging from official statistics on health status in the three 
provinces see Table 4.3) is that indicators such as the crude death rate and the infant 
mortality rate do not appear to have any clear relationship with the income of the province. 
Mahasarakham, the poorest province, has a crude death rate lower than Roi Et, the richest, 
and a lower infant mortality rate than the two other provinces. Interestingly all three 
provinces have lower rates on these two indicators than the national average, with the 
exception of the high infant mortality rate in Roi Et. Of course, it would be unwise to put 
too much emphasis on a single year’s figures. These data are included here as background 
information relating to the year of the study.
Table 4.3: Indicators of health status in the three provinces in 2003
Health status 
(Vital statistic)
Mahasarakham Kalasin Roi Et Whole country
Crude birth rate per 1000 8.74 9.34 8.51 11.79
- Number of live births 8,250 9,273 11,257 742,174
- male 4,220 4,731 5,733 382,612
- female 4,030 4,542 5,524 359,562
Crude death rate per 1000 5.53 5.14 5.73 6.10
- Number of deaths 5,215 5,101 7,585 384,131
- male 2,880 2,885 4,238 221,962
- female 2,335 2,216 3,347 162,169
Infant mortality rate 
Per 1000 of live births
3.76 6.58 9.86 7.21
- Number of infant deaths 31 61 111 5,349
- male 14 35 49 2,915
- female 17 26 62 2,434
Maternal mortality rate 
Per 1000 of live births
12.12 0.00 0.00 13.74
- Number of maternal deaths 1 0 0 102
Sources: Bureau of Policy and strategy, Ministry of Public Health, 2004a “Health Resources Report”
As mentioned previously, hospitals and health centres in Thailand are generally located 
(one-to-one) in local government districts and sub-districts. The existing number of 
districts and sub-districts thus explains a good deal about the distribution of health care 
facilities in the three provinces. The numbers of doctors and dentists are roughly in line 
with the relative population sizes of the three provinces. However, the second most 
populous province, Kalasin, is less well off for pharmacists, nurses and health workers 
than smaller Mahasarakham. Conversely Kalasin has more favourable ratios of doctors 
and dentists to population than the other two provinces. Roi Et has three private hospitals 
compared with one each in the other two provinces, which may be a reflection of its 
relative wealth.
Table 4.4: Numbers and population ratios of health resources in the three case study 
provinces: 2002
Health resources Mahasarakham Kalasin Roi Et Whole country
(number) (number) (number) (number)
population ratio population ratio population ratio population ratio
Public hospitals8 (13) (14) (18) (973)
1:72,645 1:71,042 1:73,466 1:64,830
Public beds8 (952) (960) (1,143) (105,539)
1:952 1:1,036 1:1,156 1:597
Private hospitals8 (1) (1) (3) (320)
1:944,385 1:994,600 1:440,796 1:197,124
Private beds8 (50) (30) (235) (28,914)
1:18,887 1:33,153 1:5,627 1:2,181
Health centresc (175) (156) (230) (9,810)
1:5396 1:6375 1:5749 1:6430
Doctors “*b (84) (108) (HO) (17,529)
1:11,207 1:9,147 1:12,011 1:3,295
Dentists * b (25) (31) (32) (3,529)
1:37,657 1:31,866 1:41,288 1:8,022
Pharmacist81 b (66) (47) (67) (6,168)
1:14,264 1:15,680 1:19,720 1:8,511
Nurses * b (665) (622) (877) 85,392
1:1,416 1:1,588 1:1,507 1:739
Health workersc (537) (430) (559) (28,835)
1:1,744 1:2,264 1:2,911 1:1,657
Sources: a. Bureau of Policy and strategy, Ministry of Public Health, 2004 “Health 
Resources Report”
b. The National Economic and Social Development Board, 2006 “Health 
Resources ”
c. Wibulpolprasert, S. (ed.), 2005 “Health Profiles 2001-2004”
Unfortunately figures for health care facilities were only available for 2002 rather than the 
year of the study, but are unlikely to have changed greatly.
4.7 Health finance and the 30 baht scheme
Before telling the reform stories of the three provinces, it is necessary to give some 
additional background on the way the financing mechanism changed in the first two years 
of the UC reforms and how this affected the Esarn provinces. This is important because it 
affects one of the main areas for local decision making by health administrators in each 
province.
As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the most radical aspects of the UC reforms was the 
introduction of capitation-based funding One of the original policy objectives was that 
money would ‘follow patients’, so that the financing mechanism would be used to 
engineer a re-distribution of the medical workforce. Hospitals in Esarn would receive 
funding in line with their populations and be able to pay the salaries of extra health care 
staff to draw a fairer share of the professional workforce to the north east.
However, in the course of detailed implementation various problems arose in the purchaser 
mechanism, particularly in the public hospitals which remained under the command of the 
MoPH. The most difficult problem was the survival of hospitals that were dependent on 
MoPH funding. It was relatively straightforward for the MoPH (via PHOs) to use the 
planned contracting system to purchase care from private hospitals and hospitals controlled 
by others ministries (such as military or university hospitals), which were also supported 
by other funding streams. However, it was problematic to channel all funding to public 
hospitals via capitation-based contracts, while simultaneously ending the old system of 
annual grant allocations. This was mainly because the switch to capitation-based funding 
would have significantly reduced the total budgets available to many of the larger units to 
the extent that they ceased to be financially viable.
There were two aspects to this problem. The first concerned the way resources were 
allocated at national level, and the second concerned the way resources were distributed 
within provinces. At national level the reforms involved a dramatic shift from annual 
allocations to provinces based on historic uplift, to funding based on the population served, 
which threatened to render the existing distribution of health professionals and facilities 
unviable. For example, Racha Buri province in central region has four large general
hospitals serving a relatively small population of under one million people, and it was 
evident that a capitation-based budget would not cover existing staff salary costs.
At provincial level, the problem concerned how far the new fund holding bodies on the 
provider side, the CUPs would distribute monies within the local health care system. The 
CUPs would be funded on capitation, but the larger hospitals would depend on payments 
from the CUPs made in respect of referrals. There were worries that the CUPs might hold 
some patients inappropriately in community hospitals to save on referral payments to 
provincial and tertiary hospitals, and that this would also lead to underfunding of the big 
hospitals.
These two problems taken together cast doubt on whether it would be possible to introduce 
full capitation-based funding immediately. The reality facing policy makers was that the 
main health resources such as the workforce, the buildings and medical equipment could 
not be easily moved, and any attempt to use the financing mechanism as a lever of change 
was going to take time and would have damaging short-term consequences. In particular 
there was strong professional opposition in the main urban areas. Widespread financial 
crisis in provincial hospitals and larger units in urban areas would have been highly 
detrimental to the overall reform agenda, especially given that around 90% of the hospitals 
were controlled by the MoPH and they these would play a key role in policy 
implementation. Reduced budgets would leave these hospitals unable to implement the 
new policies as expected. In a situation where there were insufficient funds for core 
hospital salary costs, there was the risk that promotion and prevention activities and the 
upgrading of primary care would be neglected.
The existing mal-distribution of resources across the nation also affected the pace at which 
extra resources could be transferred into underserved areas. Areas such as the north­
eastern region had large populations but historically had only a limited health 
infrastructure and longstanding staff recruitment problems. Again it was evident that even 
if more money was forthcoming, there problems of structural adjustment would mean that 
money would not convert automatically into improved health care delivery.
Senior MoPH administrators had been aware of this problem from the beginning and had 
established a national ‘Contingency Fund’ of 5000 million baht at the central level for the
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first year of implementation. However, a significant group within the MoPH argued that 
further additional adjustment mechanisms would be required. This was a highly 
controversial issue on which no consensus was forthcoming. Ultimately the issue was only 
resolved by a decision of the Permanent Secretary and the approach taken in the first year 
of policy implementation represented a compromise. It was agreed that provinces would 
be allowed decision making power to decide the preferred approach at local level. In 
essence, the MoPH allowed provinces discretion to introduce two measures that would 
enable them to pull back the budget to the large hospitals:
1. PHOs could opt to separate out salary costs from the capitation payment. This
involved ‘top-slicing’ the salary cost element for the entire province from the 
total UC budget allocated to the province based on capitation. Supporters argued 
that the PHO could then use this central budget to redistribute monies to support 
the larger hospitals by paying their salary costs. It would also promote a more 
co-operative attitude in which salary costs across the entire province were 
disbursed in an equitable manner.
2. PHOs should split the UC budget (with or without salaries taken out) into the 
three categories of inpatient Care (IP), outpatient care (OP) and promotion and 
prevention (P&P), and could opt to retain the IP element for disbursement by the 
PHO rather than the CUP. This was known as the ‘exclusive’ payment model, as 
compared with the ‘inclusive’ model in which IP + OP + P&P was paid to the 
CUP. Advocates of the exclusive approach argued that it would ensure that 
referrals would be funded and solve the problem of delay in referrals. 
Additionally, it secured the position of provincial hospitals which would be more 
confident about their income stream since it would come from the PHO rather 
than the CUP.
The central ‘war room’ decided that the MoPH would still provide a contingency fund at 
the centre to support hospitals in exceptional difficulties whose problems could not be 
managed at provincial level (MoPH 2002a).
The first measure conflicted with the ‘money follows patients’ concept associated with the 
‘capitation model’ and led to much controversy. In those provinces that opted both to
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hold the salary budget at the centre and use an exclusive allocation model a reduced 
proportion of the total capitation payment was disbursed to the CUPs, and the PHO had 
control over a substantial fund which could guarantee monies for referrals to, and staff 
salary payments in hospitals that would otherwise have been capitation losers.
Official figures show that a variety of approaches was taken across the nation (Table 4.5). 
A narrow majority favoured centralised salary budgets and exclusive payments, while a 
smaller but substantial group opted for devolved salary budgets and inclusive payments, 
and a significant minority used mixed arrangements. Generally speaking, provinces that 
held salaries at the centre also opted to do the same with IP budgets, and those that 
favoured devolved salary budgets also passed IP budgets to the CUPs.
Table 4.5: Model of the staff salary costs funded and model of capitation during October 
2001-June 2002
Province FY 1 ( Oct 2001-Sept 2002) Plans for FY2 (as 
recorded in June 2002)
FY2 Outcome following 
New MoPH policy
Nation level Salary fund at Model Salary 
fund at
Model Salary 
fund at
Model
PHO = 40 Ex = 38 PHO = 36 Ex = 29 PHO=75 Ex=75
CUP = 30 In = 31 CUP = 32 In = 40 - -
Mixed = 5 Mixed = 6 Mixed = 7 Mixed = 6 - -
Total 75 75 75 75 75 75
Adapted from: Bureau of Health Insurance, MOPH, 2002
In June 2002 the MoPH asked provinces to report on their intended financial strategy for 
the following year (i.e. from October 2002). The responses showed a move towards 
greater support for devolved budgets, with a growing majority favouring use of the 
inclusive model. (31 provinces in October 2001 rising to 40 provinces in June 2002). This 
was interpreted in the MoPH as a sign that CUPs (and their associated community 
hospitals) might be insufficiently willing to support the large hospitals. There was 
additional uncertainty because it was known that many provinces had moved back and 
forth between the two models several times during the 2001/02 financial year, and that the 
situation was more complex and fluid than the above table suggests.
Following much debate in the MoPH, it was decided that in 2002-03 that the Ministry 
would hold the salary fund centrally and would require PHOs to use an exclusive payment
model. Many commentators attributed this to a crisis of funding in the hospitals which 
was intensifying at this time. This change had a big impact in the Northeast. Full 
capitation funding meant an increase in Esam’s UC budget in 2001/02 (see Table 4.6). 
These figures may overstate the shift in funding between central region and Esam because 
they exclude Bangkok and also take no account of the contingency fund, but they show 
that the new allocation system had the potential to engineer a significant redistribution of 
revenue. However the changes in 2002/03 worsened the allocation to Esam more than for 
any other region, significantly reducing its allocation at a time when all regions were 
having to cope with an increase in workload because of the 30 baht scheme. Although total 
health spending rose between 2001-02 and 2002-03 (Table 4.7), the capitation payment set 
remained the same at 1202 baht per head, and the salaries component of this was now held 
at the MoPH.
Table 4.6: Allocation of the health budget per capita from the government by region, FY 
2000-01 to 2002/03
Region Number
of
provinces
(2001)
Number
Of
hosp.
beds
No.
Doctors
(2001)
UC
Population
(2001)
FY 2000-01 
(Baht)(1)
FY 2001-02 
(Baht)*2’3*
FY 2002-03 
(Baht)*4*
Central 25 23,800 2,404 12,154,023 1,042 1,052 1,076
Esarn 19 23,184 2,040 17,381,915 616 1,052 834
The North 17 15,148 1,576 9,272,061 894 1,052 1,065
The South 14 11,975 1,130 6,225,624 993 1,052 1,064
Nationwide
(75 provinces)
75 74,107 7,150 45,033,623 840 1,052 1,009
Adapted from: (1) Rural Doctors’ Society Report, 2003 
(2) Tiamworakul, S., 2002 
Note: 1. FY 2000-01 was the last year before capitation funding was implemented
across the country
2. This information excludes the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, which may lead it 
to understate inequality.
3. The per capita allocation in FY 2001-02 excludes top-ups from the central CF 
budget.
4. In FY2002/03 the salary budget was separated from the capitation payments 
and held at the MoPH.
Figure shown includes UC capitation payment plus per capita salaries payment 
from centre.
Table 4.7: The real allocation of health budget from the government, from FY 2000-1 to 
2003-04
FY 2000-01
(Million)
FY 2001-02
(Million)
FY 2002-03
(Million)
FY 2003-04
(Million)
1. MoPH/NHSO(1) 61,097.20 70,923.19 74,133.89 77,720.79
1.1 MoPH fixed cost 61,097.20 41,500.62 41,995.49 45,147.92
1.2 UC - 22,138.45 27,138.40 29,727.54
1.3 central fund for 
UC
- 1,597.43 5,000.00 2,845.33
1.4 central CF fund - 5,686.69 - -
2. For other Ministries 5,157.10 1,846.51 4,090.31 6,065.81
Total health budget(2) 66,254.30 72,769.70 78,224.20 83,786.60
Source: (1) Bureau of Policy and Strategy, MoPH, 2004 “Health Resources Report”
(2) Ministry of Public Health, 2006 “Budget from FY 1997 to 2005”
Note: FY 2001-02 was the first year of UC scheme spread across the country
Payments from the central salaries budget were channelled via the PHOs to public health 
staff, but this money was now ring-fenced so as to be under the control of the Ministry. 
However, in practice the new system allowed the Ministry to reallocate money from the 
central salaries fund according to the needs of the different regions rather than being 
distributed on the basis of population. Consequently the money allocated to Esam fell 
sharply and that going to Bangkok rose. The result of these changes was to further weaken 
the re-distributive impact of the reforms, both at the level of individual provinces (where 
the position of large hospitals was strengthened and the re-channelling of funds to primary 
care was halted) and at the level of the nation (where Bangkok hospitals were the main 
beneficiaries). This issue of the change in the financing mechanism in 2002-03 will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8.
4.8 Implementing reforms at provincial level: ‘76 flowers bloom*
The provincial case studies are important because they examine an administrative level 
that was given a significant degree of devolved decision-making power at a key stage of 
implementation of the UC reforms. One of the respondents interviewed as background for 
the research was a senior economist who had chaired a key national committee, advising 
on the reforms and the initial capitation payment. When asked whether the reforms 
represented top-down or bottom-up policy implementation he said:
“Top down only in the broad outlines of what they wanted. They haven’t got a 
blueprint. The Ministry of Public Health... interestingly, the Permanent Secretary
at the time said that to this group that I chair: the whole thing was implemented so 
rapidly that this became part of it, in more senses than one. In the end I think there 
was so much conflict at the top of the Ministry of Public Health that the issue was 
per force devolved to the provincial level. So it is 76 flowers bloom. Everybody 
had their own thing, you know, not only about the salaries but also whether 
because of the referral problem - 1 am thinking mostly of the reimbursement system 
because I am economist - but whether there should be a split in payment for IP and 
OP, or whether it is just straight capitation” (Senior Economist, Anonymous Think 
Tank, Bangkok) (English language interview).
The ‘76 flowers’ are the provinces of Thailand. The following chapters explore the reform 
stories of three of them.
4.9 Summary of chapter
This chapter has provided background information on Esam Region, the three case study 
provinces and issues concerning the financing mechanism that opened up an area of choice 
for provinces. It prepares the way for Chapters 5, 6 and 7, which describe the reform 
stories of Mahasarakham, Kalasin and Roi Et. Those chapters will outline the 
implementation strategies used, and also examine how much decision space local actors 
had to shape the UC reforms in particular ways. Each chapter will consider the distinctive 
aspects of the approach used in the province, the question of which actors or interest 
groups were able to mobilise influence, and the interaction between the various influence 
groups. The constraints that limited the scope of local decision making will be considered 
in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5 
Mahasarakham province: 
distributed power and civil society engagement
Chapter 5. Mahasarakham province: distributed power and 
civil society engagement
5.1 Introduction
This is the first of three chapters concerned with the differing approaches to 
implementation of the UC reforms in the three case study provinces. The chapter will 
consider Mahasarakham province and the particular influences and conditions there that 
affected the approach taken. It will describe the role of key actors and the power structure 
in place (termed here ‘distributed power’), the guiding themes of the reform effort in the 
province, and changes in organisational arrangements that occurred. The chapter will 
consider a number of areas where key actors had decision space to adapt the reforms to 
local conditions, including determining the financing model that would apply, managing 
the allocation of resources, including the health service workforce, and making decisions 
about the degree of public participation. It will also briefly consider how the discretional 
space open to local actors was affected by the existing positive relationship with the 
MoPH.
An important policy theme at local level in Mahasarakham, not found to the same degree 
in the other two case study provinces, was ‘civil society engagement’ -  the attempt to 
involve of voluntary civic and social organisations and institutions. This was bound up 
with the particular distribution of power that existed in the provincial health office, the 
commitment of senior officers to decentralisation and community empowerment, the 
relatively autonomous position of hospital Doctor-Directors in the province, and the 
attempts by professionals to engage the population at grass roots level.
5.2 Implementing the UC reforms in Mahasarakham 
5.2.1 Actors, networks and power
As elsewhere in Thailand, the local implementation of the UC reforms in Mahasarakham 
Province was crucially shaped by the approach taken by senior officers in the Provincial 
Health Office (PHO). Although the policy template initially communicated from the
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Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) was not fully worked out, a number of requirements 
needed to be put in place within a defined timescale, including the rolling out of the UC 
gold card scheme, the development of an health insurance office at provincial level, reform 
of the financing system to incorporate capitation-based funding, creating of the Contracted 
Units for Primary Care (CUPs), reform of primary care services to create the Primary Care 
Units (PCUs), and changed arrangements for referrals within the system. At the centre of 
much of the key decision-making were a small group of senior officers inside the PHO, 
comprising the Head, two deputies and an assistant.
There are three senior administrators who act as the assistant team in each sector, 
such as the hospital sector. I have a senior doctor who acts as the deputy CMO in 
medical preventive care, he is a former doctor director of a community hospital. 
In the district health office sector, there are a former DHO head, who had a strong 
relationship with the group of the DHO heads, to act as the assistant to the CMO. 
And in the public health sector, there are a senior public health technical expert, 
who came in to be the deputy CMO in public health. (SAO-PHO, MK 01)
These officers worked in conjunction with the Provincial Committee for Implementing 
Health Insurance (PCIHI), a body that was set up in provinces across the nation in line 
with a MoPH regulation. The regulation provided that PCIHIs could be formed either 
from existing the Provincial Sub-committees for Health Card Administration (PSHCA) -  
based on an older insurance scheme - or the Area Health Boards (AHBs) that had been 
formed in some provinces. The AHBs were local committees established as part of the 
ongoing decentralisation reforms of local government, which were deemed by the MoPH 
to be capable of the new role.
In Mahasarakham senior officers were not attracted to the idea of creating the PCIHI from 
the Provincial Sub-committees for Health Card Administration because the membership of 
the latter was drawn exclusively from the PHO and lacked representation from other 
bodies in the local health system. An AHB had recently been appointed. However, the 
senior PHO administrators considered this too new and untried to be trusted to act as 
PCIHI. The delay in creation of the PCIHI attracted attention at MoPH level, where 
similar problems in several provinces had emerged as a major hold up. Finally, 
Mahasarakham PHO negotiated permission to set up a PCIHI anew, rather than basing it
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on the existing bodies. As a quid pro quo, the AHB has given a new role as the advisory 
board to the PHO. This re-arrangement of the local power structure was accepted by the 
national ‘war room’. It necessitated a change in the published MoPH regulations (MoPH 
2001), so as to allow a PCIHI comprised of the CMO, the doctor director of the provincial 
hospital, representative of the DDCHs, representative for the doctor director of private 
hospital (optional), representative of non-MoPH hospitals (optional), representative of the 
DHO heads, representative of health centres, representative of local government, 
representative of UC scheme members, the deputy CMO and the head of the Health 
Insurance division. It was this group that made early important decisions about the 
allocation of funding between the PHO, hospitals and other parts of the provincial system, 
and also the approach to be taken with respect to referrals and primary care reforms.
In the early stages of the reforms the structural position of the PHO in the local health care 
system was ambiguous. On the one hand, the PHO remained in a chain of command which 
was headed by the MoPH and stretched down to the district health offices and medical care 
facilities. Thus in 2001-02, the PCIHI acted as the local policy board and the PHO was 
the main operational arm of the MoPH within the province. The PHO played a key role in 
negotiating budget arrangements with hospitals, which was one of the main problems in 
year one. The Deputy CMO in medical preventive care, who acted as the UC project 
manager, headed the ‘provincial war room’ which generated documents for the PCIHI 
meetings and was responsible for putting PCIHI resolutions into effect. Since the PHO still 
had authority to command the hospitals, the DHOs and the health centres across the 
province, the CMO and the PHO staff had significant authority to control activities 
covered by both the UC policy and non-UC policies. Additionally, both the MoPH and the 
government departments in the centre still requested routine reporting via the PHO using 
the pre-existing command and control channels.
On the other hand, the long term power of the PHO was in doubt and it was cast in a 
transitional role as a purchaser which was likely to cease operating when the NHSO’s 
plans for permanent local offices became known. The new capitation-based financing 
arrangements seemed to threaten the financial stability of the hospitals and led to a loss of 
confidence regarding the power of the PHO in a period of turbulence. There had been 
many budget setting meetings, and many arguments about allocations, which the
community hospitals took to be a sign of the PHO’s inability to protect them from the 
consequences of the new policy.
In November 2002, the National Health Security Act B.E. 2545 (A.D. 2002) was passed, 
and the NHSO was established as the organisation with formal responsibility for oversight 
of the UC policy implementation. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, a provision in the 
bill introduced a transitional arrangement whereby the MoPH retained responsibility for 
budget allocation for three years. As part of this arrangement, in early 2002 the NHSO 
gave PHOs the authority to act as its local branches. This approach, which had originally 
been adopted as a crisis management measure by the War Room, meant that PHOs were 
buying services from hospitals which they also directly managed, and continued to be a 
source of tension as implementation proceeded. Most significantly, it ensured that the PHO 
-  rather than some new local purchasing agency -  was still the main body at local level in 
UC implementation, even though it was a body whose role was unclear.
Regarding its role as local purchaser, the PHO had a range of specified powers and duties:
• To function as the Provincial registration centre.
• To evaluate health services delivered by the CUPs and their networks.
• To be responsible for the arrangement of implementing the UC policies in the 
province.
• To act as a protection agency to ensure people’s rights under the UC scheme.
• To support the CUPs and their networks in quality development.
• To support the Provincial Sub-committees, overseeing different aspects of the UC 
scheme which were appointed from the central and the local levels.
• To monitor and control the implementation process, and act as the representative of 
the NHSO in co-operation with other health-related bodies such as NGOs, 
voluntary agencies and community groups.
As mentioned above, the PHO operated in conjunction with the PCIHI. The latter’s duties, 
as set out by the National Committee for Implementing Universal Coverage, included:
• To formulate the provincial UC implementation policies consonant with the 
policies of the National Committee for Implementing Universal Coverage at the 
central level.
• To determine local arrangements and decision making mechanisms for 
implementing the UC policies and agree a PHO action plan.
• To monitor and supervise UC-related activities at provincial level.
• To appoint a working committee to support implementation of UC policies.
The PCIHI comprised four parties: a purchaser group, provider group, service user group 
and local experts group. The Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of the PHO chaired the sub­
committee and the deputy CMO took the role of secretary. A third officer, the Head of the 
Health Insurance group acted as assistant secretary. In practice the various working 
groups developed policies in different areas, which were then referred back to the main 
committee for final decisions and resolutions. The PCIHI was responsible for allocation of 
the UC budget, and it was this process that was used to determine the methodology of 
allocation and the distribution of monies to the contracting units for primary care (CUPs). 
The CUP boards then allocated monies at local level. (Interview MK 06)
The MoPH in Bangkok had set up an ad hoc working group to monitor and ‘trouble shoot’ 
emergent problems associated with the reforms known as the ‘war room’, and this was 
copied on a smaller scale by senior officers in the PHO. The provincial war room was 
effectively a co-ordinating centre for solving early problems thrown up by the reforms. 
The CMO appears to have acted alone to decide on an appropriate division of labour and 
determine the membership. While the PCIHI contained representatives from many 
organisations, the war room group consisted mainly of PHO staff, headed by the Deputy 
CMO. The division of labour between the war room and the PCIHI was not entirely clear- 
cut. However, in broad terms the first took responsibility for day-to-day problem 
management and the fine tuning of procedures, while the second set the longer term policy 
direction in the province and made formal decisions.
Another important component of the local service network was the Provincial Sub- 
Committee for Quality and Standards, which had a remit to monitor standards in provider 
units, to receive complaints and promote public understanding of the reforms. It consisted 
of a health professionals group of doctors and allied health professions, and a non-health 
professionals group made up of representatives of the public, local government and local 
experts in various fields.
It is this nexus of actors in the PHO and the PCIHI, generally led by, but extending beyond 
the PHO leadership, that has been termed ‘distributed power’ for the purposes of this 
chapter. By this is meant that senior officers in the Mahasarakham PHO sought to involve 
a wide range of actors in decisions, and to drive the reforms forward by gentle steering 
rather than old style command. Although senior officers talked of a shift in their role from 
control to supervision, they continued to take a leadership role, though one based on 
influence and persuasion rather than line management. This can be contrasted with the 
more top-down leadership style in one of the other study provinces and, taken together 
with the emphasis on civil society engagement, set a different tone for the administration 
of the reforms.
Figure 5.1 Organisation and management structure for UC implementation in 
Mahasarakham, 2001-2002
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Source: Adapted from a Manual for the National Health Security Implementation 
FY 2004 (National Health Security Office 2004)
5.2.2 Recent changes in organisational structure
In the early 1990s, the Mahasarakham PHO was divided into ten organisational divisions 
listed in Figure 5.2.14 An Accident control and Non-communicable Disease Section was 
set up around 1995, as an unofficial department in the PHO. However, as the result of the 
bureaucratic reforms which followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the launch of the 
30 baht policies in 2001, there was a period of rationalisation which culminated in a 
contraction to five groups (listing in the second row of figure 5.2).
14 When the government rolled out the 30 baht scheme across the country and forced the PHOs to prepare, a 
Health Insurance Section was established unofficially in the PHO. Thus several respondents reported that the 
PHO organisational structure comprised 11 or departments (or 12 with the Accident Control and Non- 
communicable Disease Section).
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Figure 5.2: Transforming the new organisational structure in the Mahasarakham PHO,
2002 to the present
Previous organisational structure
2. Planning and Evaluation Department,
3. Human Resource and Primary Health Care 
Development Department
4. Community Pharmacy Department
S. Dental Health Department
6. Health Promotion and Health Care 
Department,
7. Communicable Disease Control Department,
8. AIDS Control and Prevention Department
9. Sanitation and Environmental Health 
Department
10. Health Education and Public Relations 
Department
11. ‘ Accident Control and Non- communicable 
Disease Section
12. ** Health Insurance Section
C urrent organisational structure
1. Administration Department
General Administration Section
- Correspondence Unit
- Finance Unit
-  Procurement Unit
-  Personnel Unit 
Public Relations Unit
Health Strategy Development 
Group
Planning Unit 
Health Information Unit 
Epidemiology Unit 
Evaluation Unit
Technical Support Group
Technology Application Unit 
Personnel Development Unit 
Supervision Unit 
Information and 
Communications Unit
Consumer Protection Group
- Public & Local Agencies 
Coordination Unit
- Public Health Law Enforcement 
Unit
- Health-Care Facilities Quality
Health Insurance Group
Registration Unit 
Claims Centre 
Health Care Budgeting and 
Planning Coordination Unit 
Complaints Management Unit
Adapted from: Ministry o f Public Health: A new mandate and structure, 2002
Note: * This department was established unofficially in the PHO in around 1995 and was unrelated to the 
UC reforms
**The unofficial organisational structure which was established in mid-2001 to prepare for the new 
policy
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Consideration of possible adaptation of the old 10-departments structure began in the 
province around 1997 as preparation for the decentralisation reforms that were under 
discussion by the then government (see Chapter 1). The main issues at this time were the 
possible transfer of some functions to local government, and reappraisal of the duties of 
departments to take account of the new division of labour. At that time Mahasarakham 
province was included in a scheme whereby 1 in 4 provinces took part in pilot projects on 
the transfer of functions to local government. Later, in 1999-2000 the Sarakham PHO 
participated in an additional Ministry scheme involving 1 in 6 PHOs which were required 
to implement action research projects on approaches to organisational change linked to the 
Government’s reforms of the state bureaucracy. Consequently the Sarakham PHO had 
already investigated a range of possible structures and options for allocating tasks to 
sections, so that they had a good basis for action when reform came. These projects meant 
that the culture of the organisation was relatively open to change, and that there was not 
the same entrenched opposition found in some other provinces.
However, the 30 baht scheme was introduced with such rapidity across the entire country 
that PHO officers had given little consideration to the specific adaptations that would be 
needed. Thus the prospect of sudden dramatic change still caused a degree of uncertainty 
and anxiety. The CMO emerged as the key actor to plot a way forward and communicate 
this to staff.
Regarding the reform of the organisational structure of the PHO, the reduction in 
staff numbers caused us concern. However, the CMO had held meetings to try to 
help staff understanding how things would change and started to allocate some 
staff outside so as to prepare for downsizing and give people freedom to move to 
the hospitals and health centres. We had a short period of crisis but the 
administrators stepped in to make staff understand. Then some staff moved out. 
(SAO-PHO, MK 07)
Though the onset of the reforms was rapid Mahasarakham had already taken more steps 
than neighbouring provinces to control the size of the staff complement. As part of the 
1999 project on bureaucratic reform, projections had been made of likely future staffing 
needs. At that time the PHO had taken a decision to freeze routine recruitment of new staff 
and to cover new activities by redeploying existing staff. This led to a gradually fall in 
staff numbers. The news of the UC reforms created a need for significant additional 
reductions, but from a base that was lower than in provinces such as Kalasin and Roi Et.
The main impact was to require some secondees and junior staff to move to positions in
the service units.
Previously, we had 108 posts in the PHO but there were around 130-140 staff 
working here. When the 30 baht policy came in, they set the number of staff 
working in the PHO at not more than 98. So, we had a continuation of the 
downsizing process, because, instead of the PHO officers being operational staff 
they had to change to be ‘supervisors’ (in English). So there were many staff who 
had to go back to the service sector, in roles that would safeguard their careers, 
but they were more valuable working here. (SAO-PHO, MK 01)
This was unwelcome to many of the staff involved, but despite a degree of resistance, this 
transfer was accomplished quite rapidly. A senior administrator associated with the new 
Health Strategy Development Group, looking back on this period reflected on the 
personnel problems that this caused.
Personnel management is very difficult. In Mahasarakham PHO we prepared for 
5 years on this before the new system came. However, we are still having many 
problems. In other provinces - such as Khon Kaen, which had more than 300 
PHO staff, who had come in from the community hospitals, and Korat, where in 
one of the biggest cities they had 300 to 400 staff in the PHO - when the reforms 
came in a lot of people came under pressure to move out. There were a lot of 
people suffering over this. The 30 baht scheme is a good policy but it came in 
suddenly and we should have been given time to prepare the workforce - it would 
have been better. Now we have a lot of problems because of this. (SAO-PHO, 
MK 06)
In Mahasarakham, the reorganisation of the PHO from the former 10 departments and one 
section to five groups proceeded in a planned way, co-ordinated by the CMO. Initially the 
functions and tasks of the old departments were mapped on to the new structure (see 
Figure 5.1), in accord with top-down guidance, and key personnel from the old 
departments were allocated to the five new groups accordingly.
The management system in place as the UC reforms were implemented was therefore a 
simpler, more streamlined one than had previously existed, but arguably it still had not 
undergone sufficient preparation to proceed smoothly. The staff losses, and need to 
concentrate staff resources on the internal PHO re-organisation, made it difficult for PHO 
staff to look outwards and support the service units in the planned transformation of the 
local health care system.
The MoPH, when it was in discussions with the politicians, did not negotiate 
enough time for the preparation phase. (...) If the politicians and the senior 
administrator at the policy level had talked together and agreed things, the 
problems would not have arisen. For example, in the first year, the minister told 
the health officers that they would be given allowances if they worked at full 
capacity a lot of money was thrown at the allowances budget. That caused their 
working behaviour to change. The new behaviour might be called ‘no money, no 
work’. The officers have learned this and some people have made a down­
payment on a new car. When the budget was cut 50%, they did not get the money 
they expected. That caused them trouble. (SAO-PHO, MK 06)
In Mahasarakham, as in many other NE provinces, a sharp increase in the budget in Year 1 
of the reforms led to a policy where monetary rewards, in the form of allowances to reward 
flexible working, set up certain tensions in local service networks.
5.3 How the financing framework was adapted to local conditions
5.3.1 Adapting to the new financial framework
As explained in Chapter 4 one of the main areas of latitude given to provinces concerned 
the financing arrangements to be adopted locally, but the way PHOs reacted to this 
depended on how they conceptualised their own role in the rapidly changing system. 
Senior officers in Mahasarakham saw the PHO’s role as changing from controller agency 
to monitoring and general support unit. A senior administrator officer (SAO-PHO) 
described the change as follows:
Previously we acted as an administrative organisation, to support and control the 
health care service in the local area, both hospitals and health centres. All health 
activities had been centralised by the PHO office, such as: personnel, policy, 
strategies and resources. We were the main administrative organisation. (...) The 
PHO has changed to a new role - from controlling unit to monitoring unit. So we 
act as coordinator, compromise broker and evaluator under the new policies. (SAO- 
PHO, MK 01)
The new financial framework did not allow the PHO the power to control the budget as at 
the past. Initially, however the PHO still has to act both the supervisor and monitor to the 
local health unit due to rapid roll-out of the new policy. ‘Supervision’ still implied active 
engagement with the service units, and a proactive approach to driving the reforms.
Previously we were controlling a budget of 200 million baht per year. Now we 
have only 3 million baht per year. This budget needs to support both the PHO and 
all the district health offices in our province. It seems the administrators have lost 
the power to conduct and control any more because of we have no money. (...) We 
still have the same responsibilities, but we don’t need to do all these things by 
ourselves. We must go outside to monitor community hospitals or health centres. 
The money has gone but our responsibilities still remain. We must request money 
from community hospitals when we need to go to supervise them. (SAO-PHO, MK 
08)
The provincial ‘war room’ was tasked with anticipating problems and proposing solutions, 
as far as possible using a co-operative approach. As one informant reported:
We tried to make things clear and bring the problems into the open. The PHO is a 
neutral agency which can oversee negotiations. We tried to solve the problems by 
providing information and discussing the problems in meetings. We gathered the 
background information and options for the committee to make a decision. If we 
can’t discuss it in this way the problem will not end. (SAO-PHO, MK 02)
Lower level respondents seemed to accept that committee membership in Mahasarakham 
had been opened up more than in many other places.
Regarding policy at provincial level, I think that in Mahasarakham, we have 
participated at all levels. On the provincial committee for budgeting (the war 
room), we have representatives of the health centres, the DDCHs, the DHO heads 
and Head of provincial groups. These all participated at the beginning. With 
regard the workforce allocation process, we pushed the involvement concept at 
the provincial level, which was different from in the past when there were only 
the DDCHs and DHO heads. There are much more participation in the committee 
but I don’t know about their actions. However, it is better than previously 
because we could more easily report problems concerning budgets or the 
workforce from the lower level.
(ADHOH, MK 35)
This relatively inclusive approach included the war room, the PCIHI, and even the 
composition of CUP boards, which included lay representatives. Overall, the 
Mahasarakham PHO took a stance where it accepted that lower-level actors should be 
involved in the core committees, and where co-operation was preferred to conflict. The 
decisions about the financial allocation model to be employed in the province also 
appeared to reflect a wish for a fair distribution to the CUPs, while at the same time 
safeguarding the position of the hospitals.
5.3.2 Choosing a budget allocation model
As mentioned In Chapter 4, the MoPH gave the PHOs important decision-making powers 
in two areas in FY 2001-02:
• Firstly, they had discretion to decide whether to hold the staff salary budget at the 
provincial level or the CUP level;
• Secondly, they could opt to use either an ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ model to 
channel funds to CUPs.
One national requirement was that the UC budget should be divided into (a) in-patient 
costs - IP (b) outpatient costs -  OP, and (c) the costs of prevention and promotion - P&P. 
The ‘inclusive’ model involved passing on the nationally-agreed capitation payments to 
CUPs without deduction, including the monies for inpatient, outpatient and P&P activities 
(IP+OP+P&P). In the ‘exclusive’ model, the IP component of the payment was retained at 
the provincial level and only the payments for outpatient and promotion and prevention 
activity were passed to the CUPs (OP+P&P). However, there was also scope to vary the 
basic models and create a ‘mixed’ approach.
In 2001/02 all three case study provinces opted to hold salary budgets at the provincial 
level. However, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7, Roi Et and Kalasin took different 
approaches from Mahasarakham regarding the choice of allocation model for IP. In 
October 2001 Kalasin opted for an exclusive model, while Roi Et favoured the exclusive 
approach, but with a different Clearing House arrangement, and Mahasarakham employed 
a mixed payment method. In June 2002 the MoPH asked provinces to state their plans 
regarding the model that they intended to use for the year starting October 2002. 
Mahasarakham opted for the inclusive model, while the two neighbouring provinces both 
stated that they would use the exclusive model (see Table 5.1). Following policy 
discussions at the Ministry level it was decided in the event that all provinces should use 
the Exclusive model from 2002/03 onwards.
Table 5.1: Comparing the budget model decided in three provinces in the FY 1 and their 
intention in FY 2
Province FY 1 (From Oct 2001) Plan for FY 2 (June 2002)
Salary fund 
at
Model Salary fund at Model
Mahasarakham PHO Mixed PHO In
Kalasin PHO Ex PHO Ex
Roi Et PHO Ex PHO Ex
Source: Adapted from a table produced in: Bureau of Health Insurance, MOPH 2002 
Note: Salary fund refers to where the salaries budget is held -  PHO or CUP.
Model refers to the models o f capitation used at the provincial level, for example:
- Ex = Exclusive model in which IP is held by PHO and OP+P&P is paid to CUP
- In = Inclusive model where OP+P&P+IP is paid to CUP
- Mixed = situation where some element is split between PHO and CUP
As Table 5.1 shows, Mahasarakham opted in financial year 1 to hold the salary budget at 
the PHO and to use a mixed payment model. This involved splitting the IP budget and 
holding 60% in the Provincial Clearing House while allocating the remaining 40% to the 
CUPs, together with the payments for OP and P & P .  This effectively meant that the PHO 
created a budget to provide extra support for hospitals and districts that were under­
financed under the capitation model, using the top-sliced element of the salaries and IP 
budget.
Within the PHO, the war room took the lead in organising a series of discussions and fine- 
tuning the policies coming from the PCIHI. There were a series of minor technical 
adjustments, but the key decisions centred on the handling of the salary budget and the IP 
budget that would support referrals. The senior PHO officer who responsible for leading 
policy on financing describes how this fitted into the wider policy agenda:
I was responsible for this task directly. We considered that, in respect of the 
policies, the government told us two things must change, first, financial changes 
which allocated money to people based on registration, and second, health care 
delivery which focused on primary health care units in the community or ‘close to 
the home, close to the heart’. So, we had to set the goal of working together. We 
have got problems. First, cooperation between the hospitals and health centres; 
these have long been very different organisations, so how could we make them 
work together? And second, the capitation budget included staff salary costs, so it 
would cause problems if we allocated directly to areas, especially in the 
provincial hospital. In principle, we had analysed the total provincial budget and 
it was enough to survive. But if we focused on each health unit there would be 
problems in some areas, for example, regarding the issue of staff salaries in the 
provincial hospital. Therefore, we have aimed to pool resources within the
province and decide a rule together, and then arrange a series of meetings to make 
decisions. (SAO-PHO, MK 02)
It has been decided that the salary budget must be held centrally ‘for the reason that all the 
hospitals must collectively support the referral system, as well as technical and staff 
support.’ (Mahasarakham PHO 2003: 23-24). The decision to ‘pool’ funding did not fully 
resolve the issue of whether this would be done entirely through the salary budget or 
would also require central use of IP monies. This was discussed over a series of ‘war 
room’ meetings. Senior officers considered a range of options, and worked out simulation 
models of the results of different funding splits. In the event it was decided to use what 
was to be called an inclusive model, but one which performed a sleight of hand which 
effectively changed this to a mixed approach. The PHO Report to the Government 
Inspector of Health Region 5 recording the choice of the ‘inclusive capitation model’ also 
states: ‘However, it was agreed that there would be an additional special arrangement in 
respect of IP, where 60% of monies for referrals would be managed by the PHO Clearing 
house. In the event that some of this remained unspent it would be reimbursed to the CUPs 
at the end of the financial year.’ (Mahasarakham PHO 2003: 23-24)
The provincial hospital, represented by its doctor director, had been a powerful voice 
pushing for monies to be managed at the PHO. But other senior officers had put limits on 
the amount the provincial hospital could receive.
In the first year we deducted salary costs at the province with the additional 
condition that the provincial hospital would not receive more than 60%. That was 
our agreement. Then after about 9 months we analysed how this should be 
developed in the second year. At the beginning we did not have a policy about 
deducting salary costs. We agreed that we would deduct 50% of salary costs at 
the province: that means dividing 50% for the CUP and 50% at the province. That 
is an ‘inclusive model’. We have run simulation models to understand our budget, 
what would happen if we deducted 50% or 100% at the provincial level. We 
presented data from the simulations to the committee. We found in the case of 
the provincial hospital that if we directly allocated staff salary costs to CUPs, they 
would be facing a difficult situation, because there is only one hospital which has 
had high staff salary costs amounting to more than Bt 100 million per year, 
whereas the PHO and all the CUPs, excluding the provincial hospital, have a 
salary budget of Bt 200 million. The budget of CUPs where they have under 
50,000 people registered will not increase too much. On the other hand , the 
community hospitals which have more than 100,000 people will have increased 
budgets, for example, where previously they received Bt 30-40 million per 
annum, they will now get Bt 60-70 million. (SAO-PHO, MK 02)
This respondent describes how the war room’s preferred plan for year two was to retain the 
(partially) ‘inclusive’ model of funding, but to split the salary budget so that 50% was now 
disbursed to the CUPs. This would have resulted in an increase in devolved budgets to 
CUPs in line with what officers took to be the spirit of the reforms, but there were also 
worries about the destabilising effect on the provincial hospital if more money went to the 
community hospitals. The war room’s recommendation of a split salary budget plus 
inclusive funding went to the PCIHI but, after long debate, the Board took the view that 
this strategy carried unacceptable risks. The PCIHI decided that the salary budget would 
continue to be held in its entirety at the PHO and also opted to increase the proportion of 
IP held at the Clearing House from 60% to 80%, with the rest disbursed to the CUPs. The 
detailed policy on disbursement of funds for referrals is discussed in a later section.
5.3.3 Safeguarding the service units
The position of the provisional hospital was one of the main concerns behind both the 
decision to hold salaries at the PHO, and policy on the use of the IP budget. The doctor 
director of the provincial hospital and some PHO officers perceived that capitation-based 
funding threatened the survival of larger hospitals with many staff, and that this made it 
necessary to devise a local mechanism that would mitigate the intended effect of the 
‘money follows patients’ policy.
We must arrange our budget locally to be fair and systemic. For example, what 
payment model to use. So we had to have a meeting with the key administrators 
to decide how to allocate funds. For example, the basic capitation payment was 
1205 baht. When it has been deducted from the centre, we got only 1052 baht 
which included provincial salary. But if we decide to apply this strictly across 
the area it will create problems. Especially in the case of a large hospital such as 
the provincial hospital, where there would be problems with salary costs. It 
seemed that all the funding would go for staff salaries and that would mean the 
hospital could not survive if we made the allocations based on capitation only. 
Therefore, we decided to deduct staff salary costs at the provincial level before re­
allocation. (SAO, MK 05)
Another approach, used early in implementation, was to re-draw the boundaries of the 
CUP in which the provincial hospital was located, so as to increase its catchment 
population and boost the capitation-based budget available to support the hospital for the 
‘local’ aspect of its work.
Regarding the provincial hospital, they didn’t have enough money because they have 32 
doctors and nearly 1000 nurses. The great majority of the budget is spent on staff salary 
costs. The PHO created a new catchment area so that the provincial hospital gained 
population, which increased the budget for the provincial hospital. We took 7 out of the 14 
health centres in ‘G’ district, 2 health centres from ‘B’ district and 2 health centres from 
‘K’ district and added them to the provincial CUP. That was a way to increase the 
population and the money. (SAO-PHO, MK 03)
There was thus a twin-track approach involving, first, supporting the provincial hospital 
from centrally held budgets, and second increasing the population size of the 
administrative unit from which the hospital’s nominal capitation-based funding would be 
derived.
The risk to the survival of the provincial hospital was one of the big issues of Year 1 of the 
reforms. However, against the claims of an immediate financial crisis, there were 
questions about whether the provincial hospital was benefiting from funding streams from 
other programmes and whether it had been frank in declaring this income fully. This 
meant that some PHO officers expressed a degree of scepticism about the extent of the 
problem.
The provincial and the regional hospital, they can easily survive. To tell the truth, 
these hospitals obtain money in many ways, such as the SSS and the civil servant 
scheme, whereas the community hospitals do not. In contrast, with regard to staff 
salary costs they (provincial hospital) receive an amount from the UC budget 
which is ‘inside’ information. In the provincial hospital report, they show only Bt 
30 scheme income, but do not display other income and then complain that they 
will not survive. (SAO-PHO, MK 06)
Apart from the financial stability of the provincial hospital, the other major problem facing 
the PHO was a small number of districts and community hospitals serving areas with 
insufficient populations to make capitation-based funding viable.
There were problems in some community hospitals, for instance, a small hospital 
which serves a small population then gets a small budget, such as ‘K’ hospital or 
‘Y’ hospital. ‘K’ hospital serves a population of about 20,000 and they will 
receive a budget of about Bt 10 millions. The budget includes all expenses and 
that disadvantages a small hospital. In the cases of ‘Y’ and ‘K’ hospital, they 
have been obtaining extra money from the provincial contingency fund, which is
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a way of supporting small hospitals to ensure that they survive. Other hospitals in 
the 11 districts have no problems. (SAO-PHO, MK 03)
In the first year of the reforms in Mahasarakham province the centrally-held salaries 
budget was used to support the provincial hospital and these two small community 
hospitals. A similar pattern was discemable in terms of district health offices, with the 
large Muang district (the central city district) as well as two small districts receiving extra 
monies to top up the share of the capitation payment. Funding problems in the new system 
in this province thus tended to concern both the largest and the smallest population units, 
but not the units in between.
5.3.4 Referrals and the Clearing House
Another area of concern as the reforms were rolled out was the distribution of funds 
through the local health care system as referrals were made. The importance placed on 
primary care in the Thai reforms was reflected in the use of the CUP (nominally located at 
the primary care level) as the entity through which funds would be channelled to the rest of 
the system. In practice most CUPs were attached to community hospitals and in the first 
instance channelled a large proportion of monies to them, to support both their work and 
the cost of referring patients on to higher levels of the system. However, this created 
perverse incentives for community hospitals to delay referrals to provincial or tertiary 
hospitals so as not to lose income, and also the possibility of payment delays for referred 
patients.
This was one of the considerations that led the PHO to top-slice the salary budget and keep 
a contingency fund to support salary costs in large or very small hospitals. However, an 
additional factor was that holding all the monies at the provincial level would have meant 
that referrals had no cost at all to community hospitals and might have led to a flood of 
cases transferred to larger hospitals. There was thus a perceived need to get the balance 
between under and over-referral right via the mixed payment system, and to ensure that 
this was happening through monitoring and ‘follow-up’.
In this province we used an ‘inclusive’ model so had a problem which was the 
small number of cases referred. If we had used ‘exclusive’ this would have 
resulted in a lot of referrals. So, we must follow up and monitor, and manage the
system well. We must accept that the monies were provided for the entire 
province, not for each hospital. (SAO-PHO, MK 02)
As events turned out in Year 1, it was reluctance to refer rather than over-referral that was 
the bigger problem in Mahasarakham. Thus there were concerns about the possible 
slowing down of payments and the rules for holding community hospitals responsible for 
the costs of secondary or tertiary care referrals in instances where they had had little of no 
contact with patients at the point of entry.
There may have been delays in referral in some districts. The provincial hospital 
told us that referrals might be slowed, so we understood this. In the beginning we 
set up regulations. First, whenever the patient is admitted to hospital then the 
hospital is responsible for payment. For example, if a patient is referred from ‘P’ 
hospital to Mahasarakham hospital, ‘P’ hospital must pay for everything. We set 
up a mechanism at the beginning in which we gave ‘credit’ to the doctor (to 
decide responsibly). Secondly, where a patient from a private clinic needs an 
operation and the community hospital cannot do this, then he/she will be referred 
to the provincial hospital and the community hospital must be held responsible for 
payment. That led to complaints from the community hospital that they were not 
involved in treating the case. Sometimes people didn’t go to the community 
hospital and they would like go directly to the provincial hospital. We had talked 
a lot together about a suitable approach between the ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ 
models, which both have strengths and weaknesses. There is no single best model. 
(SAO-PHO, MK 02)
Provinces therefore needed to have a robust system for directing payments for secondary 
and tertiary care to providers. The MoPH had directed that all provinces needed to 
establish a clearing house for this purpose and that these should be managed by the 
hospitals. However, there was an immediate problem in most provinces across the nation 
because hospitals that were already overburdened by the workload pressures imposed by 
the extension of the UC had insufficient capacity to manage this task. The result was that 
apart from some large hospitals in Bangkok, this responsibility was passed on to the PHOs. 
This change was one of the adaptations sanctioned by the MoPH’s ‘war-room’ as it 
struggled to manage emergent problems in the early months of the reforms.
One of our duties at the beginning was that we had to establish a Provincial 
clearing house. In the first year of the UC reforms, the hospitals had a duty to run 
this but they were overburdened with the documentary reports and passed the 
responsibility back to the PHO for operating the clearing house. Actually, we 
could do it because we had experience from the previous health insurance 
schemes. In the first year, we also managed both IP and OP payments and then
we started to try to encourage the hospitals to operate by themselves. (SAO-PHO, 
MK 05)
The approach taken to the management of referrals involved setting up a clearing 
house based at the provincial health office. This was an office that received 
information in the form of reports of referrals of in-patient cases from community 
hospitals to the provincial hospital and specialist tertiary hospitals, and arranged 
payment. The administrative work of the office involved validating data received 
from the community hospitals, ensuring that cases were correctly allocated to 
DRG categories, with adjusted relative weights (RWs), and then arranging for 
reimbursement of hospitals for treatment. The details of the payment mechanism 
were determined largely by the MoPH and were based on DRG-based payments 
to providers, up to the level of the global budget allocated to the Provincial 
Office. (DDCH, MK 20)
In Mahasarakham, the clearing house was a centre located within the Health Insurance 
division of the PHO, tasked with processing documents and managing the processing of IP 
payments to secondary and tertiary hospitals. It also had responsibility for channelling 
payments from the NHSO for ‘high-cost cases’ (using a special budget already top-sliced 
from the UC budget) to hospitals. As the extract above suggests, in this province the 
methodology used was modelled on past experience of administering the Social Security 
Scheme and the Health Card Scheme. This meant that the PHO was able to adapt quickly 
to the unexpected contingency of taking over the job of administering the clearing house 
from the hospitals, but also that the administrative process used was that had been created 
to manage the earlier schemes rather than one designed specifically with the UC reforms in 
mind.
One feature of the Thai reforms was that they combined UC and a global budget at the 
macro level with elements of ‘managed care’ at the micro level, so that inpatient care was 
reimbursed using a version of the Diagnosis-related Groups (DRG) system15. There was 
therefore little scope to vary the basic reimbursement mechanism or the ‘relative weights’ 
(RWs)16 used to set payment levels for different hospitals, since these were set first by the 
Bureau of Health Insurance and later the NHSO.
15 The diagnosis-related group (DRG) is a patient classification system for in-patients that has been utilised 
as part o f the health care financing mechanism in many countries. The system employs a minimum data set 
to classify admissions into different diagnosis-related groups. In Thailand much research was carried out on 
DRGs and the alternatives, and a version (since revised) was selected as a reimbursement mechanism for 
hospital care.
16 Relative weight, as used in the diagnosis related group system, is an important signal to the hospital about 
how much it will get from the insurer for providing care to the beneficiary.
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We deducted the budget at the province level. It amounted to 60% of the total IP 
budget of our province, for payments for in-patient cases within the province and 
referrals outside. We have a condition for referral cases which that that they need 
to have a referral recommendation letter that is approved by the community 
hospital or provincial hospital. The higher hospitals need to call for payment to 
the provincial clearing house, such as the Khon Kaen Regional Hospital or the 
Srinakarindhra University Hospital etcetera, which receive different amounts 
according to the relative weight in the Diagnosis Related Group model -  (RW 
with DRGs) between them. The one RW for Khon Kaen hospital was Bt 14000 
and Bt 16000 in the Srinakrarindhra Hospital. Last year’s report for this hospital 
shows that payments based on RW were more than twice the real costs. So this 
year, we have a new agreement with the Srinakrarindhra Hospital to pay real costs 
but we still apply RW to pay Khon Kaen Hospital. We agreed with our hospitals 
first to make payments outside-province and after that we will pay within the 
province applying the RW model. In the case of RW under 0.5 the community 
hospitals clear the payments themselves. With RW from 0.5 to 2.5 we calculate 
the average costs of provincial cases then re-allocate the IP budget remaining 
from payments outside for reimbursement to community hospitals. And with RW 
higher than 2.5 we call the NHSO directly regarding what we call the high risk 
costs such as heart disease or renal failure cases et cetera. (SAO-PHO, MK 11)
In FY 2002/03 the proportion of IP monies disbursed via the Clearing House was 
increased to 80 per cent. This was divided into (a) IP outside the province, which took 
first priority and (b) IP within the province, which was funded from the remaining resource 
pool.
This year, the system has changed to the DRG approach for referrals and we have 
the funding at the provincial level, where 80% (of IP) is funded at the PHO. Thus 
we don’t have any problem with referral cases. However, the new problem is a 
decrease in our budget, where the previous one is small this becomes too small. 
(DDCH, MK 23)
In the second year, the rules were changed so that the CUP rather than the PHO paid 
providers for out-of-province OP attendances, but with a cash limit of 700 baht per case. 
Although the rules for reimbursement of inpatient work were fixed at the centre and 
outside the discretion of the PHO, the arrangements for reimbursing RWs using different 
mechanisms according to these three bands were determined locally. These arrangements 
were important because they meant that the mixed model applied in Mahasarakham in 
Year 1, and to a large extent in Year 2, resulted in a complicated division of 
responsibilities between PHO and CUP. In both Year 1 and Year 2 relative weights were 
used to determine the threshold at which responsibility would move from the CUP to the 
PHO. The rule applied was that the CUP IP budget would pay for treatments whose 
relative weights were below 0.5, while treatments with higher RWs would be paid for from
other sources. The Clearing House first met the cost of out-of-province referrals, and then 
used the remaining funds as a pool that could be re-allocated to the CUPs to pay for the 
treatments with RWs of 0.5 to 2.5. High cost treatments with RWs over 2.5 were funded 
directly by the NHSO, on a first-come first served basis up to a global budget top-sliced
1 7from UC funding at national level.
There were a small number of additional innovations in Year 2 such as the creation of a 
top-sliced provincial ‘investment fund’, and an additional ring-fenced fund to support 
district office utility costs.
The financial allocations are sent direct to CUPs, and CUPs will distribute monies 
to Health Centres. To sum up, we allocated for P&P around 16%, OP around 50% 
and IP around 28%. That was based on central allocations and we suggested a 
model to use in our CUPs. However, before making the allocations we deducted 
10 per cent for a Provincial investment fund, which we have agreed together 
because the North Eastern region remains underdeveloped and the 30 baht project 
aims to improve quality of health service units. So we will use this for investment 
to increase the capacity of health care units. We have divided the fund into 2.5% 
for equipment for shared use, and 7.5% for allocating to hospitals based on their 
own development plans. (SAO-PHO, MK 05)
In assessing the significance of local decision making and its impact on the financing 
mechanism, it is also important to note that the overall budget allocation for inpatient work 
(IP) was determined by the PCIHI/PHO. The PCIHI had power to fix the financial 
allocation between the three categories of OP, IP and P&P, which determined the spending 
envelop for secondary and tertiary care. In Mahasarakham in the first year of the new 
system the division was roughly 16 percent for P&P, 50 percent for OP and 30 percent for 
IP. Following negotiations it was agreed to reimburse the provincial hospital for inpatient 
care bi-annually and the community hospitals on the basis of quarterly billing (Interview 
MK20).
17 In FY 2001/02 High Cost Care (HCC) was funded from the MoPH Bureau o f Health Insurance and in FY 
2002/03 responsibility was transferred to the NHSO. Payments for HCC usually related to catastrophic 
disease cases with RWs over 2.5, and were subject to published maxima for length o f stay and prices. In 
cases where costs exceeded the maxima in the HCC list, either the hospital or the PHO clearing house must 
pay.
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5.3.5 Summary of financial changes in Mahasarakham in FY 2001-02, 2002-03 and
2003-04
In Year 1 there was an iterative process between the MoPH and the PCIHI/PHO in which 
many of the key decisions about financing were devolved to the province. The PCIHI/PHO 
employed a ‘mixed’ approach, which, although described in many official documents and 
discourses with outside bodies as ‘inclusive’, involved allocating 60% of the IP budget to 
the PHO clearing House. Reimbursement to the hospitals was based on DRGs within a 
global budget -  RW 0.5 to 2.5., and 40% of the IP budget was directly allocated to the 
CUP. Regarding in-patient cases which have RWs above 2.5, the PHO clearing house 
passed these to central clearing at the Ministry for approval and reimbursement of the 
hospitals.
In 2003-04, the budget split in Mahasarakham was IP = 30%, OP = 54%, and P&P = 16%. 
The main funding flows and relationships between organisational divisions are represented 
in the following diagram.
Figure 5.3: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Mahasarakham in Year 1 (FY 2001-02)
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Adapted from: the Mahasarakham Report, 2001-02 (Mahasarakham PHO 2002)
In financial Year 2, following direction from the MoPH, the salary budget was held at the 
MoPH level and the PCIHI/PHO applied an ‘exclusive capitation model’. In Year 2 the 
PCIHI/PHO agreed to establish as a risk management fund held at the provincial level, 
based on 2% of total budget. The PCIHI/PHO also created a top-sliced budget to cover the 
health centres’ operational costs, such as the water and electricity bills, which resulted in a 
separate allocation of Bt 5450 per unit per month. In 2002-03 the PCIHI/PHO again used
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a special arrangement to allocate the IP funds, but this time increased the proportion 
disbursed through the Clearing House to 80%. In this year the split between budget 
divisions was OP = 54%, IP = 29% and P&P = 17%. Additionally the PCIHI/PHO agreed 
to channel 10% of the budget for allocation to CUPs into a ‘Provincial Cooperative 
Investment fund’. This fund was divided into two parts with around 75% going to support 
CUP investments and 25% allocated for shared investments managed by the PHO (see:
151Mahasarakham PHO, 2004: 15-16) . Figure 5.4 shows the resource flows and 
relationships between organisational divisions in 2002-03.
When the last interviews were completed in 2003/04 financial year, the basic arrangements 
had been rolled on, with only minor adjustments.
In Mahasarakham, we have received a capitation payment of 1052 and we have 
then deducted all provincial staff salaries, and then deducted 2.5% into a risk 
management fund to act as a safety net for some crisis hospitals. And for health 
centres we allocated for public utility costs and general expenditure an amount of 
baht 18 per head per year. All together health centres got around 5450 baht per 
month in 2003 and we have done the same this year. (SAO-PHO, MK 05)
18 Report to Inspector Health Region 5
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Figure 5.4: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Mahasarakham in Year 2 (FY 2002-03)
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In Financial Year 3 (FY 2003-04), as in all Thai provinces, Mahasarakham followed the 
policy direction from the Ministry that staff salary costs were to be funded at the Ministry 
and that an ‘exclusive model’ should be used at the provincial level. In this year the 
PCIHI/PHO again established a risk management fund held at the province, based on 2% 
of the total budget. The budget for health centre utility costs remained but was cut from 
5,450 baht per unit in Year 2 to 4,500 baht per unit. The percentage of IP monies going to 
the Clearing House increased a little to 70%. In FY 2003-04 the split between budget 
divisions was IP = 39%, OP = 48% and P&P = 13%. However there were stricter 
restrictions on how monies allocated to the CUP should be spend. Thus there were 
earmarked pots from the OP budget for medical equipment costs in the health centres and 
part-time allowances for health centre staff. There was also a pre-determined division of 
the P & P budget between hospitals and health centres, and a direction about how the 
hospital allocation should be divided between non-medical equipment and other costs.
Figure 5.5 shows the resource flows and relationships between organisational divisions in 
2003-04.
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Figure 5.5: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Mahasarakham in Year 3 (FY 2003-04)
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5.4 The view of actors in the local health care system
5.4.1 The view from the community hospitals
Staff in community hospitals differed sharply in the responses to the reforms and local 
financing arrangements. This was partly a reflection of when they were interviewed, since 
the allocation to these hospitals worsened significantly in the second year of the study. 
But it also reflected the fact that the new system created winners and losers. One school of 
thought among doctor directors interviewed was that there was no problem with referral 
delays or reimbursement rates, even in the first year, because the CUP and/or the PHO met 
the bulk of these costs directly.
In Mahasarakham, we did not have a problem with the referral payments. The 
CUPs took responsibility for payments themselves, because cases that were 
referred were screened by us first. Except in emergency cases, for reasons of 
patient safety, they can go for treatment at another hospital directly. Money for 
inpatient work was deducted at the provincial level and they applied a DRG 
model to make the distribution. (...) I couldn’t ‘delay’ [English] the cases that 
must be referred to a higher level because if I did the patient could sue me. I do 
not risk doing this. We are not private hospital. I have been referring patients, 
and if we were to go bankrupt the government should came and help and take 
responsibility. In cases where we refer patients, the payment is deducted from the 
provincial fund, so we have no reason to delay referrals. (DDCH, MK 20)
They arranged the IP system where there was ‘the centre’ at the PHO. If we didn’t 
refer (the patient) then (our) the hospital would pay a lot. So, referral is better 
because we have already established a clearing house at the province level. 
(DDCH, MK 19)
Another respondent suggested that the problem had been exaggerated because patients 
aware of the new Bt 30 project had wrongly believed that this entitled them to choose 
which hospital they would be referred to.
Regarding the problem with delayed referrals, I think personally it was a problem 
which people did not understand. Because, if they need to go to hospital for 
treatment, they expect to be able to choose where they go. For example, we could 
operate on an appendicitis case here but the patient does not want to stay with us so 
they need to go to a larger hospital. I think there is a growing problem of personal 
conflict. In a case where it is medically indicated we must refer. (DDCH, MK 22)
Two community hospitals had benefited directly from use of PHO contingency funds, 
which had been used to counterbalance the effects of their low populations on their 
capitation-based budget allocations.
However, others were less happy about the new methodology. Respondents complained 
that the capitation payment paid to the hospital had been reduced excessively by provincial 
top-slicing, that the DRG-based treatment payments were excessive and higher than those 
applied by the SSS or CSMB scheme, and that large hospitals were been reimbursed at a 
rate higher than would have been warranted if the calculation was based simply on 
numbers of patients treated.
In my own view, the provincial hospital charged us too much and much more 
than the price rate under other schemes. There was no discount or anything. If 
they did not deduct the salary costs I might have other choices for referring cases, 
based on better quality of service or cheaper process. I have no choice now but to 
refer to Mahasarakham hospital only, because the budget has already been 
deducted by the province. I couldn’t refer the patient outside the ‘chain’ [in 
English]. But irrespective of whether the main network provides good or bad 
quality, I cannot choose. If I had a choice, I am going to choose the best hospital 
for my patient. Now the community hospital is dying. (DDCH, MK 20)
One source of grievance was the perception that the provincial hospital was able to benefit 
from payments under the SSS and the CSMB scheme that had not been taken into account 
in the overall settlement. Some doctor directors felt that this was not merely an issue of 
omission but that some large hospitals were concealing the size of this income stream.
I think the government should not apply ‘capitation’ to all of the system. I think 
we must take account of existing assets. With regard to the salary budget held at 
the province I must pay an amount of Bt 8 million to support the provincial 
hospital. I don’t mind but in solving the problem we are missing the point. I think 
in the case of the provincial hospital where there is a lot of staff, we should use 
other funds to support them to survive and then they should open up all their 
accounts. The provincial hospital might lose. But when they open all their 
accounts, if we know how much they lose, then it is possible to support them 
through the contingency fund. Now they don’t open all their accounts. (DDCH, 
MK21)
Several respondents made the point that the early worries about survival of the provincial 
hospitals had effectively disappeared by FY 2003-04, when policy change to hold the 
salaries budget centrally by the MoPH had strengthened their position further.
Regarding the criticism about 2001-02 where the registration system was not 
complete and it seemed that the provincial hospital might not survive. At the 
moment, the provincial hospital receives its budget from the SSS, the Civil 
Service scheme and the UC scheme. So, they did not depend on the Bt 30 scheme 
much more than the other schemes. In 2001-02 we had talked about channelling 
the salary costs direct to each hospital so that they (the provincial hospital) might 
not survive. Now the salary costs are funded at the MoPH level they can easily 
survive. (DDCH, MK 22)
There were also concerns about the ability of community hospitals to use their budgets to 
purchase supplies so as to get best value. Although lip-service had been paid to 
decentralisation at national level, respondents argued that the local picture was very 
different.
In Mahasarakham, it is clear that decentralisation is still not in place because 
when we need to buy medicines costing more than Bt 100,000, we must request 
permission from the CMO. They allow the hospital autonomy to make purchases 
of Bt 100,000 or less. It is not a flexible system: many times they returned 
documents to us for correction before allowing us to proceed. These problems 
make us uncomfortable and seem inflexible to the community hospitals. (DDCH, 
MK21)
This arrangement was in line with the PHO’s overall approach to resource allocation, 
whereby community hospitals had autonomy below defined spending ceilings and a share 
of split budgets, but the PHO retained a measure of control over the big picture.
As the reforms moved into their second and third years a new problem emerged because 
the uplift in capitation payments did not match growing staff costs. Staff costs inflation 
squeezed non-staff budgets so that monies available for infrastructure, medical goods, and 
perhaps most of all health promotion and prevention activities was reduced.
Regarding the capitation model, in my view it should include the staff salary costs 
because they have increased every year. In the long term that reduces the 
development budget. Additionally, they are applying a new criterion to calculate 
the budget allocation based on the characteristics of each area. That results in a 
decrease in our budget so that we did not get the full figure expected. (DDCH, 
MK20)
Others too did not receive the expected amounts:
Last year, we obtained a budget of about Bt 680 per head, but then they allocated 
only 80% of that figure and this year this was decreased to 60% of the expected 
figure. I am not sure whether we will get the remaining part or not? (DDCH, MK 
23)
This failure by the MoPH to pay the full amounts due to the PHO for disbursement in the 
local health system affected all three study provinces. Because of resource pressures at the 
centre, monies were paid at several points in the year19 rather than as a single allocation, 
and payments were both delayed and less than the promised amounts.
The system of geographical-based weightings, also introduced in Year 2, was intended to 
adjust allocations in light of the differing health care needs and state of health care 
facilities in different districts, but was also criticised as ‘unfair’ in some quarters. It 
typically meant that districts with limited health care infrastructure, which had been 
disadvantaged in the past but, were ‘capitation winners’ in Year 1, saw some of these gains 
clawed back as the redistributive effects of the reforms were watered down.
The cumulative effect of holding staff budgets at the centre, top-slicing IP budgets 
introducing new mechanisms to adjust capitation payments, and underpayments, was to 
claw money back from rural north-eastern provinces to the infrastructure-rich central 
region, and within province to pull resources away from smaller hospitals towards larger 
ones. The situation changed from one in Year 1 where it was the large provincial hospitals 
whose viability was threatened by capitation-based funding, to one in Years 2 and 3 where 
the smaller community hospitals came under pressure. One doctor director stated bluntly 
that ‘the central management in the PHO did not support the hospitals too much’ (DDCH, 
MK 21). Another talked about a real question of survival.
Now I would say that the most difficult problem is the community hospitals. (...) 
Mahasarakham hospital is responsible for a population of 170,000 and also 
receives a budget from the SSS and civil service scheme, as well as the monies 
for referrals from the community hospital. When I refer patients they charge me 
every last baht, and they receive everything. So why can’t they survive? On the 
contrary, they are going to be rich. Over the last two years, they’ve said there is 
going to be no provincial hospital, it is going to collapse, but they are very rich 
hospital. The community hospital looks like ‘the middle child’. The parents take 
care of the smallest child - the health centres - where they receive everything, and
19 Initially payments were made monthly but this was later changed to two-monthly and then three-monthly 
intervals.
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the biggest child - the provincial hospital -  which has received too much. I have a 
question. If a person from my district has been in an accident in Bangkok, who 
must pay? Of course, I need to pay. Furthermore, I obtain a budget but not the full 
figure. In cases where I have referred to Mahasarakham hospital then they have 
referred on to a higher hospital, then I must pay again. How will I survive? The 
community hospital is going to be bankrupt. (DDCH, MK 20)
Overall the plan to use capitation-based funding to correct the historic imbalance in 
resources and workforce distribution had little effect on a province like Mahasarakham. 
Respondents were sceptical about the prospect that the reforms would create new 
incentives to achieve greater mobility.
I think that if the MoPH forced doctors to re-locate to rural areas that would make 
them resign. The MoPH should be clear about this policy. I used to say that the 
doctor distribution problem was caused by the wrong policies a long time ago. 
Consequently, the way to solve this problem is how we distribute the new 
graduate group so that they do go to over-supplied areas and we shouldn’t use 
increased salaries in the places that have enough doctors already. (DDCH, MK 
20)
Absolutely, we did not solve the human resource distribution problem. In the first 
year, the policies aimed to redistribute the staff all over the country applying the 
financial system brought in by the reform. Each of the health units were 
developing their capacities based on the population in the area. In the second year, 
the policies changed, there is the concept of survival of the health units. We need 
to accept the facts; there has been wrong direction of hospital development for a 
long time, at least 10 years, which included the number of hospitals and the staff 
problems in some areas. The redistribution policy was launched in the first year of 
implementation. This line of thought did not take account of the need to ensure 
the survival of hospitals which concerned the centre. In contrast, in the second 
year, they came back to secure the position of all the staff which led to the end of 
the redistribution reform. (DDCH, MK 22)
By Year 3 there was increasing awareness of the intractability of the workforce problem, 
the difficulty of bringing about planned primary care reforms and the gap between 
promised and actual funding.
Previously, I wasn’t concerned about the resource distribution problem. After the 
Bt 30 policies came in I started to analyse this problem. For example, ‘Rachaburi’ 
(central region); they have population of about 500,000, 4 general hospitals, over 
10 community hospitals and hundreds of doctors in the province. In ‘Ayuthaya’ 
(central region), they have population less than 300,000 while they have 200 
health centres. Regarding Mahasarakham, it has a population of more than a 
million with a general hospital, 10 community hospitals, 175 health centres and 
75 doctors. I just know that in the whole nation we have around 20,000 doctors,
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when compared with a doctor/population ratio for the whole country of around 1 
in 3000. But in Mahasarakham it is around 1 in 20,000. In my district, we have a 
population of around 100,000 and we have 3 doctors or around 1 in 30,000. 
Previously, we never made comparisons but after I analysed this it made me 
understand why we work so hard. In terms of the numbers of nurses in our district 
there is the same problem. We have only 50% of the numbers which we should 
have, and that caused them to work hard. After the new policies came along we 
supposed that things would improve and we were very glad about the new 
policies. In the first year, we assigned nurses to go to work in all the PCUs for 
health service improvement. In the second year, the budget was decreased around 
40% from the first year but we did not know about this in advance; they (the 
MoPH) did not inform us about anything. It was not until the 8th month of the 
fiscal year that we were told it was decreased, that left us facing problems with 
work and the budget arrangements. (DDCH, MK 20)
There was also a perception in community hospitals by Year 3 that the PHO’s power to 
make local adjustments was diminishing. After a period when disagreement among 
national policy makers had given devolved power to the provinces, a more top-down 
approach to policy development seemed to be re-emerging. The following respondent 
comments on how the approach to managing the staff salary budget was now dictated from 
the MoPH.
Now, we don’t have a system where the province has the power to make complete 
decisions. Things were changing every week. In the first year the MoPH directly 
allocated the budget to the province using a capitation model. In contrast, in the 
second year this was changed; they deducted all the staff salary costs at the 
central level. This is different when compared with the first year, when each 
province received a capitation payment of Bt 1052 that included the staff salary 
cost. That means the staff salary costs were deducted in the province. When it 
came to the second year, they deducted at the centre in the MoPH and as you 
know, the budget that we received was not the full figure. (DDCH, MK 22)
Many doctor directors was expressing disillusionment with the reforms by Year 3 as their 
budgets were trimmed back and the distribution of resources seemed to be swinging back 
in favour of the provincial hospital rather than the community hospitals, and central region 
rather than the north east.
5.4.2 The perspective of the DHOs and health centres
One factor that worsened relationships between the DHOs and health centres and the 
hospitals was the way that doctor directors of community hospitals gained control over 
CUP boards, and then made the key decisions about use of the budget. This arose because
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most of the medical workforce at district level was in these hospitals, and the health 
centres were dependent on them to send out professional staff, thus leaving the doctor 
directors as key actors in the local system. However, as the later case studies will show, the 
extent of this problem in Mahasarakham was more limited than in many other places. The 
involvement of a wide range of actors in the PCIHI and the decision to create a separate 
budget at the PHO to support the fixed expenses of health centres appears to have helped 
the health centres keep a fair share of the budget in this province.
With regard to the budget, previously the DHO received money from the PHO 
directly and we were implementing the health projects in the local areas with 
health centres staff. At present, the budgeting system is the UC budget, which 
means that the DDCH is responsible for the financial management, and I 
undertake the personnel management, monitoring, supervising and evaluation of 
health activity programmes. The health centre’s budget comes from the CUP 
based on the CUP Board’s resolution. Regarding the allowances for the health 
workers, we prepared documents in the DHO then submitted them to the 
(community) hospital to make payments. Budgets for other items, such as the 
water and electricity bills, are funded by the PHO. This has dramatically changed 
the budgeting system. (DHO Head, MK 31)
For front-line health centre staff, the changing structure introduced considerable confusion 
about lines of accountability and who was responsible for what. Many perceived that they 
now had two bosses who stood in an unclear relationship to each other.
In the first year, there was a lot of uncertainty about the new system, such as who 
our boss is. At the moment the line of command is unclear. Previously, ‘Nai 
Am phuf and the DHO head were the direct bosses. Now, is the DDCH becoming 
the boss? We are not sure because we have to submit documents for payment to 
the DDCH but we need to present to the DHO head as well. Now, the health 
officers at the lower level are very confused and uncertain. (HO-PCU, MK 38)
Now, I don’t know who the boss is, which I find confusing. For example, if I buy 
a computer for the health centre, I don’t know who would have the authority to 
give permission between the DDCH and DHO head. Who makes the final 
decision on this? (HO-PCU, MK 36)
Although conflict was not as great as observed in the other cases, some DHO staff 
complained that the dominant role of the DDCHs in the CUPs meant that hospitals worked 
to their own agendas and gave the health centres insufficient support.
[the] community hospital created projects and then we have to follow them but we 
didn’t have any participation on the planning processes. We would like to be 
involved with them in project development but we can’t do tha t..( . ..)  previously, 
the health centres were involved in financial arrangements with the DHO. Now,
the budget is allocated directly to the CUP and they don’t participate. I think the 
old system is better, because the DHO has a better understanding of the health 
centres’ problems due to the fact that we have worked with each other for a long 
time. (ADHOH head, MK 33)
Many times, when we implemented health activity projects in the local area, the 
budget has delayed our plans. We have decided to work with our scheduled plan 
but the budget did not arrive on time. When the budget did come in sometimes 
the people did not have time to cooperate with us, because it was in harvest 
season. Because of this there were only a few people collaborating in our project. 
(HCO, MK 42)
In Mahasarakham the other problems mentioned by many informants concerned the 
‘incentive’ payments made to front-line staff to work extra hours in the community. There 
were suggestions that some staff were dishonestly over-claiming for hours they had not 
worked. Some senior staff also believed that the ‘overtime allowance’ was undermining 
the public service ethic of staff.
[the] OT (in English) was a double-edged sword. We never had OT for a long 
time; however, we were able to make faster progress after it came in. But that left 
us facing a new situation, where we must have extra monies to ‘push up’ the work 
rate. It led to a new ‘working culture’. In my view, I prefer the old system which 
encouraged the health centres to work according to an ethic of responsibility. In 
case of insufficiency in some creative project - there isn’t enough money - they 
cut the money for work in the local area. This means we don’t have money for 
implementation. (HCO, MK 36)
Before the policy came in the health workers never received an extra allowance 
and we didn’t have any problems at all. After the new incentive measure came 
along, if they did not get it or they got less than they expected, they would 
complain. I tried to explain in a meeting that they should understand that they 
would be receiving less than previously because the money had decreased. 
However, they argued that before the new policies came in there was no money, 
but after the reform came along the money came too, so they should have the 
right to get it. That caused conflicts between the hospital and the health workers. 
(DHO Head, MK 28)
At the beginning of the reforms, many DHO heads anticipated their role would be 
decreased due to transfer of budgetary power to the CUPs, and there was initially a period 
of inactivity, but as things settled the burden of work quickly increased. The DHO heads 
still had authority to control the health centre staff and carried out their old health 
promotion activities. However, in addition they now found they had a new role as the 
district monitoring unit.
Initially, some critics said that working in the localities was the province of the 
health centres and that the DHOs didn’t do much of anything. It was true at the 
beginning that we didn’t have much work because we didn’t understand about 
monitoring and evaluating tasks. We then studied our role and went to consult 
with the deputy CMO in the PHO, who clarified that we had a role in monitoring 
and evaluating health activities. Now we have a lot of work and must always go 
outside to supervise, so we don’t have time to relax. (DHO Head, MK 29)
When we talked about the 30 baht policy, I think that we’ve got increasing work, 
because (there were) a lot activities and high expectations, but we have limited 
time and insufficient staff. The number of staff is the same but we have to do 
many activities within limited time (...) they were changing both the working 
method and our roles. That is, we must move forward to work in the community 
while we are still responsible for routine work in the office. (DHO Head, MK 26)
5.5 Civil society engagement
5.5.1 The emphasis on ‘civil society’
Although prominent in the national policy discourse, civil society involvement was only 
emphasised as a core aspect of the health care reforms in one of the three case study 
provinces: Mahasarakham. This section provides an account of the civil society movement 
and its impact on health sector reform in the province.
There are many definitions of civil society (see: Gosewinkel, 2005), but most scholars 
agree that the term refers to social institutions and activities that are not part of the state or 
the commercial sector, and are above the level of individuals The British Council (n.d.) 
defines civil society as “the part of a society which is neither state nor private sector, a 
large and diverse sector which in general is understood to range from the individual at one 
end to large non-governmental organisations, national and international at the other. In it, 
we find associations and organisations such as trade unions, trusts, charities, community 
groups, churches and faith groups, mutuals and cooperatives, academic institutions and 
political parties and groups representing specific interest groups or working with single 
issues.” Usage of the term in Thailand does not always distinguish between civil society 
and state or private organisations as sharply as this definition suggests. As will be seen 
below, some civil society organisations may appear to be sponsored by state bodies and 
market-related organisations like farmers groups may also enter the picture. In rural
Thailand the main groups involved are national NGOs and grass-roots organisations of 
various kinds.
The term ‘civil society’, translated in Thai as ‘prachasangkhom’ or ‘prachakhom ’, has 
become prominent in Thai political discourse in the last ten years. Some political scientists 
(e.g. Phatharathananunth 2002, Thabchumpon 2002; McCargo 2002) have distinguished 
between 'prachasangkhom ’, which has the connotation of a self-organised autonomous 
realm, and the state-sponsored ‘prachakhom ’ organisations, which every Thai province 
was ordered by the central government to establish at the provincial, district and sub­
district levels. The latter are said to have been ‘captured’ or even created by state agencies, 
and are locked into top-down government projects and programmes. According to the 
critics they constitute a fake civil society, aimed at neutralising potentially dissident 
community organisations and NGOs. Both terms come up frequently in the context of 
local policy initiatives.
5.5.2 Civil society at provincial level
Mahasarakham is the one of a few Esam provinces that had introduced pilot projects based 
on the public participation concept. Both public and private agencies have launched 
projects with an explicit ‘civil society’ component in Mahasarakham, such as: the 
Population Development Association, PLAN (Thailand), the Social Investment Fund, the 
Local Development Institute, and the University and other academic institutions, (see 
Table 5.2)
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Table 5.2: Chronology of ‘civil society’ projects in Mahasarakham prior to the UC 
reforms
Year Events
1992-1997 - The Population Development Association’s ‘Meechai Project’ launched a 
project providing water supply storage tanks with community participation. 
(Prachasangkhom)
- PLAN (Thailand) 20launched a project to provide a community school library 
(Prachasangkhom).
- The Social Investment Fund (SIF) launched a community economic 
development project based on local activity groups. (Prachakhom)
- Thai Farmers Foundation launched a livestock project which provided a cow to 
selected low-income families. (Prachakhom)
- The Local Development Institute (LDI) launched a project on civil society and 
local political structures in Wapee Phatum District. (Prachasangkhom)
1997-1999 - Workshop ‘strengthening civil society in Esam’ held at MSU
- Collaborative Research project on ‘Strengthening civil society in Esam’ 
launched by Local Politics Information Centre, MSU and Department o f  
Politics, University o f Leeds, UK
-MSU initiatives to improve people’s participation in local politics; shift burden 
of responsibility for training and awareness building to local institutions such as 
MSU, stimulate contracts between the Local Politics Information Centre and the 
people, and make it into a source o f information and advice for the community. 
(all Prachasangkhom)
1998-1999 Action research project on ‘Research on social organisations and community 
developments: a case study o f the community o f Tambon Nakha, Amphur 
Wapee Prathum conducted by MSU scholars group with funding from the 
Health System Research Institute, MoPH. (Prachasangkhom)
1998-1999 A project on civil society development at the sub-district level was launched in 
Donwan sub-district, Muang District. It was conducted by Centre for Training 
and Development o f Primary Health Care in the North-East, directed by the 
MoPH and the Mahasarakham Provincial Health Office. It aimed to enhance the 
capacity o f village leaders and community groups to support local health 
promotion and prevention strategies. (Prachakhom)
February-December
2002
A project on Participatory Action Research to Advance Governance Options 
and Networks: a case study of the development committee for Nongo village, 
Borabue District was conducted by the MSU scholars group with funding from 
the King Prachatipok Institute, Bangkok and United Nations Development 
Program. (Prachasangkhom)
A rough categorisation of these initiatives suggests that they include both ‘pra-cha-khom ’ 
projects, funded mainly by central and provincial agencies, and a number of ‘pra-cha- 
sang-khom ’ projects funded by NGOs and the University/academic grant-giving bodies. 
Mahasarakham University had been a major centre for critical analysis of the civil society 
movement, and in particular academics there had promoted the notion of state capture of 
'pra-cha-khom'. Thus some of the University-supported projects, notably the
collaborative project with Leeds University, had consciously sought to move more 
towards the ‘pra-cha-sang-khom ’ model, with greater emphasis on autonomy of local
20 PLAN is an international non-governmental organisation that works in 62 countries around the world. For 
further details, see: http://www.plan-intemational.org/
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communities. For this reason civil society projects here probably had less of a top-down 
character than in many other provinces. Since the other study provinces of Roi Et and 
Kalasin did not possess a major public university, the influence of MSU in Mahasarakham 
is a significant point of difference in the study comparison.
5.5.3 Civil society and the UC reforms
Some of the past projects had involved the health sector and it seems likely that the policy 
environment of Mahasarakham province had a significant impact on thinking within the 
PHO. There were close links with the University in that many of the senior officers 
participated as invited speakers on university courses, there are a number of joint 
projects21, and many staff were present or past students on public health degree courses.
Some of the earlier ‘civil society’ projects were recalled by senior officers when they 
discussed the background to current developments.
Prior the 30 baht policies, at the provincial level, we had talked to civil society in 
health from 1999 onwards. That was when we introduced people to participation 
in health activities, especially, communicable disease prevention projects such as 
haemorrhagic fever protection etcetera. There were many activities in civil society 
not only the health sector but also other sectors. (ADHOH, MK35)
However, they indicated that these policies would now be given fresh impetus by the UC 
reforms, particularly through the new funding arrangements that channelled money to the 
CUPs and thereby strengthened primary care, and the separate budget for prevention and 
promotion (P&P). Public participation was mentioned by senior officers as an important 
element in the development of effective local prevention and promotion programmes.
By the time of this study, public participation featured as an explicit objective in many of 
the PHO’s current planning documents. One of seven objectives of Mahasarakham PHO 
described in the 2002 PHO Annual Report is: ‘(6) To enhance civil society (Prachakhom) 
at the sub-district level to improve efficiency of health promotion activities by at least 
80%’ (Mahasarakham PHO 2002). The role of local stakeholders is highlighted in the first
2] For example, one collaborative project on ‘The future shape o f public health’ was being conducted as this
study proceeded
- 132-
of five aims in the mission statement contained in the 2003 PHO Annual Report: ‘(1) To 
enhance support, and develop cooperation with stakeholders and the health care network 
so as to provide health education and information for achieving health promotion...’ 
(Mahasarakham PHO 2003).
Civil society involvement was a theme discussed at length in interviews with senior 
administrators. They presented the PHO’s involvement in this area as a longstanding 
concern over many years, which could now be developed further.
I began in 1997 and continued to implement the approach in 2000 -  so we have 
about 5 or 6 year’s experience of developing civil society involvement. So in 
doing this we have been pushing at the community level first and then the family 
level follows. In order to do that, the process must start with the health officer 
who must understand what is required. The public organisations must co-operate 
(in civil society development) with key persons from the villages to stimulate and 
strengthen activities at the family level, as well as in the community. Hence 
empowerment in the local health system should be achievable by the community. 
That’s the main point. That is to encourage them to participate in the 
management of all areas, especially decision-making making has an impact on 
them, including the hospital and health centre and the community too. They get 
involved, they understand and they learn. We give them training so that they 
acquire greater knowledge of an appropriate kind. So when they must do this it 
will be satisfactory. If they do it often it will change behaviour and this will 
continue. (SAO-PHO, MK 01)
The principle is to empower them - at the same level - because the health system 
is a system which needs everyone to take care of themselves - make the best of 
themselves, follow their potential, as humans should. That is the main goal. But 
how can we empower every person? We need a process. The family is the main 
thing. They can achieve the goal of good health by taking care of themselves. 
Only the people have potential to take care of themselves, health professionals 
cannot do it. In our strategy we do not use health professionals to do everything. 
Health professionals co-operate with people and promote empowerment in the 
community. We use civil society. That is our main activity -  it is civil society. 
We are going to build up strong families and link them together. We help them to 
think, help them to do, and help them with suggestions. We help weak families to 
be strong through the civil society process (SAO-PHO, MK 01)
Another interview, which links ‘public participation’ to ‘good health’ illustrates a degree 
of ambiguity that came up in a few interviews as to whether civil society is really about 
taking responsibility for prevention and a shift to healthier patterns of behaviour, or if it 
should involve a push to widen ownership of the local health system, so that community 
representatives are involved in consequential policy decisions.,
Currently, public participation is different from previously. At first, people 
thought good health that was duty of the MoPH. Nowadays, we are working to 
make them understand that they are responsible and must take ownership and 
must do things by themselves - not the health officer. (SAO-PHO, MK07)
Another official mentions the province’s track record of earlier projects and existing 
networks, but hints that the culture of the PHO needs to change further.
In Mahasarakham, we are well known for work on civil society and working to 
strengthen communities. We had worked a lot with certain groups of people, but 
we haven’t put our own house in order. I would say that we have done it a lot 
outside. In my opinion, a key success of civil society was, firstly leadership and 
secondly, to share benefits between people within their group, I mean that was 
going well in some places if they were sharing the benefits together. In the case 
of ‘Baan Khong Kud Whai\ by working together they have built up a strong civil 
society.22 (SAO-PHO, MK09)
Later in the interview, this informant expanded on his reference to ‘leadership’. It became 
apparent that his version of civil society engagement was one in which effective leadership 
combined with monitoring and evaluation by the PHO were prerequisites for success.
I think the leader in an organization is the most important thing. Often a doctor is 
the leader, someone who will dedicate themselves a lot. But some people take 
part because it is a road to career advancement. I insist that the leader is very 
important. (...) This year in the PHO we have reorganized, but we can see that 
some people have not changed their views, that they still work under the old idea 
which assumes that the PHO needs to have service clinics. That tells us they have 
not changed their ideas and also that they would like to carry on with their old 
roles. But in reality, the PHO has changed its function to a role of monitoring and 
evaluation. They should work on technical support tasks not health service 
delivery tasks. I think that there was an organizational change but I did not see a 
lot of change in health officers. (SAO-PHO, MK07)
As interviews were completed with other staff in the chain of command, informants 
sometimes mentioned limitations in the policies and cast doubt on their real impact at grass 
roots level. The theme of leadership comes up again in an interview with another senior 
officer with a professional qualification. However, this time the respondent identifies the 
CMO as the leader and hints at the kind of top-down model of civil society involvement 
described by the academic critics. This interview also highlights the perceived problem
22 ‘Khong Kud Whai’ village is well-known as a local conservation area which generates income through 
tourism. Some of this has been channelled into a community fund, which supports the village committee that 
led the local civil society movement
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that many community stakeholder groups were less interested in health promotion projects 
than in projects that would develop local infrastructure, such as road building or water 
supply improvements.
We have done a lot: we have a leader, the CMO in the PHO, who is quite 
interested in this area. He tried to build up people participation, for example, he 
encouraged them to take part in community planning processes: think, identify 
their problems, and develop own community plan. Nevertheless, regarding the 
health services sector, I did not see very much. I felt that we have done well as 
regards the community process, and do a lot, I would say that we are well known 
at the National level. Many organizations have started public participation 
activities in the villages, such as NGOs and the University. In the health service 
sector, increasingly we are bringing in people to the provincial committee, which 
is a regulation from the centre. For example, (there are) in the case of the 
Provincial Area Health Broad and the other Provincial committees. However, 
the role of people... they seem to play at councillor level, not a very significant 
role. Because, we are still facing the same problem as the other provinces: a few 
people concentrate on health services, whereas, I see that they more pay more 
attention to the provision of public infrastructure. That is a source of conflict 
(SAO-PHO, MK12)
One problem for the senior officers was that while there was a strong generalized pressure 
from the centre to develop public participation policies, this did not fully recognize the 
problems of local implementation. As one moved nearer the front-line, many informants 
started to question the reality of public participation projects more openly. This was so 
among both medical directors and administrators in district offices.
Nowadays, there are many projects, which are the main role of public health 
officers, working together with Village Health Volunteers. In fact, we still need to 
stimulate the public to participate much more. For example, we faced problem 
with villagers, in the haemorrhagic fever control project, when we went to their 
homes to eliminate mosquitoes. They did not cooperate and sometimes they 
could not be found at home. Regarding the community environment it seems that 
they are not aware of improvement. (DDCH, MK 20)
In (this) district, prior to the implementation of the 30 baht policies, we had 
operated the Hospital Promotion Project - HPP. This project focused on 
improving public awareness and problem solving in the local service. The 30 baht 
project changed two things: first, health service delivery standards and, second, 
hospital accreditation. The MoPH forced us to set up a hospital accreditation 
scheme, which is based on improving services and internal standards. It seems 
that in the health sector people have participated little, because it is a seen as an 
academic topic. Instead they just come to use the hospital service. In the last 2
years, people have participated only in the sense that they access hospital 
services. (DDCH, MK 22)
I have encouraged PCUs to think about various public cooperation projects in 
local communities. There were many interesting projects, however, we have been 
hard pressed to find funds because we have got a restricted budget that make it 
difficult to work. (DDCH, MK 23)
Heads of district offices had both positive and negative messages. Many reported progress 
in recruiting village health volunteers, who were a tangible manifestation of local 
involvement, and the ability of DHO staff to engage with them.
A concrete project is the health promotion with exercise activity project that has 
been the most interesting one from our people. Because we trained the group of 
Village Health volunteers and built up local society through the health centre 
officers. Then they have taken the programme into the community and after that 
we have followed up to monitor it. Not long after starting the exercise activities 
they had spread to all the villages. As we have seen in the community, this project 
got a large of people participating and that created an opportunity to give them 
additional health education. (DHO Head, MK 28)
Previously, we implemented a primary health care project that was called Public 
Collaboration in Health. Village health volunteers had an important role in 
cooperating with public health officers. With these community health activities 
the health officers did not work alone. We needed village volunteers such as 
village health volunteers, and members of the ABT (Sub-district Administration 
Organisations) to come to work as well. (DHO Head, MK 27)
But respondents also mentioned the sometimes disappointing limits of participation, the 
distance between appointed bodies and the communities they served, and the lack of real 
impact of existing and past projects.
At the beginning of the (decentralisation) reform policy, the policies focused on 
administration by committee, based on the new model of the Provincial Area 
Health Board. They were clear that the committee would represent different 
sections (of the population). They met many times and that gave confidence to the 
front-line actors that the Provincial Health Board model would be formally 
established by government. At the district level, we have responded to this 
direction and tried to build up public participation. After the 30 baht policies were 
announced, the Provincial Area Health Board stagnated: at the Provincial level it 
doesn’t ‘run’ (uses English word) at all and they don’t even talk about this story 
any more. The Provincial Area Health Board that was established are now playing 
at being councillors. (ADHOH, MK 35)
We have focused on village health volunteers only. I think that is not good 
enough: we should have given the people greater public participation. They come 
and use health services only. It seems they do not participate much. I feel that 
they have no power; they have just gone along with our health activity projects. 
(HCO, MK 37)
We still don’t have any obvious activities. I go out to do home visiting but it is a 
project that we ‘feed’ to them. For example, the civil society project, we 
organised the meeting so that people could come to discuss their problems and 
teach them to make projects to solve local problems. But I am not confident about 
how much of a success it’s been, because so far there’s been no follow-up. 
(HCO, MK 39)
At the moment, there is no clear model. Generally, joint working between health 
workers and nurses more than anything else, and mainly they work more in the 
health centre than outside. (HCO, MK 44)
There was a feeling in many quarters that civil society involvement effectively meant little 
more than participation in health activity projects, which were usually concerned with 
health promotion (e.g. aerobic exercise class projects) rather than dissemination of 
information about local policies or participation in policy making.
One route towards greater community involvement might have been closer co-operation 
between the PHO and local government, of the kind that had been envisaged in the 
decentralisation reforms. However, although some steps had been taken to begin to 
develop structures, these had been hampered by the slow pace of implementation. The 
recently established Area Health Board had not been seen by PHO officers as well enough 
developed to become the PCIHI, and had relatively little influence during the study period 
because planned legislation giving power to the AHBs was delayed.
Joint working between the PHO and local government on more detailed policies, such as 
health promotion, was still at an early stage. In an interview, a senior municipal 
representative expressed positive aspirations but could give no examples of co-operative 
projects or activities.
I think in the roles and functions of local government, we participated only a little 
in this policy because it was a national policy. However, I would like to 
participate in formulating local policy such as health promotion or health disease 
prevention more than at present. There should be cooperation between the health 
organisations in the province and local government, for example, by sharing the
budget and working together on how to prevent rather than cure, how to ensure 
that people do not get ill. There were a few areas of shared interest and fewer 
areas of cooperation, although we have requested this many times but with no 
result. (Senoir municipal representative, MK 15)
Even though both parties had been involved in an earlier pilot project on decentralisation, 
this had not translated into concrete initiatives under the UC scheme.
There has been little work, and if we view this against the overall progress of the 
nation it was little, although Mahasarakham was a pilot province in the 
decentralisation scheme and we have talked together a lot. We always cooperate 
with the health sector both in the meetings and operationally. We have not any 
conflicts with the PHO and the hospitals but the MoPH does not allow us to take 
action. I think the local government is ready but they do not give the opportunity 
to us. (Senoir municipal representative, MK 15)
The one area of involvement reported by the senoir municipal representative was that the 
municipality had been requested to assist in publicising the rules of the UC scheme and the 
need for local residents to register in order to gain eligibility for treatment in local health 
care facilities.
With regard to the Mahasarakham municipality, we were rarely involved in the 
management. They just assigned us to announce to the people that they should go 
to register and have us check their names - that was at the beginning. After that 
was finished all the activities were controlled by the hospital. (Senoir municipal 
representative, MK 15)
5.6 Relations with the Ministry and the Health Region
One additional feature of Mahasarakham province that differed from Roi Et and Kalasin 
was the good channels of communication and good relationships that existed with most of 
the key departments within the MoPH. Mahasarakham had been a pilot province for a 
number of past initiatives, including projects on civil society engagement and 
decentralisation. In the first year of the reforms, Mahasarakham province won an award 
for best implementation of the Bt 30 Project in Esam Region. This track record had 
resulted in very good relations between senior PHO officers and senior officials in the 
MoPH, and meant that the Ministry took a sympathetic approach to provincial initiatives 
and granted this province even more autonomy than some of its neighbours. This was 
reflected in the relaxation of the standard requirements for the formation of provincial
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PCIHIs, so that the rules were rewritten to allow Mahasarakham to bypass the AHB and 
establish a committee from scratch. Despite the possibility that the reforms would 
eventually result in the purchasing function being removed from the existing health 
administration bodies, relations between the PHO and local government remained 
underdeveloped. There was an absence of joint projects and little existing co-operation on 
which to build. Local government had no significant voice when it came to influencing 
the direction of reform implementation. The single representative on the PCIHI was too 
isolated to wield effective influence.
5.7 Summary of chapter
This chapter has considered a number of areas in which the approach taken in 
Mahasarakham province differed from the other two study provinces, including the 
specifics of how the reforms were introduced, the choice of financing mechanisms, the 
emphasis on civil society involvement and the province’s good relations with the MoPH. 
These were all areas in which local actors could exercise substantial influence over the 
detail of policy implementation, but of course not all actors had equal influence. In 
Mahasarakham the CMO was probably the most powerful single actor but he had been 
content to support a set of arrangements in which a wider group of actors, including the 
three most senior PHO deputies, the director of the provincial hospital, and to the lesser 
extent the representatives of the community hospitals and DHOs, shared decision making 
power. The ‘war room’ dominated by PHO staff was the main operational body for day- 
to-day problem resolution, but on occasions its recommendations were over-ruled by the 
PCIHI, as with the question of the handling of the salaries budget in Year 2. The CMO 
had also been influential in promoting a significant degree of support for civil society 
participation in Mahasarakham province. There was a history of past projects and a range 
of current initiatives in Mahasarakham that was more extensive than anything in the other 
two study provinces. These were a mixture of government-sponsored ‘prachakhom> 
projects and a small number of grassroots ‘prachasangkhom’ initiatives. However, in 
most cases the positive view of progress from the higher echelons of the local health 
system co-existed with a more sceptical and mixed assessment of these programmes at 
grass roots level.
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Chapter 6. Kalasin: fragmented power and struggles between 
professional interest groups
6.1 Introduction
This is the second chapter concerned with the different approaches to implementation of 
the UC reforms in the three case study provinces. The chapter will consider Kalasin 
province and the influences and conditions that affected the approach taken there. It will 
describe the network of key actors and the more fragmented distribution of power that 
emerged, as well as the ongoing tensions and conflicts that occurred between professional 
interest groups. These conflicts led to a significant change in the budget allocation process 
in the third year of implementation, which are a key aspect of the reform ‘story’ in this 
province. As in Chapter 5, this chapter will consider several areas where key actors had 
decision space to adapt the reforms to local conditions, including determining the 
financing model that would apply, managing the allocation of funding and human 
resources (i.e. the health service workforce), and correcting emergent problems.
The main themes found in this case study were fragmentation of power and professional 
struggle. This was bound up with the relatively weak lead given by senior PHO officers 
(which was the result of a combination of factors, including personalities, impending 
retirements and staff mobility), the less-dominant position of senior staff at the provincial 
hospital, the greater influence of middle-ranking policy actors in the PHO and the 
community hospitals, and the trenchant rearguard action fought by a group of experienced 
DHO Heads to retain some influence over the course of the reforms. This led to an 
important change in financing arrangements in Year 3, after the DHO Heads had gained 
support from the Health Region Inspector and the CMO to correct problems associated 
with the under-funding of PCUs/health centres.
6.2 Implementing the UC reforms in Kalasin
6.2.1 Actors, networks and power
In Kalasin senior PHO staff faced the same early problem described in Chapter 5 of 
creating a working set of operational structures based on the incomplete reform template 
coming from the centre. However, in Kalasin a variety of factors came together to throw 
the burden of decision-making on the CMO, the deputy CMO (Medical Services) and a 
small number of relatively junior actors in the PHO. This was largely because other senior 
staff were not in a position to act energetically to support the reforms. The Deputy CMO 
(Public Health) was due to retire in late 2001, while the Deputy CMO (Administration) 
was due to retire in 2003 and appears to have been perceived as someone whose career 
was winding down. This opened the way for more junior staff, notably the new Head of 
the Health Insurance Division, to play a more influential role. Within a few months, the 
Deputy CMO (Public Health) had retired and was replaced by an ‘acting Deputy’, in the 
shape of a relatively junior officer who had been Head of Health Promotion in the old 
organisational structure. As will be seen this relative lack of depth in the senior 
management of the PHO led to a situation where outsiders were given influential roles in 
the various committees and working groups that were set up to take the reforms forward.
In Mahasarakham one of the most powerful external actors in the early period of 
implementation was the head of the provincial hospital, but for various reasons the pattern 
was different in Kalasin. Here the doctor director of the Provincial Hospital (DDPH) 
lacked the same degree of influence with the MoPH and the Health Region, and took a less 
proactive role in local health circles. There were internal problems in the hospital both in 
terms of managing a reduced budget and handling conflict about the reforms within the 
medical staff group, which distracted the DDPH from working effectively in outside 
forums. Later as implementation went ahead there were more management problems 
concerned with the large volume of patient complaints and adverse coverage in national 
newspapers. With the relative lack of power in the provincial hospital, the senior doctor 
directors from community hospitals emerged as the most influential medical professionals 
in Kalasin province. Two who were to have important roles on key decision making
23 Within two years the DDPH had moved to a similar post in another province.
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bodies were respectively a nationally-prominent member of Rural Doctors Society, and the 
senior (i.e. longest serving) doctor director of a community hospital in the province.
As in Mahasarakham, the first task was to create the basic structures dictated by the MoPH 
- the Health Insurance Office (HIO), the five key operational groups of the PHO, a 
provincial war room, a PCIHI, and a Provincial Committee for Quality and Standards 
(PCQS). Shortly after these had been established, a provincial IPD fund (i.e. a centrally 
held budget for inpatient department work) and the CUPs were put in place. The relative 
lack of ‘seniority’ at the top of the PHO was again apparent in the leadership of the five 
operational groups. The two groups most closely involved in implementing the reforms, 
the Health Insurance Group and the Health Strategy Development Group were headed by 
staff recently promoted from middle-ranking positions. The Head of Health Insurance 
Group was a woman who had previously worked as a planning officer, but who now 
emerged as a key actor in shaping local reform implementation.
Another important difference between Mahasarakham and Kalasin concerned the 
respective roles of the war room and the PCIHI. Kalasin, like Mahasarakham had opted to 
set up a PCIHI from scratch. All three case study provinces were in the third wave 
entering the UC Scheme on October 2001, at a time when the regulations regarding the 
establishment of PCIHIs were under review. In Kalasin an AHB had not yet been 
established and senior officers found the options of basing a PCIHI on the Health Card 
Administration Committee unattractive. The Health Card Committee was a small group 
within the PHO which did not include the key external actors with whom the CMO was 
seeking to engage. However, whereas in Mahasarakham the most influential PHO 
outsiders were recruited to the PCIHI and the PHO insiders dominated the war room, in 
Kalasin key outsiders were admitted to both bodies. It was the war room that did the 
initial background work required to support decisions, and which prepared the ground for 
resolutions passed by the PCIHI.
Regarding the budget arrangement, we set up a committee called the Provincial 
Committee for Implementing Health Insurance - PCIHI - which acted as the top 
committee at the provincial level. However, at the beginning we had a small 
committee called ‘the war-room’, where we prepared and analysed various things 
in a meeting very week on Wednesdays. Then the resolutions would go to the 
PCIHI meetings for decision. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
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In Kalasin the war room included the CMO, the deputy CMO (Medical Services), the 
Heads of the 5 Groups, a representative of the provincial hospital, two representatives 
from community hospitals, two DHO Heads representatives, and one representative of the 
health centres. The Head of the Health Insurance Group acted as secretary to the war room 
committee. One senior member suggested that the members were selected on the basis of 
their expected contribution rather than their seniority.
We selected people who were forward-thinking and were not afraid to speak out. 
The war-room meetings looked like an informal meeting which analysed 
problems before they went to the PSIHI meeting. Because at the beginning there 
were so many problems that we usually worked until 1 a.m. or 2 a.m. everyday. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 04)
In the first year all the members of the war room also held posts on the PCIHI, where they 
were joined by some additional external actors, comprising representatives of the 
municipality and the sub-district administrative organisation (ABT - pronounced in Thai 
as Aor-bor-tor), a representative of the private hospital and four representatives of the 
general public. This substantial over-lap between the war room and the higher level 
committee meant that war room recommendations were generally accepted without 
significant change, and that in reality it was the informal committee that shaped major 
policy decisions. The problem was not so much over-coming opposition from interest 
groups not already represented in the war room, but of dealing with the lack of knowledge 
of the local government and public representatives on the PCIHI.
I would say it was not difficult work but about preparing papers for the PCIHI 
meeting for decisions. It required us to assemble a lot of data and documents that 
tired us out. They were outsiders who didn’t have a good understanding of how 
we work, and it was hard work to try to make them understand. (SAO-PHO, KS 
04
In Kalasin there was nothing resembling the situation in Mahasarakham where a key 
recommendation about the preferred resource allocation mechanism in Year 2 was over­
turned by the PCIHI.
The war room liaised regularly was the Health Insurance Group. This was singled out in 
some senior officers’ accounts as one of the key entities driving the reforms, though it was 
secondary to the war room in determining local policies.
When the new policies came in, we organised and assigned a team to take direct 
responsibility for the policies. The CMO had set up a new department to oversee 
policy implementation before the present reorganisation of the PHO. We selected 
high quality staff because the new policies came along quickly and there were a 
lot of things to do. At the beginning we were usually working until one or two
a.m. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
One SAO-PHO characterised the work of the section as: ‘To support the Bt 30 policies in 
particular’.
Any activities that began or ended with ’30 baht’ were sent here. We acted as the 
secretarial office for the Bt 30 policy activities. Actually, the Bt 30 scheme 
affected all departments but at the beginning things were not clear: the CMO gave 
us the role of analysing things and organising cooperation with other departments 
before changes were implemented. However, these things must be passed to us 
first. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
The precise division of labour between the Health Insurance Group and the war room was 
not fixed, and there were times when the latter drove particular initiatives. However, the 
general pattern was that the war room set the framework for action, in the form of 
recommendations to the PCIHI, and the Health Insurance Group supplied background 
information and looked at systems for operationalising what had been agreed. Generally 
the activities of the Health Insurance Group were concerned with the details of policy 
implementation and fine tuning the procedures and technologies that would be used.
We have been busy setting up an electronics and IT system, because with UC 
working the IT application in particular is one of the main tools in our office, so 
we needed to understand about health claims and payments via an electronic 
system called the ‘E-claims’ system, which we must use to ‘deal’ (in English) 
with the NSHO. One duty of the Health Insurance Group was managing claims 
from the hospitals, where we handled requests and payments based on the 
electronic system, which meant that when the hospital requested payment from 
the NSHO via the electronic system then the NHSO would send it back to us 
again (SAO-PHO focus group KS)
At the beginning, the main work was about registering people and setting the 
regulations. With regard to registering people, the population of the province was 
around 900,000 and we needed to register around 700,000-800,000. So we were 
busy both with the registration process and giving gold cards to people. The 
government gave us around 3-4 months for preparing both: checking the 
household census data and setting up a register for giving out the gold cards. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 04)
In Year 2, after the war room was dissolved in line with national guidance, more onus fell 
on the Health Insurance Group to liaise with the PCIHI. However, informants suggested 
that this arrangement left something of a vacuum in terms of policy preparation for the 
PCIHI. To try to address this problem a new committee, the Planning and Evaluation 
Committee, was established in Year 324.
While the CMO in Kalasin exercised a leadership role, this left a place for delegation and 
allowing lower-level actors some voice in determining the way the reforms were 
implemented. This was linked to the view that, if the reforms were to succeed, outside 
actors would need to be given a central role in determining local policies, and a conviction 
that in particular the doctor directors of the community hospitals would be important actors 
in engineering change. Partly because of the lead that the CMO had set and partly because 
of the limited capacity of senior PHO officers, the Doctor Directors of the Community 
Hospitals became powerful players in the reform process. This was reflected in their 
representation on key committees, and also their strategic position vis-a-vis the flow of 
monies.
A lot of power was decentralised to the doctor directors of hospitals. The previous 
power of the CMO has dispersed to the doctor directors of community hospitals, 
while the PHO function was to supervise the provincial budget and cooperate as a 
member of various committees. Previously, the PHO had the role of managing the 
entire health care resources of the province. In the past they had been the most 
powerful organisation. Now, this is changing so that increasingly outsiders have 
come in to participate on the various committees. (SAO-PHO, KS 03)
Most doctor directors took the role of chair of their local CUP, the body through which 
most money was dispersed to service units. The change to capitation-based budgets under 
the UC reforms and the rise in the power of the doctor directors weakened the power of the 
PHO and changed its relationship with the hospitals.
It seems that ‘the power follows the money’ and when the budget changed hands 
and went to the hospitals and the power passed into the hands of the hospitals too. 
This might be the Thai organisational culture where the power follows the money. 
(SAO- PHO, KS 05)
The PHO was no longer a supervising organisation at a higher point in the command and 
control hierarchy than the DHOs, hospitals and health centres, but a body concerned with
24 Re-establishing a committee from the old structure o f the PHO
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monitoring and evaluating units that it did not control. This change was greater in Kalasin 
than the other case studies because PHO officers fought a less effective rearguard action to 
maintain authority.
At the beginning the effect was to change the PHO organisational structure. The 
terms of the PHO functions changed. The period of ‘implementation’ has gone 
and now we have only ‘monitoring’ and ‘evaluation’, which are the PHO’s 
functions in the transformation period. There were many aspects of the ministry 
policies then that we pushed to the CUP for implementation but things did not 
lead to concrete results. This problem came from the CUP: they couldn’t respond 
well because they weren’t familiar with the new style of working. They were still 
used to working under the command of the PHO, in line with the previous work 
system where the PHO acted as the main body that passed down the central 
policies for local implementation and then instructed the district to take action. 
This was obviously affected by the reforms. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
This had knock-on consequences for morale within the organisation.
Someone who had been the head of department (in the PHO) might be affected by 
this, because they wouldn’t be head of department any longer. That made them 
‘suffer’ [in English]. And this affected work morale. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
The reforms affected the morale of PHO staff. It is true to say that there is a good 
deal of uncertainty about whether the PHO will still remain, or who will come to 
control the PHO, which it is not clear. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
These difficulties within the PHO, and the combination of low morale and loss of staff in 
senior positions helps to account for other problems that will be considered below, such as 
lack of direction in the DHOs, an imbalance of funding between the community hospitals 
and health centres, and inadequate support for community-based health activities.
6.2.2 Recent changes in organisational structure
In the early 1990s the organisational structure of Kalasin PHO included ten organisational 
divisions, similar to the 10 departments in Mahasarakham. As in the latter, an Accident 
Control and Non-communicable Disease Section was set up around 1995, as an unofficial
25 As in Mahasarakham these were: (1) the Administration Department, (2) Planning Department, (3) Human 
Resource and Primary Health Care Development Department, (4) Community Pharmacy Department, (5) 
Dental Health Department, (6) Health Promotion and Health Care Department, (7) Communicable Disease 
Control Department, (8) AIDS Control and Prevention Department, (9) Sanitation and Environmental Health 
Department, and (10) Health Education and Public Relations Department.
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department or section in the PHO.26 After 1997 the trend towards bureaucratic reforms, 
decentralisation and the possible transfer of functions to local government, led to some 
changes in the tasks undertaken by departments. During this period certain health 
functions, such as operational aspects of communicable disease control, were transferred to 
the municipalities, the sub-district administrative organisation (ABT), and the provincial 
administrative organisation (ABJ- pronounced in Thai as aor-bor-jor). With the launch of 
the UC reforms in 2001, there was a period of rationalisation which culminated in a 
reduction to five groups in PHOs across the nation (see figure 6.1). Thus the change in 
organisational structure in Kalasin is similar to that described for Mahasarakham in the 
previous chapter.
Figure 6.1: The new organisation and management structure of the Kalasin provincial 
health office, 2002- the present
Provincial Public Health Office
General Administration 
Section
- Correspondence Unit
- Finance Unit
- Procurement Unit
- Personnel Unit
- Public Relations Unit
Health Strategy 
Development Group
Planning Unit 
Health Information 
Unit
Epidemiology Unit 
Evaluation Unit
Technical Support 
Group
Technology 
Application Unit 
Personnel 
Development Unit 
Supervision Unit 
Information and 
Communications Unit
Health Insurance Group
Registration Unit 
Claims Centre
Health Care Budgeting and Planning 
Coordination Unit 
Complaints Management Unit
Consumer Protection Group
- Public & Local Agencies Coordination Unit
- Public Health Law Enforcement Unit
- Health-Care Facilities Quality Monitoring 
and Inspection Unit
Adapted from: Ministry of Public Health: A New Mandate and Structure (MoPH 2002b)
26 In mid-2001 as the government rolled out the 30 baht scheme across the country and pressed PHOs to 
prepare, a Health Insurance section was established unofficially in the PHO. Thus several respondents 
reported that the PHO organisational structure o f the PHO comprised 11 or 12 departments
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The main difference in the implementation of the new structures in these two provinces 
concerned the extent of preparation for change, and the lead from the top about how it 
should be phased. Where Mahasarakham’s strategy had elements of ‘think and then do’, 
Kalasin’s approach never moved beyond ‘do and then think’. While the Mahasarakham 
PHO had been selected to complete a pilot project on approaches to organisational change 
and perceived itself as a research-led organisation, Kalasin took the more reactive 
approach of a bureaucratic organisation which first responded to commands and ‘thought’ 
only reactively when gaps in the reform template became apparent. In the absence of 
extensive preparation Kalasin had to make rapid plans about how to downsize to five 
groups from a high staff base. The CMO’s approach was not to undertake any extensive 
planning exercise but to delegate the task of forming the five new groups to the PHO staff.
We let the heads of the 12 departments talk together about reducing from 12 to 5, 
and in the monthly meetings the CMO had informed us many times about the 
reforms and was sure it would happen. He had a good ‘technique’ (in English) 
which involved getting them to complete a form to apply to the group they 
wanted to join. Things settled down automatically. I don’t quite know how this 
happened. In my case I got the post here that I wanted: nobody else choose it 
because they thought it would be hard work. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
The reorganisation depended on staff preferences and some negotiation rather than any 
overall plan. This led to various teething problems and ongoing adjustments.
In Kalasin, after the reform policies were announced, the CMO allowed staff to 
join the new departments as they preferred. That caused chaos at the time 
because when they moved from the old department and faced problems in the new 
department, they couldn’t come back. And furthermore the CMO found many of 
the problems hard to solve, so that problems accumulated. (SAO-PHO, KS 06)
Kalasin has started from a higher base in terms of size than the other two case study 
provinces, and had over 150 PHO staff at the beginning of 2001. This number was 
progressively lowered in a series of cuts and staff reallocations.
The PHO organisational structure has changed from 11 departments to 5 groups. 
Previously, we had about 150 to 170 staff in the PHO but then we had to reduce 
this to 88 persons. That affected our work morale, and those who had to be 
moved out did so with reluctance. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
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This downsizing seems to have had more impact than in the neighbouring provinces both 
because of higher baseline workforce and also because it coincided with the loss of 
experienced staff. As expected, the Deputy CMO (Public Health) retired a few months 
into 2001 and soon afterwards the deputy CMO (Medical Services) left to take up a CMO 
post in another province. This deputy post was frozen with no replacement recruited, and 
this further weakened the capacity of the senior administration tier of the PHO. There was 
also a loss of competent staff because some officers who had been seconded from lower 
level posts within the province now had to return to the hospitals and health centres.
Mahasarakham had prepared for the reforms by organising workshops and training, and 
placing experienced staff in key posts, but this does not seem to have happened to the same 
extent in Kalasin. Nor was there a local policy drive towards innovative projects such as 
civil society involvement or decentralisation, or co-operative projects with NGOs or a 
local university. One of the biggest problems seems to have been a lack of local capacity 
to take advantage of the decision space that suddenly opened up when the Ministry of 
Public Health decided to allow provinces to determine the details of local implementation.
Several senior respondents highlighted this problem of adjusting to a new system in which 
organisations needed to ‘think for themselves’, rather than following orders in a command 
and control system
I don’t like to attach blame to the Ministry for the lack of preparation. On the 
contrary, I thought that they gave us the power to think out what to do by 
ourselves. They gave us only ‘key words’ (in English). We couldn’t wait for the 
guidelines about step one, two and three - we didn’t have enough time. For people 
who like to ‘create’ [in English] it was good. But, if one was waiting for a 
command, one wouldn’t have liked it done like this. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
The PHO had become familiar with programs and projects which involved top- 
down [in English] command from the centre, including the details of budget 
allocation. (...) When the new budgeting system came in, our staff had not 
prepared adequately to support to district sector. It seemed that there was a lack 
of knowledge, and this looked like ‘do and learn together’. Furthermore, the 
implementation processes was unclear and we almost started to learn the 
principles of economics again because previously we weren’t familiar with profit 
and loss, so we needed to take the first steps. There was a few staff who could 
understand but also some who carried on working in the old style. (...) There 
were many affects because the PHO was transforming its organisation, which 
meant that we didn’t adequately supervise the districts and that made them rely on 
themselves for about 6 or 7 months in year one. In the first year that led to a 
failure to deploy the policies as expected, especially the budgeting arrangement,
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where the regional and provincial approach was to use a top-down model. So 
there was a similar pattern across the entire region which was not responsive to 
the problems in each local area, as had been anticipated. (SAO-PHO, KS 05)
The ‘regional’ and provincial approach’ mentioned in this quote refers to the allocation of 
certain non-UC monies from the centre.
The work of the five new groups was not necessarily very different from the work of the 
previous departments, though the pressure of work increased following the reforms and 
many previous ‘specialists’ had to take on responsibility for a wider range of tasks.
It has changed in that previously we were each responsible for a particular task 
but now we must take responsibility for a variety of tasks. However, sometimes 
these seem to be fragmented activities which don’t integrate together. This may 
be because the previous system of work should have changed but actually did not 
change. There were many top down projects from the central government 
departments, at the Ministry level, where direct commands were issued to the 
PHO. Actually work at the ministry level is still not well integrated and this then 
affects the provincial level so that only the language changes. (SAO-PHO, KS 05)
We needed to start learning anew with this work, which is quite a difficult job 
because there were 20-30 tasks coming in each day and we needed to have 
coordination with both the lower and higher organisations. Sometimes the 
commands from the centre came in quickly with a request for an urgent answer, 
For example, they might need our staff to go to a meeting or training course that 
required of us to select suitable staff and prepare all the documents to support 
expenses. (SAO-PHO, KS 06)
6.3 How the financing framework was adapted to local conditions
6.3.1. Adapting to the new financial framework
In general the Kalasin PHO was less creative that its neighbours in adapting to the new 
financial framework so as to retain some control over the flow of money. Mahasarakham, 
which opted for inclusive funding model, used the provincial Clearing House to establish 
effective control over the bulk of the IP monies and limit CUP influence on how money 
was spent, but Kalasin, although opting for ‘exclusive’ funding, gave more power to the 
CUPs/community hospitals to use their devolved budgets as they wished. This 
comparatively ‘passive’ approach to managing the roll-out of the new funding
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arrangements and disbursing money to the CUPs is captured in the following extract from 
an interview with a senior administrator.
Now, we have no right to touch the UC budget. Actually, the budget comes to the 
PHO but within 15 days we must allocate it to the CUP. So, the budget 
management isn’t part of the PHO’s duties. Anything concerning buying 
anything or employing any person comes under the responsibility of the CUP. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 07)
This contrasts with the relatively interventionist stance taken by the Mahasarakham PHO 
in relation to health plans and the purchase of medicines.
6.3.2 Choosing a budget allocation model
Kalasin choose an ‘exclusive’ budget model for allocating resources to public facilities, 
which involved holding the budget for in-patient services -  the TP budget’ - at the PHO. 
It also opted to hold a staff salary budget at the PHO. As elsewhere the decision about 
using inclusive or exclusive funding was a difficult one, and was bound up with discussion 
of the funds that would be available to allocate to different types of service units, in 
different geographical areas, under the two models
The most difficult problem was the budget allocation policies whereby the MoPH 
gave us only a range of methods. We had to discuss this in the PCIHI to make 
decisions about the budget allocation. For example, with the first CUP before 
making the allocation we needed to decide how much to deduct for the health 
centres’ fix costs expenses, such as water and electricity bills or the staff 
allowances etcetera. After that we would go on to the second CUP and so on. 
Later the central policies required us to use the exclusive method: that was 30% 
for the IP payment used with the DRG model. The other 70% went partly for the 
OP and the P&P payments, which were difficult to divide. We had to allocate the 
P&P payments directly to the health centres and the community hospitals. In this 
province with regard to the 70% part, we divided 50% for the OP payment and 
20% for the P&P payment. At the beginning the Ministry gave us authority to 
choose between exclusive and inclusive budget models. We chose the exclusive 
model from the beginning and this year the Ministry issued an order to use 
exclusive only. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
Respondents reported that the issue was discussed in a series of meetings and there was 
much lobbying of directors of community hospitals by the CMO and the Head of the 
Health Insurance Group, who put forward arguments on the lines of ‘we must all survive’, 
and used the Thai cultural rhetoric of ‘pee and nong’ (the obligation of older family
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members to support younger ones) to try to encourage stronger organisations in the 
province to recognise the needs of weaker ones.
Given the power of the doctor directors it may seem strange that Kalasin choose an 
exclusive model from the beginning, rather than an inclusive or mixed model, because the 
former had the potential to weaken the position of the CUP and community hospital. At 
face value Kalasin opted for central control, when compared with Mahasarakham’s more 
decentralised funding approach. One possible explanation for this difference is the lower 
degree of concern in Kalasin with issues of civil society involvement and the need to 
support the drive to decentralisation, which in Mahasarakham may have led to a need to 
pay lip service to devolved budgets. However, another explanation is that the doctor 
directors of community hospitals in Kalasin knew they had a strong voice in the central 
decision making committees, including the war room, and had few concerns that budgets 
held by the PHO would be used to draw money away from their hospitals. As we shall see 
in a later section, the division of monies between the IP, OP and P& P budgets was done in 
such a way as to favour the CUP and the hospitals. These last two factors may have led 
some the DDCHs to conclude that the difference between an inclusive and exclusive 
model would not be very great. In fact the community hospitals were granted considerable 
flexibility to use OP and P&P monies as they wished. Actually none of the DDCHs 
interviewed in the study expressed criticism of the exclusive model and some gave 
surprisingly positive assessments. They presented it as a necessary safeguard for the 
provincial hospital, which was a key part of the local health system, on which their own 
hospitals depended.
In Kalasin we applied an ‘exclusive model’ from the first year to now. Really, I 
preferred the ‘inclusive model’ but I couldn’t push this point because in my 
district we have largest population in this province. However, when we used the 
‘exclusive model’, I was pleased and had no problem.’ (DDCH, KS 12)
There was enough sympathy from this group that the Head of the Health Insurance Group 
was also able to gain agreement from the hospital directors to create an additional 
contingency fund of 5% of the budget to support hospitals in trouble. There appears to 
been a degree of pragmatism in the decision in that ‘exclusive’ funding was seen to be the 
safest option given the uncertain impact on the local health care system if budgets were 
fully devolved. Thus, the following DDCH respondent points out that the inclusive model
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would have been more in keeping with the spirit of reforms, but accepts that this would 
have carried risks.
We applied the ‘exclusive model’ in this province, which involved holding part of 
the budget at the provincial level then applying data-based reporting using the 
DRG mechanism to re-allocate money, while deducting a part to fund referrals 
outside the province. We deducted the salary cost at the province. Based on the 
principle of the policy we should really have used an ‘inclusive model’ with the 
salary costs funded at the CUP as well. Because the implications of the policy 
were not clear we funded the staff salary costs at the province. (DDCH, KS 14)
One point worth noting, in terms of the comparison with Mahasarakham, is that Kalasin 
had one private provider operating within the UC scheme, and thus applied a split policy 
where the exclusive model applied to the state sector and an inclusive model applied to this 
provider (Focus Group KS).
6.3.3 Safeguarding the service units
In Kalasin the choice of the exclusive model and a central salary budget was once again 
dictated by a perceived need to safeguard the health service units. The central ‘IPD fund’ 
was seen as a mechanism to secure the viability of the provincial hospital and small 
community hospitals. The quotations below highlight the financial problem in the 
provincial hospital and smaller district hospitals. As elsewhere, the problem for the 
provincial hospital was that capitation funding reduced its budget.
The clear effect was on the budget: the hospital income was decreased. 
Previously, the hospital was received the budget from the ministry: including 
through the Low Income Medical Welfare Scheme and the Health Card Scheme. 
When the new policies came in, our monies only came from the Bt 30 project, 
which resulted in a reduction in our total income. (Senoir Doctor PH, KS 09)
Regarding the provincial hospital, if they received only the capitation budget they 
would not survive. However, we have supporting measures such as the IPD fund 
which we set up at the PHO for referral payments, when the community hospitals 
refer patients to the provincial hospital. And they must pay via this fund or in case 
of the patient jumping over the referrals system they will request fee for service or 
claim with the hospital where they have registered. The provincial hospital could 
survive in this way. (DHO Head, KS 20)
If we funded the salary costs at the CUP, the provincial hospital wouldn’t have 
survived because they had responsibility for care at all levels such as: primary 
care, secondary care and tertiary care. (SAO-PHO, KS 06)
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The other vulnerable players were again community hospitals in small districts, whose 
allocation would then be based on a small population. In some cases the administrative 
location of the hospital did not coincide with its natural catchment area, and there was 
some possibility of receiving transfer payments from adjoining CUPs, but there was still 
often slippage in these payments. Consequently hospitals in this position faced a situation 
where funding was insufficient to cover operating costs:
The budget, when we looked at the numbers, was a small increase, but we had big 
expenses, about twice the previous expenses. With the old budget that we got 
under the previous system, we never worried about financial management but we 
survived. Nowadays, we economise and strictly control expenditure. We can’t 
get careless because it may take our account into the red. Additionally, the 
previous budget was allocated on time, based on the size of the hospital. For 
example, we are a 30 bedded hospital so we would receive a similar budget to 
others of that size. Now, with the UC budget based on population, this results in 
different budgets even where we are a similar size. For example, we serve 20,000 
people in our district, while Somdej serve 50,000. We have similar numbers of 
patients visiting the hospital. However, we receive a quite different budget. 
Furthermore, in a small district, such as Rongkham hospital which serves about 
10,000 people, how will they survive? (DDCH, KS 17)
Compared with Mahasarakham, concern focused more on the provincial hospital because
onthis was a larger unit with more staff and beds than its counterpart. The Kalasin 
provincial hospital had relative high fixed costs, including staff salary budget and 
operational expenses. These high costs in combination with a limited district catchment 
area caused a major problem, because capitation-based funding would only give the 
provincial hospital a similar budget to some community hospitals in large districts.
The provincial hospital served similar numbers of people as some districts but 
they received the budget at the same rate. For example, Kalasin hospital served a 
population of around 100,000 while Yang Talad hospital served about 80,000, 
which resulted in a similar budget. However, the fixed costs of Kalasin hospital 
were higher than the others. One way to deal with this was to re-allocate staff to 
outside facilities and decrease their primary care role. But they had to set up a 
PCU, which limited their ability to re-deploy staff outside. (DDCH, KS 18)
This funding took no account of the significant greater tertiary care capacity in Kalasin 
hospital, and the greater complexity of case mix as compared with community hospitals.
27 Kalasin hospital had around 330 professional staff (36 doctors, 7 dentists, 11 pharmacists and 276 nurses) 
and 505 Beds, while Mahasarakham hospital had about 235 (39 doctors, 8 dentists, 22 pharmacists and 166 
nurses) and 480 Beds.
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The fact that Kalasin was a tertiary care centre made this hospital an important component 
of the local health care system and a destination for a large proportion of referrals coming 
from community hospitals. This was mentioned by one of the key DDCHs from the war 
room, who were willing to support the ‘exclusive’ model on the basis that it would protect 
a hospital to which he referred many of his patients.
I agreed that it is still necessary for us to apply an ‘exclusive model’ - that means 
keeping funding at the provincial level to support large hospitals, such as Kalasin 
hospital, because they are the only unit that provides specialist care in the 
province. If they do not survive my hospital might be closed. (DDCH, KS 13)
There were only two community hospitals in very small districts who were serious 
capitation losers, and thus this aspect of the problem was less serious than elsewhere.
6.3.4 Referrals and the Clearing House
In Kalasin, the key policy actors in the war room initially planned to implement the 
‘exclusive’ model through a ‘provincial IPD fund’ (i.e. in-patient department fund), rather 
than a provincial clearing house. This was one of a few important issues where outsiders -  
in this case, all the directors of community hospitals -  were invited to join the regular 
group for a special discussion. The term ‘IPD fund’ was a reference to the fact that the 
source of funding was the IP component of the capitation payment. However, as the 
reforms evolved and staff became aware of developments elsewhere, the language changed 
so that the term ‘clearing house’ was also used. In practice, the Kalasin system was 
administered by the Health Insurance Group and comprised similar activities to those 
undertaken by the Mahasarakham clearing house.
The rationale for the IPD fund was to remove the incentive for lower level units to delay 
referrals and retain patients, because it enabled referrals to be reimbursed direct from the 
PHO, so that no transfer payment from the referring unit to the receiving hospital was 
involved. Community hospitals made no payments for referrals but were allocated a 
proportion of the IP fund direct for their own inpatient work. This meant that 80% of the 
IP budget went into the provincial IPD fund for referrals, both inside and outside province, 
and 20% went direct to the community hospitals.
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Out-of-province referrals emerged as a particular problem in Kalasin province, partly 
because public concern about the quality of care in Kalasin hospital led many patients to 
demand treatment in other tertiary centres. Complaints from patients and relatives about 
poor treatment in the provincial hospital were reported at regular intervals in national 
newspapers, which encouraged this trend. Another factor was that senior PHO staff were 
concerned about the prices charged for these referrals, which were seen as inflated.
I think referral payments were a problem. Regarding outside-of-province 
referrals they charged us very expensive prices and we needed to pay them as 
they requested. As we’ve seen, the provincial hospital director has made many 
complaints such as in the case of referrals to Khon Kaen (regional) hospital or 
Srinakarinthara (University) hospital, where they charged us at full prices. While, 
with regard to within-province referral payments we have tried to limit the 
charges. Sometimes they have agreed with each other that they will not pay. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 03)
Kalasin referred to the same regional hospitals as Mahasarakham and suffered in the same 
way from the high relative weights (RWs) attached by the two main Khon Kaen hospitals 
to the basic DRG prices.
I think we must consider each hospital. In some cases where the hospital is 
popular with the people they demand to register there. For example, with Khon 
Kaen hospital I thought they could carry on albeit with difficulty, by which I 
mean that they must claim in full and try to get as much as they can. (...) I would 
criticize the university hospital, which at the beginning said ‘no’ to joining this 
scheme. Now, they don’t say anything, because with regard to the DRG system 
they got 1RW costed at 16,000 baht so that our Provincial IPD fund is beginning 
to get concerned, because if we pay 1RW at 16,000 baht many time we will not 
survive. Furthermore, the regional hospitals, such as Khon Kaen hospital, get 
1RW costed at 14,000 baht. That tires us out because a lot of money is taken out. 
In this situation I am absolutely sure that Kalasin hospital was affected because 
this amount was pulled out, impacting on the referral system and perhaps forcing 
them to delay referrals. I thought the financial situation of Kalasin hospital was 
not good: they could survive but they are overburdened. At present, they can 
carry on because they are using money they have saved. When they use up all 
their money, they will increasingly pass on the costs to the community hospitals. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 01)
The regional hospital and the university hospital taken together accounted for about 75% 
of Kalasin’s out-of-province referral payments in 2002-03. The high expenditure on 
distant referrals continued to be a problem through the reform implementation period, and
28 RW- Relative weight, as used in the diagnosis related group system, is an important signal to the hospital 
about how much it will get from the insurer for providing care to the beneficiary.
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led to a policy decision in Year 3 to top-slice money to create an out-of-province referral 
fund, before the subsequent channelling of remaining monies into the IP, OP and P & P  
budgets.
A number of difficulties emerged in the first year of the reforms in the development of the 
DRG payments system. The diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in the Thai system are 
applied in a slightly different way to the original model, developed by a national advisory 
group, so that the DRGs categories are used in combination with agreed clinical treatment 
standards to determine costs. This provides a way of linking the costs of standard treatment 
plans to disease groups. However, DRGs did not include sufficient detail to capture the 
costs of different hospitals, and the data sets on which costings were based were often 
inaccurate. The relative weights (RWs) were fixed at the centre and in the view of many 
professionals did not properly capture the relative costs of treatments across different 
specialities in the hospitals concerned
Basically, a RW should be based on the same rate for both the same disease and 
the same care in every hospital. But in fact it didn’t attract the same rate because 
there were different management costs in each hospital, and the DRGs didn’t 
contain enough detail to identify different hospitals. (...). So, the DRGs perhaps 
could not include these differences and leave a gap which it easily ‘abused’ 
(English). We have to develop the DRG system to be much more accurate and 
reliable. Regarding fixing the TRW’ rate in the university hospital at 16,000 baht, 
the regional hospital as 14,000 baht, the provincial hospital as 12,000 baht and the 
community hospital as 10,000 baht, I would say these are very different rates, 
which came from the centre. If we considered them in more detail we would see 
a lot of inconsistencies. (DDCH, KS 13)
As with Mahasarakham, one important area where local actors had decision making power 
was in fixing the breakdown between IP, OP and P&P. In year 1, while P& P was set at 
about the same rate as the neighbouring province, a rather higher percentage of funds went 
to OP and lower percentage to IP. The split in Kalasin was 25% IP; 60% OP and P& P; 
15%, meaning that about 5% more of budgets went to OP than in Sarakham. Though there 
is no direct evidence on this point, this may reflect the powerful position of DDCHs in the 
war room and PCIHI, and their ability to ensure that a good proportion of UC funds went 
to the CUPs, which they controlled. In years 2 and 3, as the approach of the DDCH in 
channelling the bulk of funds to the community hospitals was challenged, the balance 
between IP and OP returned to similar division to that in Sarakham.
As well as holding an IPD fund at the PHO, the war room decided to create a contingency 
budget to support activities not covered by the expanded UC budget -  the budget for 
clinical care. The background to this was that the main administrative and general support 
budgets for organisations like the PHO and the DHOs had been drastically reduced to 
channel money into the 30 baht project. However, war room staff were able to get 
agreement from the CUPs and hospitals to top-slice a small proportion of the capitation- 
based budgets for a fund to support general activities.
Previously, the budget was combined together and we could switch between 
headings. Now, we can’t do this because it is clearly divided between the UC and 
non-UC budgets. However, in practice we can change some things, because in the 
transitional period many things aren’t a hundred per cent certain and that’s the 
reason why our organisation can carry on. So, we asked the CUPs and hospitals to 
allow money to stay at the province for use as what we called a ‘buffer’ (English) 
or various other terms. With regard to the non-UC sector, the budget was much 
decreased but activity didn’t decrease correspondingly. That was a necessity 
especially at the provincial administrative level where we must follow many top- 
down policies so that when the budget comes to the province we must re-allocate 
it again. (SAO-PHO, KS 01)
Sometimes these monies went to support MoPH schemes, such as the 14 areas for special 
‘focus’, which were pushed hard from the centre but without adequate budgets attached. 
In Year 3 the province maintained the contingency fund but also set up an additional 
‘Health Development Fund’ to deal with this problem.
6.3.5 Summary of financial changes in Kalasin in FY 2001-02,2002-03 and 2003-04
In summary, during Year 1, Kalasin selected an ‘exclusive model’, so that it held an IPD 
fund and a fund for staff salary costs at the provincial level. The PCIHI/PHO also gained 
agreement to hold a contingency fund (CF Fund) of 5% of the UC budget to support 
under-funded hospitals, which in the event assisted the provincial hospital and the smallest 
community hospital, but remained partially unspent. The remaining UC budget was 
divided so that 25% went to the IP budget, 60% to the OP budget and 15% to the P&P 
budget. Regarding the IP budget, 80% went to the ‘IPD fund’ at the province, managed by 
the Health Insurance Group to provide for in-province and out-of-province referral 
payments; while 20% went to the CUPs for community hospital inpatient work. The OPD 
and P&P budgets were directly allocated to the CUPs, with the condition that the CUPs
must support PCUs and health centres in their own district in health promotion and health 
prevention activities.
Overall it can be seen that Kalasin’s ‘exclusive’ model had only limited differences from 
Mahasarakham’s ‘mixed’ model, in that both split the IP budget between the province and 
the CUPs. However, Kalasin released only 20% for community hospital inpatient work 
with no element for referrals, compared to Mahasarakham’s 40% which included an 
element for onward referrals. Both had a contingency fund to support the hospitals, and 
both allocated a similar percentage of the total budget to the CUP for P& P.
The main funding flows and relationships are represented in the following figure.
29 Referrals with a relative weight of less than 0.5, which was the band allocated directly to CUPs, all involve 
work carried out in the community hospitals.
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Figure 6.2: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Kalasin in Year 1 (FY 2001-02)
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In Financial Year 2 a national policy was established that salary costs would be held and 
funded at the Ministry level and that all provinces should utilise the ‘exclusive model’.
However the PCIHI/PHO retained some scope to make local adjustments. They agreed to 
reduce the ‘CF fund’ from 5% to 1.25% of the total provincial budget. But they re­
allocated this money by creating an earmarked budget to support the utility costs of the 
health centres and a budget for vaccination and medical equipment. In 2002-03 the split 
between budget divisions was OP = 5%, IP = 28% and P&P = 17%. The IP budget was 
again split between the ‘IPD fund’ and the CUPs in the same way as in Year 1.
One of the main differences in Year 2 was that the community hospitals lost a major part 
of their funding because of the changed policy to hold salary budgets at the Ministry and 
the reallocation of this money to large population centres, mainly in central region. This 
had the result that the capitation payment to the CUP dropped from about 700 to 400 baht.
In the first year of implementing the reforms -  2002 -  I was in favour of the 
resource allocation system. But in 2003 it collapsed. The money was very small. 
After the reforms we had employed many new temporary staff and paid for a lot 
of overtime. Now we did not have enough to pay overtime or pay for the new 
staff. The budget allocation reflects a conflict between the NHSO and the MoPH. 
(DDCH, KS 13) ’
Again the approaches taken by Kalasin and Sarakham were similar, this time in part 
because they needed to comply with the same central government policies. There were 
minor differences such as Kalasin’s more generous level of utilities payments to the health 
centres, and the fact that its Vaccinations and Medical Equipment Fund was the nearest 
equivalent of Mahasarakham’s ‘Provincial Cooperative Investment Fund’ (which is an 
indication of different priorities in the two provinces). Perhaps the most interesting 
difference was the treatment of the P&P monies, which Sarakham, as before, allocated 
direct to the CUP. The issue of P&P funds caused a good deal of debate in Kalasin -  as 
will be seen later in the chapter -  and a decision was taken to split the budget equally 
between the community hospitals and the health centres. However as a pragmatic measure 
this money was channelled through the CUPs and most did not actually reach the health 
centres.
Figure 6.3 below shows the resource flows and relationships between organisational 
divisions in 2002-03.
Figure 6.3: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Kalasin in Year 2 (FY 2002-03)
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Note: That was a criterion for financial arrangement based on resolution of the PCIHI
In Year 3 financing in Kalasin followed the Ministry policy, with little change in the 
formal allocation machinery. There were limited changes in detail. An additional ear­
marked budget, the ‘Health Development Fund’ was created, which was linked to the top-
down requirement to start provincial development projects. Also the portion of the IPD 
budget used for out-of-province referrals was moved across to a separate fund, so that 
inflation in this expenditure heading did not threaten the position of provincial hospitals. 
Again one of the most significant developments involved the flow of funding to health 
centres. In the light of problems of getting their share of the P & P budget channelled to 
the health centres through the CUPs, it was determined to pay them directly, though with a 
portion going to the supporting district health offices. . In this year the split between 
budget divisions was IP = 35%, OP 58% and P&P = 7%.
In terms of the comparison with Mahasarakham, differences did not widen greatly, with 
the main financing mechanisms still unchanged. Fixed costs (utility) payments stayed at 
the same level in Kalasin, while these were reduced in Mahasarakham. The changes in 
Kalasin regarding the new ‘Health Development Fund’ and the bypassing of the CUP for P 
& P payments were not copied in Mahasarakham.
Figure 6.4 shows the resource flows and relationships between organisational divisions in 
FY 2003-04.
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Figure 6.4: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Kalasin in Year 3 (FY 2003-04)
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6.4 The view of actors in the local health care system
6.4.1 The view from the community hospitals
Under the new funding system in Year 1 OP and P&P monies went to the CUPs, which 
had considerable devolved authority to decide how to share out the money. The general 
pattern was that each CUP covered a district and was associated with that district hospital, 
though a few districts with no hospital were brought into a neighbouring CUP. With the 
exception of the ‘Muang’ (city) CUP, which was headed by the provincial hospital 
director, all the CUPs were chaired and dominated by DDCHs. This generally meant that 
funding for the community hospitals was secure, and indeed much higher than before 
2001. One problem that arose concerned the imperfect match between the administrative 
units on which capitation payments were based and natural catchment areas. Some 
hospitals had large patient flows -  mainly outpatient flows - coming in from adjoining 
districts. The PCIHI had made some provision for this by making arrangements for the 
adjacent CUP to make a compensatory payment for outpatient work to the CUP overseeing 
the hospital. The problem was that DDCHs reported many cases where payments were not 
made.
We used to claim these expenses from ‘K’ CUP, but they caused difficulties for 
us. For example, we claimed about Bt 100, 000 supported by completely detailed 
documents but they only actually paid Bt 40,000 and slowly at that. They 
mentioned that they had deducted the Bt 30 per visit fee because we were in the 
same province, and also some parts of the medicines costs where they claimed 
these were too expensive, although we have already made a joint decision on this 
and charged based on the lists and prices we had agreed. (DDCH, KS 17)
There was a problem concerning the catchment area. For example, people in ‘N ’ 
and ‘P’ sub-district (under ‘K’ district) usually came to access health care in ‘H’ 
hospital (this hospital) because the transport links are much more convenient. 
When the UC reforms came in their capitation budgets had been allocated to ‘K’ 
CUP, but the people still came to us. This created a problem where ‘K’ CUP 
received the monies, but the health care provider was ‘H’ CUP. (...) Now we are 
solving this problem by not allowing them to access our service, because it puts a 
heavy burden on us. (DDCH, KS 17)
In this situation all the capitation-losing hospital could do was appeal to the PCIHI to 
intervene, which did not always solve the problem.
We have just collected these data and by the end of this year we will produce 
summaries and present them to the PCIHI (...) Now I can only influence things a 
little bit because I can only work at the service level; I am not an administrator at 
the higher level. These problems depended on many factors, including the PSIHI 
at the provincial level. (DDCH, KS 17)
Reimbursement for community hospital inpatient work, including work involving patients 
from across district boundaries, came from the central IP fund, the doctor director 
respondents in Kalasin reported no problems with this flow of monies. If there was an 
issue with referrals, it was that some hospitals retained patients who should have been 
referred to larger centres in order to keep the IP payments. Doctor Directors themselves 
generally denied that this was a problem, though a few respondents in the PHO, and most 
tellingly, the health centres, reported that this had happened.
I don’t like this policy because they have held back patients. There are many 
people in my area, who will go directly to see a doctor in a private clinic in the 
city centre, then a doctor will refer them direct to the hospital, for which they 
must pay themselves. That was the main problem in ‘K’ (district) where they (the 
hospital) didn’t like to refer patients. As we know, there is the same problem in 
many areas when I talk with my friends. (Head HC, KS 29)
The biggest funding issue was not any impediment to the flow of monies to the CUP and 
thereafter the community hospitals, but the flow of monies from the CUP to the health 
centres. This was bound up partly with self interest and the desire of some doctor directors 
to use the bulk of funds to develop hospital services, and partly with the failure of the 
hospitals to establish effective patterns of joint working with health centres because of 
reluctance to get involved in health promotion work. The CUP had a remit to develop the 
full range of services in the district including community services as well as hospital 
services. The policies called for the formation of primary care units (based on the old 
health centres) that would have doctors and nurses, as well as pubic health staff. Because 
doctor directors were not confident about the capabilities of health centre staff, this meant 
moving hospital professionals out into the community. However, motivating them to do 
this proved difficult, and there appears to have been a gradual reduction of activity as time 
went by.
The next problem was the attitude of the health officers where they weren’t happy 
and didn’t like health promotion in the community. They thought that this work 
was useless and not satisfying. They must both think and do by themselves, where 
it quite difficult work when compared with hospital work, where they can follows 
a routine. If they go to work outside hospital they find it tiring. Additionally, they
must work with the health centres and the DHO staff which is unfamiliar and 
where they feel isolated, because the system has been split for a long time. When 
we decided to roll out treatment activities to the health centres that put a big 
burden on them and they didn’t like it. The nurses who came to the health centre 
also did not like working on health promotion and community activities. They felt 
that they didn’t like health promotion work in the community and they had a 
negative attitude to working co-operatively (DDCH, KS 15)
This issue will be discussed from the other side when the perspectives of the DHO and 
health centres are considered below.
i
f
There was also a degree of conflict between the heads of CUPs and the DHOs, which had 
| previously been the line managers of the health centres and still had some residual power. 
This arose partly because of the two lines of command that now existed from both the 
CUP and the DHO to the health centres, with the CUP controlling money and trying to 
develop a community outreach capability, and the DHO having power to direct what tasks 
health centre staff carried out.
There was the one who took care of the budget and another who took care of the 
staff. I think the idea was wrong because there were contradictory principles. 
J Whenever they (health officers) required monies we had to approve it, but then it
[ passed outside our control. This meant we couldn’t control the direction of work.
! I must do this through cooperation via meetings with the DHO head. Sometimes I
encountered a problem that I needed to solve quickly but I couldn’t do that. 
(DDCH, KS 15)
i
This will also be explored in more detail below when the changes occurring in year 3 are 
described.
The other general factor that featured prominently in doctor directors’ interviews was the 
increasing administrative burden associated with the UC reforms. This was not just about 
the increasing volumes of patients presenting to access low cost care, but also the re­
organisation of local services, the extra administration associated with the financial 
reimbursement mechanism, and the increasing paper work involved based on a quality 
assurance scheme at the clinical level.
The work was increasing, for example, the contract specifies that we must provide 
a certain quality of care. The quality was divided into two aspects; firstly, quality 
as defined in a document called ‘PSO’ (the Public Sector Standardisation 
Organisation) and quality of heath care based on ‘H.A.’ (Hospital Accreditation).
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Currently we are implementing both these systems. Actually, they do improve our 
work but they cause us increased ‘workload’ (in English). They generate both 
paper work and service work. For example, previously a doctor needed to write 
down about 4 lines taking about 15 seconds per case in an OPD medical 
examination, but in the new system reporting has increased a lot. So the 
‘workload’ (English) has increased, regarding the time taken to provide the 
service. Additionally, more patents came to visit the hospital because of 
government publicity. Work increased, the staff remained the same and the 
budget decreased. (DDCH, KS 17)
A number of respondents named colleagues who had resigned from the public service and 
talked about the comparative attractiveness of private practice.
6.4.2. The perspective of the DHOs and health centres
The rapid implementation of the reforms and the failure to work out all matters of detail 
meant that the role of the district office and the working of the local health care system 
remained unclear. This applied particularly to the lines of authority and the focus of work. 
The reforms seemed to transform the function of the DHO from hierarchical manager to 
arms-length supervisor and monitor, but as time passed the DHO was frequently called 
upon to carry on with some of its previous responsibilities.
Regarding the structure and functions (of the DHO) this was changed in line with 
guidance which set out our responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation. In fact, 
we are still doing similar work as previously. Perhaps we are doing more because 
we must operate as the main coordinating body in the district. At the beginning 
we thought we would have the same functions as the PHO but in fact we need to 
work at everything. (DHO Head, KS 24)
We are still acting as both an operational body and supporter for local work, as 
with the previous functions. Actually, we clearly understand that we are the 
evaluator and supervisor but we can’t do this because of our existing 
responsibilities. The DDCH: he claimed that health centres were under the control 
of the DHO head and he couldn’t command them. I thought this was 
‘overlapping’ (in English) each other’s function. If we assigned the DHO head to 
be evaluator, we could move the health centres out, I didn’t worry about losing 
the power at all. Perhaps the health centres would move under the hospital or 
local government, depending on policy, but we will act as evaluator and a 
reporting base on their performances. (DHO Head, KS 19)
We were not responsible for acting as the leader in the district for health 
activities, but the CUP board was. The DHO should act as the district supervisor. 
When the health policies were introduced we had to analyse how to do the 
monitoring and what the evaluation criteria should be. However, we had a 
problem when implementation happened for real. For example, with the
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haemorrhagic fever control and the healthy exercise projects, if we hadn’t gone to 
work on these projects they would have failed. (DHO Head, KS 19)
One part of the reforms, intended to increase the power of primary care, had been the 
creation of the CUP. In practice, because CUPs were headed by hospital directors, this 
meant that the hospital became to the lead body directing work in the local health care 
system. However, the DHO also continued to exist, though with a reduced and ambiguous 
role. This led to the problem of a command system with ‘two heads’ also cited in the other 
case studies. In essence there was a ‘boss’ who controlled the money, the Chair of the 
CUP (a hospital director), and a ‘boss’ who had line management responsibility for health 
centre staff, the DHO Head.
There was a problem about integrated work in the district, for example the DHO 
Head and the DDCH. There are two organisations in the district. They (the 
government) would like them to work together but this didn’t happen. Because, 
the first thing is that there are two bosses. People did not know who the real boss 
was. When the DDCH needed the health workers to come to work, they must be 
allowed to do so by the head of the DHO. That caused a dispute between them. 
And, there was a problem with the budget arrangements. In the first year of 
implementation, the budget was directly allocated to the hospital, but it was 
changed in the second year so that the P&P budget was directly allocated to the 
health centres. So the hospital wasn’t responsible for this budget and the health 
centres were puzzled to get such big money and didn’t know what to do with it. 
After this we (the PHO) focused on cooperative working but the hospital weren’t 
interested, they have just worked by themselves. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
The transfer of authority to the CUP (and community hospitals) also led to problems of 
communication and also the co-ordination of hospital and community work, especially 
curative and preventative activities.
At the start of the reforms all official documents were sent directly to the CUP, 
which had the result that we didn’t get any information and didn’t know anything, 
but the PHO required us to report on the results of the work. Then we had new 
discussions with the PHO, and then they sent things directly to us as well. For 
example, in the ‘food safety project’, at the beginning the PHO had direct contact 
with the hospital and the CUP, but there were nothing about implementation and 
we were waiting to start work on this project until nearly the end of fiscal year. 
Then last month the PHO asked the DHO to come in and take responsibility for 
this project, including other activities needed to back up the action. The hospital, 
they didn’t focus on health promotion or proactive measures. (DHO Head, KS 24)
The change led to a perception on the part of most DHOs that the CUPs were overly 
preoccupied with developing treatment activities at the expense of health promotion and
prevention. The ‘close to the home, close to the heart’ component of the reforms had 
called for an expansion of primary care, linked to the formation of PCUs, and this involved 
a transfer of resources from hospitals to the community. This implied that CUPs would 
not simply use existing health centre resources within a different management structure, 
but would oversee new patterns of working where doctors and other hospital staff moved 
out into the community to assist the existing health care officers. The problem in the eyes 
of many DHO and health centre staff was that there was no enthusiasm for this change of 
focus.
Of course, it was changed because, in the structure of the CUP, the DDCH is the 
chair. He or she focuses on treatment activities, and doesn’t play up community 
activities or health promotion as expected. The largest part of the budget is paid 
for treatment activities in the hospital and does not provide for health activities in 
the community. (DHO Head, KS 23)
But it seems that a curtain has come down between the health centre and the 
hospital staff, and they have been separated for a long time. There was a situation 
where the staff came to work together, they did not get into conflict, but they feel 
that they still have two bosses. (DHO Head, KS 20)
Part of this problem was about relationships and the cultures of the two groups of workers. 
Several DHO and health centre informants suggested that hospital staff saw themselves as 
‘professionals’ now forced to work with the ‘non-professional’ health officers. They did 
not always conceal their feeling that they were different from the health centre staff. For 
many respondents in the health centres, this amounted to being treated like ‘second class 
citizens’.
In my opinion, the hospital staff seem to be biased against the health centre staff; 
they always treat them as second class citizens, including the nurses who go to 
work in the health centres, and I don’t know why they do it. I tried to explain that 
in the hospital staff that they have better facilities and more comprehensive 
equipment than the health centres, and receive about 10 times more. Such as a 
free house and a car available when they have to go to work outside, whereas the 
health centres staff don’t have this. They must take care of themselves and stay in 
the community. They have problems in work with either the lack of good 
facilities, support or poor quality of work life, especially when compared with the 
hospital staff. (...). So they treat them as second class citizens. (DHO Head, KS 
24)
Apart from status differences, different working conditions and career prospects applied to 
hospital and community work. Hospital work brought better fringe benefits, including 
housing and car, and better allowances. This arose largely from the hospital staffs
continuing civil servant status, and the employment of community staff on new 
‘government officer’ grades, in line with changes introduced as part of the wider reforms 
of the state bureaucracy after 1997.
For example, two newly graduated nurses came to work in ‘N ’ (this district): one 
worked in the health centre and the other worked in the hospital. This made them 
compare the facilities. The one who worked in the hospital got everything and 
worked mainly in the municipal area with extra monies for supporting work in 
rural areas. The one who worked in the health centre didn’t receive this even 
through she worked in a village. They got together and compared these things 
and told me about it. (...) One person came to see me in tears, saying she needed 
to work in the hospital. Working in health centre didn’t lead to success in a 
nursing career, while a nurse working in hospital receives more rewards and has 
an easier time because they only have to follow doctor’s orders. (DHO Head, KS 
22)
In turn health officers had negative feelings about hospital staff, especially when their 
suggestions for changes in practice were ignored. The following extract describes a 
situation where a hospital team had come to carry out a clinic in the health centre:
We gave ‘feedback’ [English] but they didn’t change things and answered back in 
sarcastic terms that made us afraid to give feedback again because we are at a 
lower level. Sometime we were busy and didn’t help them to move medicine 
bottles, which made them get angry and blame us. When they came to the health 
centre we had to entertain them with food when they finished, and after they went 
back we had to tidy up and clean everything. I wanted to tell them that we are the 
same team, so don’t treat us as subordinates. They work in hospital and they act 
as the boss, even though we have graduated with the same degree. If we were 
dissatisfied with something and we went to talk with the boss, they will be 
keeping an eye on us. We felt pressurised. (...) Ordinarily, the relationship 
between the health centres and CUP is not close. They came to see us every two 
months. (HO-PCU, KS 35)
In the view of several respondents, the problem was the medical control of the CUP and 
the difference in perspective between acute medicine and public health.
They tried to get across the problem that I described, but the doctors obstructed 
any change, they did not change much. They listened but made no concrete 
changes. If the chair [of the CUP] wasn’t the doctor it would be better. (DHO 
Head, KS 24)
These difficulties in working together co-operatively led to a series of problems in 
community services, which pulled the DHOs back into the area of operational work. This 
was partly because the PHO and Ministry, when confronted with difficulties expected the 
DHO to take some responsibility. They still required reports from the DHOs, rather than
the CUPs and encouraged them to get involved in P&P projects that were under threat of 
going wrong.
When the Bt 30 policy came in they re-assigned the DHO to be the supervision 
body to support the people, so that they could access health care service based on 
the core-benefit package in the new policy. However, when we had a problem, for 
example, in a case where haemorrhagic fever had spread in our area, the higher 
administrators intervened to put pressure on the Head DHO. Meanwhile, the UC 
budget was allocated direct to the hospital and the DHO received a lower budget 
figure of around 10% of the UC budget to district for all supervision work. (...) 
As I have said, ‘our responsibilities have changed little’. Everything still remains 
with us, the regional health inspector and his team still require reports from us. 
We do not avoid our responsibilities but they should go to the CUP. (DHO Head, 
KS 19)
It was also the case when things went wrong that it was the DHO rather than the CUP that 
higher-level bodies blamed. In the following extract, a DHO Head recounts how failures 
of the part of the doctor director went unnoticed, and how control is separated from 
responsibility.
We don’t work only on the evaluation task; we must help the hospital work too, 
because if communicable diseases spread in the district, such the PHO don’t 
blame the CUP, they blame only the DHO. For example, in the case of 
hemorrhagic fever control in ‘S’ district (another district), there were many 
hemorrhagic fever cases in that area even though the CUP there has obtained a 
large budget. But the DDCH did not allocate money to the health centres to 
support these activities and that led to a situation where the disease spread widely. 
In a PHO meeting, they blamed the head DHO, and the head DHO explained that 
he had already done everything and could control the cases in the DHO area, but 
he did not know about control in the hospital area. So why did they separate the 
two areas? With regard to this case, it made us feel uncomfortable that we cannot 
touch them [i.e. the doctors]. We must accept that doctors have a lot of prestige; 
we must go to talk with them (DHO Head, KS 24)
The problem between CUP and DHO remained an issue in the early years of the reforms, 
especially in Muang CUP, where the provincial hospital led the CUP and should have co­
ordinated primary care. A DHO Head on the CUP recalled how meetings ranged over 
tertiary and secondary care but rarely discussed primary care issues.
To tell the truth about ‘the city’ CUP it is very different with other districts that I 
have worked in. In another district we could easily ring each other. Regarding the 
provincial hospital in the last 3 months we have just had one meeting because 
they are a very large organisation and responsible for 3 levels of care. At the 
primary care level they are responsible for the health centres, and at the secondary 
and the tertiary care levels for the entire province. When we met in the CUP
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board there were many issues discussed concerning both secondary and tertiary 
care, but we should have been talking about primary care. They are a large 
organisation and don’t have a champion for primary care activities. Actually the 
social medical department should have taken on this role but they didn’t. For 
example, in the case of communicable disease control, if we have early detection 
it would be easily controlled, but they did not do this. I don’t know why. At the 
moment they are trying to solve this problem. I think that the CUP conference 
topic should be the problem of primary care and the Bt30 scheme, but they have 
picked the opposite topic. (DHO Head, KS 19)
6.4.3 The role of the private sector
The single private hospital in Kalasin province opted to join the 30 baht scheme in the first 
year of roll-out to the North East. At the same time Mahasarakham’s private hospital also 
applied for entry but was rejected because it had no dentistry. However early dealings with 
the PHO were not smooth. Unlike in some other provinces, Kalasin residents were 
allowed to select between the provincial hospital and the private hospital, which meant that 
the population group covered was not confined to a separate locality. Health promotion 
and prevention work had to be covered by both hospitals taking patients from the ‘Muang’ 
(city centre) district. However activities were not co-ordinated, so that there was overlap 
in their work.
I don’t know about elsewhere, but here with my hospital we have a different 
system from the main policy. I have a problem about people who came to register 
with us, for example, in a family which has 10 persons but only 3 persons come to 
us and others are registered with the provincial hospital. Regarding treatment 
care, we didn’t have a problem but there were problems with health promotion 
activities where we had to go to do family visits or give vaccinations. It was 
complex and difficult work. For example, take the community activities based on 
the dengue fever control project where we (the private hospital team) went to kill 
mosquito larva in the family home. Later the provincial hospital team went to do 
this again, which was redundant work because it was the same area where we 
share responsibility. Of course, this may have been more convenient for people 
who could chose which hospital to register with, but it caused the management 
system double work and double costs. That was the problem. If I had a question 
about our capacity, we could do this. But in my view, as the manager, I would 
say it is like a stupid but diligent man. We could do this but why do we want to do 
the same thing twice? (DPH, KS 10)
A senior PHO source explained that this problem had arisen because it proved unviable to 
allocate different catchment areas to the two hospitals. Initially the PHO had created 
separate municipal areas but many people had expressed unwillingness to be registered
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with the private hospital. Local MPs had become involved in the issue and the PCIHI had 
been forced to move to a policy of choice between the two local providers.
Initially, ‘the city’ district was separated into 5 areas and we expected to assign a 
hospital to be responsible for each area. However the people would not agree to 
this. They said that they had the right to choose the hospital and caused us 
problems in making the arrangements at the beginning. Because some people in 
some areas who had to register with the private hospital did not accept this and 
asked to register with the provincial hospital. They pressured the politicians who 
came to force us to change this. Finally we gave the people a free choice of 
hospital, either the provincial hospital or the private hospital. (SAO, PHO, KS 04)
Many senior PHO administrators supported the PCIHI decision, not so much on choice 
grounds, but because of their lack of confidence in the capacity of the private hospital to 
offer a full range of services.
However, we didn’t get a satisfactory performance from the private hospital, 
based on both direct and indirect evaluation. For example, we asked the people, 
such as diabetes sufferers, for their views. They said they got medicines in small 
quantities and had frequent appointments.30 Patients at the provincial hospital are 
given more medicine. (SAO, PHO, KS 04)
At the beginning, I thought that we might have a lot the people going for care in 
the private hospitals. In fact, the situation was the opposite: the people didn’t go 
to the private hospitals. This made them launch a campaign to attract people to 
come to register with them. Then, the PHO decided to divide the catchment areas 
so that it was clear that people should register with the public or the private 
hospital. However, some groups of the people in the private hospital area objected 
to this because they wanted to get health care in the public hospital. There were a 
lot of people who didn’t want to register with the private hospital. (SAO-PHO, 
KS 08)
Regarding the community activities I wasn’t satisfied with the performance of 
both the private hospital and the provincial hospital. There are a lot of problems 
and - if  I could make a suggestion - the DHO should be working better. (SAO- 
PHO, KS 05)
The director of the private hospital argued with this outcome was not efficient and went 
against the aims of the UC policy.
If it was based on the manager’s view, the separate areas would be used 
economically to maximise the use of resources. If we were taking account of 
public satisfaction we wouldn’t achieve this. Freedom for a person to register was 
good but it was not efficient or good for quality management. A freedom should
30 Each attracting the 30 baht co-payment.
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have limits for the public benefit because this freedom may waste too many 
national resources. (DPH, KS 10)
If we examine public satisfaction, it passed but only at about 60%. However, 
there were many complaints about the health care system because the government 
gave the people high expectations. They announced that ‘30 baht Treats All 
Diseases’ but in fact that was not true because it doesn’t treat all diseases. Due to 
the people’s expectations, it ‘failed’ (in English) but with regard to access to 
services it is going on. (...) When we talk in terms of the business management 
concept it ‘failed’ (in English). From talking with others in public hospitals, I 
know they are in deficit, including the University hospital too. This policy is 
going as long as the ‘Thai Rak Thai’ government stay. I am 100% sure because it 
comes with the politics; also it is going to go with the politics. (DPH, KS 10)
From the private hospital’s point of view the PHO was not allowing free competition with 
the public sector. The doctor director argued that public hospitals were allowed to 
participate in the scheme without meeting the same accreditation requirements that applied 
to private hospitals. Also the PHO was not a fair arbiter because it was biased in favour of 
the public sector. It was the purchaser but also controlled the public providers, evaluated 
provision, and let the contracts.
When the competition started the politics came in. Competition is a good thing 
but it was not clear that there was competition: if somebody has more power than
another person it would not fair. It is ‘idealism’ (in English). (...) In the last two 
years I have fought a lot. Now the fighting seems to have ceased but this is not 
really true. There are differences between the provincial hospital, the community 
hospitals and the private hospital. Actually, I have only got around 400-500 baht 
(per head) because they played a game with me that caused me delays in getting 
involved. For example, I was supposed to join in October but they fobbed me off 
in January and again in March last year, which made me lose money each month. 
This is not transparent management. I don’t know if these were on table or under- 
the-table policies. We was also faced with the same problem in nearly all 
provinces on the part of private hospitals. (DPH, KS 10)
Regarding the money which I should receive, it came to the PHO but did not 
come to me and I don’t know why. The PHO officers are human beings who may 
be biased. If they keep my money for around 4 to 5 months then where has my 
profit gone? The bureaucrats have used the ‘tactics’ (In English) of blaming me 
and delaying my monies. If these were directly transferred via a bank there would 
be no problem. If we talked about the ‘internal control’ (In English) idea it would 
be wrong. The implementer, controller and auditor should be different persons but 
this is the same person, and that conflicts with ‘the internal control’ concept. 
(DPH, KS 10)
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By year 3, the private sector was in a difficult situation because participation in the UC 
scheme had not turned out to be as profitable as expected and there had been many 
withdrawals. Private hospitals perceived that they were not receiving support from central 
policy makers and were having difficulties with the financing system applied at provincial 
level.
Commonly, around 10,000 people could be registered with me. In my hospital we 
have got only 2,000 to 3,000. How can I survive? They annoy me in lots of 
ways. I insisted that we were being defamed but we remained patient, and they 
don’t do it any more. (...) We tried to adapt themselves because we knew that this 
would be the new ‘monopoly’ (in English). We are willing to take some losses for 
the sake of the future. Now we cut ourselves to the bone and run on existing 
resources. (DPH, KS 10)
6.5 Professional struggle and the change of approach
6.5.1 How middle-level policy actors gained influence
A number of factors in Kalasin came together to increase the influence of middle-level 
actors and open the way for a struggle between interest groups more visible than anything 
in the other two provinces. This came about partly because of the loose control imposed 
by the CMO, and his preference to act as arbiter between parties rather than leader. The 
large number of retirements of senior officers, the promotion of replacements from fairly 
junior positions, and the fact that the most experienced senior administrators were in posts 
not concerned with the UC reforms, meant that there was not the same direction from the 
top of the PHO as elsewhere. Additionally the inspector general in Health Region 6 was 
more hands-on and interventionist than in Mahasarakham and Rio Et. He monitored 
events and exerted influence at key points,
Kalasin was different from the other case studies because a larger number of middle- 
ranking actors were given places in the key ‘war room’ committee. The senior PHO 
officers had accepted the notion that the CUPs would drive the reforms to a greater extent 
than their counterparts in Kalasin and Roi Et, and accepted that the DDCHs would be key 
actors in the UC scheme. This meant that the DDCHs were given two places in the war 
room and were seen as middle-level managers dictating the micro-level arrangements at 
the district level. Having got a place in the war room and PCIHI, the two DDCH
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representatives were then able to ensure that doctor directors had a powerful role in terms 
of budget control and lines of command.
DHO Heads were also represented by two representatives, but initially were less powerful 
than the DDCH group. They had little control over budgets and diminished authority over 
staff. However, their co-operation was needed to keep work on track because of the 
DDCHs’ unwillingness to engage fully with P&P work. The other way they managed to 
augment their power was by gaining the support of the Health Region inspector. Different 
factions within the war room thus looked towards different allies and had different 
strategies for exercising influence.
6.5.2 Struggle between professional interest groups
As mentioned earlier, in Year 1 there were allegations that many of the Kalasin CUPs were 
failing to pass sufficient money on to the health centres and channelling it instead towards 
the community hospitals. The hospitals were well resourced but in the view of many low- 
level actors were not very effective in carrying out their responsibilities for health 
promotion and prevention. Under the influence of certain DDCHs, resources went to fund 
curative work rather than P & P, so that many of the existing projects of the health 
centres/PCUs were curtailed. Some money also went to capital investment in the 
community hospitals. However, improvements in services were limited by staff 
recruitment problems. Joint working between hospitals and health centres was not well 
developed, partly because of the different cultures and work orientation of hospital and 
health centres staff.
The DHOs which had traditionally overseen health centres were also strapped for cash 
and struggled to help keep community projects going.
[the] entire district budget was transferred to the CUP, then was allocated to 
health centres. The previous budgeting system of the health centres was based on 
the line of command, whereby the health centre submitted proposals to the DHO 
and then the head of the district government office had to approve it. Now the 
budget is channelled to the hospital and the health centres must ask for payment 
from the hospitals. The effect was that the DHO couldn’t check these plans and 
projects and whether they would benefit the public or not. (...) Previously, the 
DHO received the budget directly. When the financial reform came in, money
was divided into the UC budget and the non-UC budget, and the DHO only 
received a small proportion of the non-UC budget. (DHO Head, KS 20).
This situation, and particularly the starving of the health centres of funding, led to 
continuing complaints from health centre staff and lobbying from the DHO representatives 
on the PCIHI for change. This included both representations to senior PHO staff and to 
personnel in the Health Region and the Ministry. One of the most significant factors at 
this time appears to have been the increasingly active stance of the Health Region and its 
Inspector. This post holder was an ambitious and energetic official, who within two years 
was to be promoted to a Deputy Permanent Secretary position in the Ministry. He 
determined to take a more directive approach to the implementation of the reforms in 
Health Region 6, and paid special attention to a number of emerging problem areas. In the 
words of one PHO informant: ‘Year 2 was the Year of Inspection’.
One of these areas was the underfunding of the health centres, and the Inspector gave a 
strong steer to the CMO, the PCIHI and the CUPs that change was necessary. However 
the extent of the Health Region’s ability to command in these circumstances was unclear, 
and initially, rather than imposing a change directly, the Inspector pressed the PCIHI to 
agree a mutually acceptable arrangement with the CUPs. Near the end of Year 1, the DHO 
Heads get together to try to exert influence to change things, especially via the Health 
Regional Inspector. They also complained to the CMO in the war room. There were 
heated arguments. One informant looking back at this period recalls:
Last year, before we started to do the work, we spent 7-8 months talking about the 
budget arrangements. I think that in other districts they faced the same problem, 
with regard to payment channels and how to manage the allocation of the budget. 
Nevertheless, this year they (PCIHI) made the determination that the (P&P) 
budget wouldn’t pass to the CUP and would be directly allocated to the health 
centres. But we wasted time discussing how much to allocate, whereas the 
(provincial) policies were clear that it must be transferred. We wasted time asking 
the DDCHs whether we should do this or not. I was a one of the PCIHI members 
and we spent far too much time discussing the budget arrangement, before finally 
deciding to allocate directly, but the DDCH group wouldn’t agree to this, and then 
the PHO came back to ask whether we would do it or not. We discussed the 
policy for about 2-3 hours and a DHO Head and one DDCH almost hit each other. 
We wanted to make a direct allocation but the DDCH didn’t like that, and then we 
got into an argument about how much of the budget could be allocated in this 
way. The PHO received the P&P budget as Bt 50 per head, and then we gave Bt 
25 to the health centres and must give Bt 25 to the hospitals. So we had to share 
the money with them again. These things happen. (DHO Head, KS 20)
The initial result of the pressure was a change in financing arrangements in year 2 
whereby, in terms of the formal allocation, the P&P fund was divided equally into 
allocations for the community hospitals and the health centres.
Unfortunately this was not a complete solution to the problem. Because the discussions 
had continued until close to the budget allocation deadline, it was decided that there was 
insufficient time to allocate monies directly to the service units. Thus the money still 
passed through the CUPs, and this had the consequence that some doctor director chairs 
still did not pass the full funds due on to the health centres.
[t]he budget had been tricky because it was directly allocated to the hospital. The 
problem was that some hospitals did not allocate the budget to the health centres 
and some hospitals allocated a little, whereas the hospital could manage things 
according to their likes and dislikes. (DHO Head, KS 20)
Last year the budget was allocated directly to the CUP, so that the CUP was 
manager. There were problem in some CUPs so that they didn’t transfer money to 
the health centres. This caused complaints about money not being received or 
received late. (DHO Head (1), Focus group KS)
In other areas where PCUs were in operation the monies were passed to the lead health 
centre, and were not shared with the other centres on a fair basis.
Last year, for PCUs which comprised 2 or 3 health centres, the budget was 
allocated to the main health centre then they needed to share this budget. That 
resulted in some health centres which didn’t receive a budget directly feeling 
unhappy, because if the budget remained with the main health centre they might 
retain the full sum. (DHO Head, KS 20)
This led to further expressions of disquiet, and further lobbying by the DHO Heads Group 
of the Health Region and the Ministry. It seems to have been widely accepted that there 
was indeed a problem and that the answer would be to let money bypass the CUP and go 
direct to the service units. After negotiations between the CMO, the DHO Heads Group 
and the Directors of the Community Hospitals it was agreed that this should go ahead. The 
same 25 baht per head notionally allocated to the health centres in the previous year was 
paid directly to them, with a proportion separated off to go to support the DHOs. A 
separate steam of P & P monies also went to the hospitals. The change was welcomed by 
all the DHO and health centre staff interviewees. In the words of one DHO Head: ‘...the
DHOs group fought hard and we won when the budget was directly allocated to the health
centres’. (DHO Head, KS 20).
However there were indications that this change further weakened the hospitals’ 
commitment to work co-operatively with the health centres.
Possibly, the budget caused conflict. Because at the moment the budget is directly 
allocated to the health centres, so the DDCH assumed that the promotion 
activities are the responsibility of the DHO. It is not seen as the hospital’s task. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 05)
This contributed to a loss of momentum in the move from health centres to PCUs, which 
had anyway been constrained by staff shortages. Now however, as well as limited 
outreach from the hospitals there was a tendency for health centres with their own budgets 
to think they could go their own ways.
I am not sure whether the health officers understand the difference between the 
PCU and the health centres, because the health centres still work in the same way 
and the hospital doesn’t give much support. At the beginning the doctor team 
came to the health centre one day a week on Tuesdays. Now they don’t visit on 
time and it changed to once a month and sometimes there was only a nurse 
coming, or the doctor would come but not the pharmacist. (HO-DHO, KS 30)
The (P&P) budget was allocated directly to health centres which made the 
importance of PCUs decrease but we still call them PCUs.’ (SAO-PHO, KS 05)
Another consequence was that the future of the CUP and its role in the local health care 
system became less certain. A small number of doctor directors in particular were 
disillusioned with the turn of events.
Really, the CUPs have been abandoned now. There was an official letter from the 
permanent secretary of the MoPH that they made the decision to change things so 
that the CUP board came back to the DCCPH (The District Cooperative 
Committee for Public Health), the previous district committee before the Bt 30 
reforms. Following this they have already selected members of the DCCPH and 
are waiting for an official announcement. So they returned to the previous 
committee and don’t have the CUP board any more. Really, the CUP board and 
the DCCPH have the same function; it is the same whatever we call it. However, 
the (P&P) monies weren’t directly allocated via the CUP board or the hospital, 
only the budget for medicine costs, which we need to share, was directly allocated 
through the hospital. However, the P&P or health promotion budget was directly 
allocated to the locality (i.e. the health centre). This was managed by the MoPH 
for solving the conflict between the DDCHs and the DHO heads in the first year, 
when the CUP did not transfer monies to the health centres. Now, they have
changed that so the budget is directly allocated to the health centres, which
decreased the role of the CUP. (DDCH, KS 12)
As mentioned in this quotation the other major change that occurred in Year 3 was a 
change in the overseeing administrative structures. The CUPs were supplemented by a 
‘district committee for cooperation in public health’, which was a body from the previous 
administrative structure. This returned more power to the DHO. There was equal 
representation with DDCHs as before, but either a doctor director or a DHO head was now 
eligible to head the committee, unlike the CUP where only the former could take the lead 
role. This shift coincided with a change of Permanent Secretary in the MoPH in Year 2 
and a shift to more conservative policies. However, these were to continue for only a year, 
before a further change in Permanent Secretary led to the return of CUP influence.
6.6 Relations with the Ministry and the Health Region
The last chapter showed how the close contacts of Mahasarakham’s senior PHO officers 
with the Ministry helped them to keep their organisation in a position of influence, and to 
gain approval for local policy changes. Despite the fact that Kalasin also had a very 
experienced CMO he seems to have been unable to mobilise channels of influence to the 
Ministry in the same way.
Other senior PHO officers reported that in the early stages of the reforms, contacts with the 
MoPH were relatively unhelpful in resolving problems and areas of uncertainty.
The other departments (in the PHO) came to ask us what should we do about this 
topic and we didn’t know either. After this we rang the Ministry and they told us 
they didn’t know either. This was an example where the policies came in very 
quickly. Therefore, we needed to think by ourselves how to implement. The 
Ministry often gave us orders about the policies, sometimes right and sometimes 
in the wrong direction. However, after the government announced the policies, 
this forced us to come up with solutions by ourselves because we didn’t have time 
to wait for the detail from them. For example, they announced that Bt 30 scheme 
must be implemented across the entire provinces on 1 October (2002), which they 
have just told us about in a short command letter, then we needed to think 
ourselves what to do and how to prepare for implementation. (SAO-PHO, KS 04)
The external body that was most influential in Kalasin was the Health Inspector’s Office of 
Region 6. The office was mainly preoccupied in year 1 with developing audit and 
evaluation tools, but became very active in Year 2, prompting one informant (as mentioned
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above) to call this ‘the year of inspection’. However, formal authority for the oversight of 
the reforms was still centralised at the Ministry. Although the health inspector was 
concerned to support change and push it in positive directions, he had to be careful not to 
be seen to go beyond his audit and evaluation remit. This meant that his attempts to steer 
actors in particular directions had to be done informally and through indirect influence. A 
SAO-PHO described the inspector’s influence in the following way:
The regional health inspector’s office has fixed appointments for supervision 
visits twice a year. They came to help by seeing what our problems were and 
giving support when we requested it. However, in the final instance we must 
report directly to the MoPH because we are under the direct command of the 
Ministry. The regional health inspector might support us both through direct 
supervision in the local area and indirect influence. (SAO-PHO, KS 01)
Informal influence proceeded alongside a conventional audit role that did not meet with 
the approval of some local actors. One senior PHO source complained that their efforts to 
move forward proactively were frustrated by the inspector’s office, which ‘stays in the 
same mode and voices old concepts that just bore us’. It was only later that the Inspector 
did indeed start to press local actors to address some of the most pressing implementation 
problems, and played his part in the change in the budget allocation process.
6.7 Summary of chapter
This chapter has described some of the events and circumstances in Kalasin province that 
makes its reform story different from the other two case study provinces. Two features that 
were highlighted are the influence of middle-ranking actors, including professionals, and 
the fragmentation of power. Both may be partially attributed to the absence of a strong 
lead from senior officers in the PHO.
One important concern of the thesis overall is the role of front-line actors in implementing, 
and sometimes re-shaping national policy templates at local level, and this chapter shows 
that it is not always those at the top of the organisational hierarchy who exercise decisive 
influence. In this province, the key actors included PHO officers outside the senior officer 
group, the doctor directors of the community hospitals and the DHO heads -  all actors 
towards the middle of the provincial ‘command and control’ hierarchy,
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Middle-ranking actors exercised influence in the context of professional struggles between 
interest groups. This chapter shows how conflict centred mainly on resource allocation 
and the determination of the respective roles and scope of hospital and primary care. These 
struggles were reflected in disputes over budgets in years 1 and 2 as the health centres 
found themselves starved of funds, and latter in a significant policy shift as new 
arrangements were made for the P&P budget allocation in Year 3. Another important 
example of policy change following the mobilisation of local opinion, was the PCIHI’s 
decision to allow people freedom to register with their chosen hospital in ‘Muang’ 
municipality area. The problems surrounding this episode may reflect the relative lack of 
experience of the Kalasin PHO in engaging with community groups, as compared with, for 
example, Mahasarakham. Throughout the period studied, one of the major lines of conflict 
at provincial level was that between the DDCHs and DHO heads, which concerned 
funding and delivery of new primary care policies. However, it is important to recognise 
that this was not just a local Kalasin issue, but ran parallel with a similar clash of views at 
the highest levels of the Ministry, where a conservative group favouring the prioritisation 
of curative medicine opposed a radical group, who wished to divert resources to health 
promotion and prevention.
Chapter 7 
Roi Et: using active purchasing 
to steer the local system
C hapter 7. R oi Et: using active purchasing to steer the local system
7.1 Introduction
This is the third chapter concerned with the differing approaches to implementation of the 
UC reforms in the three case study provinces. The chapter will consider Roi Et province 
and the influences and conditions that affected the approach taken there. It will describe 
the key actors there and the way the CMO was able to maintain significant control over the 
local system by casting the PHO in a purchaser role and developing a system for 
evaluating health service bodies against key performance indicators. As in Chapters 5 and 
6, this chapter discusses several areas where local actors had discretional space, including 
determining the kind of purchaser/e valuator role that the PHO adopted, deciding on the 
financing model and the way contingency funding was utilised, and correcting emergent 
problems. The chapter also considers how the CMO and other local actors used channels 
of communication to the MoPH and the Health Region.
The main themes found in the case study of Roi Et were the development of an active 
purchaser role by the PHO and its ‘steering’ of the local health care system. More than the 
other two case studies, this province exemplified hierarchical control from the top, though 
under the guise of the PHO as evaluator rather than line manager. The situation in Roi Et is 
related to the strong position and formidable political skills of the CMO, his 
accommodation with another powerful local actor in the shape of the doctor director of the 
provincial hospital, and his ability to manage a powerful group of community hospitals 
directors.
7.2 Implementing the UC reforms in Roi Et
7.2.1 Actors, networks and power
A central element of the Roi Et study concerns how a powerful CMO was able to retain 
control for the PHO, compared with the position in neighbouring provinces, mainly 
through his skills in reaching understandings with other powerful groups in the province 
such as the DDCHs and the DHO heads. Within, the PHO itself, the CMO was able to 
consolidate control partly because of the unusual circumstance that his wife operated as
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deputy CMO, but also because his success in safeguarding the position of the PHO earned 
the support of other senior officers.
The Roi Et CMO had been in post for about two years, following a three-year period in a 
similar post in Khon Kaen province. Although this amounted to a move back to his 
hometown, this was a reverse in career terms because the Khon Kaen post was seen as one 
of the most attractive CMO positions in Esam region and an upwardly mobile civil servant 
would expect to move on from such a post to a senior departmental position in the MoPH. 
Nevertheless the CMO seems to have been determined to make the most of this posting. 
He was a member of one of Roi Et most prominent business families and continued to 
pursue business interests alongside his public duties. The position of the CMO and his 
wife as members of a wealthy and well-connected provincial elite seems to have enhanced 
their organisational power and social influence with other professionals in the province. 
At the time of the study he operated a large garden restaurant near the city ring-road, 
which functioned as a convenient site for the many informal meetings with PHO 
colleagues, doctor directors and DHO heads. In April 2006 the CMO stood as a candidate 
for the upper chamber of the Thai Parliament. He was elected as one of three senators for 
Roi Et province, and at that stage left the health service.
Following his move from Khon Kaen, the CMO had raised some eyebrows when he 
appointed his wife as Deputy CMO in Public Health ahead of a number of internal 
candidates. She had moved into administration after an earlier career in nursing. She 
proved to be a very effective networker and seems to have worked hard to get other senior 
PHO officers to support her husband.
The other two key players in the PHO were the deputy CMO (Medical Care) and the 
assistant CMO (administration). Shortly after the reforms came in, the deputy was moved 
to another province. The replacement official appointed in 2002 had previously been a 
community hospital doctor director. Partly because of this background he was asked to 
take on additional duties as care-taker drector of a community hospital. This hospital 
faced a difficult financial position, which had led to the resignation of the previous DDCH. 
This meant that an officer who was relatively new in post was also quite heavily burdened 
with two positions, and left him in no position to challenge the CMO’s authority or take 
the lead on implementation issues. The Assistant CMO (administration) had previously
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been a senior DHO head. He had headed DHOs in several districts in the province, and 
retained good relationships with the current DHO heads. However, this post was 
traditionally one which focused on routine activities such as buildings and vehicle 
maintenance and had little to do with policy development.
As in the other two case studies, another key actor operating in a supporting role was the 
Head of the Health Insurance Group. The post holder in Roi Et had headed the 
Environmental Health Department in the old structure, and had good contacts in the 
DHOs. However he retired in late 2003, and was replaced by the assistant head. This lack 
of experienced officers in high positions tended to strengthen the authority of the CMO.
As in the other two case studies, a war room was created in Roi Et in line with central 
guidance, The CMO was the chair and dominant figure. The situation was different from 
Mahasarakham where the corresponding committee was chaired by the deputy CMO, and 
Kalasin, where the CMO chair had ceded power to the DDCHs on the committee. 
However, on paper the general composition of the war room committee was similar to 
elsewhere.
The war room comprised the CMO acting as head, the head of five groups in the 
PHO, representatives of the hospitals, both the provincial hospital and the 
community hospitals, representatives of the DHO heads, a representative of the 
health centres, and the Health Insurance Group provides secretarial support. 
(SAO-PHO, RE 07)
Despite the presence of outsiders, influence remained mainly with the PHO officers. The 
CMO was supported by the deputy CMO operating in the role of secretary. The latter was 
assisted by the assistant head of the Health Insurance Group, who came to have a key role 
as a troubleshooter and problem solver. Interestingly this man had been head of the Health 
Insurance section in the old PHO structure, but had stepped aside to let a more senior 
department leader take on the new Headship role (when 10 departments reduced to 5 
groups). However, this meant that a new Head with relatively little experience of health 
insurance issues found himself responsible for this key function.
Previously I was head of the ‘E’ Department (in the old structure) and the CMO 
appointed me to be a member of the war room committee. Initially, I thought that 
‘my department’ was not related to health insurance. In the meeting we discussed 
the budget and numbers a lot, which gave me a headache because it concerned 
medical techniques and treatment activities which were not my interest.
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Sometime I felt bored, and wondered why there were so many meetings and
arguments. Later I started to understand that these things were all related, because
‘my activities’ depended on money from the UC budget so we needed to form a 
plan to request money as well. Additionally, in the new organisational structure of 
the PHO, I had to apply for the post of the Head of the ‘new’ Group. And the 
previous Head had been one of my staff in ‘K’ district health office, so we 
understood each either and I assigned him to be responsible for technical issues. 
We didn’t have any conflicts and could work alongside each other. (SAO-PHO, 
RE 05)
The assistant became a key actor in the day-to-day working of the war room, albeit 
operating under the wing of the CMO. This is a further example of how the pattern 
whereby higher level actors had greater influence on the shape of local implementation, 
was sometimes broken when lower-level actors in key positions gained an unexpected 
degree of influence. When the Head of the Health Insurance Group retired in late 2003, the 
assistant replaced him.
The war room operated alongside the PCIHI, which functioned from the start of the
reforms as the provincial health board, based on MoPH guidance. As in the other case
studies, the option of using the Area Health Board as the basis for the PCIHI was rejected, 
in this instance because the latter was not fully operational due to wrangles about 
representativeness and the appropriate mix of members from different organisations.
Instead it was decided that the PHO would set up the committee by merging some of the 
membership of the Health Card Committee, some AHB members and some newcomers. 
It was agreed that membership should be split between purchaser and provider 
organisation representatives, and also public representatives. The CMO acted as the chair 
on behalf of the purchaser interests and selected additional purchaser members, including 
the deputy CMO Medical Care, the Head and Assistant Head of the Health Insurance 
Group, and a representative of the DHOs. Representatives on the provider side were drawn 
from the provincial hospital, the community hospitals, a private hospital and the health 
centres. Public representatives comprised the Mayor of the provincial administrative 
organisation (Aor-Bor-Jor), a representative of the Mayors of the municipalities (the 
Thesaban), a representative of Mayors of the sub-district administrative organisations 
(Aor-Bor-Tor), a representative of the village health volunteers and a lay public 
representative. Additionally the committee included two local experts selected by the 
public.
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At the end of Year 1 the war room was stood down in line with guidance from the MoPH 
(and the ending of the central war room). The Health Insurance Group continued with the 
routine administration of the 30 baht project, and also assumed responsibility for trouble 
shooting and local policy adjustments. However, some respondents reported that this led 
to poor liaison between senior officers and front line staff.
At the beginning we established the ‘war room’ based on government guidance. 
At the moment the war room has gone, and that caused problems in 
communication, so that we thought we might re-establish the war room. The 
previous war room committee comprised representatives of the hospitals and the 
DHO heads from around 3 to 4 districts, and when they allocated resources most 
were transferred to the districts represented in the committee. Now, that we will 
use the committee for planning and evaluation (CPE) to replace the war room, 
that cause of conflict has decreased because we all understand the issue. That was 
the nature of the committee approach because each member of the committee 
represented their own different interests. For example, in the case of allocating 
newly-graduated staff these were allocated to the home districts of the committee. 
(SAO-PHO, RE 05)
In Year 3 a successor committee to the war room, named the Committee for Planning and 
Evaluation was created. This comprised the CMO, two deputy CMOs, the assistant CMO, 
and five heads of PHO divisions. As mentioned in the quotation above, there had been a 
perception that some of the ‘outside’ members of the original war room had used their 
position to benefit their own organisations or localities, and this was now used as a 
justification by the CMO to restrict membership to PHO officers. This had the result of 
strengthening his ability to steer developments in the province.
Overall then the picture in Roi Et is one of a relatively powerful and resourceful CMO 
who was able to impose his authority on the PHO officer group. However, in this province 
there was also a powerful, doctor director in the provincial hospital (DDPH), and an 
influential group of DDCHs with a strong local organisation.
The doctor director of the provincial hospital differed from the typical middle-level health 
administrators occupying this position, because he had moved from a senior post in one of 
the central departments of the Ministry - the division for hospital support - in early 2002. 
He had been a casualty in the shakeout of senior administrators that occurred after the new 
Permanent Secretary came to power in October 2001, and his move to a post in a small
Esam province represented a considerable loss of status. He had been seen as a prominent 
senior doctor in the progressive camp within the MoPH, who had clashed with the more 
conservative policies being introduced by the Permanent Secretary of MoPH, and still had 
good contacts with some in the MoPH and the NHSO. In the research period, he was 
successful in gaining funding for a number of development projects directly from the 
centre, largely bypassing the PHO.
The doctor directors of community hospitals in Roi Et province had organised effectively 
into a strong professional network. This centred on the provincial Society for Doctor 
Directors of Community Hospitals, which was stronger in Roi Et than in the other two 
provinces and which virtually all the DDCHs had joined. The society functioned as a local 
pressure group which co-ordinated negotiations between DDCHs and the PHO and helped 
DDCHs to share information on their experience of UC implementation. This society had 
close links with the Rural Doctors Society at national level.
The Roi ET DHO heads also had a strong professional network, but were less effective in 
translating this into influence on the PCIHI. The ‘city’ DHO head was the chair of the 
Esam regional branch of the Society for Public Health of Thailand. He made efforts to use 
the informal authority of the society to gain influence in local health circles but did not 
succeed in gaining a place on the PCIHI. Generally the Public Health Society was less 
powerful than the Rural Doctors Society, and lacked the organisation and contacts of the 
former. The ‘city’ DHO head took the early-retirement in late 2003.
7.2.2 Recent changes in organisational structure
The UC reforms were introduced in 2001 at the same time as previous bureaucratic 
reforms, aimed at down-sizing public organisations came into effect. The PHO was 
required to become a smaller, more streamlined organisation just as the UC policy forced it 
to transform from being a local health administration unit to a supervisory unit. As was 
true elsewhere, Roi Et PHO staff found themselves pressed to move in two directions 
simultaneously as both the administrative structure and the functions of the PHO were 
changed.
[the] change had been forced by the situation. Due to the organisational 
restructuring, the 10 departments shrank to 5 groups. They must change both their 
concept and method of working. For example, in the Dental Health Department 
previously they had provided care to serve schools in the municipality area, then 
they had to change and transferred all activities to the provincial hospital. Dentists 
in here weren’t responsible for dental care. They moved to work in technical 
support activities so that they would be accepted. (SAO-PHO, RE 03)
The CMO was a key actor leading change in the office. Many heads of department in the 
old structure had to accept positions as subordinates in the new organisation due to the 
shrinkage from ten departments to five new groups. The CMO decided that the changeover 
would be accomplished by a formal process of application for the new posts, so that even 
senior staff had to reapply for posts.
There were many old heads of departments that went back to being staff, so that 
they felt hurt. However, the CMO is very able and has good mediation skills for 
getting people affected by the reforms to accept what had happened. (SAO-PHO, 
RE 04)
...regarding the new organisational structure they didn’t ‘fix’ [English] people to 
be the new heads; they were selected competitively according to seniority and 
experience. So, the new heads of groups had to apply as well and were appointed 
based on seniority. (SAO-PHO, RE 03)
However, a number of senior staff resigned due to the uncertainty introduced by the 
ongoing changes, times of changing, and concern about the fairness of the selection 
system.
This led to a loss of experience and capacity in the early days of the reforms, which 
combined with the overall downsizing exercise, increased pressure of work on the 
remaining staff. Roi Et had reacted at quite an early stage to the reforms, not waiting for 
legislation to work its way through the system, but there was a period of about two years 
before the new arrangements began to settle down.
When the reforms were coming in, we considered whether to wait for the 
government’s orders, but the trend from the government told us we were going to 
have organisational change. We saw drafts from the Ministry, which changed 
many times, so we were absolutely sure this was coming. So, in the first stage we 
started preparing our staff by arranging a seminar course, which got our staff 
thinking, before the Ministry order came out about the [bureaucratic] reforms. In 
the second stage, the Ministry issued an official command to us about changing 
and transferring duties to other organisations. For example, regarding AIDS and 
Venereal Disease activities we must transfer responsibility to the provincial
hospital because we didn’t have area responsibility, so that we had to transfer this. 
That made us start to understand that the reforms were real because we didn’t 
have either money or responsibility due to the new financial mechanism which 
was based on the capitation model. The third stage came after we had talked and 
accepted that the reforms were certainly coming. The CMO held a meeting and 
gave us freedom to fill in applications to apply to whatever group we wanted to 
join. Later we reorganised the PHO structure in line with these choices, and then 
about 1 to 2 months later the CMO held another meeting and gave staff an 
opportunity to move again. (...) We spent a lot of time on the reorganisation-  
about 2 years -  before it settled down. Yet, there were certainly some people who 
were hurt by the reforms. (SAO-PHO, RE 03)
As discussed earlier, the planning and co-ordinating functions on the purchaser side was 
very underdeveloped in many provinces and the main co-ordination role at district level 
lay with the CUP on the provider side. However, in Roi Et the CMO was clear that the co­
ordinating or ‘central management’ function rested with the PHO, assisted by the PCIHI. 
From the perspective of senior administrators of PHO was the central manager that would 
smooth out the problems caused by capitation-based funding, and the viability of smaller 
districts and units.
We still have to the ‘central manager’ at the province level because in our country 
at each level - villages, sub-districts, districts - there were differences in capacity 
and different numbers of population, so that budgets based on numbers of people 
would lead to problems. That is because in a large district which has a lot people, 
say 100,000, they might receive a large budget, maybe around 60 million baht, 
which they didn’t get in the past. Regarding a small district covering a population 
of about 20,000, they might get 12 million baht. So there might be a big 
difference between the two. So that certainly the last one could not have 
survived, because in terms of the hospitals, they have the same fixed costs. That is 
a reason why we have a ‘middle man’ in the form of a committee to manage the 
balancing here. Consequently, we had an office at the province to oversee this 
matter. And perhaps the district administrators might not understand because 
they didn’t have experience of this. (SAO-PHO, RE 01)
During the period from the start of implementation to the creation of the NHSO in 2002 
there was considerable ambiguity about what the new supervisory role of PHO entailed. 
From the MoPH perspective the idea of ‘supervision’ was not clearly linked to the 
purchasing role, and in the view of many local actors was more about acting as the local 
arm of the Ministry to keep reform implementation on track. However from 2002, the 
NHSO (although still not functioning as the primary purchaser) designated the PHOs as its 
branch offices. This opened up a discretional space in which different PHOs could decide 
to develop their role in different ways. Some like Kalasin and Mahasarakham interpreted
the supervision role in traditional MoPH terms, but others like Roi Et started to put more 
emphasis on the purchaser role.
The senior Roi Et officers did this by emphasising the ‘evaluation’ aspect of supervision, 
which also linked to purchasing. They developed a system of performance appraisal and 
grading -  much more elaborate than anything in the other two case study provinces - that 
they imposed on the lower-level units, and which gave them a new way to steer the local 
health care system, which did not depend on control of money.
We changed the PHO organisational structure in line with the reforms of the 
bureaucracy. After that we started to act in an evaluation role much more and we 
developed local supervision to include evaluation. We brought together 
supervision and evaluation. When we had finished evaluating the local units, we 
would make suggestions. (...) The supervision style has changed to evaluation. 
We set new criteria based on the new policies about ‘KPIs’ (in English -  key 
performance indicators), then decided what to do and how we should follow this 
up. We divided the supervision schedule into 3 phases. Phase one is checking on 
the planning process -  whether it is based on policy and is going in the right 
direction, and benefits people. The second phase concerns planning processes and 
whether they are working to follow their plan or not. And, the last phase concerns 
‘outcomes’ (in English) what they have achieved. We have reported on all phases 
and presented this to district health administrators. Additionally, we gave them a 
grading or score, which is an overall grading based on ‘KPIs’, which allows them 
to make comparisons with others. Scoring is helping us to develop together in the 
province. (SAO-PHO, RE 01)
Interestingly the new system involved reporting back to lower level organisations on 
performance scores, just as much as reporting upwards to supervising bodies, such as the 
Health Region, on aggregate performance of the province. The new arrangements thus 
emerged as a powerful tool via which the PHO could force units to compare their 
performance with others and press for improvements where scores were low. This came at 
a time when the PHO was losing its previous control of resources and the management of 
the district offices and service units, and appears to represent an attempt to create an 
alternative source of power based on the evaluator role.
From the point of view of senior administrators, the supervision role was linked to the 
PHO’s new role of purchaser, as the local office of the NHSO. From their perspective the 
PHO would need to set standards and ensure that the central funder was getting value for 
money. The PHO was able to maintain this stance with bodies in the local health care
system despite the fact that its own budget had been cut dramatically. Although it could 
not retain monies, the PHO could exercise some control over the new UC budget 
channelled from the MoPH to the CUP by delaying or speeding up payments. It could also 
use the threat of redirecting payments based on performance against KPIs.
The top PHO administrators admitted in interviews that the change to this style of 
supervision led to a degree of conflict with staff in the service units.
When the new policy came in that caused the management of the PHO to change. 
Previously, the PHO commanded the health care service units but it now became 
a ‘purchaser or standard setter’ [English]. That brought in a much clearer 
relationship between them, like a purchaser/ provider split. This affected the PHO 
because their service activities have been pushed to providers. Many staff in the 
service sector has moved out to the service units, which decreased PHO staff 
numbers. (...) Regarding the new roles as the purchaser and standard setter, that 
forced staff to learn new functions and also increased workload. (SAO-PHO, RE 
02)
The ministry ordered us to use the seven issues of the strategic plan in evaluation 
and supervision. That meant we had to learn about this but one problem was that 
the health officers weren’t very familiar with the ‘new evaluation’ (in English). 
The new indicators that we had developed led to problems when we used 
‘ranking’ (in English) and linked this with a reward system, because the results 
reduced work morale. Instead of the evaluation system encouraging the staff, it 
actually discouraged them. For example, in some districts where they did not 
work well their scores were high, that was an error of the system. (SAO-PHO, RE 
02)
Regarding supervision, we gave scores and summarised the overall results across 
the province and then gave feedback to them. At the beginning we had a bit of a 
problem with them because we were unclear about the criteria. Later on we made 
changes and told them about this which lessened the problem. (SAO-PHO, RE 
06)
The CMO appears to have set out to counter these problems by using his strong 
networking and communications skills. There was a proliferation of meetings, sometimes 
located at the CMO’s family restaurant, at which problems were discussed and thrashed 
out.
We used the top administrators’ meeting for provincial problem solving, and 
sometimes we allowed others staff to come to meetings to solve problems 
together. (SAO-PHO, RE 03)
We learnt things from training and meetings. The CMO was an important ‘key 
man’ [English] and presented data and problems to discuss, so that we discussed 
and learnt from each other in the meetings. (SAO-PHO, RE 07)
Meetings were used to disseminate information about the new evaluation system, and
 ^1
discuss changes such as the decision to apply a system of ‘PSO’ standards.
We used meetings as the main method, and we had a good opportunity to put 
ourselves forward for the public service organisational contest award, which was 
promoted by the central government. We started the ‘PSO’ (English) and in this 
scheme they could check our work against that of others. I tried to add in 
‘innovations’ and didn’t tell our staff. We had to introduce ‘provincial standard 
data sets’ which would help us to think things out together. (...) Of course, some 
people can understand and some people did not understand. (SAO-PHO, RE 01)
These ‘innovations’ were what set Roi Et apart from the other study provinces and allowed 
its PHO to maintain a relatively active stance to overseeing the reforms.
Respondents in lower-level organisations who were interviewed reported a degree of 
confusion about the new approach to evaluation. Some claimed that it was peripheral to 
the real problems of resource allocation and shortage of money about which the PHO did 
little to help. There was a feeling that evaluation related to an additional level of analysis 
that was not the service units’ problem.
The PHO didn’t help us move forward because the money was gone and they 
acted only as a supervisor. The supervision style was changing. They didn’t have 
many suggestions. They went to collect results and give a score. (DHO Head, RE 
20)
With regard to the supervision, the PHO came to follow up their problems, they 
weren’t our problems. For example, in the case of the Minister visiting, they only 
came to prepare for the tasks that concerned them, such as that the Minister had to 
give out the gold cards to people. We had to work all night preparing when the 
Minister came, and the PHO staff only assembled in the morning. After the 
Minister finished they were gone as well. They were only there to take the credit. 
(HCO, RE 40)
In late 2002, when the NHSO began to operate in a partial purchasing role, there was a 
corresponding reorganisation in the MoPH, The Bureau of Health Insurance in the 
Ministry transferred part of its functions (and staff) to the NHSO, but retained part of its
31 Standardisation for Public Service Organisations or so-called PSO was a quality management scheme 
adopted by the government based on the ISO (International Standards for Organisations).
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work in the Division of Health Insurance. This came after a period of uncertainty when it 
had at first seemed that the Health Insurance Group would work under the NHSO, but then 
seemed more likely to remain under control of the MoPH. PHO staff had to adjust to these 
successive changes, and try to develop new working relationships and learn the new rules.
Working in the Health Insurance Group we work rather hard because we have to 
be familiar with all the data and manage both the claims system and budget 
allocation. Regarding cooperation with the centre, at the beginning we contracted 
with the Bureau of Health Insurance in the MoPH. Then last year based on the 
National Health Security Act they were divided into two organisations: one being 
the NHSO which was an independent organisation and one that remained in the 
MoPH being called the Division of Health Insurance. At the provincial level, in 
the beginning we supposed that the Health Insurance Group would move to be 
under the NHSO according to the new bill at around 2004 or 2005. However, the 
Ministry gave new orders that we were to remain under the command of the 
Ministry, because the PHO was under the command of the Permanent Secretary 
as well. But the NHSB appointed the PHOs to act as the branch offices of the 
NHSO in the local areas, based on the authority of the new bill. Yet, this is an 
abstract approach because we are still reporting to the Ministry. This confused 
roles and things did not settle down. (SAO, PHO, RE 05)
Now, the CMO acted as director of the branch office of the NSHO in the 
province, as appointed by the NHSO in addition to his CMO role. Many orders 
have been sent down from the Ministry and the NSHO, so that we have to 
respond to both. However, we certainly have to obey the Permanent Secretary 
because we get our salary from the Ministry. (...) As we have seen there are a lot 
of problems because the guidelines have changed day to day and new regulations 
were announced week to week and these have always been changing. (SAO-PHO, 
RE 06)
The NHS Act required the PHO to act as the branch office of the NHSO in the province. 
That meant that the CMO had dual duties both as the director of the NHSO branch office 
and the chief of the PHO, which was the main organisation on the provider side under the 
MoPH. This placed the PHO in a complicated situation in relation to the purchaser 
provider split, but opened the way for a dominant CMO to exercise considerable influence 
over both the purchasing function and providers in the local area. Across the nation 
different PHOs reacted in different ways to this opportunity: in some places the CMOs 
were able to control the main service and professional networks in the province and gain 
near-absolute power over UC implementation, but in other places where power was more 
fragmented the CMOs had to struggle for control with other interest groups. As discussed 
above, the CMO in Roi Et had previously occupied a senior administrative position in the 
MoPH and had strong leadership skills and good contacts, which enabled him to take a
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dominant role in managing the local health care system, largely using the justification of 
exercising the purchaser function. At the same time however a good deal of the talk about 
commanding activities in the province centred on traditional public health activities such 
as setting a lead on disease prevention strategies and co-ordinating activity in times of 
crisis, such as disease outbreaks. Thus the approach taken in Roi Et was based on a PHO 
claim to elements of both the new and old roles.
The CMO in Roi Et was in a position where there were no real rivals to his power in the 
senior levels of the PHO, where his wife occupied a strong supporting role as Deputy 
CMO and where others in the hierarchy were willing to give support. The organisational 
culture that emerged was one in which traditional hierarchical authority remained 
important, but where seniors continued to have an obligation to assist juniors in accord 
with the Thai cultural mores of ‘quam-bpen- pee- bpen- nong ’ (the idea that older siblings 
help younger ones)
Regarding that topic the non-UC budget, it’s been given already but not used 
adequately. Due to the system we come from, we act like seniors towards juniors. 
If the money is finished then ask in the community hospital via the doctor director 
in the CUP. The CMO might help make the connection. We have a good 
organisational culture and a mutual support system. Many people come into 
contact which they admire and which brings us an advantage. The assistant CMO 
is also a person close to the CMO. Personal relationships and sibling relationships 
still help a lot in solving work problems. And the senior administrators group in 
the province works as a good team together, which helps in work of different 
kinds. (SAO-PHO, RE 06)h
The image of family relations transposed on to an administrative organisation conveys an 
idealised image of social relations in the local health care system. However, in more 
general terms this may be seen as an attempt to stress the importance of close relationships 
and co-operation between organisations in changing times, when new resource allocation 
arrangements and the purchaser provider split might have led some organisations to act in 
a self-interested way.
7.3 How the financing framework was adapted to local conditions
7.3.1. Adapting to the new financial framework
Roi Et represents another, though different example of a an active stance to the new 
resource allocation arrangements. In line with the role of active purchaser, with a strong 
emphasis on evaluation and monitoring of performance in the service units, the Roi Et 
CMO tried to maximise his control over the flows of funding. As will be described below, 
Roi Et used the exclusive model, held a salary budget at provincial level and created 
additional contingency funds, so that the basic capitation payment channelled to the CUPs 
was already minus significant deductions. Roi Et utilised provincial contingency funds to 
top slice money from the better off and adjust allocations for service units in trouble.
Regarding the new budgetary system, we could not use the money. However, we 
could adjust the allocations. For example, in ‘M2’ (district) we certainly knew they 
were in trouble because they served a small population and that led to a funding 
crisis. We decided to top slice around 5% of the provincial budget to set up a 
‘Contingency fund’. When the hospitals faced money problems, they had to submit 
a proposal to the PCIHI, and later on we would discuss in the committee whether to 
allocate funds to support them, which took the form of a ‘LOC’ or Letter of Credit 
(English) to enhance their budget. We applied this method to solve problems last 
year. But this year, we are perhaps applying a new support mechanism, which will 
allow them to get funds but impose conditions, to stop them just making requests 
and not trying to solve their problems. Or alternatively they could pay back the 
money by instalments out of next year’s budget, which is a way to safeguard the 
central fund for the future. (SAO-PHO, RE 01)
7.3.2 Choosing a budget allocation model
In early discussions about the budget model to be adopted, senior PHO administrators, 
including the CMO, favoured using the ‘inclusive model’. This is confirmed in a summary 
of the supervision report of Bureau of Health Insurance on January 2002. Respondents 
interviewed informally (and off tape) suggested that this was in line with the stance taken 
by the Society for Doctor Directors of Community Hospitals in discussions with the PHO. 
It also reflected senior administrators’ view that the logic of the reforms involved 
channelling monies to the CUPs and that ‘fairness’ required that most of the capitation 
payment be passed on. However, at this time the doctor director of the provincial hospital, 
whose voice carried weight because of his former MoPH position, made a strong argument
for use of the ‘exclusive’ model on the basis that the hospital might otherwise not be 
financially viable. In subsequent discussions some of the Community hospital doctor 
directors changed their previous position to support the provincial hospital, on the basis 
that its viability was important for their own tertiary referrals. Soon the CMO also 
changed his view to support this approach. It was agreed that the salaries budget would 
also be held centrally. As in Kalasin, the main reason for favouring an ‘exclusive model’ 
was to ensure that the provincial hospital could carry on and guarantee that staff salaries 
across the province could be paid.
Respondents reported that once the choice had been made there was little opposition and 
few problems. Although a small number of doctor directors interviewed were still unhappy 
with the system, a majority appeared to support it,
In Roi Et we use an ‘exclusive model’ and ‘the salary costs’ are held at the 
province, so that we have had no problem. If we applied an ‘inclusive model’ they 
would have a problem because the provincial hospital was the largest hospital. 
Their salary costs are a burden because they have a lot of staff. (DDCH, RE 18)
One senior doctor director offered an interesting variant on this view when he said that he 
supported the exclusive model, but had realised in retrospect that the top-slicing of the 
salaries budget had not benefited the province. This was because in the following year, the 
separate salary budgets were consolidated into a single central budget held at the Ministry, 
which then allowed a re-allocation of monies away from the North-eastern region.
Here, we used an ‘exclusive model’ from the beginning and we have had no 
problems, so I would agree with this. But, with regard to the salary costs being 
held at the Ministry, I disagree. We should fund more at the regional level so as 
to support workforce reallocation. Deducting salary costs at the Ministry did not 
force a redistribution of staff, while the money held at provincial level was so 
small. (DDCH, RE 14)
In this respondent’s view the system would have been fairer if the salaries budgets had 
been held at Health Region level rather than national level.
One senior PHO respondent mentioned that the capitation model had made direction and 
co-ordination of P&P activities more difficult, but this was not a consequence of exclusive 
funding as such:
In Rio Et, we used an ‘exclusive model’ and deducted the salary costs at the 
province, then allocated a part based on the capitation model. Generally, there 
seems to be no problem but this has affected promotion and prevention activities. 
Previously, we had a central fund at the province so that in the case of 
communicable disease control, such as hemorrhagic fever, which by the nature of 
the disease spreads to other areas, prevention and control were commanded from 
the provincial centre. But when the budget was isolated in each CUP, we may 
have a problem in linking everything together. (SAO-PHO, RE 04)
7.3.3 Safeguarding the service units
As mentioned above the choice of resource allocation mechanism was made mainly to 
safeguard the provincial hospital. However, a number of other steps were undertaken to 
support service units likely to lose budget under capitation. In particular the CMO 
established a ‘Fund for Service Unit Investment’. This was created by top-slicing about 
10% of the provincial budget after deductions had been made for salary costs. In the first 
year, this fund was divided into two parts: 5% went into a contingency budget (known as 
the CF budget), and 5% went to a ‘reserve’ for outside referrals under the control of the 
Health Insurance Group. The CF was intended to be used to top-up the budgets of 
capitation-losing hospitals in the province. Such hospitals were able to make requests for 
assistance to the PCIHI, who were then able to make payments according to their 
assessment of the problem. In Year 1 and Year 2 this was paid as a non-returnable grant to 
a small number of problem hospitals, but in Year 3 the majority of hospitals within the 
province tried to claim on the fund. This led the PHO to review the mechanism and a new 
policy was introduced whereby payments to hospitals were regarded as repayable advances 
against the next year’s allocation.
In Years 1 and 2, the CF help was concentrated on just four small hospitals which were 
receiving insufficient capitation funding to be viable.
We were covering a small population of about 30,000 and this year the budget 
decreased. At the moment we have received around 63% of what we got last year. 
However, we can maintain ourselves and continue work. If we faced money 
problems, the central fund at the province would help us. There are 4 hospitals 
which the fund has to support- ‘S” , ‘P’, ‘M l’ and ‘M2’. (...) Last year we 
obtained from the ‘CF’ 3 million baht and this year they told us we would receive 
2 million. (DDCH, RE 19)
Actually, this year I received 12 Million. In the past I got about 5 million per 
year. Regarding the size of the population we could have 10 million but an expert
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- Dr. Ammar - has studied this and suggested that in places which were covering a 
population under 30,000, there would be difficulties so that they should have a 
central fund at the province to support these. Roi Et established this fund and that 
led to me getting a top up of 2 million; so in total I received 12 million. (DDCH, 
RE 18)
Despite their relatively small size all these hospitals incurred significant fixed costs and 
salaries costs, which could not have been met without the additional CF. They faced the 
additional problem that government regulations required hospitals in some remote rural 
districts to pay a salary top-up for health professionals. This was not included in the top- 
sliced salary budget controlled by the PHO and had to be paid directly from the hospital 
budgets in Year 1.
I am worried about the budget because in my district I have to ask for the special 
monies that we called ‘CF monies’. If we didn’t get this we wouldn’t survive. 
Another budget was the support budget for remote areas, which we didn’t get in 
the first year but we got in the second year, so that we had to pay from the UC 
budget in the first year. Regarding this budget, we have to pay a top-up to the 
salaries of the health professionals -  the doctors, dentists and pharmacists - who 
work in the rural areas, as in our district. (DDCH, Focus group in RE)
In year two, the CF was decreased from 5% to 3% of the UC budget (minus salaries). This 
was the year when the total budget for the province was reduced because the Ministry held 
the salary budget at the centre and reallocated part of this to support hospitals in other 
regions. This general reduction in the budget affected all hospitals, both large and small, 
across the province.
Regarding the capitation rate, at the moment it wasn’t sufficient for implementing 
the policy. In 2003,1 felt we had a problem with insufficient money and as we’ve 
seen this was ‘cut’ across the entire (health) region. We had to argue about the 
budget, many community hospitals requested money from the ‘CF’. The Roi Et 
hospital had lost out, but we’ve seen that the community hospitals have lost much 
more and everyone lost so that we didn’t know what to do. The older brother has 
to save the younger brother, so that we had to put our reserve money to use. 
(SAO-Provincial hospital, Focus group in RE)
I was worried in the first year because according to our expenses and income we 
could lose in many ways. We discussed this a lot and I don’t know if our staff got 
as stressed as me. But in year one I felt very pressured. I had to fight at the 
provincial level for additional budget. We weren’t clear about the mechanism 
which made me feel stressed about whether they would support us or not. 
Sometimes, the provincial committee came to visit us but we felt neglected 
because of the PHO’s approach to us. They didn’t seem to pay much attention to
us. We continued the work in year two and the pressure decreased somewhat. 
Later on in year three the pressure was gone (laugh) although they took the same 
interest in us. Perhaps, we could change ourselves with much adaptation. This 
year is the third year and we aim to stop using the CF, but I don’t know whether 
we could survive or not without it. (DDCH, Focus group in RE)
The pressure on budgets resulted in a proliferation of claims on the CF budget and 
increased conflict between the provincial and the community hospitals about the costs of 
referrals. Senior PHO administrators acted in a mediator role and set up a number of 
meetings to try to resolve problems. They reviewed the existing CF mechanisms and 
prepared new arrangements for Year 3 which increased the proportion of UC funds (after 
salary) going to the CF to 8%.
I worried about the relationship between the large hospital and small hospitals, 
such as the provincial hospital and community hospitals. If they did not 
understand each other they would grab money and that would cause a lack of co­
operation between them. The large hospital complained that they were loaded 
with large numbers of referrals, while they got a low budget and claimed that 
payments did not cover their costs, or they argued for a different RW rate, 
etcetera, etcetera. That meant when the new financing arrangement came in they 
all worried about bankruptcy, so that they tried to keep as much money as 
possible. We were facing this problem on a couple of occasions when the PHO 
came in to solve a problem. And we agreed that if we went bankrupt we would 
both be affected and if we became rich we would be rich together, so that we 
should support each other across the entire province. So, in the mid-month 
meeting we changed so that we only had UC implementation on the agenda, and 
where we all tried to solve the problems together. (SAO-PHO, RE 01)
7.3.4 Referrals and the Clearing House
As in the other provinces, Roi Et made arrangements in Year 1 to create a central fund for 
referral payments to the provincial and other tertiary care hospitals. This was overseen by a 
section in the Health Insurance Group and it was only in Year 2 that this became known as 
the ‘Clearing House’. Part of the money for referrals was directed through the referral 
reserve which made up about half of the Fund for Service Unit Investment. This referrals 
reserve was funded by separating off part of the UC budget, and was fixed at around 5% in 
each of the first three years of the scheme. The other monies used for referrals came from 
the main IP budget, also controlled by the Clearing House. The arrangement in Roi Et 
differed from those in neighbouring provinces, where the clearing houses allocated IP 
funds for referrals, but had no additional referral reserve. One problem with IP monies was
that the main UC budget arrived in four instalments through the year and the IP funds 
could fall low just before each new quarterly payment was due. In Roi Et the reserve was 
allocated in full at the beginning of the financial year and was used to guarantee referrals 
in at times when the IP budget was low. As elsewhere, the Roi Et Clearing House 
administered the claims system, and reimbursed hospitals based on the DRG model.
A senior PHO administrator stated that the ‘exclusive model’ and the associated central 
fund had prevented significant problems with delayed referrals.
If we used the ‘inclusive model’ it would certainly lead to this problem. We learnt 
from the pilot provinces that in provinces where they used the ‘exclusive model’ 
they did not have this problem, but in the provinces where they used the 
‘inclusive model’ they faced a problem with delays, because if they referred from 
the district hospital to the provincial hospital they would have to pay all costs. So 
they tried to keep as much as they could. The experts had already predicted this, 
which they called ‘financially-led services’. But, if we used the ‘exclusive model’ 
as in this province, we would have a ‘central fund’ at the province so that they 
could routinely refer because the claim payment was managed through the 
provincial fund. (SAO-PHO, RE 02)
DDCHs, such as the following respondent, also suggested that the problem of delays had 
been avoided in Roi Et. This doctor argues that professional ethics and the risk of public 
complaints anyway meant that most doctors would refer appropriately rather than retaining 
patients to maximise income for community hospitals.
We had no problem in this province because we are people-oriented and we think 
patients are like relatives. So why would we retain them? If we did this we 
would risk both that they complained about us and that we wasted money. We can 
make referrals if it is better because we already have a fund at the province. 
Additionally, the Medical Council is very strict on this now. (DDCH, RE 17)
The main problem between the community hospitals and the provincial hospital was rate at 
which referrals were charged. This rested on a complicated calculation based on the 
relative weights (RWs) payable to different hospitals in relation to particular DRGs, and 
frequently led to arguments in PCIHI meetings, as reported by the DHO head responding 
below.
Regarding the budget arrangement they argued every month about aspects of the 
referral system, claim payments and the provincial hospital’s payment rates
etcetera. Those were usually the issues for argument between the provincial and 
the community hospitals. (DHO Head, RE 20)
A source in the provincial hospital confirmed that staff there had been unhappy about the 
calculation of RWs, and especially what he regarded as the inadequate differential between 
cases that could be treated in the community hospitals and referred patients requiring more 
specialised treatments.
Generally, the provincial hospital has often lost because we are the highest 
secondary care unit, and when they cleared money based on DRGs we usually got 
low scores. In this province we applied the ‘exclusive model’. One problem was 
that we used RWs in DRGs to allocate money back to the hospitals, but in Roi Et 
‘1RW’ was set at the same rate for both the provincial hospital and the 
community hospitals32. Whereas we have different capital costs so that the 
community hospitals send a lot of referrals to the provincial hospital and don’t 
take responsibility. Regarding other provincial hospitals, such as Korat and Khon 
Kaen, they are regional hospitals so that they got the benefit because they could 
receive much more than us, almost twice the amount, especially in a centre of 
excellence they could take much more33.1 would like to see a study of the basis of 
the RW rate by unbiased outsiders to set a new rate which would acceptable to 
everybody. (Senior doctor PH, RE 09)
The provincial hospital was the main centre for referrals inside the province, and 
frequently complained that referral payments did not cover its expenses.
For their part, the community hospitals argued that the provincial hospital received income 
from a number of funding streams, including routine cases and primary care. This overlap 
between the hospitals ‘district role’ and its role as a referral centre often came up as an 
area of controversy in the PCIHI and other forums.
There is a difficult problem of management regarding Rio Et hospital because 
they are a general hospital which looks after Muang district, but with regard to the 
budgeting problem, the PCIHI assigned two districts -  Chaing Khwan and 
Thoongkaoluang - to come in as well. However, they still have a lot of expenses 
so that they usually complained that they had lost, while the community hospitals 
complained that Rio Et hospital had charged quite a high rate. (...). There were 
often arguments between Roi Et hospital and the community hospitals in the war 
-v, room meetings. (SAO-PHO, RE 04)
321RW in the provincial hospital and the community hospital = 10,000 baht
33 1RW in the regional hospital = 14,000 baht and the university hospital = 16,000 baht
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Some respondents suggested that the provincial hospital should have responsibility only 
for referrals and tertiary care, and should be funded only for this activity.
I could never see why the provincial hospital couldn’t survive. For example, now, 
Roi Et hospital has a reserve of more than 100 million. Actually, if we need to 
develop the health care system, the provincial hospital should only be the tertiary 
care centre of the province. They should have responsibility for special care and 
referrals. (DDCH, RE 19)
The clearing house and referral payment system in Roi Et was different from both 
Mahasarakham and Kalasin. These two provinces released some part of IP budget to the 
CUP and then applied the DRG system to re-allocate monies depending on claims between 
hospitals in the province. In contrast, Roi Et’s PHO established a referrals reserve used to 
smooth out fluctuations in the IP budget. Any remaining IP monies were then returned to 
the CUPs at the end of fiscal year, but usually there was no unspent balance.
7.3.5 Summary of financial changes in Roi Et in FY 2001-02,2002-03 and 2003-04
In summary, during Year 1, Roi Et applied an ‘exclusive model’ and also held the staff 
salary costs at the province. A ‘Fund for Health Service Units Investment’ was set up 
which top-sliced about 8% of the UC budget to be managed by the Health Insurance 
Group. This was split roughly between the ‘CF budget’ (which supported smaller 
hospitals) and the referrals reserve. The remaining 90% of the UC budget was divided into 
the three categories of: IP, OP and P&P. In Year 1, this was split between IP at 23.35%, 
OP at 58.26% and P&P at 18.37%. The OP and P&P budgets were directly allocated to the 
CUPs, with the condition the CUPs must support PCUs and health centres in their own 
district.
On the whole, the financial arrangements in Roi Et’s ‘exclusive’ model differed only a 
little from Mahasarakham’s ‘mixed’ model and Kalasin’s ‘exclusive’ model. The main 
difference concerned use of the IP monies. Roi Et PHO held the IP budget centrally and 
used the DRG model to pay for referrals on behalf of the CUPs based on actual inpatient 
treated. In contrast both Mahasarakham and Kalasin released some part of IP to the CUPs, 
to spend on low-cost inpatient cases in their own hospitals. An additional point of 
difference between Roi Et and the other two provinces was the allocation of monies for 
fixed costs to health centres. In Mahasarakham and Kalasin these were excluded from the
provincial UC budget and directly allocated to the health centres. However, in Roi Et 
there was no separate fund for these expenses, and the corresponding monies were 
included in the P&P budget and directly allocated to the CUPs. This meant that it was 
within the discretion of the DDCHs who acted as the chair of the CUP board whether to 
allocate monies to cover fixed costs and at what level.
The main funding flows and relationships for Year 1 are shown in the following figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in 
Roi Et in Year 1 (FY 2001-02)
The Government via the Bureau of Budget
(Capitation budget o f Bt 1202.4 per head)
MoPH via the Bureau of Health Insurance -  the BHI
The centre deducted 150.40/head, leaving Bt 1052 remaining 
[Investment cost=83.4, High cost care =32, AE= 25 and EMS= 10]
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The PHO via the Health Insurance Group- HIG
Salary costs budget for all provincial staff (after deducted about 580 
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Adapted from: Roi Et PHO Report 2001-02 (Roi Et PHO 2002)
In Year 2 the Ministry required all Esam provinces to draw salaries from a central national 
budget, and also to apply an ‘exclusive’ funding model at provincial level.
Roi Et continued with the Fund for Service Units Investment, which was reduced slightly 
to 7% of the UC budget. This was now split between 3% for the CF budget and 4% for the 
referrals reserve. In Year 2, the split in the remaining UC budget was 50.17% for OP, 
26.41% for IP, and 16.32% for P&P. The IP budget was again under the control of the 
clearing house at the PHO, while the OP and P&P budgets were directly allocated to the 
CUPs. However, the P&P budget was now divided into three categories: 25% for 
provincial activities, 43% for CUP activities and 32% for hospital and health centres 
activities.
As in Year 1, there was still conflict between the hospitals and the health centres about the 
P&P budget. It was, because many health centres didn’t receive the expected budget. This 
is discussed later in the chapter.
Figure 7.2 shows the resource flow and relationships between organisational divisions in 
FY 2002-03.
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Figure 7.2: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Roi Et in Year 2 (FY 2002-03)
The Government via the Bureau of Budget
(Capitation budget of Bt 1202.4 per head)
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In Year 3 salary costs were again held at, and disbursed from the Ministry. In this year, 
the Fund for Service Units Investment was increased so that it now accounted for 11% of 
the UC budget, with 7% going to the CF budget and 4% to the referrals reserve. In Year 3 
the remaining UC budget was split between 38.40% for OP, 32.94% for OP, and 18% for 
P&P. As before, the IP budget remained under the control of the clearing house, and the 
OP and P&P budgets were directly allocated to the CUPs. However, the P&P budget was 
now divided into two categories: 60% for hospital activities and 40% for health centres 
activities.
There was still no separate fund for health centres’ fixed costs. However, the PCIHI/PHO 
had now ring-fenced 40% of the P&P budget to go to health centres so as to solve a 
problem of under-funding of health centre. Again this will be discussed later in the 
chapter.
The main funding flows and relationships are show in the following figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Financing arrangements and relationships between organisational divisions in
Roi Et in Year 3 (FY 2003-04)
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7.4 The views of actors in the local health care system
7.4.1 The view from the community hospitals
For most community hospitals the arrival of capitation-based funding, channelled through 
the CUP, resulted in a significant increase in funding. In year 1 the doctor directors had 
more money than at any time before. As discussed earlier, the exceptions were smaller 
hospitals, based in low population districts, whose funding streams were small, but who - 
in the worst four cases - were assisted by the CF scheme.
The general picture, however, was of significantly increased funding and the possibility of 
taking on more staff and developing new facilities or projects. The problem was that new 
staff were not easy to recruit. This was not so much related to the availability of funds to 
the hospital, but to the Government rules that set public sector salaries at a low level, 
which was unlikely to attract doctors to move to remote Esam provinces.
For example, my district covers a population of 80,000 and the guideline that was 
decided was one doctor per 10,000 population, so that we should have at least 8 
doctors but we have only 4. We were able to keep working but with regard to 
proactive work it didn’t go well. We needed to increase the staff but where could 
we go to get them? Actually, we had budgets to employ them but doctors didn’t 
come because nobody would come for a salary of around 8,000 baht per month, 
plus extra payments of say 20,000 to 30,000 baht. With regard to work in the 
private sector they could all get sums of nearly 100,000 baht. Additionally, 
working for the public sector under the new title of ‘government officer’ didn’t 
bring the same benefits as the civil service. As we have seen, this year the rate of 
doctor resignations is significantly higher. At this point the centre needs to come 
and see what is happening. (DDCH, RE 15)
We have a problem with shortages of staff such as nurses. We have only 27 or 
28. This doesn’t meet the requirement in the guidance, which we’ve missed from 
the beginning. When we raised this at a higher level they told us that the budget 
was already allocated to us, so that we had to recruit additional new staff by 
ourselves. However, we don’t know what we should do because nobody wants to 
come. For example, in case of a doctor, here, I were working alone from 1995 
to 2000, then in 2001 we just had one other who came in. At the moment we have 
4 doctors. Now, the government rate is around 8,000 baht per month, while the 
private hospital pays about 100,000. The result of that is that nobody comes: 
even through we had money we couldn’t find new staff. (DDCH, RE l 9)
Regarding health professionals in other disciplines such as nursing, we were 
allocated limited numbers. We tried to work with each other. If we had to 
increase the number of posts we would have to consider that carefully, because 
we don’t employ people for only 2 or 3 days. We have to consider whether this is 
economic or not. (...) With regard to the problem of the staff shortages, we are 
trying to solve this, even though it is difficult to recruit new staff. For example, in 
the case where ‘Suwanaphumi’ hospital advertised to recruit new nurses, they did 
this for 3 to 4 months, but didn’t have any applicants, and in the case of Roi Et 
hospital they assigned newly-graduated nurses to jobs as temporary employees to 
fill about 40 to 50 posts. After not very long about half of them left for better jobs, 
which were much more firm. They quit because here the salary rate was lower 
and their position wasn’t as stable as being in the civil service. Because after the 
year of economic crisis in 1997, the civil service was the most secure job, which 
is the strength of being a civil servant, even though there is the downside that the 
salary is not high. (DDCH, RE 15)
Many of the staff working in community hospitals in Esam are professionals who come 
from the north-eastern provinces. As one DDCH respondent (RE 16) told us: ‘the majority 
of staff in the hospital are native to the district’. One recruitment strategy employed by 
some community hospitals was to target Esam people who had moved to find work 
elsewhere and encourage them to return to their home areas. The problem was that this 
involved an element of forward planning and took time to achieve, and within a year 
community hospitals found their budgets cut following the change of policy on salaries at 
the MoPH. At the same time, the old system of temporary secondments, which had often 
meant that staff moved from smaller to larger community hospitals was changed. Under a 
new work force planning system, the permanent staff complements of service units with a 
large de facto staff (i.e. units with a history of boosting their permanent staff by accepting 
many secondees) were allowed to increase the number of permanent employees in line 
with their actual staff needs. This meant that many smaller units, which had been 
managing with less than their official staff complements, suddenly found that their official 
numbers were cut in line with their actual staff on site.
Previously some of our staff moved to work temporarily in other places in line 
with the regulations of the bureaucratic system, and we supposed that they would 
come back based when we heard about the new financial mechanism announced 
by the Government at the start of the reforms. But, now both the positions and the 
staff have gone, due to the new rules via which posts move in line with budgets. 
The overall affect was that what at first we thought were positive measures have 
turned out to be negative measures. (DDCH, RE 15)
By Year 2, when salaries were held centrally, and not paid within the capitation funding, 
smaller community hospitals found that they no longer had money to recruit extra staff or 
even to reclaim seconded who had gone elsewhere on a temporary basis.
As stated above, failure to fill posts was a serious issue both in terms of the direct impact 
on workload, but also in respect of inability to meet Ministry guidelines and move towards 
the new ways of working required by the reforms. The 30 baht scheme was launched 
rapidly without good preparation at the local level. In Year 1, when hospitals and other 
local service units found themselves cash rich, yet were unable to recruit new staff, there 
were sometimes problems in using the money. One doctor director reported.
When the money went through to the health centres, say about 100,000 baht, 
some places didn’t know what to do with it, but other places could manage it 
because they may have studied a lot such as for masters degrees. However, this 
depended on the DHO heads, who had various approaches, both conservative and 
progressive. With regard to the community hospitals as well, in some places when 
the money showered down, there was a problem of using it efficiently. Regarding 
the PHO when the budget was taken away, they had to reduce their roles which is 
a point I disagree about: because we should be using the PHO’s experience to 
oversee things. However, at first the community hospitals clamoured because 
doctors had big voices in the health system. At the moment, I think the way 
budgets are used is not efficient. (DDCH, RE 14)
In some CUPs there was also uncertainty about how the new policies on ‘close to the 
home’ care and P&P should be apportioned between hospitals and PCUs/health centres, 
and the appropriate balance between curative care and other services.
The following doctor director puts forward a version of care in the community close to 
official policy, but draws attention to some of the problems of getting doctors out into the 
community and also of securing a population that will guarantee the hospital’s survival. 
From his perspective community outreach is partly about establishing a relationship that 
will prevent people on the edge of the community hospital’s catchment area from 
registering with adjacent providers, when the next phase of the reforms makes this 
possible.
The basic concept of the ‘PCU’ is not that of an ‘extended OPD’, but the doctor 
team has to go to the community. For example, [that was] regarding ‘N ’ (sub­
district) we visit there every Wednesday, so that a doctor goes to see people there 
because this area is far from the hospital. It meant that we moved the OPD to 
them. If a doctor didn’t go, a nurse would have to take care of them but doctors
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and nurses are accepted differently by the people. Under the guidelines of the 
PCU, nurses have to examine but they still don’t have the same respect as the 
doctor. Additionally, the next step in this policy will be that the people will have 
freedom to register with a hospital. If we didn’t go to block this, they would 
move to register with the provincial hospital because they are not far from the 
provincial hospital. We need to go out and establish a relationship with them. 
Due to the new financing mechanism, we would not survive, so we have to round 
them up. (DDCH, RE 17)
A contrasting view offered by another informant represents a trend affecting a number of 
hospitals, especially in Years 2 and 3, whereby the PCU was sited in the hospital and came 
to resemble an outpatient clinic. In this case, even though the PHO pushed hard for the 
service to be clearly separated from ‘routine’ hospital services, there was no actual split 
except at the level of data reporting.
Firstly, I would like to discuss the concept of the PCU, because I may have a 
different view from the others. We upgraded or improved the health centres to be 
PCUs, in line with the wishes of local people that they would like to have a doctor 
and nurse go to see them, but that was not the principle of the PCU. In fact a 
doctor was only advisory, and didn’t go out to examine people like in the 
‘extended OPD’ of the past. However, in the public perception when they saw a 
doctor that meant the doctor had to diagnose them. That was a misunderstanding 
of the PCU concept. When we have a problem with staff shortages then the 
guideline says we should create the PCU inside the hospital, separate from the 
routine units. Here, we didn’t separate from the beginning because we considered 
that if we divided the unit we would need increased resources including staff, 
office space, materials and costs especially, and this might lead to double 
standards of service. Because people came to visit the PCU even through it was a 
PCU inside the hospital they might not see a doctor because that day a doctor 
wasn’t working at the PCU. So, we didn’t create a separate PCU away from the 
hospital. We split out only the data-base system. The supervisors from the PHO 
have visited us and tried to push us to divide into separate units, I needed to find 
something to make reference to and found that the central war room agreed in 
October 2001 that units should not provide care according to a double standard, 
and confirmed this with them. At the beginning, many hospital staff would have 
liked to split, but I didn’t allow this because in the long term it wouldn’t ‘work’. 
[English] (DDCH, RE 15)
The justification used by this doctor director is that, given the possibility that doctors 
might be too busy to cope with hospital and PCU work, creating a separate PCU service 
might result in patient care that is inferior to care in regular hospital clinics, and that this 
would run counter to MoPH regulations about avoiding double standards. However it 
seems clear that his approach is quite contrary to the idea of the PCU as a community- 
based service unit.
Other DDCHs took the idea of community outreach more seriously and tried to find ways 
for staff to visit patients in their homes. The following doctor director respondent was 
enthusiastic about the benefits that home visiting could bring, but still wished to leave the 
hospital as the core unit in the local health care network. He suggested that visits to 
hospital for those requiring treatment were more appropriate than setting up clinics in 
community-based health centres.
With regard to this policy (PCU), I would like to highlight family visiting in 
which we have to identity a clear target because we are short of staff. Firstly, we 
plan to visit chronic disease cases but at the moment we are in the process of 
improving this. Perhaps in the coming 2 to 3 months we will go out every day and 
that would be the main element of community care services. Regarding people 
who come to see us in the hospital it is harder to get a good understanding of the 
case, but with cases outside hospital, if we have seen their home, we have a 
clearer understanding. For example, in a case of diabetes mellitus where we think 
that they may not be taking medicines following instruction we then visit their 
house and find a lot of medicines remaining unused. In some cases where they 
needed insulin by injection we wondered why they didn’t get better even though 
we increased the ‘dose’, and when we went to their home we found they had 
problem both with the injection method and storing the medicines properly 
etcetera. We should focus on community care in this way, and this is much more 
useful than creating a PCU in the health centre. In my opinion, at the moment, 
transport from the sub-district to the district to access the hospital is easy. 
(DDCH, RE 15)
In this same respondent’s view there should be a division of labour where the hospital was 
responsible for curative treatment, backed up by some home visiting, and the health centre 
should concentrate on P&P activities.
I think that we shouldn’t push the health centre’s role towards treatment care. On 
the other hand I would say that the health centre could act in health promotion and 
disease prevention much more. With regard to treatment care they should be 
responsible only for emergency care and basic care before referral to hospital. If 
we improved the health centres so they are small hospitals it would be the wrong 
direction to take because we have problems with shortages of staff and we haven’t 
put aside a budget for this. Additionally, at present, most of the staff of the health 
centre are health officers and there are only a small number of nurses. If we were 
concerned with treatment care we would need to give them additional training 
because they have studied in a different field. We have to reflect on why we 
upgraded the health centres - for what and for whom? And the PCU is for whom? 
(DDCH, RE 15)
As in Kalasin, an important part of the Roi Et story concerns the failure of some doctor 
directors, acting in their role of CUP chairs, to pass money on to the health centres. As
another informant (DDCH, RE 14) acknowledges: ‘When the budget came to the CUP 
everyone would try to get money, and with regard to meetings they would argue about 
their proportion, based on population and how much they should have had, whereas they 
should have been discussing real problems such as how we should control dengue 
hemorrhagic fever in the district etcetera’. Although holding back of monies was rarely 
mentioned in interviews with doctor directors, it came up frequently in interviews with 
DHO heads and health centre staff. This will be discussed in the next section.
7.4.2 The perspectives of the DHOs and health centres
In the view of some DHO heads the issue of resource allocation within the local health 
care system was the biggest problem in the implementation of the UC reforms. Part of the 
problem was that community hospitals needed to safeguard their own staff by ensuring that 
they had funds to pay the extra allowances introduced under the reforms to reward 
performance, and this led to the prioritisation of their needs over that of health centre staff.
The problem of the budgeting arrangement in the 30 baht policy was equity of 
distribution. Especially, starting at the CUP to primary care level, the health 
officers in the front-line didn’t have sufficient money. The hospital was afraid that 
it would lose and not have enough money to pay extra allowances to hospital 
staff, so that the front-line staff in the health centres were seen as a burden and 
didn’t get equity in this. As we’ve seen, the staff at the lower level didn’t get 
fairness, and they usually made comparisons between the health centre and 
hospital staff. The hospital has been providing all facilities to staff, while in the 
health centres the staff have to look after themselves and pay for some things 
themselves. (DHO Head, RE 22)
The P&P budget, in particular, was a source of conflict between the hospital and health 
centres in many places. In Roi Et as elsewhere the budget had to be split to cover some 
P&P costs at the CUP, as well as P&P work in both the community hospitals and the 
health centres. Given that there was no separate fund for utilities expenses in this 
province, proper disbursement of the P&P budget was crucial to the health centres. Even 
where health centres had some reserves carried over from previous years, these only gave a 
temporary respite from current under-funding. Some health centres that had mistakenly 
assumed that funds would be distributed downwards, used their reserve money quickly in 
the mistaken expectation that they would soon be paid back.
The big problem was the budget. Such as when last year our projects weren’t 
successful according to our targets, because we had no money so that we couldn’t 
work as we planned. The CUP was received the budget but they didn’t pass it to 
the PCUs and the health centres as we had agreed together. (...) They (the 
government) gave us money but the CUP took all of our part and gave only a 
small part back to us. At the beginning we expected we would get money, so that 
we had paid in advance using our reserve money. Later when our reserve money 
ran out, they told us that the budget had gone too. (Head HC, RE 36)
There was conflict between the health centres and the hospital about budget 
management. The health centres are still wondering about the transparency of the 
hospital in this. Because the hospital used a lot of the money but sometimes this 
was transferred late and in small amounts. When the health centres requested 
money from the hospital they didn’t want to pay. (HCO, RE 34)
Under the low cost health card scheme that had existed before 2001 (the 500 baht per 
family card) health centres were able to establish a local fund from contributions paid 
which they could manage themselves. However, the switchover to the 30 baht project 
meant that, apart from the small receipts from co-payments, health centres were dependent 
on allocations from the CUP which were smaller than expected and subject to delays
The problem (...) was delays in the budget allocation. Early in the year, we had 
agreed we would receive this amount but in fact it was late by around 4 to 5 
months. As is common in health promotion, we had already planned to work 
every month but the budget didn’t come so that we couldn’t work as intended. 
Previously in the other health insurance schemes, such as the health card, we 
could pay from the fund to support this work. (Head HC 2, Focus group in RE)
Just as occurred in Kalasin, the starving of the health centres of funding continued into 
Year 2. It was only in Year 3 that the position improved somewhat, partly as a result of 
pressure from the MoPH for PHOs to allocate directly to health centres
The main problem was the distribution of resources, both money and staff. In 
particular, the budget was not managed well when it came to the hospital: in some 
places they didn’t re-allocate money to the health centres. Some hospitals said this 
belongs to me so you must make a formal request to me, something like that. 
They should transfer money to them but they did not. In some places we talked 
and discussed this a lot in meetings, but it wasn’t successful. I did this many times 
and I think I am a mature person, so that I allow bygones to be bygones. It wasn’t 
in accordance with Ministry guidance: when the budget came into the province it 
didn’t go out. This year the Permanent Secretary urged the province to allocate 
directly to the health centres, because last year this was a big problem, especially 
in the case of the health promotion and prevention budget. (DHO Head, RE 20)
However, in Roi Et there was no equivalent to the mobilisation of DHO heads that 
occurred in Kalasin, and the improvement in the funding of health centres in Year 3 was 
more limited. The CMO tried to mediate between the two sides, but was unwilling to 
interfere too much in the freedoms of the main provider organisation, the CUP, in line with 
the vision of developing purchaser provider relations that the PHO was pushing. The 
approach in Roi Et was to do just enough to keep things under control at the health centre 
level, encouraging players to move in the direction set by the MoPH, while concentrating 
most PHO attention on developing the new evaluation and oversight role linked to the 
purchaser function. Thus from the perspective of the lower participants there was 
sometimes a gap between what they believed the PHO had said would happen and the 
behaviour of CUPs at local level.
The problem was the budgeting arrangement. For example, we went to hear about 
the policy from the province but, when we came back to the district, the policy 
and action didn’t match - even though the province told us they would allocate the 
P&P budget to the health centres via the CUP. Actually the CUP didn’t pass it 
through to the health centre. Now, it is the last month of the fiscal year. (...) that 
has affected the public because the budget didn’t come as we had planned. (DHO 
Head, RE 26)
The view from the bottom-up did not necessarily distinguish clearly between the new 
purchaser role and the old supervision one, but what was clear was that the relative 
positions of the PHO and the community hospitals had changed. This was largely due to 
the change in the way money flowed through the system.
In my opinion, I think the CMOs in many places didn’t like to touch the hospitals 
because they still had to ask for money from them as well. If they didn’t make 
these requests, they would not survive, so that they didn’t touch them. The CMO, 
when he arranged a meeting with the DHOs, promised that he would act, but 
when he talked with the hospitals he didn’t use the same words, because we didn’t 
meet at the same time. We raised the problem many times, particularly about the 
budget, when we made presentations to them but nothing changed. (DHO Head, 
RE 20)
The reduction in health centre budgets also affected the DHOs. Since these were not 
provider organisations, they were not in line for direct capitation payments and needed to 
recoup a share of the payments going to the CUP. However, many CUPs passed on very 
little to DHOs.
The money holder was the CUP - they told us don’t worry about money and 
continue work. However, then we requested money, they didn’t give it to us, which
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meant that we couldn’t continue with the work because we were in debt to others. 
The government allocated the budget but the money holder was mad. If the money 
was directly allocated to the health centre it wouldn’t have been a problem but the 
Ministry didn’t allocate through the DHO and told us to go to ask the CUP. I think 
this is the difficulty: we are the administrator but don’t have money. The Bureau of 
Budget34 should understand who are the real workers, so that they should have 
changed the financing mechanism by allocating directly to the DHO. I think at the 
moment the budgeting arrangement wasn’t fair to the DHO or the PHO. (DHO 
Head, RE 23)
In some areas even the relatively under-funded health centres had more money for routine 
expenses than did DHOs. There was no separate PHO fund for utilities and fuel costs that 
could help DHOs. Yet they were expected to carry on with some of their past activities.
We drew a comparison in the health centres, they had lot of money but we didn’t, 
it was gone. Before the reforms we got allowances of around 5,000 baht per year 
but after the reforms we had a problem. We had no money for things such as 
office costs and car fuel. We were in debt but the health centre staff still came to 
use facilities in the DHO, as at the past. (HO-DHO, RE 27)
We have to adapt from the previous situation where we had our own budget 
which was easy to work with. Now we have to plan carefully but we must still go 
to work outside on disease surveillance, such as with SARS and hemorrhagic 
fever, etcetera. This was necessary activity and we had to go out into the 
community, for which we needed to pay the costs of car fuel, but we didn’t have 
the money. At the moment I am requesting support from the hospital. With regard 
to a small district they get tiny money, so I am not sure they can help us. (DHO 
Head, RE 25)
As in the above case, some DHOs resorted to asking for money wherever it might be 
available -  CUP, hospital or health centre -  in respect of particular projects or crisis 
situations. Getting money often depended on good relations with these organisations, and 
might involve bending the rules. In the Thai language this is sometimes termed ‘zig­
zagging’.
Regarding the UC budget, the service unit could use the money, but we couldn’t. 
So the CUP had to allocate money to the health centre. When we wanted to use 
this, we had to ‘zigzag’ (in English) to get a share. Sometimes this led to 
problems between the DHO and the health centres. The senior administrators said 
when the budget came in to the CUP that we had to support each other. However, 
in fact when the budget came in the CUP, they didn’t give money to the health 
centres, or at least not much. (DHO Head, RE 20)
34 The Bureau of Budget (BOB) is a central government agency which monitors and evaluates public sector 
expenditure.
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I think the DHO and the health centres had problems with each other because the 
budget didn’t pass through the DHO. At the moment the DHO must request 
money from the health centres - every month at 1,000 baht per month. We have to 
fill in the paper work pretty much as we like to take out the money for the DHO, 
and I am afraid that I may get a problem the next day when the officer of the 
OAG (the Officer of the Auditor General of Thailand) comes in. Last year we 
gave them about 1200 baht per month. This year it has reduced to 1000 baht. 
Early in the year we tried to negotiate them down to 500 baht per month and that 
the DHO should provide clear accounts regarding the payments. But they didn’t 
accept this. (HCO, RE 39)
Zig-zagging in its widest sense in Thai suggests ‘gaming’ the system or bending rules by 
creative interpretation. As in this case, it sometimes has the connotation of bringing about 
something by hidden and indirect means that could not be done openly and directly. In 
theory, money from the UC budget allocated to the CUPs to purchase care should have 
been kept separate from the non-UC budget allocated to support the administrative units. 
The CUP thus had no legitimate means of transferring UC funds to pay for the routine 
expenses of the district health offices. However, it was possible to get around this by 
transferring money first to the health centres (a UC body), which could then pass on a 
portion to the DHOs. Thus the money got to the intended destination via a zig-zag route.
Transfers of money at that level were less visible but still technically irregular. Zig­
zagging helped keep the system functioning, but led to misgivings and feelings of 
vulnerability. In a context where there was already a lack of transparency and hints about 
possible misallocation of funds for development projects, the absence of proper paper 
work caused concerns. In one rare case where the DHO obtained a large allocation for 
office expenses, health centre staff were critical of their former boss’ probity.
The DHO head in my district has a problem with ‘commissions’ that frustrates 
me. He wasn’t ‘fair’ (in English) to us. For example, the PHO gave us a budget 
for office expenses of about 70,000 baht but he only paid himself for car fuel and 
car maintenance. With regard to materials for the DHO they pestered us because 
they had no money. (Head HC, RE 35)
Getting money usually involved opening a dialogue with the doctor director chairing the 
CUP, and trying to get some recompense for activity that both agreed needed to be done. 
However, even where there was an acknowledgement that the DHO deserved money, its 
allocation was likely to be much less than before the reforms.
Of course, there are problems in work because the budget is small. I needed to 
make savings everywhere and asked the health centres to support our expenses. 
Previously, we had a budget of more than 300,000 per year because this was the 
largest district. In the first year we got below 100,000 and this year we received 
about 50,000 to 60,000. We still face a lot of debts because we work the same as 
in the past. We have been talking in the CUP with the Doctor Director of the 
hospital about our duties. We still look after many things because there is a lack 
of clarity about our new functions, but they were afraid of the change. Regarding 
all problems they said we have responsibility. (DHO Head, RE 20)
The cut in DHOs’ funding and the scaling down of their old role coincided with a 
reduction in their staff numbers. Many staff moved out to the health centres or hospitals 
due to the increase in workload there, and the incentive payments on offer. They also 
perceived that career opportunities in the DHOs were sharply reduced.
The staff in the DHO were limited (by the government) to not more than 7, while 
the PHO, which is non-UC as well, still have more than 100 even though we are 
carrying out the same functions. They had a substantial budget and facilities. The 
hard worker was the DHO because we had to follow up and work in the 
community. Then we had to report on performance to the PHO, and after they 
passed on this result they got a grade35 8 and 9, while the DHO didn’t even get 
given a grade 8. (DHO Head, RE 23)
Here, (the DHO) the number of staff was decreased because they moved to the 
health centres and the hospitals due to the fact that they could get allowances 
there. That increased the burden of work because the staff was reduced from 6 to 
4. Nobody wants to work in the DHO because it is hard work. Previously, 
everyone wanted to work in the DHO but when the UC reforms came in nobody 
wanted to come. (DHO Head, RE 26)
The DHO staff were non-UC staff and short of money. Many people moved out to 
the health centres or the hospitals because of the allowances and promotion 
prospects. For example, at the moment the position of the professional nurse in 
the health centre is still unclear, so that they move back to the hospital where they 
receive better allowances and can get promotion to grade 8. The government 
should be clear about this aspect, because they announced the policy as 
‘promotion-led cure’, but the majority of staff are in the hospitals which are the 
curative units. (DHO Head 2, Focus group RE)
As the above quotes suggest, this movement of staff may have reduced the capacity of the 
local system to undertaken P&P projects. It also contributed to a widespread sense that the 
DHOs were organisations in decline, which did not easily fit into the new structure of local 
services and had an uncertain future.
35 These are grades from the standard Thai civil service hierarchy.
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One source of frustration for several respondents was that the PHO still held the DHO 
responsible when things went wrong in the district health care system. When 
haemorrhagic fever spread through many districts of the province, a group of DHO heads 
were summoned by the PHO to account for the problems that had arisen. This was seen as 
unfair and unreasonable by some respondents.
I told the PHO that haemorrhagic fever was spreading in the province and asked 
why they were pressing the DHO heads. They should talk to the DDCHs about 
what to do and speak in same way as they did with the DHO heads. (DHO Head, 
RE 20)
The uncertainty about the DHO’s role also affected the chain of command. The DHOs 
were still expected to oversee and manage aspects of the local system, but found that 
because funding now flowed through the CUP, the directors of community hospitals acting 
as CUP chairs were also exerting control over the content of health centre work.
When the budget was held at the CUP, the DDCH said that the health centres 
came under hospital control because the money was channelled through them. 
They could arrange this as they wanted. The PHO told us that we should still take 
care of things if we had a problem, such as communicable disease, we would 
have responsibility. Then we informed to the PHO that since we didn’t have 
money we couldn’t act as the past. However, the CMO said you have to look after 
things whatever may have happened. (DHO Head, RE 20)
This problem of the two lines of command from both the hospitals and the DHOs down to 
the health centres and PCUs was a common one across Esam and will be considered in 
more detail in the next chapter.
7.4.3. The role of the municipal sector
The UC policies built on the earlier decentralisation reforms by requiring closer co­
operation between the MoPH services and local government. The National Health 
Security Act B.E. 2545 (AD 2002) provides for the establishment of Area Health Boards 
with health and local government representatives. However, because the municipalities 
were short of resources and their roles focused mainly on environmental health and 
sanitation activities, little was done to implement this policy. In Roi Et, the role of local 
government in health care was not extensive at the time of the study, though there were 
some developments that did not occur elsewhere. In an interview conducted with a senior
municipal representative, he explained that the impact of the 30 baht project on his 
organisation had been limited because of the traditional separation of functions between 
the health system under the MoPH and local government health departments.
[Regarding the UC reforms] We didn’t have many changes because the 
municipality’s role in the public health sector was mainly that we looked after 
sanitation activities, such as: cleaning, flood prevention, sewage and drains, the 
fresh markets, restaurants and beauty shops. (...) We are accountable for disease 
prevention and sanitation, based on our duties, while the public health 
organisations look after treatment activity. Now, we have different functions. 
(Senior municipal representative, RE 11)
The main change that occurred affected two centres for public health services set up by the 
municipality to serve people in the local area when the UC scheme came in, these centres 
entered a co-operative agreement with the CUP associated with the provincial hospital, and 
became the sites for its urban PCUs.
In the municipality, we have ‘centres for public health services’, in which they do 
similar work as ‘the health centre’ under the MoPH. Previously, we had a co­
operative project with Rio Et hospital and Roi Et PHO in which the professional 
teams from both organisations took turns to visit the two centres for public health 
services that we have. When the 30 baht policy came along, the nature of co­
operation changed because they divided the municipal area into three sections for 
3 hospitals which had joined this scheme. (Senior municipal representative, RE 
11)
The provincial hospital used our service centre to provide treatment care for 
people. People were very interested because a specialist doctor came to examine 
them. (...) Our roles are still the same but our treatment role has decreased so that 
we do only basic care, because the provincial hospital came in to look after all 
that. We moved to work on health promotion activities and increasingly go out 
into the community. (Senior municipal representative, RE 12)
However, the main funding for these centres still came from the municipality. It was 
unable to get reimbursement for the fixed costs of the centres because it could not get 
access to the UC budget allocated to the CUP (linked to the provincial hospital). 
Municipality public health staff continued to share the work of health promotion using 
their existing budgets.
Before the 30 baht scheme came in, we worked in isolation from the hospital. 
When the new policy came along we didn’t get any of the UC budget because it 
was directly allocated to the hospital based on population registration. Regarding 
the 16 communities in the municipal area, these were separated between Roi Et
hospital and [the private] hospital so that there were 12 that went to Roi Et 
hospital and 4 to [the private] hospital. Roi Et hospital used our offices in the two 
centres for public health services to establish a PCU and assigned hospital staff to 
work there so that the roles of our staff decreased. With regard to health 
promotion activities we worked with hospital staff but we didn’t receive a budget 
from hospital, we used the municipality budget for everything. (HCO-CHPS, RE 
44)
The main obstacle preventing the municipality from contracting directly with the CUP or 
the NHSO, was that they were aware that they would be unable to meet the criteria set out 
in MoPH guidance under the UC regulations. This was because they had insufficient 
qualified professional staff. The existing local government public health officers were 
however permitted to carry on their previous health promotion activities, working 
alongside public health officers in the PCUs, and sometimes supported in the community 
by the health professional team from the hospital.
We have two centres for public health services which have full time staff working 
there. Regarding the PCU standard based on the UC guidance, the regulations state 
that we must have a doctor and nurse working full-time at least 50 hours per week, 
so that we wouldn’t meet those criteria because in the past we were only concerned 
with basic treatment. So we participated mainly in health promotion activities, 
which the provincial hospital did not do, and they used our offices in the centres for 
public health services to set up the PCU outside the hospital. They arranged a 
schedule for a doctor to come to see people there. Additionally we operated in the 
areas where they didn’t, such as exterminating rats and mosquitoes and also 
providing health education for the public. (DPHED, RE 12)
The existing budget split led to a feeling of unfairness on the part of municipality staff. 
They perceived that the UC budget had been intended to pay for both curative and P&P 
activity, and that they were being unjustly excluded from their share of the P&P budget.
The municipality did have problems with the budget arrangement because we 
survived for a long time before the reforms came in. However, the UC budget was 
allocated to support all health care, both treatment care and health promotion 
work, but with regard to managing the UC arrangements we didn’t have much 
participation. We felt dissatisfied because we had insufficient involvement and 
our role was too small. Actually, I would like to see, if they clearly separated the 
budget from the top, how much we would get. (DPHED, RE 12)
This was only partly an issue about money, since the municipal Health Department was 
able to survive given its modest activities, but was also about the limits this put on its 
ability to play a bigger role in the overall UC scheme. Given the possibility, foreshadowed 
in the public debate, that local government would eventually have a larger role in
purchasing, especially for prevention and promotion activity, some senior staff were keen 
to establish that they had a part to play.
7.5 The active purchaser role and top-down steering
As seen earlier in the chapter, the distinctive characteristic of the PHO in Roi Et was its 
attempt to construct a new role as purchaser. The fact that the NHSO entered into 
contracts with the CUPs, through the PHO (as its local office), and with the contracts 
signed by the CMO and the CUP chairs, opened the way the PHO to see its role in this 
way, even though the neighbouring PHOs did not. Nevertheless, parts of the old role 
remained and there was still an expectation from lower level units that the PHO would 
remain responsible for the oversight of public health care services across the entire 
province. This meant that the PHO could also engage in a considerable amount of top- 
down steering alongside the new approach.
The purchaser role gave it a new source of power at a time when it had lost control over 
funding. The PHO was able to develop the evaluation and monitoring aspects of the old 
supervision role to develop the notion of the purchaser as the overseer of provider units, 
which had to be accredited before contracts could be signed and money channelled on.
Regarding the health contracting units who will contract with us, basically, they 
should have developing themselves in line with UC guidance, and we must go to 
accredit them before signing a contract. However, in the remote areas the problem 
was that the health units were still missing the required standard, while the PHO 
had responsibility for providing health care to the people as well. The result was 
that we had to return to the issue of developing health care for people in remote 
areas. Rather than going to certify the health service units we had to go to 
develop the providers to gain the UC standard in remote areas such as ‘M’, ‘P’, 
‘P’ and so on. (SAO-PHO, RE 02)
This is close to the active purchasing role in a traditional purchaser/provider split system 
such as the British NHS, but was not an approach that most provinces took in the early 
years of the Thai reforms. Indeed the Roi Et senior PHO officers were themselves aware 
that their ‘style’ was different.
We thought things out ourselves and learnt from each other in the top 
administrator group. After the CMO went back to receive the policies from the 
Ministry he brought these to the PHO meeting for discussion, such as how to
apply the new financial management arrangements and which model we should 
select for payment. That was the ‘Roi Et style’ (in English) due to the fact that 
we couldn’t copy from others because there were different -  all the other 
provinces. (SAO-PHO, RE 03)
As seen earlier in the chapter, the logic of the purchaser/provider split model required that 
there had to be strong organisations on both the purchaser and provider sides. This meant 
that although being the purchaser reinforced the PHO’s position, it also had to allow space 
for the CUPs to develop as autonomous provider organisations. This may account for why 
the PHO did not step in more strongly to do something about the non-allocation of CUP 
monies to health centres. The CUPs had to be allowed under the new financing mechanism 
to take responsibility for many things themselves. Yet, this introduced a complication 
because many of the CUPs lacked the capacity to do this immediately.
When the new policy came in, the budget was transferred to the districts, under 
their authority. Actually, in the transitional period this is possibly leading to 
problems because they had been ‘fed’ (in English) by the PHO for a long time and 
now they must do by themselves and take responsibility for their own area with 
their own money, based on the 30 baht budget that includes everything. (SAO- 
PHO, RE 01)
In the transitional period the PHO had to support the CUPs because they were accustomed 
to working in an old system where the PHO had made all the important decisions and 
directed work across the district. Although the PHO was seeking to operate as a purchaser, 
it sometimes slipped back into a more traditional role to help compensate for the 
weaknesses of some providers. This was also used to justify the holding of some budgets 
centrally to support province-wide activities and to provide a safety net when things went 
wrong.
Of course, in the transitional period they (district staff) didn’t work very skilfully 
so that the PHO had to go to help them. But, we didn’t have a budget for this, so 
things did not change much. After that, we came to an agreement that the PHO’s 
role is to act as an evaluator and supervisor by using performance indicators to do 
this. That improved district staffs understanding of their roles and functions. 
However, I think we should have a part of the budget held at the province for 
emergency problem solving. We must bring in the capitation model as part of 
local implementation, but we should also have a ‘central fund’ held at the 
province to support province-wide activities, such as health promotion campaigns 
across the entire province and so on. As regards health promotion activity, this 
should not be fragmented activities. Perhaps, there are problems in the province
and the PHO should have the authority and budget to support the districts. (SAO- 
PHO, RE 01)
Active purchasing was thus accompanied by a good deal of top-down steering.
Overall then, the system remained a hybrid one, in which the PHO would sometimes 
emphasise its role as purchaser and sometimes its duty to support the local service units. 
There were other remnants of the old system, such as that the PHO remained the body 
responsible for deciding promotions and the award of salary increments for all staff in the 
province. This mixture of old and new roles was also apparent in the attitude of the 
Ministry, which simultaneously regarded the PHO as the local branch of the NHSO (the 
purchaser), and as the body that would be held responsible if implementation went poorly 
or there were major health problems in the province.
7.6 Relations with the Ministry and the Health Region
The role of Roi Et’s overseeing Health Region -  Khet 7 -  was less directive than that of 
Khet 6 in Kalasin or even Khet 5 in Mahasarakham. Respondents said much less about it 
in interviews than in the other provinces. Health Region 7 seems to have focused mainly 
on technical support and routine supervision.
The Regional Health Inspector has a local office in Ubon Rachathani. This is an 
advisory office opened at our request. The main services are technical support 
such as academic materials. We have a relationship with the regional health 
inspector office in preparing the performance report. Actually when we have 
problems we have to contact to the Ministry directly. (SAO-PHO, RE 06)
This light remark appears to accurately reflect the tendency of senior staff in Roi Et to 
communicate directly with the Ministry. This may reflect the standing of both the CMO 
and the Director of the Provincial Hospital as well connected people, who had previous 
held very senior positions, and had good relationships with senior Ministry officials.
7.6 Summary of chapter
This chapter has examined the distinctive features of the implementation of the UC 
reforms in Roi Et province. The areas where the policy choices of local actors were most
evident were selection of the financial allocation mechanism, the development of a PHO 
role as active purchaser and - linked to this - an attempt to create a strong evaluation 
function for the PHO, which gave it a new source of power to steer the local health system.
Overall top-down steering was more evident in Roi Et than in the two neighbouring 
provinces. Its CMO skilfully emphasised the purchaser/provider split aspect of the 
reforms in a way that Mahasarakham and Kalasin did not, and built up strong local 
networks with key actors. Middle-level actors did not accumulate the same influence in 
the main decision forums that they did in Kalasin. However, the community hospitals 
nevertheless gained control over a good share of resources, with only minimal interference 
from the PHO, largely on the basis that the purchasing organisation should not interfere 
too much in the sphere of the provider CUPs.
Although there was a problem of poor micro allocation from the CUPs to the health 
centres, it was handled in a different way than elsewhere. The Roi Et CMO concentrated 
most administrative effort on the development of the new PHO evaluation and standard 
setting role, and tried to manage the problem of the health centres by discussion and 
mediation rather than direct intervention. Pressure from the MoPH affecting all Esam 
provinces had some impact, but the CMO did nothing to force the CUPs to move further. 
Rather he emphasised the need for them to learn to work effectively as the main provider 
organisation in the new system. This meant that the problem of underfunding health 
centres was kept within manageable proportions, but not resolved in the way that occurred 
in Kalasin. Even beyond Year 3, Roi Et still had problems of CUPs starving health centres 
of funds.
In Roi Et the most influential policy actors in the local health care system were generally 
those in high positions -  the CMO and a handful of supporting senior PHO officers 
(including his wife), the Director of the Provincial Hospital, and one or two influential 
Directors of Community Hospitals. Those middle-level actors, who had a voice, such as 
the Assistant Head of the Health Insurance Group, were operating very much under the 
CMO’s control. Most doctor directors and the DHO Heads were relatively weak 
compared with in Kalasin. Grass roots involvement in Roi Et was also very limited. 
There was no attempt to engage civil society, even in the limited way attempted in 
Mahasarakham. Channels of communication upwards were generally directly with
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contacts in the MoPH. Health Region 7 covering Roi Et, and its Inspector General, played 
a less interventionist role than did Health Regions 5 and 6 covering the neighbouring 
provinces.
Chapter 8 
General findings: common pressures 
and problems in Esarn
Chapter 8. General findings: common pressures and problems 
in Esarn
8.1 Introduction
The three preceding chapters present data on the different policy stories of the three case 
study provinces, highlighting their divergent approaches to policy implementation. The 
present chapter fills some gaps by describing common features of reform implementation 
across Esam region. Inevitably there is a degree of overlap because in the course of telling 
the three stories, it has already been necessary to touch on some background factors that 
remain the same for all provinces. This chapter therefore contains some sections that 
present new data on common aspects so far not examined in detail, but also sections which 
draw together findings already discussed to highlight shared trends across the three 
provinces.
8.2 The problem of the financing mechanism
It has already been suggested that the implementation of the UC reforms was affected by 
both a macro allocation problem and a micro allocation problem. The macro allocation 
problem related to the pre-existing problem that the reforms had been designed to address: 
the mal-allocation of health care resources across the nation. Capitation funding was 
designed to help rectify this problem, but the attempt to change patterns of resource 
allocation in such a short time span created difficulties for capitation-losing regions that 
eventually had consequences for capitation-gaining Esam. An early phase where Esam 
gained money was followed by a later phase where this was clawed back to the centre, and 
this had highly visible consequences in all three study provinces.
The second, micro-level resource allocation problem related to the distribution of 
resources within the local health care system. It involved the increased funds going to the 
CUPs and the decreased funds available to the PHO and DHO, but also the issues relating 
to the payment of hospitals for inpatient care and the distribution of money from the CUP 
down to the PCUs and health centres. Again this was a general problem that set up
tensions in the implementation process across Esam, though with some differences in local 
detail touched on in previous chapters. Because it has been discussed already, this aspect 
is covered more briefly here.
8.2.1 Unequal financing at the national level
Most Thai policy analysts agree that a significant degree of reallocation of funding 
occurred in Year 1 of the reforms. Southern region gained money and Esam too received a 
slightly higher level of funding than in the past, which was reflected in a corresponding 
squeeze on funding in Bangkok and central region, as well as some other large urban 
centres. However, this general picture hides considerable variation across different Esam 
provinces. Actually the experience in the three case study provinces suggests that the gain 
may have been very limited. In Roi Et, the wealthiest of the case study provinces and the 
one set to benefit least from the change, PHO administrators claimed that the new level of 
funding was only roughly equivalent to the old one.
The budget was a big problem because according to my analysis of the budget for 
the entire province before the new policy came in, we received about 700 to 800 
million baht per year. That was the budget from the lower income scheme of about 
200 million baht and the Health Card Scheme of about 400 to 500 million baht, and 
excluding the staff salary costs. When the 30 baht scheme came in Roi Et had a 
population of about 1,300,000 and the population covered by this scheme was say 
1,100,000, and multiplied by the capitation budget at about 1000 baht per head, in 
total we would get around 1,100 to 1,200 million. Regarding the staff salary costs 
for the entire province, in year one this was 397 million, say about 400 million 
baht, and then taking 1,100 to 1,200 minus 400 the budget would remain at 700- 
800 million baht. That meant that under the new policy we got a similar budget 
amount as last year. It wasn’t very different with the old system. (SAO-PHO, 
Focus group in RE)
The budget holder was changed from the administrative unit to the health service 
unit but the total amount allocated to the province didn’t change. The first year was 
the best year for us regarding the UC budget, because we deducted the staff salary 
costs at the province level, say 400 million, so that in Roi Et we still had about 700 
million baht, and we were ‘happy’ (in English). In FY 2003 they deducted the 
salary costs at the Ministry, which had the result that our budget in this province 
lost nearly 200 million baht. Additionally, in FY 2004 the salary costs were held at 
the Ministry again so that suddenly our budget had gone down by 200 million baht 
again. This is a big problem in the province, we are worried and have difficulties 
with this. (SAO-PHO, Focus group in RE)
Because of the compartmentalisation of funding and the different types of funding streams 
applying before and after 2001, it is difficult to obtain definitive official figures on this 
point. However, rough calculations suggest that Kalasin and Mahasarakham initially 
received small budget increases, while Roi Et received about the same as in the past. Of 
course, as we shall see in the next section, there was a big change in the ways the money 
was distributed between bodies within the province.
What is clear is that all three provinces then experienced a significant squeeze in budgets 
in 2002/03 as the salaries budget was held at the Ministry and a corresponding cut was 
made in the amounts of UC funding going to the provinces. This common change had 
similar impact in all three provinces, although where Roi Et appears to have received a 
lower budget in Year 2 than before the reforms, the other two may have been merely 
returned to close to the baseline position.
The change received a good deal of publicity at national level and was apparent to 
respondents on the ground from personal experience. They were fully aware that after a 
period when Esam had made limited gains, or at least held its own in terms of survival of 
units, the position of the north-eastern provinces weakened significantly in Year 2.
In the first and the second year of implementation, if we got the budget that they 
promised, we could easily survive but some provinces in the central region had 
insufficient money, especially for the staff salary which they could not to pay. 
Nevertheless, the MoPH could not bring this problem into the open. They could not 
call for additional budget because they had less population and more staff than the 
north-eastern region. Their budgets were not enough to cover both staff salaries and 
medicine costs. Therefore, the north-eastern budget had to be cut to support this. In 
fact, the north-east had also been disadvantaged for a long time, because, a long 
time ago, it had a larger population and less staff than the others. (SAO-PHO, MK 
06)
If we considered the size of the budget, we received much larger increases than 
previously. However, in 2002 we received about Bt 600 million, while in 2003 we 
got about Bt 400 million, which was a loss of Bt 200 million. But we understood 
that they took a proportion from the north east to the central region, where they 
faced a cash crisis. Previously we were never concerned about the budget 
allocation but when we came to analyse this after the reform came along, which 
gave us a better understanding. However, at the health centre level, where they 
never directly received a budget before, when this policy came in an increased 
amount of money went to the health centres. (SAO-PHO, KS 02)
The financial allocation problem, which was a hot issue in the newspapers, came 
about because the budget allocation was unfair. (In FY 2002-03) Some provinces 
got 1400 or 1500, while some provinces received around 1100 or 1200 due to the 
problem of workforce distribution, as in the past. Then the salary costs were funded 
at the Ministry, so that first they top-sliced the salary costs for the entire country 
and, after that, they allocated a part to the province based on capitation with an 
adjustment for population-age structures. That was a measure to support each other 
because some provinces did not have enough budget even to pay salaries. (SAO- 
PHO, RE 05)
Generally the notion of a change of policy necessary to ‘support each’ other seems to have 
been accepted by respondents in the PHOs, though there was a sense that the division of 
resources between particular provinces had been unfair. However, doctor directors of 
community hospitals which experienced a sharp fall in budgets in 2002/03 were more 
critical about the budget cuts in the North East.
8.2.2 Unequal financing at the local level
The change in financial allocation within the district health care system affected (a) the 
position of the overseeing administrative bodies, the PHO and the DHO and (b) the 
funding of the service units and the share of the budget that they received.
The PHO has lost its previous control of the provincial budget and found its own funding 
curtailed sharply. Funds were now separated into the UC budget, which was channelled 
through the PHO but could not be retained for PHO projects, and the non-UC budget, 
which supported administrative activity. The three PHOs in the study differed in the extent 
to which they were able to use their responsibility to disburse the UC budget to retain 
authority in the local system, and were able to channel some funds towards provincial 
contingency funds and other re-distributive mechanisms aimed to safeguard weaker health 
system organisations. However all struggled to cover expenses from the reduced non-UC 
budgets that they received. All needed to augment this budget by requesting funds for 
particular activities and projects from the CUPs, which were now the main UC budget 
holders.
Regarding the financing system, it is based on ‘direct capita’ or what we call the 
‘UC budget’. We cannot use the UC budget: it must be directly allocated to health 
care service units. (SAO-PHO, MK 01)
Previously, we were the budget controller but then we had no money, which had a 
big effect because we had never prepared for this situation before. Previously the 
PHO had had a management budget of several hundred million per year: now we 
have only 3 to 4 million and that was affected us. If we used this for the PHO it 
would be sufficient but we must share it with the DHOs in the entire the province 
too. This has had an effect. (SAO-PHO, KS 05)
Regarding that topic, the non-UC budget - it’s been given already but was not 
sufficient. Due to the system we come from, we act like seniors towards juniors. If 
the money is finished then ask in the community hospital via the doctor director in 
the CUP. The CMO might help make the connection. We have a good 
organisational culture and a mutual support system. Many people come into 
contact which they admire and which brings us an advantage. The assistant CMO is 
also a person close to the CMO. Personal relationships and sibling relationships 
still help a lot in solving work problems. And the senior administrators group in 
the province works as a good team together, which helps in work of different kinds. 
(SAO-PHO, RE 06)
The provincial hospitals in all three provinces faced similar problems because of their high 
salary costs compared with the community hospitals. Each received funding through a 
combination of capitation payments based on population of the CUP in which they 
participated, and also DRG-based payments in respect of inpatient work referred to them 
from other CUPs. However the income from these sources was insufficient to meet salary 
costs in all three of the case study provincial hospitals. In each case they depended on the 
salary budget coming from the PHO, which was skewed to give the provincial hospitals 
more than they would have received had salaries been paid with the capitation payment.
The clear affect was on the budget: the hospital income was decreased. Previously, 
the hospital received the budget from the ministry: including through the Low 
Income Medical Welfare Scheme and the Health Card Scheme. When the new 
policies came in, our monies only came from the 30 baht project, which resulted in 
a reduction in our total income. (Senior doctor PH, KS 09)
For instance, Mahasarakham hospital, before the 30 baht scheme came, had savings 
from income of about 100 million baht. After the first year of implementation they 
had a deficit of 15 million baht. Under the current model of allocating budgets, 
they may go so far but they (the government) need to pay the same amount, or 
more than at present. But, this year (the second year) they received around 60% of 
the first year. The reason for this was that the MoPH deducted money to help some 
hospitals in other regions. They may have known that there was a lot of money in 
the north-eastern region, and therefore they allocated some to another area. 
Nowadays, we are just playing to survive. (SAO-PHO, MK 05)
The provincial hospital couldn’t have survived because they were covering a small 
population, when compared with their expenses which were high. And to claim 
referral payments we use DRGs, so that they need to return complete case reports.
We were trying to solve this problem. If the provincial hospital had to pay the staff 
salary costs by themselves they could not carry on because they have a lot staff. 
(SAO-PHO, RE 04)
As the dominant players within the CUPs, whose boards their directors typically chaired, 
the community hospitals across all 3 provinces were well funded in 2001/02. However, 
they then experienced a sharp fall in their allocations in Year 2. This problem was 
accentuated because the budget that had been announced was often not paid in full. This 
gap between the funding expected and actually received left many hospitals with deficits in 
Year 2. It meant that they struggled to pay routine expenses such as the extra allowance 
payments for staff in the community hospitals and health centres.
With regard to the budget, we have been able to obtain increased funding and we 
have increased power to use that in a positive way. In contrast, the money that 
came was less than the full figure the centre promised. In the management system, 
there were increases in the efficiency of the system with high technology such as 
an e-inspection model of supervision that is better and more rigorous than the 
previous system. (DDCH, MK 23)
Especially, regarding the funding arrangement, the government did not allocate full 
figures following their promises to us. If the monies came to us in full we would 
have no serious problem. During this year - over the last 10 months - Kalasin has 
obtained around 63% of the expected figure. The government planned to give 1202 
baht (per head) after top-slicing at the centre, which would leave 1052 baht. In fact 
we received 633 baht, which included the staff salary costs. (This amount) when 
we deducted the staff salary costs that left 328 baht which included all expenses, 
both the medicine costs and the P&P budget. This was linked to other problems 
and affected other activities in the chain. (DDCH, KS 14)
With regard to the budgets, in 2001/02 we got the full figure that the government 
had promised us. We received this and used the budget with considerable 
flexibility. After that in 2002/03 at the start of the year we anticipated that we 
would receive not less than the previous year, so that we went ahead with programs 
and projects. Later, in the middle of the year, we started to become aware that we 
might not receive the budgets we had expected, because we made estimates from 
the last 2 or 3 budget allocation periods when the Ministry transferred money to the 
PHO. It was about 50 to 60% of the amount given last year. It has gone down 
around 40% which is a large amount, so this affected our plans and projects, which 
had been decided. (DDCH, RE 15)
In all three provinces, though less so in Mahasarakham, there were problems in the 
distribution of the budget from the CUPs down to the PCUs and health centres. In many 
places, there was conflict between the hospitals and the PCUs or health centres because the 
P&P budget was not allocated to them or delays occurred in payment. This severely
limited the ability of some cash-starved health centres to engage in preventative and 
promotive projects.
The problem of the budgeting arrangement in the 30 baht policy was equity of 
distribution. Especially, starting at the CUP to primary care level, the health 
officers in the front-line didn’t have sufficient money. The hospital were afraid that 
they would lose and not have enough money to pay extra allowances to hospital 
staff, so that the front-line staff in the health centres were seen as a burden and 
didn’t get equity in this. As we’ve seen, the staff at the lower levels didn’t get 
fairness, and they usually made comparisons between the health centre and hospital 
staff. The hospital has been providing all facilities to staff while in the health 
centres the staff have to look after themselves and pay for some things themselves. 
(DHO Head, RE 22)
Last year the hospital and us could coordinate our budgeting. Recently it seems that 
the hospital has delayed releasing money and held on to it at the hospital. When 
we asked to use money, it was difficult. For example, I faced a problem with the 
‘Pink Card Project’ which is about mosquito larva control, where they (the PHO) 
gave the authority to the CUP to allocate the budget which supported the awarding 
of a prize of 1000 baht per sub-district for households without mosquito larva. I 
didn’t see this money and the CUP was doing nothing. (...) The main power is still 
the hospital and, in Kalasin, we funded the P&P budget at around 17 baht (per 
head) at the hospital, and when we need to use it the DDCH won’t allow this. 
(HCO, KS 30)
Many times, when we implemented health activity projects in the local area, the 
budget has delayed our plans. We have decided to work with our scheduled plan 
but the budget did not arrive on time. When the budget did come in sometimes the 
people did not have time to cooperate with us, because it was in harvest season. 
Because of this there only few people to collaborate in our project. (HCO, MK 42)
Almost all DHOs received a much reduced budget, perhaps amounting to 10% of the 
previous allocation, and often insufficient to cover basic office expenses. Across all three 
provinces many DHOs had to ask for additional financial help from the CUP or the health 
centres. Nevertheless they were still required to exercise oversight over many P&P 
projects, and were sometimes able to negotiate some extra funding to support this work. 
The DHOs found themselves in an anomalous position after the reforms due to the 
confused chain of command to the health centres, which now found themselves dependant 
for funding and approval of many projects on the CUP, but still under the line of command 
of the DHO. This is discussed in a later section.
8.3 The Problem of the health workforce
One of the main problems for the health services in Esam is the unfavourable ratio of 
health care facilities and professional staff to population.
Table 8.1: Distribution of the main health resources (reported in population ratio) by 
region, in 2003
Bangkok Central The North The south Esam Nationwide
B ed 1" 1:206 1:391 1:496 1:496 1:759 1:462
Health centres^ - 1:4,629 1:4,662 1:4,433 1:5,540 1:4,895
Doctors 1:974 1:3,577 1:4,754 1:4,632 1:7,542 1:3,577
Dentists 1:6,836 1:17,799 1:17,699 1:19,767 1:26,675 1:17,416
Pharmacists 1:3,793 1:8,894 1:13,437 1:8,845 1:13,437 1:8,963
Nurses 1:282 1:494 1:582 1:527 1:888 1:562
Health centre office - 1:1,552 1:1,713 1:1,511 1:2,097 1:1,762
Sources: Report on Health Resources 2004, Bureau of Policy and Strategy, MoPH, 2004 
Note:(1) Data for 2002
The UC reform policy aimed to encourage a reallocation of the health workforce from 
other regions to Esam, in line with the plan that ‘money follows patients’. However, the 
MoPH’s backtracking from the original policies in 2002/03, particularly holding the salary 
budget at the Ministry level, ended the dream of an easy solution to the under-strength 
workforce in the north east. These problems were highly visible to respondents in all three 
case study provinces and were mentioned often in the interviews.
8.3.1 The mal-distribution of the workforce
Although there was an obvious problem of insufficient professional staff which almost all 
recognised, respondents pointed out that the reforms had worsened the situation in some 
ways. The extra burden of work imposed when 30 baht treatment became available put 
extra pressure on already busy staff, who also needed to develop more community projects 
The guidelines about numbers of professional staff per 10,000 population were unrealistic, 
and staff in large centres resisted the idea of moving to rural areas.
At the moment given how the budgets are arranged, the allocation of staff will not 
change. Additionally, in FY 2002-03 the salary costs were held at the Ministry 
level so that there weren’t any staff moving, some hospitals had many staff and that 
still continues and these aren’t re-distributed to others. That is contrary to the 30 
baht policy intention, which was announced as at the beginning and this affects 
Esam region where they had the problem of a big population but a small workforce 
with a heavy workload. For example, I talked with doctors in our hospital - they all 
said that we work hard with out-patient attendances averaging 300 per day, covered 
by 4 doctors, who also have to look after both emergency cases and about 40 in­
patient cases per day. When you compare this with other provinces and the same 
size of hospital, they have about 6 to 7 doctors. (DDCH, RE 15)
There were many things that have been affected by this policy. For example, we 
have limited staff and when the policy was introduced quickly the increasing 
numbers of patients made our quality of service fall. There were insufficient 
numbers of the main health professional staff such as doctors, dentists and nurses 
(...) especially nurses, who have to work hard because the major part of work was 
nursing care. We had big shortages. (DDCH, KS 16)
The problem was workforce distribution, which the policy aims to address by re­
allocating the health professionals, such as doctors and pharmacists, to go to work 
in the rural areas. At the moment they are still bunched in the urban areas. That 
was a one of the failures of this policy, which they couldn’t solve. The Bt 30 
scheme means that we must have the health team to go to work in the community 
at least in a proportion as a team to the population of around 1 to 10,000. Now it 
wasn’t anywhere near this, so the government must solve this problem. (...) The 
most difficult problem is the distribution of the health workforce. For example, in 
the case of doctors, most of the newly-graduated doctors come from the big city or 
urban area then work in a rural area for about 2-3 years. Then they try to move 
back to work in an urban area or large city. I think that we should select local 
students to study in the medical schools so that after they graduate they will go 
back to work in their communities. (SAO-PHO, MK 07)
8.3.2 Differences in workload and the problem of morale
The problem of workforce mal-allocation was accentuated by a sense of unfairness about 
how the burden of work, and the rewards on offer, were shared out between different parts 
of the local health care system. In all three provinces there was a big difference between 
the situation of hospital staff and health centre staff. In terms of the monetary incentives, 
workload and facilities, the hospital staff enjoyed big advantages over health centre staff. 
From respondents’ accounts, this translated into dissatisfaction and problems of morale in 
the disadvantaged group.
For example, two newly graduated nurses came to work in ‘N ’ (this district): one 
worked in the health centre and the other worked in the hospital. This made them
compare the facilities. The one who worked in the hospital got everything and 
worked mainly in the municipal area with extra monies for supporting work in rural 
areas. The one who worked in the health centre didn’t receive this, even though 
she worked in a village. They got together and compared these things and told me 
about it. (...) One person came to see me in tears, saying she needed to work in the 
hospital. Working in the health centre didn’t lead to success in a nursing career, 
while nurses working in hospital receive more rewards and have an easier time 
because they only have to follow doctors’ orders. (DHO Head, KS 22)
I think the problem was how to get staff to go to work in the community. In our 
district, we launched the PCUs in many places but we had insufficient staff. At the 
beginning, the DDCH used money to ‘push’ them to do the work; those who went 
out to work could get allowances and so the allowance rates were increased. After 
this the DDCH decreased the allowance rates for those staff who wanted to go to 
work in PCUs. Previously they could receive an allowance for 5 days per week. 
Now, it became 4 days per week and decreased from 500 baht per day to 250 baht 
per day. (DN-PCU, MK 39)
Regarding the health workforce; after they graduate, the majority of newly- 
qualified health officers want to work in the hospitals because the hospitals have 
sufficient budget to pay allowances, and better facilities. For example, when 
hospital staff go to work outside in the community, they have both a car and driver 
to run the service. This is different from the health officers in the health centres, 
even though they may have graduated in the same subject from the same college. 
So they would like to work in the hospitals much more. (DHO Head 1, Focus 
group RE)
On a smaller scale this was also true of the relative positions of hospital and health centre 
staff in large (capitation-rich) and small (capitation-poor) districts. Staff in the urban areas 
were said to have relatively easy work and less pressure than the staff in rural areas.
8.3.3 The new public sector employment scheme
Thailand introduced a series of bureaucratic reforms in the 1990s which led to the 
downsizing of the civil service and public officer status replacing civil servant status for 
some post holders. This affected many health workers, and led to recruitment difficulties 
and more feelings of unfairness. This had the dual impact that the posts that still carried 
civil service status were harder to obtain, and that the posts that had officer status were 
hard to fill. Limits on the number of new entrants meant that well-qualified graduates 
often had to wait for the dwindling number of more attractive posts. The officer posts did 
not enjoy the same favourable health, pension and other benefits available to civil servants.
At the lower levels, limits were also set on the numbers of public service officers, which 
led to a practice of appointing staff as ‘temporary employees’.
A MoPH student scholarship scheme covered both higher professions such as doctors, 
dentists and pharmacists, and para-professionals such as nurses and public health officers. 
This meant that about 3,000 new graduates become ready to enter the employment market 
at about the same time each year, and are allocated to posts through a formal process in the 
MoPH. Health professionals are required to work for 3 years in the public sector, while 
the para-professionals are required to work for the MoPH for twice the number of years 
spent in higher education. Before the public sector reforms, all new graduates were 
appointed to civil service posts, but after the reforms they had to be split between civil 
service and officer posts. While the higher professions had first priority for civil servant 
jobs, in most years some doctors would only be offered officer status. Yet the 
unattractiveness of the new grade meant that some graduates at all levels found these posts 
unacceptable. Many would leave after their term of duty, or resign and pay the required 
fine so that they could go to work in the private sector.
At the moment the MoPH has a problem with newly graduated officers because 
there are insufficient ‘civil service’ positions available. So they have appointed the 
‘4 year group’ into the civil service positions but the ‘2 year group’ are appointed 
as ‘temporary employees’. And they take on new graduates every year so that they 
deal with this problem year to year, because they can’t negotiate with the 
government about the quantity of civil servants due to government policy on 
controlling staff in the public sector. They didn’t allow an increase in the numbers 
of new civil service positions. We couldn’t even use retirement positions. 
Regarding the higher administrative positions we have had to merge around 4 or 5 
of the lower positions to make up one senior position. That led to the loss of many 
lower positions. (SAO-PHO, focus group RE)
The best way of achieving workforce redistribution was to have a good system. We 
can’t force staff in the central region to move to Esam but we need to good 
motivation system such as topping up salaries or extra allowances for staff in rural 
areas. I agreed with the previous measure that the new health professional 
graduates must start work in the public sector and we must change the health 
workforce in the ‘public government’ scheme back to the civil service scheme to 
keep them working in the public sector. (DDCH, MK 24)
Regarding the new scheme of public sector employment which is not the ‘civil 
service’, that influenced our staff greatly. For example, this year one doctor (in the 
new scheme) has resigned. Actually, nobody wants to have a private boss: we 
would like to have the King as the boss in the civil service scheme. However, they 
must leave due to the fact that the system has changed. (DDCH, KS 17)
The consequences for the health reforms in Esam were problems of staff recruitment and 
retention, and further loss of capacity in the system. Although the MoPH allocation 
process might have seemed to be a way to transfer the workforce to Esam, there was a 
longstanding agreement that new graduates would not be sent to remote areas against their 
wishes, and that a different approach based on incentive payments would be used. 
However, where Esam hospitals only had low paid, non-civil service posts on offer, the 
remote area allowance was not a sufficient incentive to counter the basic unattractiveness 
of the job.
8.4 The impact of changes in the management system and organisational 
structure
In all three provinces, capitation-based funding led to problematic changes in relationships 
between organisations. Because UC funding channelled money into the system in a 
different way it led to a change in the balance of power, based on who held and allocated 
budgets and who did not. Previously, the PHO was the most powerful unit in the local 
health system with authority to determine the patterns of allocation of health resources 
within the province. However, when the CUPs became the main budget holder under the 
new financing mechanism of the UC policy, they became much more influential players in 
the local health care system, particularly at district level.
8.4.1 New relationship of health service units at the provincial level
Previous chapters have explored the decision space that PHOs had to adjust to the new 
conditions in different ways. The three provinces studies represent a spectrum from active 
to passive responses to change, with the Roi Et PHO in particular retaining considerable 
power by developing a purchaser role. However, the point that also needs to be made in 
this chapter is that all three PHOs confronted a common set of changes, which in many 
ways had similar impacts. Thus all needed to downsize to reduce their 10 old divisions to 
5 groups, and all had to adjust to losing their former status as the ‘commander’ of the local 
system, and the problem of developing a new role (where in terms of supervision, 
evaluation or purchasing). All also had to get to grips with the new financing arrangement 
which separated off the UC and non-UC budget. After the reforms the PHO had direct
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control over a non-UC budget of under 10 million baht per year, compared with the past 
when they controlled a total budget of several hundreds of million baht per year.
Previously, we were controlling the whole provincial budget. I feel that this did 
not sufficiently emphasise the performance-based model. We received the monies 
and paid them out according to a trimester budgeting system. After the 30 baht 
scheme came in, there were many changes which affected our department. In 
addition, the new system forced us to decentralise power to community hospitals, 
under the system that we call CUPs. So, we (the PHO) don’t have very much 
money, which causes difficulties. We need to request money from the CUPs or the 
UC sector. The PHO senior administrators have changed their roles. Even the 
CMO has changed his role to coordinator or monitor. (SAO-PHO, MK 08)
With regard the policy level, they wanted the PHO to change from a controller to a 
supervisor but didn’t provide any detail about how the change should occur. And, 
the PHOs were familiar with the old style of work as controller. Then they had to 
work without money. So we didn’t know what to do. I accept that I had no idea. 
(SAO-PHO, KS 05)
We take responsibility for the non-UC budget and all programs and projects of the 
PHO in the entire province. All of the non-UC budget which comes from central 
sources - both departments and divisions - is known as the ‘health system 
development budget’ or ‘cluster 300’. This budget in some provinces may be under 
the control of the General Administration Section but in this province the CMO 
gave it to the Health Strategy Development Group to look after. We have to check 
both how much money we have and how to manage on it. In this year, we received 
a budget of only 4 million baht. In addition we have to share this budget with the 
DHOs too. That is very small money when compared with the past, so that it 
doesn’t cover our expenses. We have to ask for help from part of the UC budget 
with CUPs to support our expenses. (SAO-PHO, RE 07)
Even allowing for the striking differences in the ways the three PHOs adjusted to the new 
situation, they shared a common problem of adjustment. They were all smaller, less 
wealthy bodies that had experienced a period of contraction and retrenchment, and faced 
an uncertain future.
8.4.2 Confusion in the line of the command at the district level
The rise of the CUPs as the main fund holders caused a problem in the line of command to 
the PCUs and health centres. Again this was a common issue in all three provinces, 
though one that was handled in different ways. Before the reforms the DHOs had acted as 
administrative bodies in the line of command from the PHO which oversaw the health 
centres. After the reforms, DHO Heads still retained formal authority over health centres in
accordance with the provincial government administrative system. In the new situation the 
CUP Board Chair, who also usually a hospital director, allocated money and needed to 
approve work in the newly developed PCUs and ensure their co-ordination with the 
community hospital. This led to a dual chain of command and some confusion and 
conflict. Lower-level staff in health centres and PCUs had to liaise upwards with two 
organisations, which might issue contradictory orders. There was sometimes a clash of 
authority between the ‘task boss’ and the ‘money boss’.
When the budget comes to the CUPs at the bottom, the health workers also have 
two bosses. The ‘money boss’ is the doctor director of the community hospital and 
the ‘task boss’ is the head of the district health office. In the principles of 
management, they say that the totality of resources comprises man, money and 
material. At the moment, the one controls money and another controls health 
activities. In the district, when the policies are implemented there are many 
confusions. (SAO-PHO, MK 06)
After the 30 baht scheme came in, we felt that we had two bosses: both the 
CMO/DHO head and the DDCH. To tell the truth, if we had a meeting in the CUP 
we would go along with the chair of CUP board. But, the DHO head said that he 
was our boss, which led to conflict and each not talking to the other. (Head HC, KS 
26)
Regarding the workforce, it wasn’t clear whether they were under the command of 
the CUP or the DHO. In the first year, we were confused about this because there 
was a lack of clarity about both the line of command and the management system. 
So this looked like a unit that held the budget and also had the authority. That was 
unclear and confusing in year one. And, the Ministry wasn’t clear about this either. 
In the second year, the DHO group tried to push on this and asked the Ministry for 
greater transparency about the budget and the allocation to the health centres, 
especially regarding the health promotion and prevention budget, because in the 
last year we got only a tiny part. Later the Ministry ordered the PHO to make a 
separate allocation to the health centres of about 37 baht per head from the P&P 
budget. (DHO Head, RE 22)
8.4.3 The control of the CUP by the hospital
Across all three provinces, there was a pattern whereby CUPs were associated with, and 
effectively controlled by, a community hospital. The policy to introduce capitation-based 
funding led to the creation of CUPs based on registered population. For practical reasons 
these were aligned with the existing local government administrative districts on the 
principle of ‘one CUP in one district’. There were exceptions to this pattern in some urban 
(‘Muang’) districts where there were UC-accredited private hospitals and more than one 
CUP. Also, the provincial hospital would typically head one ‘Muang’ CUP. However the
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general pattern (in line with the UC implementation guidance) was that the doctor director 
of a community hospital (or provincial hospital) acted as the head of CUP board. Most 
doctor directors combined their CUP chair duties with their hospital duties, and did not 
draw a clear line between the two areas of their work. This meant that developments which 
were major priorities for the hospital usually became major priorities for the CUP, and that 
other projects or developments tended to receive less attention. This usually translated into 
problems in getting finance for health centre projects.
Someone has said that if the health centre staff saw the CMO walking through they 
would disregard him but if that was the DDCH they would be super courteous. (...) 
It seems that whoever had the money would have the power. We’ve seen 
something like this in my district. This was a policy of the CUP that they told us 
about: we must deliver the performance and then we’d get the money. That was 
okay, I wouldn’t have argued about that, but I think that I didn’t see any difference 
between the PCUs and health centres. However, the CUP policy focused on the 
PCUs whereby they got a lot of support while the health centres didn’t have any. 
They said that the health centres weren’t the focal point and didn’t support them as 
we expected. (DHO head, RE 35)
When this became the CUP, it seemed that all health care services were transferred 
to come under the hospital. Although the parties had to work together in line with 
the committee model, all of the decision-making was under the control of the 
doctor director. (SAO-PHO, KS 03)
Some districts have conflicts because the DHO head tried to protect the rights of 
health workers in their budgets and the DDCH did not arrange the budget fairly. 
The bulk of the budget was allocated to support the hospital staff, whereas the 
health workers were given an insufficient budget and neglected. After that, the 
PHO came to a clear understanding that the budget did not belong to the DDCH. 
These budgets were allocating for the staff of the entire district and all of them 
were part of the same district team. The PHO recommended that they should all be 
given help. (DHO Head, MK 28)
As we have seen in preceding chapters, this problem was dealt with in different ways in 
the three provinces. Nevertheless, similar issues regarding the micro-allocation of 
resources occurred in all three case studies. This raises questions about the role of the 
CUP in the Thai purchaser/provider split, and whether a provider-side organisation of this 
kind was able to co-ordinate health services in the district area effectively. The CUP is 
innovative because it represents a unique approach for mediating between the purchaser 
and the service units in the local health care system, but the evidence gathered here 
suggests that it did not work well.
8.5 The controversy over primary care-led (PCL) policy
8.5.1 Arguments over the PCL policy
One of the strands of the UC reforms not so far discussed in detail was the idea that care 
should be ‘close to the home, close to the heart’. This policy slogan -  ‘glai baan, glai ja i ’ - 
was widely used to promote the idea of a PCL system and the proposed upgrading of 
health centres to PCUs. Some critics contended that this was really just the repackaging of 
an old idea, and represented the continuation of ‘primary health care’ as in the past. Others 
thought that the creation of PCUs might bring genuine change. Many aspects of the policy 
discourse remained unclear. From one perspective the hospital might provide community 
care at arms length in the form of an ‘extended OPD’. Another view was that health care 
units in the community could be developed, and then would function as ‘gate keepers’ for 
entry to hospitals. Implementation was affected by disagreement about the best approach, 
and also by workforce and staff recruitment problems.
I would to say that this was the old strategy we called ‘primary health care’ (in 
English) where we go to provide health care in the community (in English) or at the 
primary level (in English). Previously, there wasn’t any real focus on this policy 
but when the new reform policy was launched it focused on ‘glai baan, glai jaV 
and real ‘primary health care’ (in English). The health officers have to go into the 
, community to do surveys with the ‘family folder’ (in English) to understand the 
public. (...) We advised our health officers that we should categorise people in 
three groups: the ill, at-risk and well. Previously health care focused on illness and 
risk but according to the ‘glai baan, glai j a f  policy, we must go into the 
community to work with all groups. So, this policy wasn’t only talked about and 
announced but also specified in the core-benefit package of UC scheme, which 
forced to staff to go into the community. That was the real ‘glai baan, glai jai’ 
policy. (SAO-PHO, RE 02)
It was not so different from the old concept. Previously, we had implemented ‘the 
decade for health centre development project’ which aimed to improve the health 
centre to be the PCU as well. In addition, this government tried to develop the 
previous idea to become the primary care led policy. There was a good policy but 
not good preparation for implementation, especially regarding people’s 
expectations when we told them things like the doctor will stand by in the PCU. 
We did not fully implement this which left us facing a problem. (DDCH, MK 21)
I am not sure whether the health officers understand the difference between the 
PCU and the health centres, because the health centres still work in the same way 
and the hospital doesn’t give much support. At the beginning the doctor team came 
to the health centre one day a week on Tuesdays. Now they don’t visit on time and
it changed to once a month and sometimes there was only a nurse coming, or the 
doctor would come but not the pharmacist. (HCO, KS 30)
8.5.2 The burden of implementing the PCL policy
However, the real problem in implementing the PCL policy was the shortage of staff in the 
health centres. This was partly about an absolute shortage of qualified professionals in 
Esam, but also about relationships between different sections of the workforce. Getting 
new community projects and other necessary work underway usually depended on the 
mobile team from the hospital going out to assist community-based staff. That led to a new 
problem in the relationship between hospital staff and health centres or PCU staff. These 
difficulties raised question marks about the sustainability of the policy in the long run.
I think at present implementation it is not good, because the health professionals 
who came from the hospital went into the community on the basis of incentive 
payments for the work, whereas the health workers in the community still worked 
whether they had money or no money. Then, the allowance was decreased and the 
doctors didn’t want to go to the PCUs. Often they would go to the PCU once a 
week and this became twice per week. At present the nurse must work to replace 
the doctor in some places. The doctors who go to the PCU are only responsible for 
treatment activities. They don’t understand the roles of the health professional team 
based on this concept. They did not help or support the health officers as expected. 
On the other hand the health officers must take care of them and let them use the 
facilities. (DHO Head, MK 30)
With regard to the health workforce plan of the MoPH, it was specified that health 
staff in the PCU, based on the criteria in the standard manual, must comprise a 
doctor and nurse. In fact, the average staff number in health centres was below five, 
which did not follow the criteria. Then they (the MoPH) brought together three 
health centres to become one PCU, which would cover a population of around 
10,000. However, in the government administrative structure they have a health 
centre in one sub-district, whereas the decentralisation bill, which was based on the 
Thai constitution, specified that health centres must move under the command of 
the local government organisation (LGO), and the LGO must support the health 
centres both in terms of staff and other resources. However, the MoPH created a 
new organisational structure based on the health care unit network to serve people 
in the local area. This included the proposals to merge three health centres into one 
PCU. That meant that one PCU had around 9 staff. They each had to do their own 
work, but are brought together for some tasks (SAO-PHO, KS 02)
The heath centre staff and hospital staff still work separately and hardly speak to 
each other. There were disputes in some PCUs where the health centre staff 
accused a nurse of claiming the allowance payment without visiting people in the 
community. There are still problems in some areas and worsening relationships. 
(HO-PCU, RE 39)
8.6 The perspectives of local actors on the purchaser/provider split
Although the policy design of the UC reforms called for the creation of a 
purchaser/provider split, this was an aspect of the reforms that few respondents spoke 
about at length in the interviews. Generally speaking they fell into the two camps of those 
who did not think anything had really changed and those who did not understand the 
planned changes. This can be partly attributed to delays in implementation associated with 
the 3 year transitional period of phasing in the provisions of the NHS Act. However, it 
also seemed to indicate that many informants regarded the idea of purchasing state-funded 
health care as an alien concept, which did not mesh with Thai culture, or simply found the 
idea difficult to grasp.
It did not change, in my view. There was no split between the provider and the 
purchaser; they are the same person who is both provider and purchaser. In 2003 
(the second year of implementation), the government said that it must create a clear 
split. However, it was more than 6 months ago and I did not see any change. It is 
still unclear. (DHO Head, KS 22)
I think it will take a long time until people understand. With regard to purchasing I 
may deny some people entry to the UC scheme, For instance, if local government 
is to be the purchaser and we act as the provider, perhaps we may not accept 
everyone for registration. For example, some villages or sub-districts come with 
high risk factors because they do not take care of themselves adequately, and we 
may set the insurance fee at a different rate in each area based on their risk. I am 
not sure if the government and the people understand this point. If the government 
policy forces the hospitals to become public organisations, we must manage the 
hospital as the company which is responsible for running itself. We should have the 
right to determine the insurance rate and therefore we could not accept payment at 
the same rate as the capitation rate which the government has announced. 
Moreover, I must manage the increasing burden of both the staff salary costs and 
other expenses in the liospital, so I must receive money based on the real risk 
factors. I have a question about the preparation and readiness of purchasers. If they 
give me 3 years to prepare I would be ready, but in ten years what about the 
people? For example, the people in the municipality area where there are many 
risk factors such as drugs, AIDS, accident. If I do not accept them for registration, 
they should not complain to me and the government should not force me to take 
them either, because if we transform to be a public organisation we must survive by 
themselves. Surely the government would not push us to work with an insufficient 
budget that would make us bankrupt and ensure absolutely that we would not 
survive. (DDCH, MK 20)
In the purchaser/provider concept there is good chance to support each other. 
However, in the Thai health care service system, given the people’s behaviour in 
accessing health care, provider and patient have been helping each other. In
particular, Thai culture and the relationship between the doctor and patient 
resembles parenthood and does not look like a purchaser and provider relationship. 
In future, we need to separate them - 1 think it should be done - but this is not the 
right time. Also, we have talked about the purchaser and provider split but we were 
not clear about who will act as the purchaser. (DDCH, RE 22)
Only in Roi Et, as seen in Chapter 7, did the PHO emphasize its purchaser role. However, 
even in that province the degree to which messages about the purchaser/provider system 
permeated down to lower level actors in the local health care system was limited and 
variable. Even there many had only a limited understanding of the policy.
8.7 The change of direction in top-level policy
Actors across the three provinces were well aware of the change of direction in high level 
policy that occurred in the second year of the reforms. The holding of the salaries budget 
at the centre, the cutting back of capitation payments to Esam and a degree of slippage in 
implementing the provisions of the National Health Security Act all had highly visible 
effects in the provinces. There was also a perception that influence had passed to a more 
conservative group in the Ministry. The change of Permanent Secretary of the MoPH in 
October 2001 significantly changed the implementation on the UC policy. The conflict 
between the reformist Deputy Minister and the new Permanent Secretary, led to the 
transfer of the Deputy Minister to another ministry. As described earlier in the thesis, this 
resulted in a confusing transitional period when both the MoPH and the NHSO tried to 
exercise influence at provincial level. The PHOs had been appointed as branch offices of 
the NHSO, but were also the local supervisor organisation of the MoPH with an oversight 
relationship to the providers. PHOs therefore had dual functions on both the purchaser and 
provider sides. Local actors in all three provinces perceived that the direction of 
implementation had changed and that this threw up new problems.
I think that initially, they were sincere and clearly under the control of the Deputy 
Health Minister, Surapong. That was clear direction. Nowadays, things are 
becoming confused: for example, they have deducted staff salary costs at the 
central level. That new system needs to make it clear that they must not increase 
staff numbers in areas where they already have a large staff. I agree with the 
MoPH about the need to solve these problems, but it must be under conditions that 
do not move new staff into problem areas where there are limited staff salary 
budgets. The capitation model is the way to re-distribute health resources: in places 
where there are too many staff they cannot survive. The MoPH approach does not 
ensure a long term solution. It only solves the immediate problem. After 3 years of
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implementing the policies, the budget from the NHSO will be allocated direct to 
health units. It won’t be channelled through the MoPH, and so what does it do 
next. That is my question to the MoPH, I don’t know what they are thinking now. 
It should have prepared the whole system. The system design was clear, and there 
was a clear direction. If the MoPH does not instruct them (the Hospitals in Central 
region) to change it will have problems. The MoPH does not have a clear long 
term view, it is an uncertain situation and the budget is uncertain too. How to 
develop quality of human resources is one question. The minister, she does not 
understand. I suppose that when the transition period is over we will still be in a 
state of confusion if we don’t do it the right way. When the time comes, who will 
be responsible for paying staff salary costs? There is no answer, or perhaps they 
will have one, but I do not know. Regarding the decreasing budget, we asked the 
Health Region inspector when he came, but we did not get an answer. (SAO-PHO, 
MK 02)
This policy is very a good policy but there are problems with its implementation. 
Firstly, the budget in the first year, the hospitals expected that they would receive a 
sufficient figure where they would feel ‘happy’ (in English) to pay for extra 
allowances and other activities. Then, in the second year the ministry cut their 
capitation budget and that blocked many activities and affected their programs and 
projects. These made them work at less than full capacity. I have seen in some 
CUPs that they have good plans and have dealt with their problems well, but when 
the budget was decreased that forced them to make changes and cut off many good 
projects, because they need to adapt their work to match the actual budget. They 
were unclear about the budget arrangement and they (the centre) never warned 
them in advance about this situation. (SAO-PHO, KS 07)
Regarding the top level of the NHSO and the MoPH, I think that in the new system 
we couldn’t work as we like it because we are actors and the NHSO is the payer. 
The NHSO launched a lot of guidance to support the public such as freedom for 
people to register with the hospital they chose. I think the NHSO was a forward- 
thinking organisation but the MoPH was a conservative one. The civil servants 
would have been pushed to work with the new dimension and if some people didn’t 
change they would be forced to leave. I have been working with the NSHO staff in 
the PCU on the Dream Project, and I understand the way they think, which led to 
me getting an award from them. And the directions of the NHSO and the MoPH 
were different. (DDCH, Focus group in RE)
8.8. The limits on the power of local actors to shape change
This chapter sets a context for the chapters on the individual reform stories by describing 
some of the common forces that affected all three provinces. Where Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
emphasised the areas of local discretion that provinces had to respond to the national 
reform template in different ways, this chapter list some of the constraints that affected all 
of them. It is not easy to combine an account of these shared pressures with the details of
the policy narratives in the three provinces. However a kind of balance between 
constraints and limited freedom of action emerged in all three case studies.
In most of the areas touched upon the three provinces could not escape problems, but they 
did have scope to manage them in different ways. The macro resource allocation problem 
was one that no province was able to influence to any real extent, and which led to a policy 
change in the Ministry (in the form of the central salaries budget) that affected all three in 
similar ways. The micro-resource allocation problem surfaced in similar ways across all 
three provinces, but was managed differently in different places. Mahasarakham had 
managed to prevent the problem appearing in such acute form by putting much emphasis 
on the development of community projects. Kalasin experienced open conflict between 
CUP board chairs and health centres but resolved the problem when DHO Heads and PHO 
staff gained support from the Health Region Inspector to change the rules. The Roi Et 
PHO limited the problem through mediation and kept the issue in the background, even 
through it was present for the whole of the research period.
The problems of workforce distribution, changes in the terms of public sector employment, 
and the differing benefits available to different sections of the workforce derived mainly 
from central rules that had a similar impact across all three provinces. Only in the area of 
staff morale did there seem to be any real difference. Mahasarakham’s interest in civil 
society engagement and community projects seemed to have given community-based staff 
in that province more recognition, and avoided the depth of bad feelings and divisions 
apparent in the other two provinces.
The lower-level actors who influenced local implementation of the UC policies were 
mainly people within the formal health care system, rather than actors within civil society 
or private companies. Even in Mahasarakham, where a number of community projects had 
been started up, these developments had very little impact in shaping UC policy. The 
involvement of international NGOs in the three provinces was limited mainly to a number 
of projects targeted at specific diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and again had no effect on the 
way UC policy was rolled out at local level. NGOs had a more significant role at national 
level, where they were influential in areas such as expanding the UC scheme’s core 
benefits package to include haemodialysis and ART, but this is outside the scope of the 
present study. Multi-national private enterprises, such as drug companies, played a
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significant role at national level in areas like ART policy (Tantivess, 2006), but had little 
or no role at the provincial level discussed in this thesis.
Similarly the changes in the administrative structure and functions of the different bodies 
had a generally uniform effect across the three provinces. As explained earlier, the PHO in 
Roi Et adjusted to give itself a powerful post-reform role, while the PHO in 
Mahasarakham had less power but retained a degree of influence in a co-operative network 
of local bodies. The problem of the local hierarchy and the organisation with ‘two heads’ 
were represented an area of weakness in the reform design and was never properly 
resolved in any of the case study areas.
All three provinces had difficulties in adjusting to the purchaser/provider split system. 
Although Roi Et moved further than the others is embracing this concept at PHO level, 
local actors in the provincial health care system still lacked a good understanding. The 
change of direction in Year 2, and the move into a confusing transitional phase had an 
effect in all the case studies. Although they tried to manage the problem in rather different 
ways, there was a shared sense of uncertainty about the future.
8.9. Summary of chapter
This chapter has examined common pressures or policy developments that affected all 
three study provinces. It has discussed factors that constrained the decision making 
freedom of local policy actors, and which must be set alongside the areas of discretion to 
shape local policy in different ways described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Chapter 9 
Discussion and conclusions
Chapter 9. Discussion and conclusions
9.1 Introduction
This study set out to investigate the interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
influences on the implementation of UC policy in the local health system of the three NE 
Thai provinces. The research examined the role of different actors, contexts and processes 
in policy implementation at local level. This chapter brings together the overall findings 
about the policy implementation process. It also considers lessons from the Thai reforms 
for other countries, and directions for future research.
9.2 Implementing UC policy: perspectives from three provinces
9.2.1 The Policy stories
This thesis aims to shed light on the nature of implementation process by a qualitative 
study of events and perspectives at local level. It analyses the policy stories of three 
provinces to examine common patterns and differences. The analysis pays attention to the 
extent of local discretionary power, the networks of local actors, the interactions between 
higher and lower levels, changes in the organisation of local services, perspectives on the 
reforms, problems encountered, and the balance between local discretion and central 
constraint. Some of the key elements of the policy stories will now be summarised.
As explained in Chapter 1, the MoPH had given all Thai PHOs significant areas of local 
discretion in the first year of the reforms, mainly relating to the choice of financing 
arrangements. However one important finding of this study is that it was not just the 
narrow choice of funding model that distinguished the provinces, but the wider issue of 
how PHOs constructed their role as a key policy implementation agency within the new 
framework. The reforms created an ambiguous space within which different PHOs could 
construct themselves as decision making agencies of rather different kinds, and which then 
led them to approach their (official) areas of devolved discretion in different ways. This 
initial positioning of the PHOs affected most of the other elements of the policy stories and 
is reflected in the titles of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
9.2.2 Mahasarakham: distributed power and civil society engagement
The stance of Mahasarakham province was characterised as involving ‘distributed power’. 
The PHO remained the key organisation driving the reforms, but reached out to involve 
other bodies at different levels of the local health care system and involve them in the 
decision making process. Rather than directing events through the chain of command, the 
PHO sought to do so by influence and persuasion. It exercised a form of gentle steering, 
which gave the appearance of wide participation, but where in practice most key decisions 
accorded with the plans of the PHO. This was reflected in the fact that though the PCIHI 
contained representatives from many bodies, the highly influential war room committee 
was composed mainly of PHO insiders. One aspect of the inclusive approach of the PHO 
was its emphasis on the importance of civil society, which was linked to its involvement in 
a range of community projects over many years.
The distinctive features of the policy story in Mahasarakham include the relatively well- 
developed project management capabilities of the PHO, the attempt to link a wide range of 
actors into the local policy making network, the public commitment to civil society 
engagement, and the good communication links between the PHO and the MoPH
There was a history of past projects and initiatives in Mahasarakham that was more 
extensive than anything in the other two study provinces. Many involved close co­
operation with the MoPH and helped strengthen relationships and standing with the centre, 
as was illustrated by an award for best implementation strategy in Esam in the first year of 
the reforms. The CMO and senior PHO officers were already experienced in managing 
change across a range of agencies, and their capacity to manage change appeared stronger 
than that in the two neighbouring provinces.
A range of other actors were involved in local policy making, but did not divide into rival 
camps or themselves draw power away from the PHO to the extent that happened 
elsewhere. Although other local actors, such as the provincial hospital head, the DDCHs 
or the DHO heads felt that they had exercised influence over the detail of certain policies, 
the PHO retained broad control over the direction of change. The CMO was probably the 
most powerful single local policy actor, but he was willing to give other agencies a share 
of influence and seats on important committees. Although the ‘war room’ dominated by 
PHO staff generally set the lead, there were examples when its recommendations were
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over-ruled by the PCIHI, such as the handling of the salaries budget in Year 2. The choice 
of the so-called ‘inclusive’ funding model in Year 1, which in reality was a mixed 
approach, reflects Mahasarakham’s more general commitment to inclusiveness in the local 
health system, which here again was not quite what it seemed on the surface. The mixed 
approach struck a balance between the interests of the provincial hospital and the CUPs 
dominated by the DDCHs, and the PHO also took steps to safeguard the position of the 
health centres. Even the DHOs which seemed to be the big losers in the initial 
reorganisation of services, recovered some influence as their roles were clarified in Years 
2 and 3.
Senior PHO officers gave considerable support initiatives to develop civil society 
participation in Mahasarakham province, but there are question marks about how far these 
impacted on the implementation of UC policies in the province. These were a mixture of 
government-sponsored ‘prachakhom’ projects and a small number of grassroots 
‘prachasangkhorrC initiatives. However, in most cases the positive view of progress from 
the higher level actors co-existed with a more sceptical assessment from front-line actors. 
All of the current initiatives were aimed at community-based health promotion rather than 
citizen involvement in local policy making.
The excellent relationship between senior PHO administrators and high-level MoPH 
contacts seems to be one factor that made the CMO’s subtle steering approach viable. 
Other local actors who might have formed rival power groups, such as the provincial 
hospital and the DDCHs had poorer links with the centre, and relied on the PHO to solve 
problems by bringing influence to bear. The case of the PCIHI and the change in MoPH 
regulations necessary to let the PHO bypass the AHB (which linked to local government) 
is an example.
9.2.2 Kalasin: fragmented power and struggles between professional interest groups
In Kalasin the story is about the PHO’s failure to be proactive and construct a viable new 
role in the early period of the reforms. The absence of a clear lead from the PHO resulted 
in a fragmented distribution of power, and greater influence for middle-ranking 
professional groups, such as the DDCHs and later the DHO heads. Factors such as early 
retirements and loss of experienced staff in the PHO, and the personalities of senior 
officers help to explain this. The passive stance of the PHO led to the ongoing tensions
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between the professional interest groups, and finally necessitated top-down action when 
there were changes in the mechanism for funding health centres in Years 2 and 3.
The main elements of the policy story in Kalasin are the wide range of actors in both 
PCIHI and war room, an unusual pattern in local medical networks with weak provincial 
hospital leadership and strong DDCHs, a skilful rearguard action by DHO heads, and the 
interventionist stance of the Health Region Inspector.
The involvement of a wide range of actors in the two key committees, coupled with the 
relative lack of seniority of the Head of the Health Insurance Group and the passive stance 
of the PHO leadership, resulted in a leakage of power away from the PHO. When added to 
the lack of a strong doctor director in the provincial hospital, this opened the way for 
middle-ranking actors -  the DDCHs -  to become more powerful than in the other two 
provinces. In Kalasin the leading figures in this group had a prominent national profile. 
The DDCHs’ influence was augmented because other policy actors in Kalasin accepted 
that the CUP was a key entity in the new organisational structure.
In Kalasin, conflict between interest groups centred mainly on resource allocation and the 
question of the roles of the hospitals and health centres in primary care. The fight back by 
the DHO heads illustrates how another group of middle-level policy actors regained some 
influence mainly by getting the support of an external ally -  the Health Region Inspector. 
His intervention seems to have been crucial in persuading the PHO to take action and curb 
the power of the CUPs to control the funding of health centres.
Kalasin had no major civil society projects, but it did throw up an interesting case where 
local people were able to mobilise influence to change an aspect of the UC reforms. This 
concerned the PCIHI’s decision to allow people freedom to register with their chosen 
hospital in ‘Muang’ municipality area, after opposition to the initial plan of separate 
catchment areas for the provincial and private hospitals. It is significant that this happened 
through people exerting pressure on local politicians rather than through any consultation 
process set up by the PHO. The public furore surrounding this incident reflects the poor 
capacity of the PHO to manage community involvement and its lack of experience in this 
area compared with Mahasarakham.
9.2.3 Roi Et: using active purchasing to steer the local health system
The CMO in Roi Et emphasised the purchaser/provider split aspect of the reforms in a way 
that Mahasarakham and Kalasin did not, and used this to redefine relationships with key 
actors at local level. The PHO developed a new evaluation and monitoring role, linked to 
the notion of purchaser as the overseer of provider organisations which had to be 
accredited before contracts could be entered and money passed on.
The main elements of the policy story in Roi Et concern the working out of the new 
‘monitoring’ role, the reshaping of relationships with lower level organisations, and the 
creation of an evaluation and monitoring system quite different from that operating in the 
neighbouring provinces.
Compared with the other provinces, Roi Et had a close-knit circle of senior administrators 
at the top who did make great efforts to share power with lower level organisations. 
‘Monitoring’ sometimes resembled the older PHO ‘supervision’ role, and there was more 
directive, top-down steering in Roi Et than in the two neighbouring provinces. 
Nevertheless conflicts among the local actors were handled through discussion and 
negotiation in meetings rather than direct command. An understanding was reached with 
the doctor director of the PHO, whereby hospital interests were safeguarded, even though 
the DDPH remained at arms length from the senior PHO administrator group. Middle level 
actors did not build up the same influence in the main committees that they did in Kalasin, 
even though the DDCHs were well organised through a strong provincial society. 
Nevertheless, the community hospitals were given control of a good share of resources, 
with only minimal interference from the PHO, largely on the basis that the purchasing 
organisation should not interfere too much in the sphere of the CUPs. The choice of the 
inclusive model in Year 1, may have been as much about the Roi Et PHO’s to conform 
with the logic of the purchaser/provider model which gave it a new source of power, as 
with any real move away from central control.
The new PHO evaluation and standard setting role was supported by the development of a 
system of performance appraisal and grading. Health units at the different levels were 
evaluated against their plans and then given scores, which were then mentioned in reports 
to the MoPH, and which enabled higher level administrators to draw comparisons between
units. The PHO’s control over this process gave it a new source of leverage over the lower 
level health organisations.
The Roi Et PHO’s approach to conflict between other organisations was to stop short of 
directing CUPs to change behaviour and rather to use influence to try to achieve 
compromise. This approach kept problems in channelling funds to health centres within 
manageable proportions, but did not solve the problem by a change in funding 
methodology such as occurred in Kalasin.
Senior Roi Et administrators did not emphasise civil society involvement and there were 
no projects of the kind implemented in Mahasarakham. Relations with MoPH generally 
involved communication through formal, routine channels and was not especially warm, 
perhaps reflecting the same absence of friends at the top which may have led to the CMO’s 
posting to a relative backwater after holding the prestigious Khon Kaen CMO post. By 
contrast, the Head of the provincial hospital was able to use his good MoPH contacts to get 
funding for a number of projects directly from the centre.
9.3 Answering the research questions
In chapter 1, eight questions were listed about the UC policy implementation process. 
Based on a synthesis of elements from the above policy stories, some provisional answers 
will now be put forward.
L Who were the main actors involved in the processes o f UC policy implementation in 
the local health system?
As expected, the main policy actors at local level were staff in the various tiers of the 
Ministry of Public Health system in the province -  actors working in the PHO, the 
provincial hospital and, to a lesser extent, the community hospitals, the district health 
offices and the health centres. The most important committees were the PCIHIs and the 
‘war room’ committees, as well as the CUP boards and PHO quality committees. Local 
government generally had a very limited role in implementing the UC reforms in the north 
east, and in none of the case study provinces did Area health Boards have an important 
role. Directors of private hospitals lacked influence, with the only Director interviewed 
stating that he had been largely excluded from decision making processes. The possibility
for lower level actors to influence events was very limited, with the only significant civil 
society projects (in Mahasarakham) having more to do with health promotion than public 
involvement in policy making. Such influence that was exercised was through other 
means such as local politicians (see the Kalasin case).
2. What were the channels o f communication between lower level and higher level 
actors?
The Thai system resembles some other command-and-control health systems where a 
central Ministry transmits guidance and instructions to actors in the lower tiers. During the 
research period certain guidance permitted latitude for local discretion such as that 
concerning selection of funding models, while there were also directives that permitted no 
local variation, such as the order to use the ‘exclusive’ model in Year 2. While there was a 
system of formal reporting from the lower tiers to the MoPH, and also the possibility of 
contact with the national ‘war room’ to solve problems in the first years of the reforms, 
there seemed to be no mechanisms for more general feedback to policy makers regarding 
the implementation process. One finding of the study was that provinces varied in their 
ability to supplement formal communications with informal contact with higher level 
actors to help solve problems. Mahasarakham, in particular, had good channels of 
communication with MoPH contacts. The Health Regions varied in the way they engaged 
with the UC reforms, and the extent to which local actors used them to try to influence 
developments, with Region 6 covering Kalasin being the most interventionist.
3. What changes occurred in the organisation o f local health services as the UC reforms 
were implemented?
The main changes reported by respondents centred on the changed role of the public 
organisations, and tensions between the old and new administrative structures. The 
financing mechanism transformed the relative positions of the PHO and the hospitals, 
because the CUP gave more power to DDCHs. The tension between old and new 
structures extended from wrangles within the MoPH and NHSO at the top, all the way 
down to conflict between DDCHs, DHO heads and health centre staff at the bottom. At 
face value, the changed framework seemed to leave the PHOs in a less dominant role, but 
as illustrated in the case studies, the way PHOs constructed a new role differed markedly. 
In Mahasarakham and Roi Et, the PHOs both managed to define their roles in ways which
left them with considerable influence, one through gentle steering and one through a more 
top-down active purchaser role. The purchaser/provider split remained mainly a plan not 
yet properly implemented during the period of the study. Its likely impact and what it 
might mean for a greater local government role remained unclear.
4. How much scope did local actors have to influence the content o f the reforms or the 
approach to implementation taken?
For most of the time only local actors at a relatively high level in the provinces (such as 
the CMO, senior PHO administrators and doctor directors of provincial hospitals) had any 
real prospect of offering feedback and influencing the way UC policy was implemented. 
The PHO officers in particular was the group given devolved powers to select local 
financing approaches by the MoPH, and tended to have the best channels of 
communication to the MoPH.
However, the study also found examples where actors at the middle-level in the provincial 
public health hierarchy gained a surprising degree of influence. This occurred because the 
absence of a strong PHO lead created this opportunity (as in the Kalasin case), but it also 
reflected the ability of middle-level actors to take advantage of their strategic position in 
the new organisational framework (e.g. the Kalasin DDCHs) or to gain support from 
powerful allies (e.g. the Kalasin DHO heads and the Health Region Inspector).
Many middle and lower-level staff characterised the reforms as overly ‘top-down’ and 
complained about a lack of responsiveness from the MoPH. Many respondents from lower 
staff grades did not have a good understanding of the reforms, and had no clear channels 
for feeding back their views. Although most expressed strong support for UC health care, 
the involvement of low-level public health officers in actively shaping policy was virtually 
non-existent, and several respondents flatly stated that nothing had happened at local level 
to change policy.
The case study evidence shows that the way the reforms were applied in bodies such as the 
PHOs and the CUPs were shaped by actors at PHO level and sometimes the middle-level. 
However, but this does not mean that changes they made determined the final shape of the 
reforms. Usually there was a cycle where local adaptations were made, but were then 
subject to review by higher-level actors, sometimes on the basis of emergent problems, and
where the higher-level actors then brought in further policy changes. This happened at 
both provincial level with the PCIHIs/PHOs, and at national level with the MoPH/NHSO. 
This cycle of policy roll-out, local adaptation, and higher level policy revision, seems to 
apply to many health reforms worldwide. While questions can be asked about the ultimate 
impact of the kind of local influences described here, these influences did affect the way 
reforms were implemented in the early years, and whatever the subsequent policy 
adjustments from the centre, will have crucially shaped the public experience of the 
reforms and probably their longer-term path.
This research presents the voices of local actors in Esam, the poorest and probably the 
least heard region of Thailand. One missing component of the study, in terms of 
implementation influences, is the voices of the professional interest groups in the MoPH 
and central region. This includes leading members of the medical profession in the large 
teaching hospitals and super-tertiary centres in central region, who were probably among 
the most important influences in forcing the turn towards more conservative policies in the 
MoPH in 2002. The struggle between pro-reformist elements and conservatives in the 
MoPH/NHSO is a crucial part of the implementation story that needs to be told elsewhere. 
Events in central region probably influenced the overall direction of UC policy in Thailand 
more than events in Esam. Bits of that story, and commentary on what was happening at 
the centre, came through in the accounts of respondents in this study, but this is no 
substitute for a proper study of those actor networks.
5. Given the importance o f the financing mechanism in the UC reforms, how was that 
mechanism adapted to local conditions?
As expected, the choice of funding mechanism was an important area of local discretion 
(probably second only to the overall approach adopted by the PHO in terms of its new 
role). At the time when the case study provinces were selected it was not known whether 
these provinces had taken the same or different approaches, but actually they all took a 
different route. In October 2001 Kalasin opted for an exclusive model, while Roi Et also 
favoured the exclusive model, but with a different Clearing House arrangement, and 
Mahasarakham employed a ‘mixed’ approach. Though the subsequent change of MoPH 
policy towards a more directive approach, then pushed all three in a similar direction, 
differences remained in areas such as the operation of the clearing houses, the kinds of 
provincial contingency funds held, how PHO activities were funded, and how monies were
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channelled to health centres. The differences are explained in detail in the respective 
policy stories.
6. What were the perspectives o f  local actors on the UC reforms, their feasibility and the 
implementation approaches adopted nationally and locally?
Many respondents, especially at lower levels, had a poor understanding of the 
purchaser/provider split about to be implemented in the Thai system, which highlighted the 
huge shift in culture that would be required if the new system was to work as intended. 
Nevertheless, there was widespread support for UC reform from staff at all levels. At the 
same time there was concern that limited funding might undermine the new system. There 
was an increasing feeling that Esam was not getting its fair share of resources, and that the 
early re-distributive objective of the reforms had been undermined due to pressure from 
professionals in central region. Towards the end of fieldwork several respondents 
suggested that the financial viability of community hospitals was especially precarious. 
They pointed out that the problems of workforce distribution and recruitment in Esam 
region remained largely unsolved. Ambiguous policy on spreading funding and manpower 
more equally, lack of resources and the lack of responsiveness of the MoPH to the views 
of local actors were the main problems as seen by the respondents.
7. What were the problems encountered in implementing UC policies and how fa r  did 
they differ in the three provinces?
In terms of the core financing reforms, there was a macro-level problem concerning the 
distribution of finance and the workforce across the nation, and a micro problem 
concerning how resources were distributed by CUPs to hospitals and health centres.
The capitation funding system had been designed to address the problem of unequal 
funding and staffing by having money follow patients, but was quickly undermined by 
opposition from large hospitals and professionals in urban centres (central region). The 
respondents in the present study were able to witness the effects of changing policies, 
which first gave them more money and then clawed it back, but could do little to influence 
this.
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The micro allocation problem at CUP level was a concern in all three PHOs in the study, 
but surfaced in more acute form in some places than others (it was especially problematic 
in Kalasin). All three provinces managed to avoid the risk (highlighted by many 
commentators early in the reforms) that tertiary hospitals would be starved of funds 
through non-referrals from the CUPs. But all experienced the problem of CUPs not 
passing sufficient funds to health centres. The three PHOs each used different strategies to 
deal with this problem: negotiation and gentle steering plus the mixed funding approach in 
Mahasarakham, mediation plus use of contingency funds and a tough inspection regime in 
Roi Et, and an initial hands off approach followed by intervention and top-slicing of health 
centre funds in Kalasin.
The above problems contributed to a failure to fully implement the planned move towards 
primary care-led services. The aim of upgrading health centres to PCUs by adding doctors 
and nurses remained largely unrealised. Many community hospitals created PCUs on site 
but these usually resembled conventional outpatient clinics rather than ‘close to the home’ 
care. Because the initial ‘standard’ specified for PCUs proved unattainable, 3 levels of 
development were identified, and most PCUs remained stuck at the low or middle levels.
8, What are the areas o f autonomy and the constraints affecting local actors?
The areas of autonomy open to local actors were those described under 4 and 5 above, but 
these were hemmed in by various constraints discussed in Chapter 8. Many of the 
constraints were concerned with macro resource allocation issues, and the inability of 
actors in Esam to exert influence when policies changed. They were unable to do much at 
local level to mitigate the effect of clawing salaries back to the MOPH and subsequently 
reduced budgets, or to address the workforce distribution and recmitment problems. At the 
same time staff at all levels experienced an increase in workload linked to the 
administrative burden of introducing the reforms and the increased patient attendances that 
resulted from low cost care.
9.4 Conclusions and future research
This study was conceived as a ‘policy ethnography’, an approach that uses qualitative 
methodology to investigate the perspectives of actors within the health care system. The 
research supports the idea that macro-level social structures, such as health care reforms,
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emerge from micro-level interactions but also constrain those interactions. The shape of 
the UC reforms during the 2001-04 period were determined as much by the 
implementation process as by the ‘blueprint’ devised at the policy formation stage, which
i
in the Thai case was substantially revised as events unfolded. There was a cycle of policy 
prescriptions, local adaptations and higher level policy revisions that affected several 
aspects of the reforms and particularly the financing mechanism, and in which lower level 
actors clearly had a major impact. Of course, the influence of local actors is not equal and 
is often confined to those in strategic positions of authority, but sometimes middle-ranking 
actors may be able to harness their special position or links to powerful allies to influence 
the local implementation of reforms.
However, although local actors played their part in ‘field testing’ and adapting the reform 
plan, this was something that the MoPH did not acknowledge. It made no efforts to gain 
the benefits that better channels for feedback from the lower levels might have brought. 
The implementation ‘model’ favoured by the MoPH was flexible to the extent that no 
complete reform ‘blueprint’ existed, but it lacked an effective mechanism for engaging 
with lower level actors, and was dominated by certain over-riding resource concerns which 
meant that local voices at the lower level were ignored. There is a case for a more explicit 
role for bottom-up feedback and this is a possible lesson for Thai policy makers to learn. 
One radical suggestion is that high-level policy actors should act as network managers or 
facilitators, who improve the conditions under which actors interact, so that policies can be 
refined and their goals realised (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997). Arguably the 
government should help facilitate discourse and discussion so that lessons are learned and 
implementation processes are improved. Enhancing research capacity and linkages to 
networks of actors at the service level might be one element of this.
This study suggests a number of directions for future research. The study was conducted in 
Esam because it was thought useful to assess the impact of the reforms in the poorest area 
of Thailand. However, it is important to compare these findings with accounts of other 
regions which also encountered problems in policy implementation. As mentioned earlier, 
interest groups in central region appear to have been very influential in bringing about a 
change in MoPH policies, and comparable data on events there would be especially 
valuable.
This study focused on implementation from the point of view of administrative and 
provider organisations in the local health care system, but has little to say about the 
consumers of health care. Studies are needed that look at the views of the general public 
as well as patients and relatives about the UC reforms. Historically people in Esam have 
been heavily disadvantaged by the mal-distribution of health funding and the professional 
workforce and stand to benefit considerably from the UC reforms, but there are questions 
about whether their impact has been as great as was predicted. There are indications that 
sections of the public have doubts about the quality of ’30 baht’ health care, and 
especially the drugs and level of service provided under the scheme.
Finally there is a need for research that examines policy implementation over a longer 
period, and takes account of developments such as the increasing involvement of the 
NHSO and local government. This leads to various questions. What agency will act as 
local purchaser? What kind of purchaser/provider contracting will develop? How will 
relationships in the local health system evolve? And what will be the respective roles of 
the MoPH and the NHSO in the local health system? The tendency of some Thai 
commentators to see the UC reforms as a big bang reform introduced in little over a year 
has diverted attention from the continuing implementation effort needed to keep the 
reforms on track. In many ways the initial swift roll-out of coverage was the easy part, and 
the longer-term development of the purchaser/provider split and the financing mechanism 
that will be more challenging. There is a need for further implementation studies to 
examine the next phases of reform.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Interview Guide (Prepared February 2003)
a. How have the reforms affected your organisation?
msiJgiiJipjnivmifj'lmilenj'itJ 30 uimntniifiha Swanssaijfiihbimafm
lilayuuiJma'awui^ iunja^ Yhuad'H'b (msibsiau uvujtki uasjimfvo lanarfufmvmm yiinaini^ nJaatJUiJa'iliJ
( I d | o' id e d e V<\ D o' o' v d e  <^  \L!iis;iJ5s;ifi(um5,Ll5um€it)tui5mfvii^ ™(u0'iwmtTUfiititu
b. How have they changed relationships with other organisations, including new 
organisations?
wanssaiJBinmsiiJaauuiJa^ fmT} mbiflijwusfnvi flialuuasniauanvi^a i^uSmfiiJaoimila^ayi f^riJ'u maBininmj; 
nsm'itmehath-disnaii
c. Have the reform policies changed/been adapted at all since the Government first 
announced the Bt30 scheme? That is to say, is the content of the reforms evolving as 
implementation occurs?
<=i * di * <d i tlaSmsnJaauuila^fa'diuiiJaovu i^bsmsinmiij mainuwTauia 30 mmmyiyjn'bmifalij mmaTgmalmJssma'uIaiJ'icj 
v vifandiiantfm-m S<waiwimi^ i,uuIoiJia1wm5aimi4^ iw30 mmniJiYinhaina i^nifalij atrufr (miJtbrmiilaermiiJju 
m I^ainafiwmnmlmsysviwTuiJ'i)
d. How have those changes in policy affected your organisation?, v
miiilaauuiJa-i'HfamsiNamimwijlauia^ ndiTU'u Swanjsvnifia'H'iiia'n'UDa'Jviiiiatii'jli
e. What aspects of the reforms have been most difficult to implement?
l\45ius^ vimil'uwiJgTjamalam5iiJaai4uiJa^ ,u0^ is;uu{j,uinviilB^ iJi4 
30uimntJT»inl5f) lbsiaulainnyiqfi imismijla
f. In your province, what has been done to further the policy aim of greater public 
participation in the reform process and the health service?
q  a/  a/  i Vl o o  <=> d d j  v  if «d t i i d t  4  <£ q  |  a  i <d
msBainmignmnymfalij aeJnh lib aonaiairuihsnaii
g. What in your view are the main problems of the reforms at national level? 
n'iuflfliiTums«nmnfi5*fm 30 inmmniinTfa ilfsmwla^ iSyilfyvnlwisau'Kia'Mfaluaiyis'iu
h. What are the main problems affecting your organisation? 
diuaahibsiaiiilfyinlahfias'afm 30 mYiviniiiwanssjYmthmyfiaMino^ iiMawTU
i. Have people in the organisation adapted local policy in any way to deal with those 
problems?
i i A A <=* J! i i  <=*ijaaimluvmiwiuiiawiiilmjmsiJfijaiad'u'b mo'inuwanssyjiJ^ manjtiiian'U'ia'n^ lijmiaii'U'uIaB^ fnf 30 mYifntniin 
ha
j. What kind of communication occurs between your organisation and higher level health 
organisations about implementation?
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|ilununi5liAfl0fl0msm0msiJisflTm'ni mfllnnuifl'ninjo-an'm uas5snfiwin04nunj0^nTumjnni04in0uNisAnnfl$nfi
lumsmiuulfis^ms 30 inn 
Probes about -
Monitoring and supervision msmmjnflinij tmsmi'umff-n'u
Requirement for written reports on implementation ssuussmoimtmu
Use of models of good practice 1fl2mi1ilflnmnsmm0fl™nf00^ nninibsmjfnyiijtf'iii,o
k. Have lower level organisations been able to feed back information on implementation 
problems that led to changes in policy?
'H\ii0'n,ulwi5;«ii'W'u^ Mf0'H'U'30iJgTJ^ ui50^ 0Sfrs:ii0u,u0jjai]fljTn'lunummtu^ ii4lTjlfii'3mifi lil^^nflwusuiSiliJej 
minJaanida-finssiflnin'Hifl nfoibsmmifohj
Specific areas of reforms
1. The reforms have a number of components. I wander if you can tell me a bit about how 
some of these are being implemented in the Province.
msdgiiJssnuipjmnl^miiiJaflnuiJm'Hmand'u nsonuonl^moNmmiiiJaauuilaVlnisn^sliijru ©th-ali
m. The changes in funding so that money follows patients and the plan to move to a 
purchaser/provider split
d A A i i A * v M.2nisi\J2auu2minmmjm5^ uil5smQj12^ ss;unln2nu0n5rwTN S^Vnjsms ims^ousmi
n. Administrative devolution or decentralisation -  balance of power between centre and 
lower level organisations.
Ill s / d  e  Q © i t  I 1 1 4  ©/ d  t 111IfmnisnsssntJO'mTDTumsni-iTusrHnwinfl-nufnunaTiimstn'uiJiijuwotm b
0. New district organisation with integrated local services including the district office, 
hospital and PCUs
a* d  <u |  q  i q  d  d  111 i ' d  I i d  e  i VI o o'  © ^D^ niYiiJfn?ufijiJiiiiu mu mvniYi b m mvitnuifi
ims PCUs probes in Primary Care Led
p. Areas of criticism and views
1. The universal coverage reforms have many critics and there are many reported 
problems. I will list some of these and ask for your opinion on the accuracy of these 
reports and the size of the problem. Please mention any steps to correct problems that are 
being taken in your province
2mnviin^9i5fuilfjj'Him0'3niJfniaim^lfi5-3m5 30 inn nmeiibsms uasm^flTuiflflmiiwo
d i * i 4 i V V * i iibsiA'umfhnotrnls uasmflflamiwnnlnwunniuni l^w
2. It is said that the Bt30 reforms are reinforcing health inequalities by providing an 
inferior service for poorer people (a ‘p°or man’s health service’ as Ammar Siamwalla 
termed it). The allegation is that Bt 30 patients get cheaper medicines, wait longer, and 
experience greater barriers of access for some high-cost treatments.
2mfknsdri Inn ms 30 mnihlil^miifammifpimnn&ioqfufnw IflManis2nunmrhiil‘u “infmthnl'ufi'uim” imsu 
msnmiiiiSnlm-jmsnfl'ioflin^Miajfnn ua^msiouTulussnufmimns mlnmcbufminflnfilflainuu
3. It is said that there are still very large gaps in coverage for the population, particularly 
for people working away from their home province (whose housing registration is different 
from their actual place of residence).
o' * * ^ 4Smswiani tflmnnisQdiwibssnninQgoitfalu’flS'amumsmunsmauiTygi
4. It is said that the shortage of funding means that some of the more ambitious aims of the 
reforms like better health promotion and preventative medicine are being put on the back 
burner because all the money is needed for acute treatments. 
2m nsn5fufiIfl5*m ii3Si{hiim a2s)strfN qnm iw  utim sifruiJibsinainauliJipn iiiim ssm ininnnfi
5. It is said that the present capitation system results in under-funding of provincial 
hospitals and over-funding of district hospitals. The argument is that specialist hospitals 
with more complex case mixes are only being re-paid at the same rate as district hospitals 
who treat more straightforward conditions. There are also allegations that some district 
hospitals have been slow to refer to specialist hospitals because they do not wish to pass on 
the money.
Smsitnsaimni msifa i^JibsinfusioirnbsTnni
ifausm s 1i4Dt«s:2l5-3vitnin00im0d'3iJiJ5s;iJitiiiinnn'ii I i -a r ia i ijm a ifa im iifo m y n s m w S fly iim flij t f im ij lu n if lm jfm s n  
Ifliijmiivhrnjlswaimaoim© liil'H^Nanssyiuluisiiu^^NilQumO'Jinnli'iviyTuaoimoliJoyinfliyi l^'HnuIioviaiuiad
Im fi stall]
6. It is said that there has been a failure to explain the nature of the reforms to the public so 
that many have unrealistic expectations or basic misconceptions.
7. Some critics say that the reforms will lead to waiting lists and new forms of gate 
keeping. They say that the old system involved rationing by price but that the new system 
will involve rationing by waiting or medical prioritisation?
8. From your position in your organisation do you hear of any other criticisms that I have 
not mentioned? n »
flimbsmjfmam^ viTU vim1«fijil^ ilfy'vnlum5^ ii,u'u^ iV4i40ni'H'U0!nn'u20^ 1y"lpinan^ 'Hf0vlji
9. The 30 baht project has been in operation for about 2 years. Commentators are still very 
divided about its success or failure. Do you think the 30 baht scheme will still be in 
existence in 2 more years?
10. The final question is about whether I have missed out anything. If I am interested in 
studying the implementation of health reforms are there any other areas that I need to ask 
about?
fhfnutpmiei 0ajdtu0m,U0ims;'Hf0,u00fimi4iJ5s;m5lfiI'umfflim,ul05-imi 30 uiYif'nmijnTiR'lu'wudDo^ yi'nuSiJfsimiilfi'Hf©
Ufuni00i'3li2u0nm,u00in2nA,nuiu0THf0lij
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Appendix 2: Focus Group Guide (Prepared December 2004)
Guide for the focus group discussions (^©msaim'unis ibs^yfruvminautiatj)
1. Make Introductions and inform participants of objectives (nuimsilifounsufofaqdrewfl)
1.1 Explain research topic and objectives - ‘SuiiJgiibsiJijmjmnliJibnnfflYiei:
4N3iiininiinnj0^ iin00m0ibsn0ijnn5flnini£fliJiJ5syty'U0fi uasnliifm 
<0i'3iu^ 0fno1^ m50'3U0u,u0'3 fntr?in!n50fi0niw0fifli« infl Binnnfivimamm^ nafl lbsivm
trninmtuTons)
1.2 Methodology of the study based on policy ethnography and multiple case studies -
(indainfmiflnin^mdiniimM^flfuninnHmfliiflmiBiiJiiwfoimwaiflibsmiiliinnmsflnin^m^fnajn'm
iJis;n0ijn'uIfi00pi5s;m0uiBQ002il0n'ii Policy Ethnography method - 
fmiilloumfjij)
1.3 Focus group discussions objectives - (Ti?i0ilfs;fr'30slufniiJfs:tK3jnq,ijfi00iii42iSi4nii^ nui0n^ 0'3linu
ibnfmru-n dRiivujBnnmsinununu^ualu'uii '^uluildmuuidl'Bnssiniimf^ufliufuman)
2. Get participants to introduce themselves -
2.1 Positions and workplace (imsi'uwIpiyl'HHnjjiJBsi^ iJimsiinniiminwQnu^ iu'Hii'jimsiimudiJgiji'nu)
3. Request permission for video and tape recording (moowtyiw^ miJimsTjw^ ni^ i^m^ inw)
4. Ask the questions, listen and observe fnibsiau mummj (woioiulwiniumainu mfmsliuu mfmtrn'b
n
uasmljjcbinflom^ wu)
4.1 Financial arrangement themes, il5smi4m0inuni5Bfim?'iiiiJ5s;jjiQi?njjul0ui0tTl’i'3,HaniJ55ini4tj,ufn'w 
«iT4,H'un “nf© ulcjuio 30 lnmntnnnlifi (fiymymmtn, fmSflbui™)
4.2 Workforce issues, lbsmumiBflmsfliunintnniijfififi (finu'Hemm, minJaauuiJa^ iuiHwicuua^ tuflTV'i,
msiimmEiinfljm&i'h, nisnainnTiJjffiTiimijnsG)
4.3 Organisational and power structure,
 ^ jj £ gaisijimnanmliiij (fmimiBidinsuijnif'n'U'm, Ifl^flrfufmibstrmnu, nuifmnfomlfliBfllumsin^Tu)
4.4 The primary care led policy, ibsiaijmaimjniiifaniffsiJiJiJsmsliJismjiJpjfjS (uinflflmsirinim©!!
, fmunomawowiVitnni, msm i^unijmissMWiiihtnTu)
4.5 Policy implementation in the province and action taken, dreifluinoinunijnoinfrnToinu ms
^©miidainamsSffTunwlunismnufluasfliiimnisfliNiiTfJinei naifanfouimififlsiuflOflnjo^ 'uliiinB 30 inn 
thmnnEfi (mitrinmujmlBBQijn'ulnuTyiJiy, ilmiflomBBnnrminanniimjYi, fliinmBiiTuvifmnmi 
phmimu, ibsIowunQibsTmi)
4.6 Decentralisation and working with local government, lbsiHumsmBnssflittS'i'u'mmsfm
nmi45QjjniJ0'30n5iJn050'3tr/3'un0'30'u (fniimf'ouimsimsSfr'iii^ jJii©^  © f^lmilnnjo t^mimnmi, msymTU 
nunn fjiJtmfmasfmutf'HiB)
4.7 Other issues, ibnfl'ufru*) ninoTuO'aims'mfl'u'h
5. Conclusion of meeting fqilwafmibs i^j
6. Thank you ©^ijfloiwrniQiniiti
Appendix 3: Information Sheet (English Translation)
Research on Health Sector Reform in Thailand: policy implementation in three provinces
This is a qualitative study based on interviews with health care staff at various levels in the 
local health system in three North-eastern provinces (Mahasarakham, Kalasin and Roi Et). 
The study will examine:
(a) The significance of the Thai health reforms in the wider international context;
(b) The extent to which the three provinces have faced commons problems in 
implementing the reforms and arrived at similar solutions;
(c) The dynamics of the implementation process and the extent to which health 
reforms are reshaped in light of emergent problems and the input of front-line 
staff.
The research will draw out lessons relevant to policy and feed these back to the Thai 
policy community.
Interviews will be completed with a sample of staff from the provincial health offices, 
district health offices, provincial and community hospitals, health centres and PCUs, and 
Muang municipalities. This will be a convenience sample but the staff included will be 
selected to cover the full range of organisations in the three provinces. Some will be 
recruited from the large group of health care professional currently undertaking degree 
studies at Mahasarakham University, while others will be selected via approaches to the 
relevant organisations.
The supervisor, Professor David Hughes has discussed the study with the Ministry of 
Public Health and the Director of Health System Research Institute, Dr Wiput 
Poolcharoen, and will liaise with the regional co-ordinator for studies of the UC reforms at 
Khon Kaen University, Dr Wongsa Loa-hasiriwong. He will seek the agreement of the 
regional co-ordinator before the results are presented in Thailand.
The data for the study will consist mainly of interviews, involving open ended questions, 
which will be tape recorded where possible. These will be seen only by supervisor and 
staff helping with transcription. When the study is written up, the interview data will be 
presented in anonymous form so that no real names are mentioned. The contents of 
individual interviews will remain confidential to the researcher and will not be passed on 
to other people working in the health care system. Respondents should be disadvantaged 
by participating in the research. Their main commitment will be to agree to help with one 
interview lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, and carried out at a time and place 
convenient to them.
Appendix 4: Consent Form -  Interviews (English Translation)
Research on Health Sector Reform in Thailand: policy implementation in three provinces 
Are you willing to be considered for inclusion in the research?
Name:______________________________________________________________
(....) No, I prefer not to take part, (tick if applicable)
(....) Yes, I am willing to be considered but understand that I can still pull out later, (tick if 
applicable)
If you ticked ‘yes’> please complete the following:
Position:____________________________________________________________
Work address:________________________________________________________
Telephone:___________________________________________________________
E-mail address (optional)_______________________________________________
Note: 1. Students who decide not to take part will not be disadvantaged in any way.
2. Those who say ‘yes’ may be asked to take part in an interview lasting about 60- 
90 minutes, at a time and place convenient to them.
Appendix 5: List of informants
In this study 147 informants were formally participated-124 persons by interviewing based 
on the semi-structured questionnaire as interview guide and 23 persons by focus group 
discussions. See tables A l, and A2 for lists of respondents.
Table A l: List of interviewees
No. Position/Job title ID Interview
date
Mahasarakham
1. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 01 25/06/03
2. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 02 10/06/03
3. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 03 10/06/03
4. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 04 11/06/03
5. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 05 13/06/03
6. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 06 12/06/03
7. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 07 12/06/03
8. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 08 13/06/03
9. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 09 16/06/03
10. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 10 20/06/03
11. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 11 18/06/03
12. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO MK 12 17/06/03
13. Senior Doctor in Provincial Hospital Senoir doctor PH MK 13 25/06/03
14. Senior Nurse in Provincial Hospital Senior nurse PH MK 14 27/06/03
15. Senior Municipal Representative SMRMK 15 25/06/03
16. Senior Municipal Representative SMRMK 16 26/06/03
17. Senior Officer of Health Service Department in city 
municipality
SOHSD MK 17 26/06/03
18. Head o f PCU in Muang municipality HPCUMMK 18 10/04/03
19. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 1) DDCH MK 19 04/07/03
20. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 2) DDCH MK 20 03/07/03
21. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 3) DDCH MK 21 07/07/03
22. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 4) DDCH MK 22 01/07/03
23. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 5) DDCH MK 23 04/07/03
24. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 6) DDCH MK 24 02/07/03
25. Head of Health Promotion Department in Community 
Hospital (D 2)
HHPD MK 25 03/07/03
26. District Health Office Head (the city) DHO Head MK 26 16/06/03
27. District Health Office Head (D 2) DHO Head MK 27 19/06/03
28. District Health Office Head (D 4) DHO Head MK 28 23/06/03
29. District Health Office Head (D 7) DHO Head MK 29 17/06/03
30. District Health Office Head (D 6) DHO Head MK 30 24/06/03
31. District Health Office Head (D 5) DHO Head MK 31 18/06/03
32. Assistant DHO Head (D 7) ADHOH MK 32 21/04/03
33. Assistant DHO Head (D 5) ADHOH MK 33 09/04/03
34. Health Officer DHO (D 7) HODHO MK 34 08/04/03
35. Health Officer DHO (D 6) HODHO MK 35 04/04/03
36. Health Centre Officer (D 8) HCO MK 36 10/04/03
37. Health Centre Officer (D 2) HCO MK 37 28/04/03
38. Health Centre Officer (D 5) HCO MK 38 08/04/03
39. Dental Nurse in PCU (D 2) DN-PCU MK 39 30/04/03
40. Health Officer in PCU (D 6) HO-PCU MK 40 29/04/03
41. Health Officer in PCU (D 8) HO-PCU MK41 25/04/03
,42. Head o f Health Centre (D5) Head HC MK 42 09/04/03
43. Health Centre Officer (D5) HCO MK 43 22/04/03
44. Dental Nurse Community hospital (D 2) DN CM MK 44 29/04/03
Table Al: List of interviewees (continued)
No. Position/Job title ID Interview
date
Kalasin
45. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 01 11/08/03
46. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 02 11/08/03
47. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 03 12/08/03
48. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 04 13/08/03
49. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 05 14/08/03
50. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 06 15/08/03
51. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 07 13/08/03
52. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO KS 08 12/08/03
53. Senior Doctor in Provincial Hospital Senior doctor PH KS 09 15/08/03
54. Doctor-Director Private Hospital DPH KS10 19/08/03
55. Senior Municipal Representative SMR KS 11 20/08/03
56. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 1) DDCH KS 12 29/08/03
57. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 2) DDCH KS 13 27/08/03
58. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 3) DDCH KS 14 26/08/03
59. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 4) DDCH KS 15 29/08/03
60. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 5) DDCH KS 16 26/08/03
61. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 6) DDCH KS 17 27/08/03
62. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 7) DDCH KS 18 28/08/03
63. District Health Office Head (City) DHO Head KS 19 28/08/03
64. District Health Office Head (D 1) DHO Head KS 20 19/08/03
65. District Health Office Head (D 3) DHO Head KS 21 22/08/03
66. District Health Office Head (D 5) DHO Head KS 22 20/08/03
67. District Health Office Head (D 4) DHO Head KS 23 21/08/03
68. District Health Office Head (D 8) DHO Head KS 24 18/08/03
69. District Health Office Head (D 7) DHO Head KS 25 28/08/03
70. Head of Health Centre (City) Head HC KS 26 03/04/03
71. Head of Health Centre (D 9) Head HC KS 27 06/05/03
72. Head of Health Centre (D 10) Head HC KS 28 19/05/03
73. Head of Health Centre (D 9) Head HC KS 29 13/05/03
74. Health Officer in DHO (D 9) HO-DHO KS 30 08/04/03
75. Health Centre Officer (D 1) HCO KS 31 09/05/03
76. Health Officer DHO (D 9) HO-DHO KS 32 06/05/03
77. Health Centre Officer (D 1) HCO KS 33 07/05/03
78. Health Officer DHO ( D l l ) HO-DHO KS 34 12/05/03
79. Health Officer in PCU (City) HO-PCU KS 35 04/04/03
80. Health Officer in PCU (City) HC-PCU KS 36 14/04/03
Table Al: List of interviewees (continued)
No. Position/Job title ID Interview
date
Roi Et
81 Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 01 16/07/03
82. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 02 17/07/03
83. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 03 17/07/03
84. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 04 21/07/03
85. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 05 22/07/03
86. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 06 21/07/03
87. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 07 23/07/03
88. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 08 24/07/03
89. Senior Administrator Officer Provincial Health Office SAO-PHO RE 08 21/07/03
90. Senior Doctor in Provincial Hospital Senior doctor PH RE 09 25/07/03
91. Senior Nurse in Provincial Hospital Senior nurse PH RE 10 07/07/03
92. Senior Municipal Representative SMR RE 11 28/07/03
93. Senior Municipal Representative SMR RE 12 28/07/03
94. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D l) DDCH RE 13 30/07/03
95. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 2) DDCH RE 14 29/07/03
96. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 3) DDCH RE 15 25/07/03
96. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 4) DDCH RE 16 30/07/03
91. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 5) DDCH RE 17 29/07/03
98. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 6) DDCH RE 18 25/07/03
99. Doctor Director Community Hospital (D 7) DDCH RE 19 23/07/03
100. District Health Office Head (City) DHO Head RE 20 01/07/03
101. District Health Office Head (D 2) DHO Head RE 21 05/08/03
102. District Health Office Head (D 8) DHO Head RE 22 01/07/03
103. District Health Office Head (D 3) DHO Head RE 23 04/08/03
104. District Health Office Head (D 9) DHO Head RE 24 07/08/03
105. District Health Office Head (D 6) DHO Head RE 25 04/08/03
106. District Health Office Head (D 7) DHO Head RE 26 04/08/03
107. Health Officer DHO (D 3) HO-DHO RE 27 07/08/03
108. Health Officer DHO (D 3) HO-DHO RE 28 11/04/03
109. Nurse in PCU (D 3) NPCU RE 29 05/08/03
110. Health Centre Officer (D 4i) HCO RE 30 04/08/03
111. Dental Nurse PCU (D 8) DN PCU RE 31 05/08/03
112. Health Centre Officer (City) HCO RE 32 11/04/03
113. Health Centre Officer (D 9) HCO RE 33 10/06/03
114. Health Centre Officer (D 1) HCO RE 34 11/06/03
115. Head o f Health Centre (D 9) Head HC RE 35 12/06/03
116. Head o f Health Centre (D 9) Head HC RE 36 13/06/03
117. Head o f Health Centre (D 10) Head HC RE 37 10/06/03
118. Head o f Health Centre (D 2) Head HC RE 38 26/05/03
119. Health Centre Officer ( D l l ) HCO RE 39 27/06/03
120. Health Centre Officer (D 2) HCO RE 40 28/05/03
121. Head o f Health Centre (D 5) Head HC RE 41 30/05/03
122. Head o f Health Centre (City) Head HC RE 42 11/04/03
123. Health Centre Officer (City) HCO RE 43 03/04/03
124. Health Centre Officer in Centre for Public Health 
Service
HCO-CPHS RE 44 28/07/03
Table A2: List of participants in focus group discussions
No. Name Job title/office
Mahasarakham workshop (Held on 20 January 2005)
1. Ms A* Senior administrator officer PHO
2. Ms B* Senior administrator officer PHO
3. Ms C Senior administrator officer in provincial hospital
4. Dr. D* DDCH (D4)
5. M sE Senior municipal representative
6. Ms F Senior municipal representative
7. Mr G* DHO Head (D2)
8. Ms H DHO Head (D 9)
9. Mr I DHO Heead (D 5)
10. Ms J Health centre officer (City)
11. Ms K Health centre officer (D 7)
12. Ms L Health centre officer (D 10)
Kalasin Workshop (Held on 27 January 2005)
1. Ms A* Senior administrator officer PHO
2. Ms B Senior administrator officer PHO
3. Mr C DHO Head (D 2)
4. Mr D DHO Head (D 12)
5. MsE Senior municipal representative
6. Mr F Health centre officer (D 3)
7. Mr G Health centre officer (D 2)
8. Ms H* Health centre officer (D 3)
Roi Et Workshop (Held on 28 January 2005)
1. Mr A* Senior administrator officer PHO
2. Mr B Senior administrator officer PHO
3. Ms C Senior administrator officer in provincial hospital
4. Dr. D DDCH (D 12)
5. Ms E* Senior municipal representative
6. Mr F DHO Head (D 13)
7. Mr G DHO Head (D 3)
8. Mr H DHO Head (D 6)
9. Mr I Health centre officer (City)
10. Ms J Health centre officer (D 4)
11. Ms K Health centre officer (D 14)
Note: * These participants also took part in in-depth interviews. Initials are based on 
pseudonyms.
